

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
12	11	11/19/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney General. RE: The attachment of Bill Safire's memo on the Kennedy victory scenario. 1 pg
12	11	11/15/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: The number of youth appointments the Nixon Administration has made in comparison to McGovern's campaign. 1 pg.
12	11	11/10/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: Salute to Presidential Dinner/November 9, 1971. 2 pgs.
12	11	11/10/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: The reactions to the Presidential Dinners/November 9, 1971. 4 pgs.

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12	11	11/10/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	Memorandum of Call from Nofziger to G. RE: Message that reads, "Have dinner material-sending you." 5 pgs.
12	11		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Other Document	Handwritten notes. RE: Salute to the President Dinners-November 9, 1972. Descriptions include: Reaction to dinners, Lee Nunn's descriptions, and reports from Bob Dole. 5 pgs.
12	11	11/2/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: Disagreement between Nofziger and Leonard concerning the delay in getting "First Monday" out. 1 pg.
12	11	11/16/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Letter	From Gordon Strachan to Robert M. King. RE: Appreciation for Mr. King's offer to contribute to the re-election of President Nixon in the Campaign of 1972. 1 pg.
12	11	11/30/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney General. RE: Attachment of the DNC's report entitled, "Richard Nixon, the Man...an In Depth Profile." 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
12	11	11/29/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The "National Journal", and their summary of the DNC's report on Richard Nixon. 1 pg.
12	11	11/27/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Report	The "National Journal", and their report on "Democratic Presidential Contenders Studying Private Report on Nixon's Image." 1 pg.
12	11	11/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: Arrangements with the RNC on how to handle letters concerning the campaign. 1 pg.
12	11	11/22/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RMW to Haldeman. RE: Eleanor Smith of the RNC, and her plans for setting up a correspondence section to support the campaign. 1 pg.
12	11	11/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: The Mediators Inc., and their offer of media assistance for the campaign. 1 pg.

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12	11		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	Handwritten note from Bruce Kehrli to Gordon Strachan. RE: Message that reads, "H wants to be sure that we don't use this service-may be problems." 1 pg.
12	11	11/23/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Letter	From Haldeman to Jacqueline Hopkins Garrett. RE: Mrs. Garrett's offer to contribute the media services of The Mediators in President Nixon's campaign for re-election. 1 pg.
12	11	11/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: Senator Saxbe's letter indicating that Mr. Jack Cole, President of Mail Advertising Coporation of America has an "excellent facility." 1 pg.
12	11	11/22/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Letter	From William B. Saxbe to Bob Dole. RE: The RNC's submission of recommendations for mail marketing, advice, systems and services to the "Committee for the Re-election of the President." 1 pg.
12	11	11/24/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: Advice on the upcoming plans to set up a mock convention at the University of New Hampshire. 2 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
12	11	11/19/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney General. RE: Bill Safire's memo concerning the "Kennedy Victory Scenario." 1 pg.
12	11	11/16/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Bill Safire to Haldeman. Re: The Kennedy Victory Scenario, and the probability that he may be the "easiest to beat" as the Democratic nominee. 4 pgs.
12	11	11/18/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to The Attorney General. RE: The Finch Memorandum on the Election of 1970. 1 pg.
12	11	11/2/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Finch's memo on the 1970 election in which he articulates several key points that may be of use in the 1972 Campaign. 1 pg.
12	11	10/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert H. Finch to The President. RE: "What the 1970 Election Response Now Means for 1972." 22 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
12	11	11/15/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Bob Marik. RE: Democratic Contenders Stand on Bussing. 1 pg.
12	11	10/14/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Bob Marik. RE: Muskie's statement that bussing is a "legitimate tool" that should be used in the campaign. 1 pg.
12	11	11/15/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Bob Marik. RE: "EMK", and the usefulness of the information being presented. 1 pg.
12	11	11/15/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Personal	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Dick Moore. RE: Attachment of President Nixon's thank you letter to Jack Wrather. 2 pg.
12	11	11/12/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Dick Moore to Haldeman. RE: Salute to the President's Dinner, and report on its subsequent success. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
12	11	11/12/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Personal	Memo	From Dick Moore to Haldeman. RE: Los Angeles Dinner, and Jack Wrather's hard work he put in as the dinner chairman. A suggested draft for a thank you letter to Mr. Wrather is attached. 2 pgs.
12	11	11/2/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: The 1948 election, and useful tactics to be implemented in the 1972 Campaign. 1 pg.
12	11		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Handwritten note from Gordon Strachan to Larry. RE: Message which reads, "Since you are reading a book on the '48 election, Gregg's comments might be of interest to you." 1 pg.
12	11		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	A detailed report entitled, "Inside the Democratic Party," which describes Truman's success in the election of 1948. 2 pgs.
12	11	11/1/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Jeb Magruder. RE: Committee for the Re-Election of the President Hiring of a Staff Writer. 1 pg.

November 19, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Bill Safire's memorandum on the Kennedy Victory Scenario is attached. Mr. Haldeman has a copy.

GS:elr

November 15, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LARRY HIGBY

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Youth Appointments

You commented on my memorandum to Fred Malek regarding the percentage of people under 30 in this Administration. Your question was how many under 30 year olds does McGovern have. According to Ken Rietz of the 160 staff members working for McGovern, 95 are under 30. This fact will, of course, be considered when Fred comes back with the figures for this Administration.

H. Strachan
GS:elr

Administratively Confidential

November 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LARRY HIGBY

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Salute to Presidential
Dinner/November 9, 1971

Discussion with Tom Evans, Lyn Nofziger, and Barry Mountain of the RNC developed the following information about the 19 fund raising dinners last night:

Finances:

1) The gross received was ----- \$4.5 million
a) Senate Campaign Committee automatically
receives----- \$400 ✓
b) TV expenses ----- 200 ✓
c) Dinner costs ----- 200 ✓
Net to RNC ----- 1.75
Net to States ----- 1.75

2) City by city breakdown:

<u>City</u>	<u>1968 Received</u>	<u>1971 Received</u>	<u>1971 Goal</u>
Atlanta	---	100	100
Boston	183	150	500
Charlotte	---	100	100
Chicago	556	700	750
Cleveland	214	125	250
Dallas	70	220	200
Houston	145	200	200
Los Angeles	1 million	500	1 million
Miami/Orlando	43	225	200
Minn./St. Paul	181	165	500
Nashville	75	200	200

continued

<u>City</u>	<u>1968 Received</u>	<u>1971 Received</u>	<u>1971 Goal</u>
New York	907	850	1 million
Philadelphia	92	81]	250
Pittsburg	---	165	250
Rochester	----	90	150
San Francisco	125	200	200
St. Louis	10	100	100
Washington	163	250	500
Wilmington	113	100	100

Reaction to Dinners:

Tom Evans (RNC) -- The event technically ran very well. The closed circuit TV connection was done well. "I would have heard of complaints, had there been any." In spite of the fact that the entertainers were old, the speakers and entertainment came across very well. The dinner not only raised funds but morale. (Evans was at both New York and Chicago dinners.)

Lyn Nofziger (RNC) -- At the Washington dinner there was plenty of enthusiasm and spontaneous applause for the President and his speech "was better than I have seen in a long time. It was Dick Nixon at his best." There was some distortion on the closed circuit screen due to the cameras being too close "too tight" on him. His voice came over perfectly. Nofziger has not heard any complaints and will make calls today to the cities to check each dinner specifically.

Lee Nunn (Committee for the Re-Election of the President) -- Nunn checked several cities including Houston, Dallas, and Nashville and the "TV coverage was excellent". The only technical problem was Bob Hope's surprise when he was supposed to introduce the President. Nunn says he definitely would have heard of complaints and he has heard none. He will continue to check today for both reaction and confirmation of the financial situation.

GS:lm

Administratively Confidential

November 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LARRY HIGBY

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Salute to President
Dinners/November 9, 1971

Reaction to Dinners:

Lyn Nofziger made calls to individuals at several dinners to assess the enthusiasm and reaction to the President's address and dinner in general. The results are:

Chicago -- William Croft (Dinner Chairman)--"The President was great. Hope was terrific. Perhaps 1450 attendees. Good news coverage. We are sending Lyn clippings. Only complaint is that Percy took 8 minutes instead of 2 minutes which ran into extra time and will cost extra money."

Cleveland -- Gilbert Humphrey (Dinner Chairman)--"There were 330 attendees. Excellent reaction to the President's speech. Apparent teleprompter problems as Mr. Nixon didn't look up much. Their big problem is Standart Oil (mad about the North Slope) and Continental Oil (mad at Ruckelshaus). Neither helped very much. Usually big contributors."

Houston -- James Barnes (Dinner Co-Chairman) -- "It was a fine dinner with very favorable reaction from the guests. We lined up a nice evening and it was carried off well. I enjoyed the whole affair and we got just about the number which we expected which is 350."

Minn./St. Paul -- Donald Dayton (Dinner Chairman) -- "It ran very smoothly. Didn't have a hitch. Dominick was great. Good reception. The President got a lot of applause but it wasn't the same as in person. Otherwise it went very well. The VP got some good hands. We didn't loose any people. It was the toughest selling job for fund raising that I have ever done, but most people thought of it as the first of a new year and left with a lot of enthusiasm."

Atlanta -- Bo Callaway (Dinner Chairman) -- "It was great. Went very smoothly. Pat Boone was excellent. We should use him more. Goldwater, unfortunately, didn't speak well but everybody loves him anyway. The President's speech was great. All in all it went without a hitch."

Boston -- Dick Carlson -- "There were 300 attendees. Should net about \$100,000. Audience very impressed by President's talk. Good coverage in Herald today. Have not seen Globe."

Charlotte -- John Walker -- "The President laid 'em in the aisles. 263 attending. 207 paid. 25 newspapers. Front page in today's observer. Romney did stem-winder speech that brought them to their feet."

Miami/Orlando -- Joseph Fogarty -- "We were extremely pleased, everyone had an awfully good time." David Zachman: "It was extremely successful. There were over 350 in Miami and 120 in Orland. I heard people's remarks on the President's speech that they liked his technique and hoped he would use it publicly -- he spoke from the heart. What impressed me most was that when we sent out 5,000 invitations, we got contributions from people who couldn't make it to the dinner, but just wanted to contribute--\$5 from one man, \$100, \$500, and even \$1,000. We have never had a financial effort in Miami that has come even close to half the money I have in hand to date (\$45,000)."

Nashville -- E. Bronson Ingram -- "We consider it successful. It was as much of a tribute to Tennessee as it was to the President."

New York City -- Bernard Lasker -- "'I have never presided over a dinner that was better. The President was right on target. It had all the qualities of a private affair. It was gay, magnificent. The best dressed, best looking dinner ever. It was a giant step toward 1972 and we all feel that President Nixon will be re-elected."

Pittsburg -- Richard Scaife -- "Tremendous success. Highly enthusiastic. From leftwingers to rightwingers--the President was just fabulous. And they loved Bob Hope."

Rochester -- E. Ritter -- "It went very, very well. They had so much enthusiasm that we thought we were there -- it was even better than being in New York! Stans was very reassuring on Phase II. It was a very enjoyable evening. It started a commitment to 1972."

San Francisco -- Ransom Cook -- "It was very successful -- better than anticipated. The crowd was in a very happy mood. It was a first class job. The President's speech went over very well -- very strong, forceful, indicating excellent leadership."

St. Louis -- Lawrence Roos -- "It was the most successful fund raising dinner that Republicans have seen here in a long time. We sold out the facility, with no one but paid customers present. And the representation from civic leaders was unusually impressive. The speech was top notch. We couldn't possibly have sold so many tickets if these attending didn't think we would win in 1972."

Wilmington -- John Remer -- "It was just a flaming success -- we went over target. Secretary Richardson was sensational; we were extremely happy with the President's address. The whole affair went like clockwork. One thing we did for the first time was to solicit guests from groups who haven't contributed in the past, thus hoping to improve communications with them on a larger basis and hoping that they would contribute on a quarterly basis instead of this crash program. We certainly appreciated the help we got from the headquarters in Washington."

Lee Nunn also checked today!

Chicago -- Bill Petridge -- "A spectacular success; superb; very well done. The show was good and the President excellent. The event went very well and the demonstrations did not detract from the overall success."

Washington -- Glee Gonian -- "The President's message was good, though he was not as relaxed as usual. The only problem was timing; the event came too early in the evening."

Dick Howard for Chuck Colson -- "All believe the President and Bob Hope were great. They carried the show, but the speakers were generally dull and disasters -- example: Boston where Gerry Ford and Governor Sargent were terrible."

"At several places conservative contributors were conspicuous in their absence. No specifics available yet."

Bob O'Dell of the RNC reports that Bo Calloway thought it was great; he was exstastic. Calloway didn't think a dinner in Atlanta could be done at first. There

There were demonstrations in virtually all cities, but no incidents in any cities. The best cities were not in the South but in smaller places where such fund raising events had never been held.

There were no TV hook-up problems. In fact in Charlotte the technicians were brought on to the stage for applause. The larger projectors really helped.

Pat Boone was very impressive in Atlanta.

Pete Peterson did a very good job in Miami but he came across as a guy at the White House who is really dedicated. Also in Miami, Bill Cramer introduced Gurney, a surprising event.

The Press covered the dinners heavily in all cities.

In Charlotte, Thurmond and Romney were the speakers and Romney was excellent -- the dinner sponsors had a birthday cake for his wife. He was exstatic and his speech was very well received.

In Pittsburg the highlight of the very good dinner was Gloria Loring, an excellent singer and performer.

In Rochester, Stans threw away his prepared text and warmed up to the audience and did very, very well. The event was a high quality affair.

GS:lm

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

TO: _____

YOU WERE CALLED BY— YOU WERE VISITED BY—

OF (Organization) *Nofziger in
Klein's office*

PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. _____

WILL CALL AGAIN IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

*Have dinner
material - sending
you.*

attached

RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME
	<i>10</i>	<i>4:10</i>

Boston -- Dick Carlson ~~reports~~ 300 attendance, should net about \$100,000. Audience very impressed by President's talk. Good coverage in Herald today. Hasn't seen Globe.
President

Charlotte -- John Walker, / "Laid 'em in the aisles!" 263 attending. 207 paid. 25 newspapers. Front page in today's Observer Romney did stem-winder speech that brought them to their feet.

Demon's at NY, Chi, + S.F.
Wilmington Denver - Elliot Richardson -
very well, very-much
impressed

Joseph Fogarty (Miami, Orlando): "We were extremely pleased, everyone had an awfully good time." David Zachem: "It was extremely successful. There were over 350 in Miami and 120 in Orlando. I heard people's remarks on the President's speech that they liked his technique and hoped he would use it publicly--he spoke from the ~~heart~~ heart. What impressed me most was that when we sent out 5,000 invitations, we got contributions from people who couldn't make it to the dinner, but just wanted to contribute--\$5 from one man, \$100, 500, even \$1,000. We have never had a financial effort in Miami that ~~has~~ has come even close to half the money I have in hand to date (\$45,000)."

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Bernard Lasker (New York City): "I have never presided over a dinner that was better. The President was ~~xx~~ right on target. It had all the qualities of a private affair. It was gay, magnificent--the best dressed, best looking dinner ever. It was a giant step toward 1972 and we all feel that President Nixon will be re-elected."

~~Ritter Shumway (Rochester):~~
~~Richard Scaife (Pittsburgh):~~ "It was a tremendous success. The guests were highly enthusiastic from rightwingers to leftwingers. They had so much enthusiasm that it was almost better than being in New York. Sec. Stans was very reassuring in regard to Phase II. It was a very enjoyable evening. It started a commitment to 1972."

~~Ritter Shumway (Rochester):~~ "It was a tremendous success."

Richard Scaife (Pittsburgh): "Tremendous success. Highly enthusiastic, from The President was just leftwingers to rightwingers--~~it~~ ~~xx~~ fabulous. And they loved Bob HOPE."

E. Ritter Stumway (Rochester): "It went very, very well. They had so much enthusiasm that we thought we were there--it was even better than being in New York. Stans was very reassuring on Phase II. It was a very enjoyable evening. And it started a commitment to 1972."

Ransom Cook (San Francisco): It was very successful--better than anticipated. The crowd was in a very happy mood. It was a first class job. ^{of} From the audience/the guests the President's speech went over very well--very strong, forceful, speech, indicating excellent leadership.x"

Lawrence Roos (St. Louis): "It was the most successful fund raising dinner that Republicans have seen here in a long time. We sold out the facility, with ~~not~~ ~~no~~ no one but paid customers present. And the representation from ~~the~~ civic leaders was unusually impressive. The speech was top notch. We couldn't possibly have sold so many tickets if these attending didn't think we would win in 1972."

John Remer (Wilmington): "It was just a flaming success--we went over target. Sec. ~~Roger~~ Richardson was sensational, we were extremely happy with the President's address--~~the~~ whole affair went like clockwork. One thing we did for the first time was to solicit guests from groups who haven't contributed in the past, and then we ~~will~~ will improve communication with them on a larger basis, hoping they will contribute on a quarterly basis instead of this crash program. We certainly appreciated the help we got from the headquarters in Washington."

11-10-71

FROM LYN NOFZIGER:

Chicago -- William Croft (Dinner CHairman) - "The President was great. Hope terrific. Perhaps 1450 attendees. Good news coverage. Tell Gordon that we are sending Lyn clips. Only complaint is that Percy took 8 min. instead of 2 min running them extra tnt time which will cost them extra money.

Cleveland -- Gilbert Humphrey (Chairman) 330 attendees. Excellent reaction to Pres. talk. Apparent teleprompter problems. (as Mr. Nixon didn't look up much. Their big problem is Standart Oil (mad about North Slope) and Continental Oil (mad at Ruchelshaus). Neither helped very much. Usually big contributors.

Houston -- James Barmes (CoChairman) - "It was a fine dinner with very favorable reaction from the guests. We lined up a nice evening and it was carried off well. I enjoyed the whole affair add we got just about the number which we expected which is 350."

Minn./St. Paul - Donald Dayton (Chairman) - "It ran very smoothly. Didn't have a hitch. Dominick was great. Good reception. The Pres. got a lot of applause, but it wasn't the same as in person. Otherwise it went very well. The VP got some good hands. We didn't loose any pepołe. It was the toughest selling job for fund raising that I have every done, but most people thought of it as the first of a new year and left with a lot of enthusiasm".

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HOLD

11/10

MF
F
S.

CH

Salute to President
Dinners - Nov. 9, 1972

Reaction to Dinners:

lyn Nofziger ~~has~~ ~~made~~ made
calls to individuals at several
dinners to assess the ~~reaction~~
enthusiasm and reaction
to the P's address and dinner
in general. The results are:

(L R put city 1st then
name, the quote
indented

— — : | quote

Lee Nunn also lectured today:
Chicago - Bill Fetridge:

"a spectacular success, superb, very well done; the show was good and the P excellent." The ~~FT~~ event went very well and the demonstrators did not detract from the overall success.

Washington - Glee Gornian:

"The P's message was good, though he was not as relaxed as usual." The only problem was timing; the event came too early in the evening.

Pub Howard
for Aunt

of the Col - Bill
believe N. + Bill were
great; carried the show,
but speakers generally
dull + disastrous. Ex -
in Boston. Gerry Ford + Governor
Sargent were terrible.

At several places
conservative contributors
were conspicuous in
their absence. No specifics
available yet.

(7)

Bob O'Neil Deal of the RNC reports
that Bob Calloway = thought it was
great; ecstatic - a dinner
Calloway didn't think it could in
be done but it was etc.

at first.

last
1/4

Demons in virtually all cities,
Washington, S.F., Chi,
NY
none incidents in
any cities.

The Best cities were not in the south
but in smaller ^{places} where
we never had events
before such fundraising
events had never been held.

There were no TV hook-up problems.
No complaints. TV

People in Charlotte technicians were brought on to stage for applause.

The burger projectors really helped.

Pat Boone was very impressive in Atlanta.

Pete Peterson did a very good job in Miami but he came across as a guy at UH who is really dedicated also in Miami - Bill Cramer introduced Gurney, a surprising event.

The Press covered dinner heavily in all cities

In Charlotte Thurmond + Romney ^{were the} speakers & Romney ^{was} excellent; had a birthday cake for his wife. He was ecstatic and his speech was very well received.

↙
In Pitts the highlight of the
was Gloria having an excellent
singer + performance

In Rochester - sang three
away ^{is} prepared test;
The event was a → high quality affair +

↘
I warmed up
to audience + did
very, very well.

Administratively Confidential

November 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: LARRY HIGBY
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Frank Leonard

Discussion with Len Nofsiger this morning indicated that he had had another "heated discussion" with Frank Leonard regarding the delay in getting First Monday out. Len did not think the discussion would lead to Frank Leonard's resignation because Len realizes his responsibility to work pursuant to Haldeman's recent memorandum. However, since you deal with Leonard directly, you should be aware of this most recent disagreement between Nofsiger and Leonard.

GS:lm

November 16, 1971

Dear Mr. King:

Mr. Waldeman asked me to thank you for your letter of November 8 outlining your desires to contribute your services to the campaign.

I'm forwarding a copy of your letter to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President which, as the title states, is a group of citizens like yourself who have begun thinking and planning for the campaign.

You should be hearing from them in the near future. Thanks again for your offer of support.

Sincerely,

Gordon Strachan
Staff Assistant
to H. R. Waldeman

Mr. Robert M. King
Executive Producer
Time-Life Productions/Pacific
Suite 2000
3835 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90005

November 30, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Bob Haldeman asked me to send you this Democratic National Committee report entitled, "Richard Nixon, the Man ... an In Depth Profile" with the National Journal summary.

Press reports indicated but Lou Harris has denied that he had been involved in the preparation of the report.

Attachment: As mentioned above

GS:elr

GS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: Nov. 29, 1971

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

The National Journal has summarized the 40 page Democratic National Committee Report on "Richard Nixon, the Man ... an In Depth Profile." (Full report attached.)

Colson submitted a separate memorandum pointing out that Harris had demanded a retraction from the Democratic National Committee because he didn't supply the polling information.

Suggest you send a full copy to the Attorney General.

 H Agree _____ Disagree

_____ Other

Democratic Presidential Committee Drawing private report on Nixon's image

In an effort to forge a political battle plan for 1972, the Democratic National Committee has prepared an analysis of President Nixon's personal strengths and weaknesses with the nation's electorate.

The 40-page DNC report, entitled "Richard Nixon, the Man... an In-Depth Profile" and marked "confidential," was provided last month in red-bound covers to several but not all of the Democratic Presidential candidates.

Its conclusions are based in the main on polling data secured by Louis Harris and Associates Inc. and furnished to the DNC, although some material came from the American Institute of Public Opinion, a firm headed by George H. Gallup. The pollsters gave the Democrats detailed breakdowns of nationwide survey material which is not normally published.

Plus and minus: "The forces working in the President's favor fairly well balance the forces working against him," the report concludes.

According to the report, the positive side of the President's image shows him to have been placed in a very difficult situation—a man "who is doing his best in such circumstances: who is experienced and capable, especially in foreign affairs, and who is not afraid to make a decision."

Americans tend to attribute more positive qualities to the President than negative ones, the polling data showed. Thus, one out of every four persons interviewed volunteered the statement that Mr. Nixon is doing the best he can. This turned out to be the President's single strongest positive attribute. On the other hand, the most commonly offered criticism—that he has a poor personality—was volunteered by only 11 per cent of the Harris-Gallup sample.

In drawing the President's negative portrait, as seen by the electorate, the DNC report said: "Perhaps the most important thing working against Richard Nixon is his inability to inspire confidence in the American people." (Some 50 per cent of the sample agreed with the statement that Mr. Nixon does not inspire confidence.)



The White House: The 'outs' want in

"President Nixon suffers from a bland personality," the report said. "He, in addition, gives the appearance of not really standing for anything. He has no personal warmth, no color; it is felt that he has not kept his promises."

Breakdown: The pollsters broke down their data on attitudes toward the President by region, age, size of community, educational attainment, income, party affiliation and race.

Among the findings:

- Compared to the nation as a whole, the East harbors the strongest concentration of the President's critics while he is most admired in the South.
- Attitudes toward the President correlate directly with age: the youngest voters are most critical and the eldest most positive.
- City dwellers are more antagonistic toward the President as a group. But, somewhat surprisingly, so are suburbanites, who tend to rank the President low in warmth. On the other hand, Mr. Nixon does above average in towns and rural areas.
- Those with the least education are also the least critical of Mr. Nixon, even though it is widely believed that persons with less education are apt to be Democrats. Conversely, those with the most education are the most critical.
- Positive and negative feelings toward the President cut across all

income groups, with little divergence of opinion within each bracket from the over-all national mood.

• Blacks are far more antagonistic toward the President than any other single group. In fact, they are the only group—including Democrats—that is on balance more negative than positive toward the President.

Strategy: The DNC report predicts that "as long as nothing visible is accomplished by the (Nixon) Administration, his position will erode slowly," thus making him "clearly vulnerable in a personality contest."

However, the DNC report concludes, should the President grasp the offensive and assume decisive action in key areas, public opinion will be with him because "they will see a man who has accomplished something when it was generally believed nothing could be done."

"With his penchant for the 'cold dramatic stroke' and his broad powers as the incumbent President, that the offensive will be taken at the opportune time is a foregone conclusion," the report states.

As matters stand, the Democrats are forced "to assume the guilt of having developed the impossible circumstances in which Richard Nixon now finds himself while disallowing a set of criteria by which success or failure must be judged."

Therefore, the DNC document recommends that "a concerted effort be made... to force the responsibility" upon Mr. Nixon.

One suggested means is to stress that "his best is not good enough." As the DNC report put it: "The theme: 'Is this the best we can do?' might be developed. Is Carswell/Haynsworth the best we can do? Was this slow withdrawal from Vietnam the best we can do? Is 6 per cent unemployment the best we can do?"

(The Supreme Court nomination of G. Harrold Carswell in 1970 and the nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth Jr. in 1969 were both rejected by the Senate.)

Background: The analysis of the President's personal appeal was undertaken by David A. Cooper, who plans to resign in early December as the DNC's director of research to open his own polling firm in Washington.

(For a report on political polling, see No. 33, p. 1693; for a report on the Democratic National Committee, see No. 42, p. 2092.)

Andrew J. Glass

November 26, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Campaign Correspondence

It is my understanding that you have made arrangements with the RNC and the White House correspondence section to handle letters concerning the campaign. The attached memorandum from Rose Mary Woods asks Bob Haldeman for advise regarding methods of handling correspondence during the campaign. He has not seen this request, therefore, you should get in touch with Miss Woods and advise her of your system.

Attachment

GS:elr

FU - 1 week

RMW

Nov 22

11:35

Eleanor Smith of RNC is presently setting up a correspondence section to support the campaign. Would like to discuss with RMW the numbers and types of thing for which she should plan.

484-6753

BOB HALDEMAN

To whom should we refer this woman? I have no idea of any of the plans for the campaign period and, therefore, do not feel I should try to give her advice.

RmW 11/22/71

November 26, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: The Mediators Inc.

Bob recently sent the attached letter to Jacqueline Hopkins Garrett, Vice President of the Mediators Inc. in response to her offer of her media buying services for the campaign.

Bob wants to make absolutely sure that we don't use this service. You may want to cover this with Peter Dailey and Cliff Miller to make sure that everybody who might be involved with media services understands.

FU - March 1, 1971

GS:elr

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date _____

TO: H. ~~W.~~ HALDEMAN

FROM: BRUCE KEHRLI

H wants to be
sure THAT we
don't use
THIS SERVICE - may
PROBLEMS

November 23, 1971

Dear Jackie:

Thanks for your letter of November 15 and the material on your media buying service.

A copy has been forwarded to the Committee for the Re-election of the President for their review. They will be handling these matters and you should be hearing from them in the near future.

Glad to hear that things are going well for you -- say hello to Joy for all of us.

Sincerely,

H. R. Maldemar
Assistant to the President

Mrs. Jacqueline Hopkins Garrett
Vice President
The Mediators, Inc.
Suite 208
3440 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90010

November 26, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Saxbe

Senator Saxbe recently wrote Bob indicating that he felt that Mr. Jack Cole, President of Mail Advertising Corporation of America, had an excellent facility. Senator Saxbe sent a blind carbon copy to Mr. Haldeman.

It is my understanding that you are still looking for someone to fill the spot for Director of Mailing. Maybe this is the man.

FU: 2 weeks

GS:elr

JOHN C. STENNIS, MISS., CHAIRMAN
STUART SYMINGTON, MO. MARGARET CHASE SMITH, MAINE
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH. STROM THURMOND, S.C.
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C. JOHN G. TOWER, TEX.
HOWARD W. CANNON, NEV. PETER H. DOMINICK, COLO.
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, N.H. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
HARRY F. BYRD, JR., VA. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
HAROLD E. HUGHES, IOWA WILLIAM B. SAXBE, OHIO
LLOYD BENTSEN, TEX.
T. EDWARD BRASWELL, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 22, 1971

Honorable Bob Dole
Chairman
Republican National Committee
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bob:

Recently I was contacted by Mr. Jack R. Cole, President of the Mail Advertising Corporation of America, advising me that the Republican National Committee would submit recommendations for mail marketing, advice, systems and services to the "Committee for the Re-election of the President."

I know Jack Cole personally and have had an opportunity to inspect the Corporation's facilities in Lincoln, Nebraska. I am convinced that, having seen this operation, they will be able to do a very outstanding job for the Committee, and I give Mail Advertising Corporation my highest personal recommendation.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) William B. Saxbe

William B. Saxbe
United States Senate

WBS:cmp

bcc: Mr. Bob Haldeman

November 24, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: New Hampshire Poll

It was my understanding that you and Ken Riets were working on a mock convention at the University of New Hampshire. Yet, in this morning's news summary (copy attached), there is a comment about the University of New Hampshire students voting overwhelmingly for McGovern for President.

Would you and Ken Riets please review this situation and advise me of your plans. In light of the long-term interest in mock conventions, a report at your earliest convenience would be helpful.

Attachment

Time leads with 2 pages on "Politics: Who Should Pay?" and "Of Fat Cats and Other Angels." The various proposals are reviewed in straight fashion with the mag clearly feeling something must be done if "still greater dominance of US public life by the fat cats" is to be avoided. Altho the Dems are in "penury" compared to the GOP, HHH, Muskie, McCarthy, Jackson and McGovern aren't seen to have any major finance problems. McCloskey is "in the tightest financial bind" of all the candidates and Time concludes its piece on the fat cats with Pete's appeal for small contributors -- "It's an old-fashioned, democratic idea."

Newsweek says the Dems' new campaign funding plan "undoubtedly will give their debt-ridden party a better shot at the WH in '72 -- and could change the shape of national politics" by decreasing the traditional dependence on unions, millionaires and special interests. But Newsweek notes the WH dissent on the bill, the facts that Wallace will more likely run as a result and that it does nothing re: expansive pre-convention fights.

POLITICS

A survey of listees in Who's Who among US High School students indicates they would not reelect RN in '72 tho they think he is doing a fairly good job and generally approve his positions on public issues. The findings indicate that any serious Dem candidate for the presidency -- except HHH -- could get a majority of their votes. A Dem candidate would get 43%; RN-33%; Wallace -3%. Muskie is most popular with 57%. 45% felt RN was doing a good job domestically, internationally or both; 43% said no. Some 49% rated VP Agnew's performance as VP as excellent or satisfactory.

Univ. of New Hampshire students voted overwhelmingly for McGovern for President in a recent campus poll. Asked who they would like for President in '72 -- 890 favored McGovern out of 1,552 responses. Muskie 425; McCloskey 66; RN 45; EMK - 39; Lindsay 39; HHH-12 and McCarthy 10.

November 19, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Bill Safire's memorandum on the Kennedy Victory Scenario is attached. Mr. Haldeman has a copy.

GS:elr

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1971.

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT: Kennedy Victory Scenario

I notice some people around here actually looking forward to Kennedy as the Democratic nominee as "easiest to beat." To dispel that notion, here is a quick rundown of ways he can be expected to turn Chappaquiddick to his advantage.

Pre-Convention

1. Carrying the torch. "The torch has been passed" was a memorable quotation from JFK. Teddy will constantly harp on the brother's fallen torch theme. Not subtly, either -- "we Kennedys can't make plans" is a sledgehammer, strictly emotional, playing on the guilt feelings of many Americans, and because it is bad taste does not make it bad politics.

2. The Sudden-Maturity rationale. How do they come to grips with the failure of courage at the bridge? Answer: Each of the brothers underwent a deep sea-change at some stage of their lives. The Bay of Pigs changed JFK, enabling him to rise to greatness at the Cuban Missile Crisis; Bobby, too, underwent an enormous change from the McCarthy counsel, ruthless and coldblooded, to the warm and compassionate friend of the underprivileged he came to appear to be in 1968. Similarly, the story will go, Teddy went from the high-living, irresponsible boy pre-Chappaquiddick, to the "man of the family" after being deeply sobered by that tragedy. Kennedys traditionally overcome their pasts; the "record" has never been held against them, and to more people than we like to think, will not be this time either.

3. The loss of the job of Majority Whip will be turned around to show that he is not a member of the "Club"; that he is anti-establishment; that he follows his own star. There is romantic appeal there.

4. Purity of motives. He is the only one on the political scene who can get away with saying he is not seeking the Presidency. Everybody else is driven by ambition; he's just speaking his mind.

Convention

1. There is a myth that "no one is really drafted." The truth is, Adlai Stevenson was really drafted in '52. Kennedy could arrange for a draft that appears quite real -- and, in a sense, would be.

2. Apart from the Camelot partisans, there would be a strange group of supporters pushing his nomination: Democrats who think Nixon is unbeatable in 1972 and want to get Kennedy to run and get beaten, and thus be out of the way for '76. Certainly the Lindsay people feel this way. So, oddly, would some Democratic conservatives.

The Campaign: Making Chappaquiddick work for Kennedy.

This sounds insane, I know; the episode at the bridge is an enormous liability. But there are ways to handle it.

1. Charging "gutter politics." There will probably be people with signs that say "What about Mary Jo?" at every rally. This is dirty politics; has nothing to do with "the issues"; offends the sense of fair play of many voters. Demands will be made that Nixon disavow this sort of dirty pool. If he does not, he will be charged with being secretly behind it; if he does disavow it, he will be charged with calling it to everybody's attention by his very act of disavowal. If resentment against innuendo builds, we will be busy scotching references to Chappaquiddick by our supporters, while the other side will be blowing on the sparks. Dirty jokes about Kennedy will abound; this will offend many other people. "See how this fine man is being villified" will be their theme, and the charge will be that it is all generated in the White House.

2. At an appropriate time in the campaign, Mr. and Mrs. Kopeczne will come out for Kennedy.

3. The pressure to open up the sealed verdict will be allowed to grow; then, probably in Houston, scene of the Ministers Conference where JFK "faced up" to the Catholic issue, Teddy will break his silence on Chappaquiddick. The same people who deride a "Checkers speech" as cornball will see this as a human appeal for fairness and a brave exposition of a man's soul. The tape will then be played wherever it is most useful to Teddy.

4. If the war in Vietnam is over and the economy here is in good shape, it would be to Nixon's advantage to campaign on peace and prosperity; it would be to Teddy's disadvantage to address those themes; therefore, it would be his strategy to center the campaign on his own character. This is a dangerous play of the dice, but it is at least arguable that it benefits the challenger if the campaign focuses on him and his possibilities instead of the incumbent and his successes. Of course, if there is trouble with war and the economy, he would go the other way.

5. The President can avoid television debates with any other candidate; but a public yearning for a Nixon-Kennedy rematch on television would be well-nigh irresistible. Ducking or delaying would only play up their "courage" pitch, which would directly answer that loss of courage at the bridge.

6. The polls will be far more volatile than usual, reflecting the emotional responses sure to be triggered in a campaign that plays on national guilt, past assassinations, pleas to rise above vicious innuendo, and the like. A sudden shift in polls toward the end, no more than a quirk, could be played into a bandwagon swing to overcome voter reservations with the "legitimacy" of majority opinion.

7. Great stress will be laid on the number of threats he receives, the impassioned pleas of the Secret Service to limit his campaigning to safe television appearances, and his courageous refusal to be kept away from crowds. He will motorcade Dallas. The "old" Teddy ran away from trouble; the "new" Kennedy will not run away. He will prove his courage once and for all in Dallas, on the final weekend of the campaign.

H. R. Haldeman - 4

Why do I write this memo?

I think we can beat Kennedy. But it is important that we recognize the wild and woolly nature of the campaign he could put on and stop thinking he would be the easiest candidate to beat. Also, we would do well to start thinking now about the sort of thing that could happen should he get the nomination.

November 18, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Finch Memorandum on 1970
Election

Mr. Haldeman asked me to send you the attached analysis of the 1970 election by Counsellor Finch. The President has not seen this analysis.

GS:elr

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MS

Administratively Confidential

November 2, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Finch Memorandum on
1970 Election

On December 21, 1970 Counsellor Finch received an action memorandum requesting his analysis of the 1970 election. Finch's memorandum contains several interesting observations, which do "not afford an overall basis for the planning of the 1972 Campaign", but should nevertheless be considered by the Attorney General.

You directed me to send Finch's last political memorandum on the California situation directly to the Attorney General.

AS Strachan send this 1970 election memorandum to the Attorney General

AS Haldeman send this memorandum to the Attorney General

AS Strachan ask Finch to send this memorandum to the Attorney General

AS Original memorandum should go to the President with a copy to the Attorney General

AS Other

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 26, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ROBERT H. FINCH *RFH*
SUBJECT: What the 1970 Election Response
Now Means for 1972

<u>Contents:</u>	<u>Page</u>
I. Trends, highlights, and results related to the 1972 framework	2
II. The 1970 returns, in votes for Congress by states, and in past support of Nixon for President	4
III. In the 1970 election, support of which by whom? Breakdown of House and Senate support, based on a November-December 1970 voting behavior study	5
male-female	
black-white	
age	
education	
income	
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IV. Voter attitude comparisons on Presidential and Vice Presidential principals, November-December, 1968 and November-December, 1970	7
V. Which groups showed what support (intensity of like or dislike) for which principals in November-December, 1970?	9
VI. Suggestions for action	11
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I. MEANING OF THE 1970 ELECTION FOR 1972

The 1970 election does not afford an overall basis for the planning of the 1972 campaign. The usual number of claims and counterclaims followed within a month after the election and were of concern then. They may be again when individual states and their electoral prospects are examined. But these peculiarities, and those news commentaries about which senator or governor was elected and who was defeated should not obscure the basic national trends that apparently will be present in 1972.

In this memo, there is little consideration of campaign funding or campaign organization -- two other important parts of the whole campaign process. These data refer only to voter reaction and returns. The other sides of the triangle should get full attention too, of course, using other information sources.

Looming over all is the voting population explosion, and the thought that the turnout may be eighty million in 1972, and forty-one million or more of these must be Nixon voters (Tab A).

Highlights in this report are:

- The 1970 House and Senate elections reverted to party proportions. While many GOP governors were defeated, the gubernatorial returns were somewhat more favorable. Here is further evidence that in the 1972 Presidential campaign, the emphasis must be on the Nixon record, leadership, and on issues; and not on the party.
- The hardening of the Black vote. Evidence indicates that it is heavily non-Republican and non-Nixon in the North, but less non-Nixon in the South.
- The Jewish vote remained heavily Democrat.
- The union vote remained heavily Democrat.

- In 1972, unless there are significant changes in issues and policies, a Wallace candidacy can hardly get off the ground. There are only small pockets of strong support for him. Wallace now has nuisance value, and that's about all.
- The educational revolution increases voter concern with issues and policies. Voters are increasingly informed, and opinionated. Appeal to their individuality can be effective.
- Because the President is now so well known, and because only a few voters remain neutral on him as a person, his campaign efforts should be at an absolute minimum, at least until October of 1972. Having already covered fifty states puts "a" lot of hay in the barn.
- Presidential emphasis can be on issues, on conduct of the Office of the Presidency, and on the handling of economic and foreign affairs.
- The opposition will need to catch the President (not the party), and to carry its campaign to him.
- The ingredients are there for considerable Nixon gains, in the South. These may not be party gains, but "issue" and President Nixon gains.

II. THE 1970 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION RETURNS (Tab B)

Altogether the House returns came out about 45% Republican and 53% Democratic. In the Senate races, the Republican plus the conservative (Buckley) vote came to 46.5% and the Democrat plus Independent (Byrd of Virginia and Dodd) votes total 53.5%.

Slightly more favorable to the GOP, the combined Republican/Conservative vote for gubernatorial candidates came to 52.7% compared to 47.3% Democrat.

In Congressional voting, then, the Democrats had a plurality of about four and a half million votes.

Converted into electoral college results, for 1972, the 1970 House vote gave the Republicans thirteen states, and the Democrats thirty-seven plus the District of Columbia. The thirteen states can cast 83 electoral votes in 1972 (Tab C). It should be noted that the best electoral college showing produced by this method of tabulation (247 votes based on 1966 House results) fell quite short of the 270 needed for a bare electoral college majority.

To assist in 1972 planning, the states have been ranked according to the number of times they have given a plurality of their votes to House candidates (Tab D). The number of 1972 electoral votes for each state also appears, as does each state's electoral college record in the Nixon (1960 and 1968) Presidential elections. (The lower House tallies are used because they are regular and recur nationwide every two years. They do not vary as do gubernatorial and senatorial contests, and they are not usually affected by heavy media or other outside efforts.)

In 1970 only one of the thirteen states that had a plurality of GOP congressional votes was a large state. Ohio, which will have 25 electoral votes in 1972, stood alone. The other twelve were small states with Iowa (8 votes) the largest of these (Tab D).

All thirteen of these states voted for Nixon in 1960 and 1968, and all but two of them (Delaware and New Mexico) did so in 1960. Only one of them (Arizona) voted for Goldwater in 1964.

For planning purposes it can also be remembered that eleven states have not voted Republican in the last four House elections, and did not vote for Nixon in 1960 or 1968 (Tab E). They appear to lack party bases which can cope with the opposition on national or federal matters, and they also appear to lack an affinity with the President.

III. IN 1970, SUPPORT BY WHICH GROUPS?

A reliable voting behavior study that went into the field in November and December 1970 produced these results: (Tab F)*

- A. Women continued to vote a bit more Democrat than did men. They also did so in 1968 (Dem. 45%, Rep. 43%, Wallace 12% according to Gallup). For women there was no change in '70. For men, return to party was more pronounced in 1970.
- B. In 1970 the national black vote for Congress stayed rigidly just where that vote was in the 1968 Presidential election.

	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>Cons.</u>
1968 Pres.	85%	12%	3%	--
1970 House	87	13	--	--

The 1970 black vote for senator was almost all Democrat.

The black vote continues to be Democratic property. Given this complete commitment, reduced black turnout or neutralization of black issues must be considered.

- C. Among the age groups, only those 65 and over gave a majority to the Republicans, and that in the House only. For the Senate, this age group followed all the others in showing preference for Democrat candidates. This decision by those over 65 may have been issue oriented.

*The next eight paragraphs are supported by Tab F.

D. As usual, those with more education tended to vote Republican a bit more. But not as much in 1970 (college graduates and post graduate were Dem. 49%, Rep. 51%) as in 1968 (college educated were Dem. 37%, Rep. 54% and Wallace 9% -- Gallup). Significant here are results for the 1970 "some college education" category, which includes junior and community colleges as well as two-year technical schools. For this group the returns were 55% - 45% Republican in House returns. This was not matched in 1970 Senate results which were 54% - 39% Democrat with Conservative 7%, but a like tally of 1970 gubernatorial voting showed the "some college education" group at 60% - 40% Republican. There is support here for cultivating the junior college--community college--state teachers college groups, including their alumni.

Among those with just grade school and some high school education, Republicans did not do well. Blacks and Spanish speaking, the early dropouts, appear to be included in these returns.

- E. In terms of 1970 family income, the House results for those who earned \$4,000 to \$7,400 for the year were identical with the results for those who completed high school (52% - 48% Democrat). The lower income group, below \$4,000, and the higher income group, \$7,500 to \$14,900, were each heavily Democrat. Only in the \$15,000 per year and over bracket did the House returns favor the Republicans. The returns for Senate seats remained Democrat (Dem. 51%, Rep. 44%, Cons. 4%) for this high income group, however.
- F. Union membership explains itself. Union households went heavily Democrat, 65% - 35%, while non-union households went but slightly so, 52% - 48%. It should be remembered here that non-union households are three to one in the majority.
- G. Voting responses are tied directly to party identification. Strong Democrats voted 91% Democrat while strong Republicans voted 96% GOP. In the middle came the Independent. Their return of

Dem. 52%, Rep. 48% in House elections and Dem. 56%, Rep. 42%, Cons. 2% for the Senate gave Republicans too little support. Figures in the Party Identification category also show that party cohesion was stronger for the Republicans in House voting, but stronger for the Democrats in Senate voting. Republicans tended more to cross party lines in Senate races. The relationships shown here do emphasize the importance of party affiliation in a mid-term election.

- H. The Republicans did not win favor in any "religion" category, in either the congressional or the senatorial races. Should these figures be a true representation, the party is embarrassed. In particular, the Catholic and Jewish tallies should be noted, particularly for the Senate.

	<u>Congressional Vote</u>		<u>Senatorial Vote</u>		
	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Cons.</u>
Protestant	52%	48%	53%	45%	2%
Catholic	58	42	68	25	7
Jewish	86	14	87	13	0
Other or None	68	32	72	28	0

Catholics did vote Conservative in greater proportion than did those of other faiths, but the total shift had little electoral significance, because over two-thirds of the Catholics remained in the Democrat column in the Senate races. In proportions, the Catholic vote is not quite 30% of the size of the Protestant vote. The Jewish vote is about 5% as large as the Protestant vote.

IV. ATTITUDES ON PRESIDENTIAL PRINCIPALS, 1968 and 1970

National surveys of intensity of feeling for or against each principal or candidate were conducted after the 1968 election and after the 1970 election. On a 0-100 degree scale (thermometer) each interviewee indicated his feeling toward each candidate. A mark at fifty or thereabouts indicated neutrality. A mark above or below showed, respectively, like or dislike and the degree thereof. The results are shown on Tab G.

They show:

- A. The President in first place in average (mean score) with Muskie slightly behind. But both declined from 1968 to 1970. In fact, most mean scores declined from 1968 to 1970.
- B. First choices are significant here because a first choice translates into a vote. The President has confirmed his position of leadership, and Senator Kennedy, according to this approach, is his closest competitor. Muskie and Humphrey lack the hard core support a strong first choice showing will indicate.

Except for Wallace, Senator Kennedy has a high score in "last choice" mentions, while Muskie is not greatly disliked. For the President, last choice mentions increased slightly, as they did for Humphrey from 1968 to 1970.

The neutral score combined with the "don't know" score will indicate, roughly, just how much of the electorate remains undecided on a candidate and is therefore "persuadable" through campaigning. The lower the total (17% for the President) the less effect campaigning may have. Presently Muskie can win people to his side, and he is apparently following that strategy. For Ted Kennedy, however, there are few "neutrals" or "don't knows" to win. Instead he must attack the President and the Administration. He is doing that with help from McGovern.

The results here again indicate that the President can gain little from aggressive campaigning at this time or in the immediate future, all things remaining equal. He may best serve political purposes by stressing leadership and administration at home and particularly abroad.

The Democratic contenders and the eventual Democratic candidate will need to carry the campaign to the people and against the Administration.

V. PARTISAN AND DEMOGRAPHIC SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENTIAL PRINCIPALS, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1970 -- includes 18-22 year olds

The sources of candidate strength, or weakness, appear in these columns (Tab H). The President leads because of his strength with Republicans and Independents. In contrast to the Congressional results, 52% to 48% Democrat, the President led the field of candidates in Independent support at the end of 1970. The rank order is as follows:

Rank Order According to Partisan Support

	<u>Republicans</u>	<u>Independents</u>	<u>Democrats</u>
	Nixon 81	Nixon 58	Kennedy, E. 64
LIKE	Reagan 65	Muskie 54	Muskie 64
	Agnew 60	Reagan 52	Humphrey 61
	Lindsay 51	Lindsay 51	Lindsay 53
50%			McGovern 51
	Muskie 48	Agnew 47	McCarthy 48
	McCarthy 39	Humphrey 45	Nixon 47
DISLIKE	Humphrey 37	Kennedy, E. 45	Reagan 44
	McGovern 37	McGovern 45	Agnew 37
	Kennedy, E. 33	McCarthy 44	Wallace 30
	Wallace 30	Wallace 35	

It is noteworthy that Lindsay had slightly more appeal to Democrats in late 1970 than to either Independents or Republicans.

Among the potential very young voters, Edward Kennedy ranks high, but Muskie and the President are not that far behind, nor is Lindsay in this tabulation.

18-22 year olds (candidate rank order)

	E. Kennedy	64
	Muskie	57
LIKE	Nixon	56
	Lindsay	55
	McCarthy	54
50%	McGovern	51
	Humphrey	48
	Reagan	47
DISLIKE	Agnew	38
	Wallace	35

To reopen the question of the President's strength in the North and in the South, these figures apply:

	<u>Northern Whites</u>		<u>Northern Blacks</u>	
	Nixon	60	Kennedy, E.	87
	Muskie	60	Humphrey	72
	Lindsay	53	Muskie	67
	Reagan	52	Lindsay	61
	Humphrey	50	McGovern	53
50%			McCarthy	52
	Kennedy, E.	49	Reagan	37
	McGovern	47	Nixon	35
	Agnew	46	Agnew	22
	McCarthy	46	Wallace	9
	Wallace	28		

The attitude distance between whites and blacks in the Northern areas on the President is considerable. So is the distance between whites and blacks on Senator Kennedy, but the blacks are highly favorable to him and the whites are reserved.

In the South, however, the profiles change. While the black support for Kennedy increases slightly, the black antagonism to the President disappears. Simultaneously his support from whites increases, while white favor for Muskie, Humphrey and Kennedy declines.

	<u>Southern Whites</u>		<u>Southern Blacks</u>	
	Nixon	61	Kennedy, E.	92
	Reagan	53	Humphrey	81
	Agnew	50	Muskie	61
			Lindsay	53
50%			Nixon	50
	Muskie	48	McCarthy	49
	Lindsay	48	McGovern	46
	Wallace	47	Reagan	45
	Humphrey	41	Agnew	34
	McCarthy	40	Wallace	12
	McGovern	40		
	Kennedy, E.	39		

In these rankings, the nuisance effect of a Wallace candidacy is clear. His support at the end of 1970 is about identical with what it was in 1968. His candidacy in 1972 would draw from the President, and probably more so than from Kennedy, Muskie, or Humphrey. This would be particularly true in the South, of course.

VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTION

All of the studies alluded to here and others as well indicate increased volatility in the electorate. The disparities between House and Senate election returns may be sought in this discerning judgment. The coming of age of the post World War II youngsters, most of whom are better educated has an effect, and so now may the 18 year old vote to a limited extent. Alongside this is the decline in party membership, loyalty and association. Increasingly voters, particularly young voters, are declaring themselves as Independents (Tab I).

More to the Republican point, there is statistical evidence which relates an increased feeling of "personal competence" to increased turnout and increased Republican voting. Emphasis on the individual as a voter who can comprehend government issues and who can make a difference can increase 1972 electoral support for the President.

The current postures of the Democrats who seek nomination are in line with the results shown in these tabulations. For example, Senator Muskie needs to convince the many who are uncommitted on him, and to prove he is in command. He probably will not make an all-out attack on the Administration itself until late. In contrast Senator Kennedy needs to hold his large dedicated group, to avoid antagonizing further those who dislike him and to establish himself as the Administration-killer. Because Lindsay has few enemies outside New York, apparently his only strategy is to try to establish himself as a compromise candidate.

The President needs to maintain his position with the Independents and increase his hold there. Large gains in the Black vote cannot be expected. Low Black turnout should be sought -- perhaps by defusing Black issues.

Obviously, if the Wallace campaign can be minimized, the President may make key gains in the South, particularly if the Democratic nominee is not appreciated there.

The need to overcome the numerical advantage of the Democrat Party is clear. The appeals which will be based on the role and achievements of the President should be accompanied by an emphasis on the ability of each voter, as an individual, to think and choose for himself because he, as a citizen, can make a difference.

The President's high order of stewardship for the nation should be the keystone for the coming campaign. No other theme should be allowed to replace the primary emphasis on that stewardship at home and abroad.

The secondary theme (carried by others for the time being) should be to lay a solid foundation of irresponsibility on the part of the Democrats in Congress for failing to respond to the President's leadership.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: RETURNS AND FORECAST 1960-1972

1960 ELECTION			68.3 million votes
49.9%	Nixon	34,108,546	
50.1	Democrats	34,227,096	(J. Kennedy & H. F. Byrd)
1964 ELECTION			70.3 million votes
38.6	Goldwater	27,176,799	
61.4	Johnson	43,126,506	
1968 ELECTION			73.0 million votes
43.6	Nixon	31,783,783	
42.9	Humphrey	31,271,839	
13.5	Wallace	9,899,557	
1972 ELECTION (estimates)			80.0 million votes (est.)
51.25	Nixon	41,000,000	76 million aged 21 and over plus 4 million
48.75	Democrat	39,000,000	aged 18 to 21 (36.3% of 11 million eligible)
<u>With Wallace Running Strong</u>			
47.5	Nixon	38,000,000	
46.25	Democrat	37,000,000	
6.25	Wallace	5,000,000	

1970 NATIONAL VOTE BY PARTY
FOR CONGRESS, SENATE, AND GOVERNOR

		<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Plurality</u>
CONGRESS			
Republican	24,339,240	45.1	
Democrat	28,841,106	53.4	4,501,866 (D)
Other	<u>832,500</u>	1.5	
TOTAL	54,012,846		

SENATE			
Republican	19,471,069	41.6	
Democrat	24,276,217	51.8	4,805,148 (D)
Conservative	2,276,321	04.9	
Independent	<u>809,294</u>	01.7	
TOTAL	46,832,901		

GOVERNOR			
Republican	20,479,892	51.6	1,734,061 (R)
Democrat	18,745,831	47.3	
Conservative	<u>424,476</u>	01.1	
TOTAL	39,650,199		

PER CENT REPUBLICAN OF TOTAL VOTE FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES, 1960-1970

1960	45.0%
1962	47.7
1964	42.5
1966	48.7
1968	48.9
1970	45.6

NUMBER OF STATES HAVING A REPUBLICAN PLURALITY OF TOTAL CONGRESSIONAL (HOUSE) VOTE, 1964-1970

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of States</u>	<u>Total of 1972 Electoral Votes, All Such States</u>
1964	9	50
1966	23	247
1968	25	235
1970	13	83

1970 NATIONAL ELECTION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

States Whose Voters Cast More Votes for Republican Candidates

<u>1972 Electoral Votes</u>	<u>State</u>
6	Arizona
7	Colorado
3	Delaware
4	Idaho
8	Iowa
7	Kansas
5	Nebraska
4	New Hampshire
4	New Mexico
3	North Dakota
25	Ohio
4	Utah
<u>3</u>	<u>Vermont</u>
83	13

In Arkansas more GOP than Democrat votes were cast in the one House contest, but three Democrats were unopposed.

STATES DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO TIMES WHEN THEIR VOTERS CAST
 MORE REPUBLICAN THAN DEMOCRAT VOTES FOR CONGRESSIONAL (LOWER HOUSE) SEATS

Last Four Congressional Elections: 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970

No. of Times Republican Plurality	Electoral Votes	Cast Electoral Vote for Nixon(N)	
		1960	1969
1. In all four elections 64-70			
Kansas	7	N	N
Nebraska	5	N	N
Idaho	4	N	N
North Dakota	3	N	N
Vermont	3	N	N
	<u>22</u>		
2. In 1966, 68 and 70 (not 64)			
Ohio	25	N	N
Iowa	8	N	N
Arizona	6	N	N
New Hampshire	4	N	N
Utah	4	N	N
Delaware	3	0	N
	<u>50</u>		
3. In 1964, 66 and 68 (not 70)			
Montana	4	N	N
South Dakota	4	N	N
	<u>8</u>		
4. In 1968 and 70 (not 64 nor 66)			
Colorado	7	N	N
*Arkansas	6	0	0
New Mexico	4	N	N
	<u>17</u>		
5. In 1966 and 68 (not 64 nor 70)			
California	45	N	N
Illinois	26	0	N
New Jersey	17	0	N
Indiana	13	N	N
Wisconsin	11	N	N
Minnesota	10	0	0
Tennessee	10	N	N
Oregon	6	N	N
Alaska	3	N	N
Wyoming	3	N	N
	<u>144</u>		
6. In 1966 only (not 64 nor 68 nor 70)			
Pennsylvania	27	0	0
Michigan	21	0	0
	<u>48</u>		
7. In 1964 only (not 66 nor 68 nor 70)			
Alabama	9	0	0
8. No G.O.P. plurality in any of last four Congressional elections			
New York	41	0	0
Texas	26	0	0
Florida	17	N	N
Massachusetts	14	0	0
North Carolina	13	0	N
Georgia	12	0	0
Missouri	12	0	N
Virginia	12	N	N
Louisiana	10	0	0
Maryland	10	0	0
Kentucky	9	N	N
Washington	9	N	0
Connecticut	8	0	0
Oklahoma	8	N	N
South Carolina	8	0	N
Mississippi	7	0	0
West Virginia	6	0	0
Hawaii	4	0	0
Maine	4	N	0
Rhode Island	4	0	0
Nevada	3	0	N
	<u>237</u>		
9. District of Columbia	3	-	0
		538	TOTAL

*few contests, scattered elections

TAB E

STATES WHICH HAVE NOT VOTED REPUBLICAN IN THE LAST FOUR HOUSE
ELECTIONS, AND DID NOT VOTE FOR NIXON IN 1960 OR 1968

<u>State</u>	<u>1972 Electoral Votes</u>
New York	41
Texas	26
Massachusetts	14
Georgia	12
Louisiana	10
Maryland	10
Connecticut	8
Mississippi	7
West Virginia	6
Hawaii	4
Rhode Island	<u>4</u>
	142

Alabama and Arkansas can be added to this group.
Their ventures into voting for Republican congressmen
have been just about that so far.

TAB F

These figures on Congressional and Senatorial vote and Congressional turnout relate to various demographic, socio-economic and political factors. The results are based on in-depth interviews with a selected national cross section of 1513 citizens of voting age. Interviewing took place after the election, during the months of November and December, 1970. The study was another in the regular series which the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan has conducted since 1948.

N = weighted number of interviews and shows relative size of each category.

	<u>Congressional Vote</u>			<u>Senatorial Vote</u>			
	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>% Rep.</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>% Rep.</u>	<u>% Con.</u>	<u>N</u>
1. <u>Sex</u>							
Male	54	46	(390)	60	38	2	(340)
Female	56	44	(427)	59	37	4	(402)
2. <u>Race</u>							
White	53	47	(767)	57	40	3	(700)
Negro	87	13	(52)	97	1	1	(44)
3. <u>Age</u>							
Under 35	57	43	(193)	58	37	5	(167)
35-44	58	42	(143)	64	35	2	(145)
45-54	54	46	(171)	59	37	4	(153)
55-64	59	41	(158)	64	35	2	(135)
65 and over	45	55	(148)	53	43	3	(139)
4. <u>Education</u>							
Grade School	66	34	(161)	65	34	1	(147)
Some High School	66	34	(98)	72	27	1	(88)
High School Completed	52	48	(287)	59	36	4	(253)
Some College	45	55	(130)	54	39	7	(125)
College and Post Graduate	49	51	(142)	50	48	2	(130)

	<u>Congressional Vote</u>			<u>Senatorial Vote</u>			
	<u>%</u> <u>Dem.</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Rep.</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Dem.</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Rep.</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Con.</u>	<u>N</u>
5. <u>1970 Family Income</u>							
Under \$4000	68	32	(125)	70	29	1	(108)
\$4000-\$7400	52	48	(151)	56	43	1	(145)
\$7500-\$14900	56	44	(345)	63	33	4	(310)
\$15000 and over	44	56	(170)	51	44	4	(161)
6. <u>Household Union Membership</u>							
One or more members	65	35	(194)	67	30	3	(200)
No union members	52	48	(615)	57	40	3	(536)
7. <u>Party Identification</u>							
Strong Dem.	91	9	(191)	99	1	0	(166)
Weak Dem.	77	23	(174)	85	13	2	(153)
Indep. Dem.	75	25	(68)	84	16	0	(70)
Independent	52	48	(71)	56	42	2	(73)
Indep. Rep.	35	65	(62)	31	65	4	(59)
Weak Rep.	17	83	(143)	19	73	8	(135)
Strong Rep.	4	96	(107)	6	88	7	(88)
8. <u>Religion</u>							
Protestant	52	48	(578)	53	45	2	(481)
Catholic	58	42	(167)	68	25	7	(171)
Jewish	86	14	(25)	87	13	0	(36)
Other or none	68	32	(46)	72	28	0	(54)

SUMMARY OF 1968 AND 1970 CANDIDATE THERMOMETERS

Principal (Candidate)	Mean Score		First Choice Mentions ^a		Last Choice Mentions ^a		Neutral (50° scores)		Don't Know		Standard Deviation	
	1968	1970	1968	1970	1968	1970	1968	1970	1968	1970	1968	1970
Nixon	66.5	59.0	36%	38%	8%	14%	16%	16%	1%	1%	23	28
Muskie	61.4	57.0	16	20	10	10	31	26	8	17	22	26
Lindsay ^b	--	51.8	--	9	--	11	--	31	--	21	--	23
Reagan	49.1	51.6	5	14	17	14	34	25	5	9	22	26
Kennedy, E. ^b	--	50.3	--	26	--	28	--	13	--	2	--	33
Humphrey	61.7	49.9	25	18	13	19	14	20	1	3	27	27
Agnew	50.4	45.9	4	13	13	26	41	18	7	4	21	28
McGovern ^b	--	45.5	--	4	--	12	--	40	--	36	--	22
McCarthy	54.8	44.3	11	6	14	17	32	33	5	17	23	24
Wallace	31.4	31.7	11	12	62	54	13	14	2	6	31	32

^a These columns add up to more than 100 percent because a respondent could give the same highest or lowest score to several principals.

^b Ratings were obtained for this principal in only one of the two election years.

The Distribution of Party Identification in the United States,
1952-1970

Question: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) Would you call yourself a strong (R)(D) or a not very strong (R)(D)? (IF INDEPENDENT) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?"

	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1952</u>	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1954</u>	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1956</u>	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1958</u>	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1960</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1962</u>	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1964</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1966</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1968</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1970</u>
<u>Democrat</u>										
Strong	22%	22%	21%	23%	21%	23%	26%	18%	20%	20%
Weak	25	25	23	24	25	23	25	27	25	23
<u>Independent</u>										
Democrat	10	9	7	7	8	8	9	9	10	10
Independent	5	7	9	8	8	8	8	12	11	13
Republican	7	6	8	4	7	6	6	7	9	8
<u>Republican</u>										
Weak	14	14	14	16	13	16	13	15	14	15
Strong	13	13	15	13	14	12	11	10	10	10
Apolitical, Don't know	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	1614	1139	1772	1269	3021	1289	1571	1291	1553	1802

November 15, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB MARIK
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Democratic Contenders
Stand on Bussing

The material you had the RNC prepare on the bussing stands of the Democratic Contenders should have one important aspect added. Mike Wallace 60 Minutes did a story on the children of Washington politicians who attend St. Albans, an exclusive private school. I understand that Wallace interviewed most of the Democratic Contenders and only Senator Jackson had his children in public schools. The inconsistency of publicity favoring improving public schools (by bussing) while sending your own children to private schools should be pressed. Governor Holton of Virginia has done very well with this issue on the positive side.

Please determine whether we have the factual information (quotes from 60 Minutes, etc.) and some plan for using this information successfully.

cc: Jeb Magruder

GS:elr

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FU
11/14

Administratively Confidential

October 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB MARIK
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN *9/2m*
SUBJECT: Muskie Bussing Statement

The Muskie statement about bussing being a legitimate tool that can "be used, and should be used, and the courts have said it must be used", must not be lost.

Please run periodic -- monthly -- tests of the RNC's capability of retrieving this and other bussing statements by the Democratic Contenders.

Gordon

10/21

I have set this up, and will be back in a month with the first results.

RHM

DEMOGRAPHIC AND PARTISAN BASES OF CANDIDATE SUPPORT

Overall Average	Candidate	Demo- crats	Inde- pendents	Repub- licans	18-22 year olds	North- ern Whites	North- ern Blacks	South- ern Whites	South- ern Blacks
59	Nixon	47	58	81	56	60	35	61	50
57	Muskie	64	54	48	57	60	67	48	61
52	Lindsay	53	51	51	55	53	61	48	53
52	Reagan	44	52	65	47	52	37	53	45
50	Kennedy, E.	64	45	33	64	49	87	39	92
50	Humphrey	61	45	37	48	50	72	41	81
46	Agnew	37	47	60	38	46	22	50	34
46	McGovern	51	45	37	51	47	53	40	46
44	McCarthy	48	44	39	54	46	52	40	49
32	Wallace	30	35	30	35	28	9	47	12

Source: Jerrold Rusk, Purdue University &
Herbert F. Weisberg, University of Michigan;
"Perceptions of Presidential Candidates:
A Midterm Report" (mimeo, September, 1971)

November 15, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB MARIK
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: EMK

This is the type of information I trust your people are keeping. The opening sections may prove particularly useful.

GS:elr

75

November 15, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK MOORE
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Jack Wrather -
Presidential Letter

In response to your suggestion that the President write and thank Jack Wrather for his efforts in Los Angeles, I have attached a copy of the letter the President sent to Mr. Wrather on November 11. Other November 9 Dinner Chairmen also received letters of gratitude from the President.

Attachment: Copy of November 11, 1971 letter to Jack Wrather.

GS:elr

Copy

11/11/71
RNE

November 11, 1971

Dear Jack,

The overwhelming success of the "Salute to the President Dinner" in Los Angeles and others like it in twenty cities across the nation clearly demonstrates the vitality and unity of the Republican Party. It not only establishes a sound financial base for our National Committee but also serves as an inspiration to Republicans everywhere. Nothing could be more important as we approach the elections of 1972 than to convey to all Americans the strength of our Republican convictions and the breadth of our accomplishments in this Administration.

Your role in the November 9th Dinner is a major step toward achieving this goal and has earned my deep admiration and gratitude. Through your efforts we will be able to mount an effective campaign which will surely have enormous impact on the future of the Republican Party and the nation we serve.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

RNE

Mr. Jack Whitely
270 North Canon Drive
Beverly Hills, California 90210

RW:RJC:MAAllin:RE:lrc

cc: AVH

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: DICK MOORE *DM*

SUBJECT: Salute to the President Dinner

Just a brief report on the Los Angeles dinner which was a total success in terms of both attendance and enthusiasm. The official count was 1005, which I understand was considerably more than originally anticipated.

One good feature was the projection system which was absolutely perfect, both video and audio. As a result, the President's address from Chicago came across almost as well as if he had been there.

To say the reaction to the speech was favorable would be to understate the case. For example, Donn Tatum, President of the Disney company, came over to our table to tell me that it was the best speech he had ever heard the President make, and I could tell he was not just being polite.

I realize that most of the remarks I heard were from the President's friends, but even allowing for that bias, their comments were exceptionally enthusiastic. Among those I talked to were: Taft Schreiber, Ted Cummings, Peter Pitchess, Gordon Luce, Mr. and Mrs. William French Smith, Emmett Jones, Pete Dailey, Roy Disney, Earl Adams, Jack Wrather, Jack Warner, and Henry Salvatori, to name only a few.

The separate local program of Art Linkletter, John Mitchell and Governor Reagan was very good. The Governor went out of his way to endorse the President's Peking initiative and he did it very effectively.

An interesting footnote: Mr. Frank Sinatra attended the dinner and sat at the table of the Attorney General of the United States.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: DICK MOORE 

SUBJECT: Los Angeles Dinner

Several people told me that Jack Wrather, the dinner chairman, really worked his head off, and he was obviously thrilled by the result. I had a brief talk with him, and for future reference I think it would be a good idea for the President to write him a thank you letter. A suggested draft is attached.

Attachment

DRAFT

11/12/71 (Moore)

Dear Jack:

John Mitchell and a number of those who were there have told me that the Los Angeles dinner Tuesday night was an outstanding success in every way. They also told me of the tremendous contribution of time and effort which you personally made and which meant so much to the success of the evening.

It is already clear that the dinners have given a great lift to Republican spirits throughout the country. As you can understand, I was particularly delighted to know that this is so true of Southern California.

I hope you will extend my sincere thanks to all your colleagues. Meanwhile, I want you to know how deeply I appreciate your continuing friendship and support.

Pat joins me in sending our best to you and Bonita.

Sincerely,

Mr. John D. Wrather, Jr.
207 North Canon Drive
Beverly Hills, California 90210

RN:RAM:hmd

Administratively Confidential

November 2, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: 1948 Election

A review of some of the books written about the 1948 election (the last time an incumbent President was really challenged) indicates several items which you should consider for the 1972 Campaign for the President:

1. Jack Redding in Inside the Democratic Party attributes Truman's success to the "American people's love of the underdog". President Nixon has been an underdog for many years. We may be faced with a situation where he would be characterized as all powerful - "victory similar to the LBJ defeat of Goldwater". was Oberdorfer's quote. You may want to have your strategy group consider ways of countering this psychology.

2. Apparently one of the really valuable tools for Truman was something called "Capital Comment", a four page weekly news letter which served as a mouth piece to reach party workers. It would be interesting to compare this document with Monday and whatever other Campaign publications you have in mind.

3. In addition, a daytime television program was created and aimed at housewives. It was called The Democrat's Record and it satirized the Republican "do nothing" Congress. Maybe someone should be encouraged to start a television talk show or series of radio talk shows or some other independent -- non campaign form of getting information to the people without appearing that the President is personally "campaigning". I realize that your strategy group focuses mostly on strategy for the primaries, but since the primaries will be of much less importance in 1972, would you have them give these ideas some thought?

GS:lm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 10/30

TO: Harry

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Since you are reading a book on the '48 election Gregg's comments might be of interest to you.

INSIDE THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Jack Redding

AS
L

Having served as publicity director for the Democratic National Committee under the Truman Administration, Jack Redding is eminently qualified to write this account of the two year Party effort that preceded Truman's surprising victory at the polls in November, 1949.

Redding recalls the atmosphere of gloom and the total disorganization which surrounded the Democratic Party in early 1947 and goes on to tell of the men, the ideas, and the events which led eventually to the reorganization of the Party and to one of the most successful political campaigns in American history.

The author attributes Truman's victory in large part to the man himself; his spirit and courage and his never ending drive to carry his story directly to the people. He attributes Truman's success as well to the American people's love of the underdog and to their eventual recognition of Truman as a man of the people.

Spaulth
Keri?

But the campaign workers and their ingenious ideas carried the President's message. They sought to build all levels of the Party organization to their best efficiency in spite of division within. They up the publicity department, set up long distant telephone soundings to weigh reactions to Truman's speeches. They organized Party leader conferences, later dubbed "thought control clinics", where party leaders from every state met each week with the President. They organized the "Truman File" which catalogued quotes from Truman's speeches on various topics which could be used in Party groups and could be food for press releases.

One of the most valuable campaign tools was the creation of "Capital Comment", a four page weekly newsletter which served as a mouthpiece to reach Party workers and which brought additional newspaper publicity.

The Party made special appeal to the 25% of the population which was of foreign origin. A national committee of leaders from the different language groups was organized representing the 22 million Americans who spoke in their native tongue. They helped to advise and to translate campaign material for foreign newspapers and radio stations.

A day time television program was created and aimed at housewives. Called "The Democratic Record", it satirized the Republican "do nothing Congress", the problem of increasing taxes, the Dewey campaign, etc. It proved an enormously successful tool for testing voter concerns and reactions.

What
was it like
Monday

AS
good way
to hit home

Why not start our own talk show?

The workers published a picture book of Truman's life story which was widely distributed as well as 2,000 prints of a film depicting the story of the President. For six days before the election, no one could go to the movies without seeing the film.

Television time was purchased so that prominent Party leaders could address the nation and listening posts were set up across the country where Party groups could gather to hear and discuss the broadcast.

The tone of Truman's campaign was characterized by his decision to travel across the country speaking to the people from the rear platform of a train.

While Inside The Democratic Party is a factual account of all that took place within the Democratic Party in 1947 and 1948, Redding is primarily interested in exploring the specifics which made the eventual victory possible. The most important was the very personal nature of the campaign -- Truman's concern with Party leaders and their thoughts and suggestions as well as with the common man and his desire to have them know him and his story.

Gregg Petersmeyer

November 1, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Committee for the Re-Election
of the President Staff Writer

You asked me whether it would be possible for the Committee to hire a writer but have him physically located in Ray Price's office so that he could act as liaison between the Committee and Price and be available to Price as the need arose.

The answer to your question is no the Committee writer should not be located in Price's office, but at 1701 with the rest of your Campaign staff.

GS:elr