

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
10	46	5/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RN to Ehrlichman RE: political lessons from Wallace's victory in Michigan and how to apply these lessons to similar states. 3 pgs.
10	46	5/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	Copy of a memo from RN to Ehrlichman RE: political lessons from Wallace's victory in Michigan and how to apply these lessons to similar states. 3 pgs.
10	46	6/6/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RN to John Mitchell RE: McGovern's imminent nomination and its political repercussions. 3 pgs.
10	46	8/9/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From RN to Haldeman RE: an invitation for Billy Graham to speak before the DNC. 2 pgs.

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10	46	9/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RN to Haldeman RE: the First Family's schedule during the campaign, as well as advertising and support for Republican candidates across the U.S. in 1972. 3 pgs.
10	46	7/23/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RN to Haldeman RE: the role of the youth vote in the 1972 election. 2 pgs.
10	46	7/30/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From RN to Haldeman laying out rules for White House personnel when communicating with figures in the media. 3 pgs.
10	46	8/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RN to Haldeman RE: the use of Agnew to campaign in areas visited by McGovern. 1 pg.
10	46	6/6/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RN to Haldeman asking for Buchanan to prepare answers to political questions posed to Tricia and Julie. 2 pgs.

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10	46	7/30/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From RN to Haldeman laying out more rules for White House employees to follow when communicating with media figures. 2 pgs.

May 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN

In writing this memorandum to you, I want you and Haldeman to use it as a basis for discussion with Mitchell or anyone else in the political shop who has some responsibility for Michigan and similar States.

Despite the obvious inference that the size of Wallace's victory in Michigan was in part due to the shooting on Monday, any honest observer will have to agree that, even without the shooting, he would have won overwhelmingly.

This is the most striking proof we could possibly have of the potency of busing as an issue in those States where people are concerned about it. It also shows that the only way to strike home on the issue is to be simple, direct, and uncomplicated, as Wallace was.

This does not mean that, with the position of responsibility I have, that I can talk like Wallace does. On the other hand, I fear John Connally is correct when he made the statement to me three days ago that on busing, while we probably came out with the right decision and a responsible one, we moved on it perhaps a little too late and then in a way that was not simple enough to be understood clearly by rank and file voters in a State like Michigan where it is a burning issue. I know, too, that it can be claimed that, in a final campaign, whoever is nominated by the Democrats will take a position which in one way or another is pro busing. On the other hand, we have to bear in mind that, to get Democrats to vote for Wallace--a fellow Democrat on the busing issue--is not too difficult. To get a Democrat to leave his party and vote for a Republican is far more difficult. This means that, if the issue is to be helpful to us, we must present it in a more simple, uncomplicated, direct manner.

As of course you realize, we are taking the same heat for coming out with a half-way measure as we would have taken if we had come out for a Constitutional amendment. I realize that responsibility was the key to moving in the way we did but, on the other hand, from a political standpoint we must clearly understand that what we did was not as effective as it should have been.

I think the best procedure at the present time is to try to zero in on the busing issue on a State and local basis, rather than to handle it as we have tried it to date through national statements and through the national media. In other words, busing is an enormous issue in Michigan and has no effect in Wisconsin or in Ohio or in Illinois. It might even be an issue in parts of New York State. I don't think polling is going to help you too much here because many people who feel strongly on busing are just as reluctant to indicate their feelings in a poll as they are to indicate anything other than very liberal attitudes with regard to racial equality in a poll. But Michigan, a State we normally would have no chance whatever to win, is now certainly up for grabs. But we can win it only if we strike home in Michigan in a clear, unequivocal way on busing. I think that the meeting you had with the women who came down from Michigan was a good starter. I think, however, it needs to be followed up with statements that get into the Michigan Press in every way we can possibly think of between now and election day. Any major speaker who goes to Michigan must be directed to hit the busing issue stand in a strong, unequivocal way. We should find ways through Griffin or some other Congressmen who are involved to get statements made which will get back to Michigan. We must also find ways to do something, whether intervening in cases or what-have-you to get through on the issue. If you have not already done an editorial board and a television program in Michigan, you should arrange it on your schedule. You should not have it right now, but I would say around the 10th to 15th of June would be a good time--always pointing out, of course, that the position of the President has not changed in this issue, he has held it consistently from the year 1967 and will continue to take that position.

In a subsidiary way, forced integrated housing must also be hit and hit hard. One collateral issue is the problem of Romney. You and John Mitchell probably should have a talk with him and tell him that, if he cannot enthusiastically support us on the busing and housing issues, it would be best for him to say nothing at all in Michigan on those issues.

I want the whole country studied State by State and city by city to see where a Michigan situation may exist. Where it does exist, follow exactly the same pattern that I have indicated above in order to get through to the public as to what our position is.

I realize that Harper and others on the Domestic Council Staff have been trying to peddle the idea that busing really is not an important issue, or at least that it is not an issue which will on balance help us. They have a right to their political opinions. But they are so grossly inexperienced in this field that you should pay no attention to their opinions while, of course, giving them the impression that you are listening. The Michigan result comes through loud and clear-- busing is a potent issue and can make the difference in some northern States which otherwise we would have no chance whatever to win. Incidentally, Texas with all of the liberal leanings that it has at the present time must not be taken for granted. We must do a far better job of getting through our stand on busing in Texas than we have done to date. Here I want you to talk to John Connally and of course work through Tower and anybody else who may be able to get through our position.

THE PRESIDENT

cc: H. R. Haldeman

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THE PRESIDENT

cc: H. R. Haldeman

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN MITCHELL

FROM THE PRESIDENT



This memorandum is for your information and guidance, and the contents and observations should only be used on your own and not attributed to me since some rather sensitive political matters are contained in it.

In talking to John Connally he has decided within the last two weeks that McGovern will probably be nominated.

As you know, it has been his thought all along that Kennedy would inevitably pick up the marbles at the crucial time just before or during the Convention.

However, from a number of sources it is becoming apparent that a last-ditch effort may be made by Kennedy to try to have a deadlock so that Kennedy could still get the nomination.

This seems unlikely in view of his decision to get rid of his Secret Service, but on the other hand that might just be a ploy for the purpose of playing that game. There is no question but that there has been and probably still is a deal between Kennedy and Mills. In fact, from sources that I believe are absolutely reliable, Mills desperately wants to go on the ticket with anybody, including McGovern. This, incidentally, I think would be a great mistake on the part of whoever is at the top of the ticket because I think Mills is a shrewd operator in the House and a lousy national candidate.

In talking to Connally he made one point very strongly with which I totally agree. To put it in perspective it is necessary for me to point out that one of the major mistakes we made in 1960 was to allow Republicans, particularly in the Southern states, to control the Nixon organization and also to be out front in the Nixon effort. Their interest, of course, was to use the Presidential campaign for the purpose of building the Republican Party in their states. This was particularly true in Texas and

some of the other critical states in the South which we lost. It was also a national phenomenon. We avoided it in a state like California only because Bob Finch was totally aware of the California problems and saw to it that we ran a campaign that did not cut out the Independents and Democrats.

Connally's admonition is that as we see the inevitability now of a McGovern nomination we must "leave the door open" for Democrats and Independents not only to join us but to have positions of real leadership in the Nixon campaign. I can't emphasize too strongly how much I agree with his position. You will get squeals of outrage from the National Committee and from State Chairmen, but we must remember that if the Republican Party, weak as it is, is to be rebuilt it cannot be done so at the expense of risking losing the Presidential election. The time to do it will be after the election.

Every state is to be examined with a merciless and impartial eye as to what people in that state we need in order to carry it. Generally speaking, you will find that what we need are prominent Democrats and Independents who will join our cause and if possible who will take positions of leadership in it.

In California one of the reasons we probably have less of a chance in 1972 than we had in 1960 or in 1968 is the fact that Reagan and the regular Republicans will insist on running the campaign. This will make it a walking disaster and the same is true of Texas and all the Southern States as well as some of the other states, including states like Pennsylvania where we need prominent Democrats. For example, Rizzo is infinitely more important to us in Pennsylvania than Scott or Schweiker. Ways have got to be found to allow Rizzo to be out in front if he is willing to do so.

The purpose of this memo is simply to make sure that an examination is made of the state's situation with only one view in mind -- what men and women can do us the most good in getting us the votes we need -- the votes of Independents and Democrats? Always have in mind that only 24 percent of the people in the last Gallup Poll were willing to admit that they were Republicans. With this kind of a base, putting Republicans out in front, is simply asking for suicide. This does not mean that the Republican organization should be cut out -- it does mean that we should avoid identifying too closely with Republican

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candidates who are weaker than we are or with Republican organizations that are in ill repute. It does mean that whenever we can get Independents or Democrats to take a lead role this could make the difference between winning or losing the state and even possibly the election.

The McGovern strategy is becoming very clear now that he believes that he has the nomination wrapped up. His going to the Governors' Conference for the purpose of "clarifying his stand on amnesty, marijuana, abortion and welfare is a case in point. I know there are those who will say that he can't get away with it any more than Goldwater was able to get away with it when he tried to enlist Republican Governors in Cleveland in 1964. There are two very significant differences. McGovern is more clear and less principled than Goldwater and will say anything in order to win. And second, McGovern will have about 100 percent support from the media in his effort to clean himself up so that he can beat us in the final. This points up the necessity at this time to get Democrats and Independents, not Republicans, to nail McGovern on the left side of the road which his record so clearly identifies him with. We must remember our experience in 1970. We thought that with people like Adlai Stevenson, Burdick, Moss, et al and their total record of permissiveness, anti-defense, anti-law enforcement, a good hard-hitting supporter on our side could win. What happened was that people like Stevenson ended up riding in police cars and wearing American flags and the media, of course, completely refused to point up their hypocrisy in making the change. We are going to be up against exactly the same problem with the media in this case and every possible effort must be made to develop a program now to counteract this obvious tactic which is being developed.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 9, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR : H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT

On Monday, I had the rather disturbing conversation with Alex regarding Billy Graham. Billy had apparently called on Sunday for me when I was out of reach, and then called back Monday to say that he had been invited to give the invocation at the Democratic National Committee gathering by Sargent Shriver. He wanted to get my advice on it. As you will recall, you had told me at an earlier time that Graham thought it was better, since he had not given the invocation at the Democratic National Committee, that he not do so at the Republican National Committee, and I agreed. In view of that conversation, I told Alex, since Alex was unable to get hold of you in California, to call Graham back and tell him that I thought that his doing the Democratic National Committee only would be misinterpreted.

It is not advisable in a case like this for me to talk to Graham directly. I do not want him to feel that I directly am telling him that he should not do it. On the other hand, as you know, he is extremely sensitive about hearing from anybody but me, or from you, on political matters. It may be that it went all right with Alex making the call. I strongly urge that you keep the closest contact with Graham, call him at least once a week regardless of what subjects you have to discuss, and inform everybody on the staff that if a call from him comes through that you will take it. Unless you take it, I should take it myself.

As you know, we have been trying to get McClellan's opponent in Arkansas, out of the race. I had taken this matter up with John Mitchell and he said that he would work on it. However, John is out of pocket, as you know. Connally told me yesterday that he had no success in talking to Winthrop Rockefeller in trying to get Winthrop to get him out of the race. Connally said that he thought that he had heard that the brother who had perhaps the most influence with Winthrop, was David Rockefeller. Apparently the man running against McClellan had a rather minor position with the FHA before Winthrop got him to run with the thought that in the event McClellan lost, that he would have

a candidate against Pryor. Under the circumstances, it now becomes vital that we make one last effort to try to get McClellan's opponent out of the race. It isn't that McClellan is afraid he will lose, it's simply that McClellan then will be freed to give us more open support, not only in Arkansas, but in many other areas. I would like for you to speak to Kissinger and see if he will call David Rockefeller and see what David can do in working on Winthrop. Also, if Kissinger thinks well of it, he might even consider calling Winthrop. Connally believes that Nelson is not the one to work on Winthrop on this matter. This is a matter of rather high priority, and touching base with Mitchell probably is a good idea, however, don't count on Mitchell to do it because I feel that at this time, he simply is unable to follow through on some of these things because of personal, and other considerations, which are overriding.

Connally seemed to be somewhat disappointed that he had not heard anything on the Ed Pauley matter. I would like for you to follow through as quickly as possible and inform Connally what Pauley's decision is.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 18, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

In view of recent poll results, I have some revised thoughts with regard to the schedule for the family.

I think that Mrs. RN, Tricia, Julie, Eddy Nixon and Eddy Cox should be scheduled into all of the smaller States including the southern States between now and the Election. Of course Hawaii and Alaska should be excluded unless it appears that a trip to Alaska might be essential for the purpose of shoring up Stevens.

I think it is also important that the family be heavily scheduled into Massachusetts, West Virginia, Wisconsin and any other doubtful States.

With regard to southern States, I want to be sure that none of the southern States feel that they are being taken for granted. For example, I want to be sure that some member of the family is scheduled in the Mississippi/Alabama/Arkansas/Louisiana, as well as in the States where we have Senate contests we expect we have a good chance to win.

Whenever a member of the family goes into South Dakota, I want a particularly good advance job done to be sure that we get a good reception in that area.

Also, I want the members of the family to be informed that they are to go all out in standing behind the Republican candidates for the Senate in those States where we think our Republican candidates have a chance to win.

These comments apply of course to Agnew and the surrogates with Agnew having to play a somewhat more temperate role with regard to calling for the election of a Republican Senate for fear that we will stir up the animals too much among labor and conventional Democrats who are supporting us. Agnew of course cannot and should not stand aside from our Republican candidates but he should not make a great issue out of campaigning for a Republican Senate.

As far as other surrogates are concerned, those who are not too close to me can be more vocal in their calling for the election of Republican candidates to the Senate. People like Finch and Klein, on the other hand, should be somewhat more restrained because whatever they say will be attributed directly to the White House.

In the case of the family, the problem is not too difficult. It is expected that they will be supporting the Republican nominees and they will go it at a low key, personal way that will not raise the hackles of the Democratic politicians.

Confirming our conversation earlier today, I think it is important to take the allocation of advertising for Texas and put it into Massachusetts and West Virginia. I believe that Rhode Island will go with the swing and, as far as Wisconsin is concerned, it probably also will be affected by the swing, although if there is a way to get some special attention paid to Wisconsin, it should be done.

I particularly want to make sure that we don't overlook Senate contests in places like Montana, New Mexico and Louisiana where we might have a chance to win. Also having in mind the poll on Alabama, it is quite possible now I think that Blount could win. I think it is very important that at least one or two members of the family go to Alabama and be seen with Blount. Of course the other reason for going to Alabama is to make sure that the Alabamians do not consider that we are taking them for granted.

As far as the southern States are concerned, I will cover Atlanta and I have already covered Florida. The others should all--except for Texas--be covered by members of the family, and the same is true of mountain States and farm States, and the New England States--Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island--which are not on our target list.

On another subject, I would like for you to put somebody from Buchanan's shop on a special project entitled "What the Columnists and Commentators Would Like to Forget". Here what I would like to do is to pick up their predictions with regard to the election beginning right after the California primary and carrying through the Democratic and Republican Conventions up to election. I would pick up the major liberal columnists and of course virtually all of the television commentators where they have made predictions and statements which may well be proved wrong by the election results.

This will be very useful in the event I go forward with any writing about the campaign. I had great difficulty getting this material together for "Six Crises" and I am not sure I will want to use it, but in any event I want the material prepared so that if I do decide to write on this subject I will have it in my files.

With further reference to the Senate contests, I think it is important that you very discreetly find out what contests really need more money and try to channel some of our major contributors into those contests rather than into the national campaign.

On the same subject, let us be sure that in all the Senate contests we plan the three weeks' blitz of a combined media play which will give the major possible coattail effect where there is a chance that would help.

A case in point is Wes Powell in New Hampshire. He probably has very little chance to win at this point because of the split in the Republican ranks. On the other hand, with the swing as big as it might be, if he hangs tight enough to us he could pull it off and we should not move away from him because, while he is somewhat of a cross to bear, we owe nothing whatever to MacIntyre.

With regard to scheduling, both Tricia and Julie would like very much to work in tours to southern border States and also to the mountain States at this time. I think that we have been throwing them into the heavy media areas long enough and while, of course, we should not rule out such areas totally and particularly not rule them out for the last two weeks, it might be well to give them a respite from having to face the sharpies in the Press corps in New York, Chicago, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, et. al. and schedule them into States like Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, Kentucky, Arkansas, Oklahoma and others, as well as in the smaller towns in larger States like Texas where they will be particularly well received. The same can be said of Montana, New Mexico, Wyoming, Utah, Idaho, Kansas and Nebraska as well as of other States of that type. Also, I want particularly emphasis on their schedules to be on towns that no national celebrity may have visited before.

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday - July 23, 1972
Camp David

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT *Am*

In studying the New York Times release of the Gallup Poll on youth one lesson comes through loud and clear -- it is imperative that we limit our registration efforts wherever possible, without announcing that that is our tactic, to the non-college youth. Of course, some registration of college youth on a very selective basis should be undertaken, but generally speaking we have to realize that there is about a two to one chance that college youth will vote for McGovern. There is about an even chance that the non-college youth will vote for us.

If a youth registration drive begins, pushed by the McGovern forces, every effort should be made to get them to direct that drive to non-college as well as to college youth. I know that our plan is to register youth selectively by finding out in advance which side they are on and then going forward in the registration. Here it is very important that the question asked not be on partisan terms. Over half of all youth list themselves as Independents rather than Republicans or Democrats. Consequently, it should simply be a question of asking whether they are for McGovern or Nixon and then registering those that are for Nixon.

Of course, it could be argued that the registration drive among youth, even non-college youth, is not one that we should undertake at all, since at the very best they would split 50-50. This is much poorer than the national average and much poorer than what we would do among older voters. However, to avoid the effect on older voters of our conceding the youth vote to McGovern, we need to make some effort in this area. Let us limit it to the target states, particularly

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the big city areas and the down-state areas where we might pick up support and except for a token effort let us concentrate on non-college, blue collar youth, among ethnics and, of course, among those few that might lean to our side because of their background in a Republican family.

I emphasize again that the whole youth effort should be one that gets across the idea that youth will not overwhelmingly be in McGovern's pocket, that we have in the nation very substantial support among younger voters and that we are going to get more as they learn what the issues are. In fact, something can be gained by pointing out that we are concentrating on registering all youth and that the McGovern people are limiting themselves to the elite youth who have gone to college or are in colleges and universities.

NOTE: Two copies. One for the President's file and one for Bob Haldeman - not for distribution otherwise. That is always the case where I dictate a political memorandum unless I indicate that the political memorandum is to go to others. (RN)

CAMP DAVID
Sunday - July 30, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT



In reading Lou Cannon's piece in the Sunday Washington Post I think we can get some guidance as to the handling of the press on campaign matters which should be followed strictly.

I do not want people who talk about the campaign to make the mistake of cutting off representatives of periodicals, TV and newspapers simply because they are generally against us. Consequently, I do not object to an article appearing from time to time, in unfriendly publications which is based on conversations with our campaign people. Having said this, however, we need some completely ironclad rules with regard to who talks to media representatives that we know are antagonistic to us.

First of all, it is vitally important that only the most intelligent and sophisticated person on our campaign staff dare to go in the ring with one of these people. Second, we should not waste time with one of them at the expense of turning down interviews with media representatives who are our friends. Third, even when our most intelligent people are meeting with people like Cannon they must constantly keep in mind that they are confronting a political enemy and that everything they say will, therefore, be used against us. I have to emphasize this over and over again because we never seem to get it across to our people no matter how many times they get burned.

The Cannon piece is the best example we can have of why these rules should be rigidly adhered to. In the first place, while we know the Washington Post is totally gainst us it is just as well to have a piece that has some favorable points in it as well as completely negative ones. Therefore, I have no objections to the fact that Cannon was given interviews by the Campaign Committee. On the other hand, it waa a stupid mistake - which must never be repeated - to allow Cannon to have the run of the White House staff, the campaign staff and the National Committee staff in getting his story together. The PR types representative of each of

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these groups must have a rule that when media representatives, who are antagonistic, come in for interviews they are treated courteously but that only the top political man with great sophistication will be allowed to talk to him. In addition, whenever that man talks to the interviewer the press man should sit in on the interview so as to keep it honest.

In that connection, incidentally, I was rather surprised to find that we did not have a recording of Clark MacGregor's remarks at the Press Club. It will be a very modest expense - but it is absolutely essential that a man with a small recording device go with him everywhere he goes so that we have a record of what he says which he can put out in the event that we want to correct a misquotation or get out a story that was not covered adequately. The same, I think, should be true of Dole. As you know we have always followed this custom with regard to my own appearances.

Now, looking at the Cannon story from both the plus and the minus standpoints, we find a good headline - "Nixon Running Scared," and a good thrust insofar as there being no complacency.

From a minus standpoint, it is obvious that Cannon had the run of the shop and in addition to talking to Haldeman in the White House and MacGregor at the Committee to Re-Elect, Dole at the Republican National Committee, he talked to people up and down the line and got a number of quotes that are both inaccurate and not helpful. I am not, of course, referring to quotes that he has from Republican Senators and Congressmen. We have no control whatsoever over this. What I am referring to are quotes that he obviously had to get - since he has it in quotation marks - from people on the campaign staff.

For example, as I have often emphasized, it is a mistake constantly to run down my previous campaigns. We should not contribute to the myth that I did not work hard enough in 1960 and 1968. The quotation to the effect that before the election in November I had gotten so confident that I was working on my acceptance speech, taking rests, etc., is totally inaccurate, as you know, and very harmful.

With regard to MacGregor's own interview, I would like for you to get together with him and Dole on one point and to have a rule enforced throughout the balance of the campaign. He was putting out polls from California and Texas as well as Ohio and Illinois. There was no reason why he should not have done this since we have not indicated in the past what our policy was in this respect. However, under

absolutely no circumstances are any polls whatever to be put out showing us ahead or behind in any of the major states without my specific approval. This is an area where well-intentioned people will put out a poll for what they think is a good reason - in this case to knock down complacency -- but where later on they are going to be asked for polls in these states when they might not want to put them out. Also, I don't want the impression to get across the country that we are conducting our campaign on the basis of polls rather than on the basis of principles. I want you specifically to see that this is brought up at the next meeting where Mitchell, Dole, MacGregor, et al, are present. Mitchell, of course, would not have made this mistake. MacGregor made it only because of lack of experience.

Along the same line, I noted where the statement was made that abortion was a minus issue for the President because polls showed that a majority of women favored it. This obviously comes from the Harper group in the Domestic Council Staff. I want you to get hold of Ehrlichman and tell him that he is to see that absolutely no one in the Domestic Council talks to anyone in the press without his specific approval and then a press man from Ron's office is to be present. Ehrlichman, of course, would not make such a stupid mistake and the only way he can control others is to put a tight reign on them.

For example, Syndlinger ran into outraged reaction the evening that the National Committee put out findings from their Platform Committee poll to the effect that a majority of the members of the Platform Committee found out that bussing was not a significant issue. I want some discipline enforced in this respect for reasons which should be obvious even to the most stupid of our people.

Another line which we should knock down is that there is no grass roots support for the President and that we have to get "volunteers one at a time." This probably comes from Sears or somebody in that group. The question here is not whether this may be true - and I doubt if it is in terms of getting volunteers one at a time - but it plays right into the hands of our political enemies. I could give other examples but I close the memorandum with this admonition: Let's quit tackling our own ball carrier."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT



With further reference to the discussion I have had with you on Agnew's schedule, I think it is very intriguing to explore the possibility of his following McGovern, not in every appearance McGovern makes, but once or twice a week in major cities that McGovern may visit. As I have pointed out, Agnew is undoubtedly going to draw a bigger crowd and it would give him an opportunity to hit McGovern hard on points that he may have made that need to be corrected.

In addition, the reverse twist here is to schedule Agnew in the day before or two days before McGovern goes in. Here again, we can get a good crowd comparison and Agnew, using this tactic, could ask searching questions and say that he believes the people have a right to know what McGovern's answers are to those questions. In fact, this latter tactic may be preferable to the first, but both could be tried. The more we can get Agnew engaged in a debate with McGovern the better.

It is also very important to emphasize to Agnew again that he should ignore Shriver. I realize that when he has a Q & A there may be instances when he will have to respond to a question on Shriver, but he should brush it off as quickly as possible so that we do not have a national debate between Agnew and Shriver rather than a national debate between Agnew and McGovern.

With regard to Shriver, what should be developed is a truth squad operation in which some of our better speakers follow him in to the key areas that he goes into. As a matter of fact, you might sandwich him, having someone go in before and ask a few questions which they want him to answer and someone following him. The sandwich operation could also be used on McGovern with someone going in before and then Agnew going in afterwards, or vice versa.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT



Julie and Tricia were asking me over the weekend what kind of answers they can give now that the Democratic nomination seems to be pretty much a foregone conclusion when asked their opinion on the man or his stands.

My advice off the top of my head was for them to decline to get into personalities, but to simply say that they didn't know much about it except that from listening to the debates and what Humphrey and other Democrats had said that it would appear that McGovern might have a problem in uniting his party.

What I want you to direct Buchanan to do is to figure out all the tough political questions that are likely to be put to Tricia and Julie when they appear on talk shows over the next few months and for him to prepare suggested answers for them which will keep them from getting involved personally, but which will avoid their appearing to be totally non-responsive when such a question is raised. It is vitally important, of course, that they not get headlines which indicates that the daughters of the President are attacking the Democratic nominee. The more off-hand, subtle kind of answer is what I have in mind. This is not generally Buchanan's approach, but I think if you explain it to him he will find ways to tackle the problem that could be very effective. I want you to look over the Q & A after he prepares it before sending it on to Tricia and Julie. This should be done before the end of this week because they are both going to be on shows next week and the week after, as I understand it. They have done extremely well winging it on their own on these political questions up to this point, although I realize they have had considerable help from the staff on substantive matters on

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where do I stand on environment, welfare, etc. In view of the Moscow trip I told Julie and Tricia that if they were asked what the major issue of 1972 would be that they should respond that while the domestic issues were, of course, extremely important, that where the Presidency was concerned it would be their opinion that most young people, as well as other voters, would be primarily interested in which of the two candidates was best qualified to lead the United States in international affairs and to build on the great peace initiatives we have begun in China and the Soviet Union. In any event, I want some more intensive thinking done on how they should respond to such questions in the light of our recent Moscow trip, having in mind the fact that we want to keep them and all of our speakers talking about our issue which is international affairs, and except for domestic issues that have a real appeal like busing, amnesty and pot to stay off of the domestic issues.

I think the materials prepared for them so far have probably put a little too much emphasis on the environment, welfare reform, revenue sharing, etc. These are good, safe things to talk about but they are relatively dull and will become rather irrelevant as the campaign heats up.

CAMP DAVID
Sunday - July 30, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT



This is a post script to the memorandum I wrote to you on the Washington Post story.

In laying down the rules that only our top people can talk to antagonistic media representatives and then only under the very strictest surveillance by one of the people from the press office, I realize that this is difficult to enforce because people at other levels in the campaign need a chance to express themselves and do not like the idea of feeling that they cannot be trusted to talk to members of the press. There is an easy way to handle this. Deliberately develop occasions where they can talk to friendly representatives of the media. I realize there are not too many but on the other side of the coin our major problem, as you know, is that we give about twice as much time to unfriendly people as we do to friendly press people. In this campaign I want this thing reversed as much as we can. One way we can at least reward our friends is to give them the opportunity to talk to second echelon people - something that we will not allow to unfriendly people. This way we kill two birds with one stone. Our staffers will get the satisfaction of being able to sound off about their views in the campaign and in addition our friends in the press and television will be getting something that their competitors will not be getting.

There perhaps could not be clearer proof of the difference between the kind of treatment we will get in the press and the kind of treatment McGovern will get in the press than the Nixon/McGovern articles in the Sunday Post today - July 30. The Nixon article, as I pointed out earlier in the memorandum, makes some points that we want to have made but does not miss an opportunity to make all the negative points that are part of the mythology with regard to our campaigns.

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The McGovern article by Spencer Rich, as we might expect, is a total puff piece. This comparison only demonstrates the wisdom of my advice that we have to be much more careful in programming interviews with unfriendly press people than we do with friendly press people.

Incidentally, when I said earlier in the memorandum that I thought we should see some of the unfriendly media people I meant only those who reached fairly substantial audiences that we could not afford to ignore. Under no circumstances, do I want any more time wasted, for example, on John Osborne on the left or his counterparts on the far right. I say this not because they are against us but because the audience they reach simply is not that important to us.