

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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1	10	12/13/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to Agnew RE: meeting with Buckley and Rusher. 2pgs.
1	10	12/10/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: desire to divide the Democratic Convention. 1pg.

December 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM TO: CHUCK COLSON
FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Max Friedersdorf called to say that Ashbrook may be thrown into a district with Wayne Hayes; the issue is not settled yet; which could put him in a bad way; finally, that he apparently just got a divorce from his wife of some twenty years -- which might well mean the guy must see his world falling in around him. These are factors we should be aware of.

Pat

December 13, 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE VICE PRESIDENT (Per Goodearle)

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Just a note for the Wednesday Morning Meeting:

Your decision to meet both Buckley and Rusher was precisely accurate. Had you met with Buckley along, Rusher, the leader of the Group would have considered it, I am confident, as both an end run and an absence of recognition of his crucial role. Bill Rusher, my friend, it should be remembered is jealous of his own prerogatives, considers himself the "political" mind of the conservatives, while Buckley is considered to be the "Godfather" of the movement.

By meeting with Rusher as well, the Vice President in effect put them on the same plane, which is precisely the environment we want to achieve if we want to affect the prime mover of this operation, who is Rusher. Buckley is hesitant over the project anyway.

With Buckley, the Vice President will be pushing against an open door; with Rusher, you are dealing with the one individual who more than any other, outside of Ashbrook himself, who can call this thing off.

Arguments against the Ashbrook Candidacy, which may prove helpful.

1. If there is an open rebellion by Ashbrook et al., any remnant of influence the Manhattan Twelve had in the White House and Administration will go by the boards in an Administration effort to swamp Ashbrook in the primaries.
2. Conservatives would be divided over this candidacy; the performance would be far weaker than if Conservatives were united -- yet, the outcome would invariably be taken within the White House, Administration and press as a test of Conservative strength within the party. And the Conservatives would invariably be pointed up as a "paper tiger."

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3. Bitterness would ensue, which assuredly could damage the President in 1972 -- especially if Conservatives would push for his defeat. But Nixon's defeat means no Conservative voice at all for four years in Government; it means every single one of the Conservative objectives in government, which run the gamut from defense to foreign to domestic policy would go by the boards; it means that the Conservatives responsible would be treated as the party pariahs in 1976, just as Rockefeller and Lindsay were treated because of what they did in 1964.

4. When the deluge came Conservatives in every post in the Administration, from Vice President on down, would go down the same tube as the President -- and how does that help the Conservative movement, or the country. Only bitterness and division all around.

Buchanan

[Item N-11]
December 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Reason for that piece was this:

What we want is a deadlocked, divided convention, just as the Democrats wanted a knock-down drag-out between Nixon-Rockefeller-Reagan in 1968. Instead, we moved steadily and early -- and all but locked it up.

Muskie, in my view, is quietly locking out the bloodbath possibility with few people aware of how far along his campaign is. If Kennedy, the columnists and, most important, the far left are cognizant of how close Muskie is, if this is publicized, the possibilities are greater that they will get off their McGovern fling, get together and get into the race to stop the guy. If Muskie is seen as so close and other^slike Humphrey want it, then they might start to work on him and might work to block him. What I am afraid of is that the Democrats are going to wake up in March, and find the nomination closed -- accept that fact, and rally behind him. One friend high up in the Democratic National Committee tells me that there is a possibility if Muskie rolls through Wisconsin, Kennedy will endorse him. I can't believe that -- but if something like that occurred -- we've got problems.

Buchanan