MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Vietnamese Communist Position on a Cease-fire

MACV has in hand a captured enemy document which provides one of the clearest expressions of enemy view on the timing of a cease-fire in Vietnam that we have seen (Tab A). The document consists of notes taken by a medium-level party cadre in South Vietnam during the course of lectures on the content and strategy of COSVN Resolution 9. The notes date from around the end of September.

According to the notes, the Communists will only accept a cease-fire if the U.S. has agreed to total withdrawal, if a coalition government "is" formed, and if the Communists are stronger than the allies and are "sure" they can win in "political competition with the enemy."

Comment: This document (which taken by itself cannot be considered conclusive) is about as strong a piece of evidence as we have seen to the effect that Hanoi is not now considering a cease-fire and would, in fact, reject one.

Attachment
SUBJECT: Captured Documents Screened at CDEC, Saigon (U)

1. (U) During the period 161200H to 171200H December 1969, CDEC prepared 37 bulletins, exploiting 162 captured documents. Documents containing significant information are summarized below, bulletins and translation reports are in distribution channels as addressees receive this message.

2. (C) I and II CTZI Bul 27228, Doc 12-1972-69 (71 PG Orig); notebook, entries dated from 15 August to 19 November 1969 by an unspecified individual (possibly member of Pho Chau village party committee, Duc Pho District, Quang Ngai province, Region 5), contains an entry, undated, (possibly made before the end of September 1969), which pertains to the study of the addendum of resolution number 9 adopted by COSVN, it reads in part as follows: "The primary concern of the Nixon Administration is to settle the SVN war as soon as possible, because Asia has recently become of little interest to the Americans militarily, the primary objectives of the Americans are the Near East, Middle East, and Europe. The SVN war has frustrated the world-wide strategy of the Americans and has politically isolated them in all parts of the world. The Americans have brought the SVN war to its apex, and now have to de-escalate it because they realize that they are unable to
win a military victory. On our (NFLSVN/NVN) part, we have made great strides in the military, political, and diplomatic fields, but we have failed to decisively turn the tide of the SVN war in our favor. A cease fire will only be accepted by us if the following conditions are fulfilled: (1) The Americans agree to withdraw (all) of their troops from SVN; (2) A coalition government is formed; and (3) We are stronger than the enemy (RVN) in the non-aligned people, and our mass uprisings are weak. Consequently, we are to continue our military attacks to develop our revolutionary organizations in order to generate a general mass uprising aimed at overthrowing the Thieu-Ky government and founding a coalition government. This coalition government may be formed after we have seized control of the (RVN) administrative infrastructure, we will accept a cease-fire only when we are sure to win in our political competition with the enemy (RVN)." Capture data: 12 December 1969; 173rd US ABN BDE: BS919158; received CDEC 15 December 1969.
CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 69176 (J2)
EXCEPT AUS, PHIL, ROK, RVN, NZ, AND THAI.
CINCPAC FOR J2, DA FOR AGSI/DFIRE, CINCUSARPAC FOR G2, CSAF
FOR AFNIN; DIRNSA FOR B6, FMFPAC FOR G2, AMEMB FOR PO, AMB
AND OSA (6 COPIES),
SUBJECT: CAPTURED DOCUMENTS SCREENED AT CDEC: SAIGON (U).
1. During the period 161200H to 171200H December 1969, CDEC
PREPARED 37 BULLETINS EXPLOITING 162 CAPTURED DOCUMENTS: DOCUMENTS
CONTAINING SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW, BULLETINS
AND TRANSLATION REPORTS ARE IN DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS AS ADDRESSED.
RECEIVE THIS MESSAGE.
2. (C) I & II CTZ BUL 27228; DOC 12-1972-69 (71 PG ORIG):
NOTEBOOK, ENTRIES DATED FROM 15 AUG TO 19 NOV 69 BY AN UNSPECIFIED
INDIVIDUAL; (POSSIBLY MEMBER OF PHO CHAU VILLAGE PARTY COMMITTEE;
DU C PHO DISTRICT; QUANG NGAI PROVINCE; REGION 5), CONTAINS AN
ENTRY, UNDATED; (POSSIBLY MADE BEFORE THE END OF SEP 69); WHICH
PERTAINS TO THE STUDY OF THE ADDENDUM OF RESOLUTION NUMBER 9
ADOPTED BY COSVN; IT READS IN PART AS FOLLOWS: @ THE PRIMARY
CONCERN OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION IS TO SETTLE THE SVN WAR AS
SOPON AS POSSIBLE, BECAUSE ASIA HAS RECENTLY BECOME OF LITTLE
INTEREST TO THE AMERICANS MILITARILY, THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF
THE AMERICANS ARE THE NEAR EAST, MIDDLE EAST, AND EUROPE. THE
SVN WAR HAS FRUSTRATED THE WORLD-WIDE STRATEGY OF THE AMERICANS
AND HAS POLITICALLY ISOLATED THEM IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD.
THE AMERICANS HAVE BROUGHT THE SVN WAR TO ITS APEX; AND NOW HAVE
TO DE-ESCALATE IT BECAUSE THEY REALIZE THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO
WIN A MILITARY VICTORY. ON OUR ((NPLSVN/NAV)) PART, WE HAVE MADE
GREAT STRIDES IN THE MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND DIPLOMATIC FIELDS,
BUT WE HAVE FAILED TO DECISIVELY TURN THE TIDE OF THE SVN WAR IN

ACT: DIA-30
INFO: J3-12 J5-2 NMCC-1 SACSA-3 SECBEF-7 ASD/SA-3 WH-4 FILE-1 (63)
DTR/WW

1 OF 2
Our favor, a cease fire will only be accepted by us if the following conditions are fulfilled: (1) the Americans agree to withdraw (all) their troops from SVN; (2) a coalition government is formed; and (3) we are stronger than the enemy ((RVN)) in various aspects. Presently, we have not yet won the support of the non-aligned people, and our mass uprisings are weak. Consequently, we are to continue our military attacks to develop our revolutionary organizations in order to generate a general mass uprising aimed at overthrowing the Thieu-Ky government and founding a coalition government. This coalition government may be formed after we have seized control of the ((RVN)) administrative infrastructure. We will accept a cease-fire only when we are sure to win in our political competition with the enemy ((RVN)).

DATA: 12 DEC 69 173RD US ABN BDE; BS919158; RECEIVED CDEC: 15 DEC 69.
3. (U) III CTZI NEGATIVE
4. (U) IV CTZI NEGATIVE.

GP4
BT
#4309
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Vietnamese Communist Position on a Cease-fire

You asked that the memorandum on Vietnamese Communist position on a cease-fire be done as a memorandum for the President.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

December 18, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: John Holdridge

SUBJECT: Vietnamese Communist Position on a Cease-fire

MACV has in hand a captured enemy document which provides one of the clearest expressions of enemy view on the timing of a cease-fire in Vietnam that we have seen (Tab A). The document consists of notes taken by a medium-level party cadre in SVN during the course of lectures on the content and strategy of COSVN Resolution 9. The notes date from around the end of September.

According to the notes, the Communists will only accept a cease-fire if the U. S. has agreed to total withdrawal, if a coalition government "is" formed, and if the Communists are stronger than the allies and are "sure" they can win in "political competition with the enemy."

Comment: This document (which taken by itself cannot be considered conclusive) is about as strong a piece of evidence as we have seen to the effect that Hanoi is not now considering a cease-fire and would, in fact, reject one. However, there is other evidence on this score, the most recent being Cyrus Eaton's account of his conversations with Hanoi leaders.

Attachment

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