THE PRESIDENT \S SEEN.

5778

INFORMATION

December 27, 196

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger #

SUBJECT: Vietnamese Communist Position on a Cease-fire

MACV has in hand a captured enemy document which provides one of the clearest expressions of enemy view on the timing of a ceasefire in Vietnam that we have seen (Tab A). The document consists of notes taken by a medium-level party cadre in South Vietnam during the course of lectures on the content and strategy of COSVN Resolution 9. The notes date from around the end of September.

According to the notes, the Communists will only accept a cease-fire if the U.S. has agreed to total withdrawal, if a coalition government "is" formed, and if the Communists are stronger than the allies and are "sure" they can win in "political competition with the enemy."

<u>Comment</u>: This document (which taken by itself cannot be considered conclusive) is about as strong a piece of evidence as we have seen to the effect that Hanoi is not now considering a cease-fire and would, in fact, reject one.

Attachment min again - Enot sught no are fire offen - for propaganda o I believe this should from This not from us from This not from us by if he feels the could ū t only if he feels the con do so without wesling his intend so turken CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN C O P Y

SUBJECT: Captured Documents Screened at CDEC, Saigon (U)

1. (U) During the period 161200H to 171200H December 1969, CDEC prepared 37 bulletins, exploiting 162 captured documents. Documents containing significant information are summarized below, bulletins and translation reports are in distribution channels as addressees receive this message.

2. (C) I and II CTZI Bul 27228, Doc 12-1972-69 (71 PG Orig); notebook, entries dated from 15 August to 19 November 1969 by an unspecified individual (possibly member of Pho Chau village party committee, Duc Pho District, Quang Ngai province, Region 5), contains an entry, undated, (possibly made before the end of September 1969), which pertains to the study of the addendum of resolution number 9 adopted by COSVN, it reads in part as follows: "The primary concern of the Nixon Administration is to settle the SVN war as soon as possible, because Asia has recently become of little interest to the Americans militarily, the primary objectives of the Americans are the Near East, Middle East, and Europe, The SVN war has frustrated the world-wide strategy of the Americans and has politically isolated them in all parts of the world. The Americans have brought the SVN war to its apex, and now have to de-escalate it because they realize that they are unable to win a military victory. On our (NFLSVN/NVN) part, we have made great strides in the military, political, and diplomatic fields, but we have failed to decisively turn the tide of the SVN war in our favor. A cease fire will only be accepted by us if the following conditions are fulfilled: (1) The Americans agree to withdraw (all) of their troops from SVN: (2) A coalition government is formed; and (3) We are stronger than the enemy (RVN) in the non-aligned people, and our mass uprisings are weak. Consequently, we are to continue our military attacks to develop our revolutionary organizations in order to generate a general mass uprising aimed at overthrowing the Thieu-Ky government and founding a coalition government. This coalition government may be formed after we have seized control of the (RVN) administrative infrastructure, we will accept a cease-fire only when we are sure to win in our political competition with the enemy (RVN)." Capture data: 12 December 1969; 173rd US ABN BDE: BS919158; received CDEC 15 December 1969.

C O P Y - 2 -

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER 2267

MESSAGE CENTER

CALL 53337 VZCZCJCS740 08#4383 FOR NMCC/MC PP RUCRUCS RUCRUCS SERVICE DE RHMSMVA #4309 3511218 ZNY CCCCC. 13 452 P 171016Z DEC 69 ZEX 017 FM COMUSMACY TO AIG 7054 RUHHFMAZCGEMEPAC RUAOBLS/JSPC SOBE OKINAWA RUMLPKAZDSA II CTZ PLEIKU RUMOREBZTASK FORCE ALFA NAKHON PHANOM THAILAND INFO. RHMAAVAZÖGÜSARV LONG BINH RUMLBPN/CGXXIVOORPS PHU BAI BT I DENTIAL NOFORN 69170 CONF (12) EXCEPT AUST, PHIL, ROK, RVN, NZ, AND THAI, CINCRAC FOR U2, DA FOR ACSI/DFIRE, CINCUSARPAC FOR G2, CSAF FOR AFNIN, DIRNA FOR B6, FMFPAC FOR G2, AMEMB FOR PO, AMB AND OSA (6 COPIES). SUBJECT: CAPTORED DOCUMENTS SCREENED AT CDEC. SAIGON (U). (U) DURING THE PERIOD 161200H TO 171200H DECEMBER 1969, CDEC PREPARED 37 BULLETINST EXPLOITING 162 CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. DOCUMENTS. CONTINING SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW. BULLETINS AND TRANSLATION REPORTS ARE IN DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS AS ADDRESSEES. RECEIVE THIS MESSAGE. 2. (C) I & II CTZI BUL 27228, DOC 12-1972-69 (71 PG ORIG): NOTEBOOK, ENTRIES DATED FROM 15 AUG TO 19 NOV 69 BY AN UNSPECIFIED INDIVIDUAL ((POSSIBLY MEMBER OF PHO CHAU VILLAGE PARTY COMITTEE) DUC PHO DISTRICT, QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, REGION 533, CONTAINS AN ENTRY, UNDATED; ((POSSIBLY MADE BEFORE THE END OF SEP 69)); WHICH PERTAINS TO THE STUDY OF THE ADDENDUM OF RESOLUTION NUMBER 9 ADOPTED BY COSVN. IT READS IN PART AS FOLLOWS: OTHE PRIMARY CONCERN OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION IS TO SETTLE THE SYN WAR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BECAUSE ASIA HAS RECENTLY BECOME OF LITTLE INTEREST TO THE AMERICANS MILITARILY, THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF THE AMERICANS ARE THE NEAR EAST, MIDDLE EAST, AND EUROPE, THE SVN WAR HAS PRUSTRATED THE WORLD-WIDE STRATEGY OF THE AMERICANS AND HAS POLITICALLY ISOLATED THEM IN ALLURARTS OF THE WORLD. THE AMERICANS HAVE BROUGHT THE SVN WAR TO ITS APEXA AND NOW HAVE TO DESCALATE IT BECAUSE THEY REALIZE THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO WIN A MILITARY VICTORY, ON OUR ((NELSVN/NVN)) PART, WE HAVE MADE GREAT STRIKDES IN THE MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND DIPLOMATIC FIELDS, BUT WE HAVE FALLED TO DECISIVELY TURN THE TIDE OF THE SVN WAR IN

ACT: DIA-30

× 7

INFO: J3-12 J5-2 NMCC-1 SACSA-3 SECDEF-7 ASD/SA-3 WH-4 FILE-1 (63) DTR/WW

CONFIDENTIAL

1 OF 2

CONFIDEN 14

DEPARTMENT OF JEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER MESSAGE CENTER

OUR RAVOR, SANDEASE FIRE WILLONLY BE ACCEPTED BY US IF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS ARE FULFILLED! (1) THE AMERICANS AGREE TO WITHDRAW ((ALL)) THEIR TROOPS FROM SVN1 (2) ACCOALITION GOVERNMENT IS FORMEDI AND (3) WE ARE STRONGER THAN THE ENEMY ((RVN)) IN VARIOUS ASPECTS . PRESENTLY, WE HAVE NOT YET WON THE SUPPORT OF THE NON-ALLENED PEOPLE, AND OUR MASS UPRISINGS ARE WEAK. CONSE-QUENTLY, WE ARE TO CONTINUE OUR MILITARY ATTACKS TO DEVELOP OUR REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIOS IN ORDER TO GENERATE A GENERAL MASS UPRISING AIMED AT OVERTHROWING THE THIEU-KY GOVERNMENT AND FOUNDING A COALITION GOVERNMENT, THIS COALITION GOVERNMENT MAY BE FORMED. AFTER WE HAVE SEIZED CONTROL OF THE ((RNV)) ADVIMISTRATIVE INFRA-STRUCTURE, WEWNILL ACCEPT A CEASE FIRE ONLY WHEN WE ARE SURE TO WINGIN OUR POLITICAL COMPETITION WITH THE ENEMY ((RVN)), @ CAPTURE DATAL 12 DEC 691 173RD US ABN BDEI BS9191581 RECEIVED CDECT 15 DEC 69. 3. (U) III CTZ1 NEGATIVE. 4. (U) IV CTZI NEGATIVE. GP4. BT #4309 NNNN 2 OF 2 22672



AN

26 43 Q ... () 10045 0 0 -0 AN NON Ŧ E 5-3 NAL NO BV ð U 0 U1 O

0

0 1 VRN "No e the 0 11 325

The second se

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

rety	lan -
V	Anne
ACTION	par

5778

December 22, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Vietnamese Communist Position on a Cease-fire

You asked that the memorandum on Vietnamese Communist position on a cease-fire be done as a memorandum for the President.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment

0

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION MUM Autor December 18, 1969 December

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

John Holdridg

FROM:

Vietnamese Communist Position on a Cease-fire SUBJECT:

MACV has in hand a captured enemy document which provides one of the clearest expressions of enemy view on the timing of a cease-fire in Vietnam that we have seen (Tab A). The document consists of notes taken by a medium-level party cadre in SVN during the course of lectures on the content and strategy of COSVN Resolution 9. The notes date from around the end of September.

According to the notes, the Communists will only accept a cease-fire if the U. S. has agreed to total withdrawal, if a coalition government "is" formed, and if the Communists are stronger than the allies and are "sure" they can win in "political competition with the enemy."

Comment: This document (which taken by itself cannot be considered conclusive) is about as strong a piece of evidence as we have seen to the effect that Hanoi is not now considering a cease-fire and would, in fact, reject one. However, there is other evidence on this score, the most recent being Cyrus Eaton's account of his conversations with Hanoi leaders.

Attachment

NFIDENTIAI