MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 23, 1972

Henry,

-- At Tab A is a game plan for your approval which outlines action to be taken with respect to the President's speech on Tuesday.

-- At Tab B is a draft consultative cable to be given to Alex Johnson or Marshall Greene with instructions that it be sent eyes only, to our Ambassadors in Seoul, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Canberra, Wellington, and Tokyo.

-- At Tab C is a message from you to Watson instructing him to inform Pompidou, or in the event he is unavailable Jobert, of the new initiative.

-- At Tab D is a copy of the message sent yesterday afternoon to Bunker which we discussed on the phone.

-- At Tab E is a draft message to the PRC.

-- At Tab F is a draft letter from the President to Chairman Brezhnev.

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CHECK LIST OF KEY ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

1. Confirm actual delivery time by President - 9:00 or 9:30 p.m.

2. Confirm precise backgrounding time for President's speech, composition of audience and location for backgrounder. Should network television commentators be briefed one hour before and remainder of press corps 30 minutes before?

3. What about Congressional advance consultation. Should not bipartisan leaders be informed? By who and when?

4. When do Ziegler, Scali and other members of the White House staff get brought in?

5. Advance notification should be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Time of Briefing</th>
<th>Means</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Late Monday afternoon</td>
<td>Haig to Amb. Plimsoll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Tuesday a.m.</td>
<td>HAK to Amb. Cromer</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Tuesday p.m.</td>
<td>HAK to Amb. Dobrynin (Draft Letter Tab F)</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Monday night</td>
<td>Backchannel message (Tab C)</td>
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</table>

Remainder of troop contributing countries:

Korea
Laos
Cambodia
Thailand
New Zealand
plus Japan

Not more than 2 hours prior to speech time

By U.S. Ambassador in country.
Draft message to be given to Alex Johnson or Marshall Greene at Tab D.

5. Review scope of your briefing on Tuesday night and scope of your briefing for Wednesday a.m. Set time, composition and location for followup briefing on Wednesday a.m.
6. Review and approve final text of President's speech to be given to Ziegler by noon Tuesday for reproduction and press handout.

7. We should include a senior representative of USIA at your Tuesday briefing as well as your Wednesday a.m. briefing.

8. We should draft guidance cable for State to dispatch to all interested posts in conjunction with transmittal of text of President's speech. This can be placed on wire at time President begins speech.

9. Text of your Tuesday and Wednesday press briefings should also be transmitted for guidance to all posts.

10. Prior notification of other government officials and key personalities. Recommend Tuesday afternoon telephone calls to the following:

   -- The Vice-President
   -- Secretary Laird
   -- Attorney General
   -- Secretary Connally
   -- Former President Johnson
   -- Governor Rockefeller
   -- Governor Reagan
   -- Billy Graham
TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

Draft Cable to Canberra, Bangkok, Paris, Seoul, Tokyo, Vientiane, Wellington

TO: __________________________

1. You should immediately seek appointment with __________________________
in sufficient time to inform him of the contents of a speech President Nixon will make January 25 at 9 or 9:30 p.m. EST, but not more than two hours before delivery time in Washington. If __________________________ is unavailable, you should inform highest ranking official available. Must stress, however, need for absolute security both within your mission and host government. Premature disclosure could have gravest consequences.

2. The President will reveal a record of secret negotiations which Dr. Kissinger has conducted in Paris with representatives of Government of North Vietnam since August 1969. [He will explain that Hanoi has failed to respond to a sweeping new proposal we made last fall which would end the war. Their only response has been new offensives and rehashing of out worn propaganda themes. We thus face an impossible situation at home and abroad as the enemy uses our silence about our secret talks in attempt to confuse and divide Americans and deceive]
international opinion. In order to unite Americans and hopefully engage the other side in genuine negotiations, we will thus present formally at the January 27 Paris meeting the other side has not responded privately.]

3. **New U.S./Allied Plan.** Our plan, which has Thieu's full concurrence and is being tabled jointly with the GVN, builds on the negotiating principles already established in the public record. It provides that within 6 months of an agreement there would be:

   A. Complete U.S. and allied withdrawal.

   B. Release of POW's on both sides throughout Indochina.

   C. An Indochina-wide ceasefire.

   D. A new Presidential election in South Vietnam. All forces, including NLF, could present candidates and be represented on independent body which would organize and run the election. One month before the election President Thieu and Vice-President Huong would resign and turn over duties to caretaker administration headed by Senate Chairman. International supervision of the elections.


   F. Problems among Indochina states to be settled by Indochinese parties on basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs.
Disposition of outside forces, including North Vietnamese, in each country of Indochina would have to be settled as part of agreement.

G. International supervision of ceasefire, prisoner release, and withdrawal provisions.

H. International guarantees.

4. The President will state that alternatively to foregoing approach, we remain prepared to negotiate on military issues alone, an approach we proposed secretly last May. If we pursue this tack, we would settle the issues of US/allied withdrawal POW's and Indochina-wide ceasefire and leave the political issues to the Vietnamese alone. Choice as to which of foregoing approaches to adopt is up to Hanoi.

5. Full text of President's speech will be sent immediately after delivery as will text of any amplifying remarks made subsequently by Administration officials. Any supportive statement your host can make after speech delivered would be most welcomed here.
6. For Seoul Only:

You should tell Pak that in dealing with DRV on withdrawal issue we have consistently used formulation "U.S. and Allied Forces." With New Zealanders and Philippinos out and Australian and Thais on verge of removing last combat elements, the TCC list now narrowed to ourselves and ROK. We would strongly hope Pak sees merits of surfacing secret record at this time and that he has no difficulty endorsing it.

7. You may also tell Pak we are under no illusions of early acceptance of our proposals by other side and our thinking is that, if our initiative cannot be successfully negotiated, then of course GVN will continue to require substantial assistance from ourselves and other friends. With particular reference to your 356 in front channel, we would expect Pak might relate issue of our negotiating proposals and position relayed to you by Foreign Minister on January 19 to effect that ROKs want to complete withdrawals by end CY-72. You should stress that in absence of negotiated settlement, our position on ROK forces in SVN remains unchanged and reaffirm our hope that ROKs plan on keeping two divisions there through end 1972 with consideration of further redeployments in early 1973.

TOP-SECRET/EYES ONLY
January 24, 1972

TO: Ambassador Watson, Paris

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

Please seek Tuesday A.M. Paris time meeting with President Pompidou and inform him that President Nixon will make a speech at 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. EST on January 25. Speech will reveal record of secret negotiations which I have conducted in Paris with representatives of Government of North Vietnam. Inform that President Nixon wished him to be aware of this development on an exclusive basis prior to the event. Emphasize premature disclosure could have gravest consequences.

While revealing general scope of previous secret discussions in Paris the President will use this occasion to present publicly and formally sweeping U.S. proposals for peace. U.S. and GVN will also formally table this proposal at January 27 Paris meeting.

**New U.S./Allied Plan.** Our plan, which has Thieu’s full concurrence and is being tabled jointly with the GVN, builds on the negotiating principles already established in the public record. It provides that within six months of an agreement there would be:

A. Complete U.S. and allied withdrawal.

**TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY**
B. Release of POWs on both sides throughout Indochina.

C. An Indochina-wide ceasefire.

D. A new presidential election in South Vietnam. All forces, including NLF, could present candidates and be represented on independent body which would organize and run the election.

One month before the election President Thieu and Vice President Huong would resign and turn over duties to caretaker administration headed by Senate Chairman. International supervision of the elections.


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issues of U.S./allied withdrawal POWs and Indochina-wide ceasefire
and leave the political issues to the Vietnamese alone. Choice as to which
of foregoing approaches to adopt is up to Hanoi.

Full text of President's speech will be sent immediately after
delivery as will text of any amplifying remarks made subsequently by
Administration officials. Any supportive statement your host can make
after speech delivered would be most welcomed here.

Please convey to President Pompidou President Nixon's deeper
personal appreciation for arrangements which have made conduct of these
secret negotiations possible.
January 23, 1972

TO: AMBASSADOR BUNKER
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

1. The President and I want to express admiration for the masterful job you are doing in coordinating this speech with Thieu as you have done all along with regard to our secret negotiations. It is a most delicate and skillful performance for which we are all very much in your debt.

2. We seem to be in good shape. The President may speak at 9:30 rather than 9:00 Washington time Tuesday evening. I will brief on our proposals just before the speech and hand out the text embargoed until the speech. Thus your assumption paragraph 3 of Saigon 0023 is correct. I plan also to brief press Wednesday morning and take any general questions on the chronology of the secret negotiations. There may also be follow-up questions on the speech and our proposal. We will continue to keep you abreast of precise plans at this end.
3. Re paragraph 4 of Saigon 0022, we will insert language in the speech which will make clear that Thieu had the proposal before transmission to the other side. This will also be clear from briefings.

4. Re paragraph 4C of Saigon 0022, we have information here that Lam has been recalled to Saigon. You should caution Thieu that no one besides Lam should be informed of this initiative and that Lam in turn should talk to no one. We are holding information tightly at this end and as we all recognize, premature disclosure would be disastrous.

5. We are making one further change in our proposal sent in my January 1 letter as modified by our cable 2011. This is designed to make absolutely clear that our dates in paragraphs one and two are illustrative only and to eliminate the risk of September 1, 1972 being touted as a fixed date for our withdrawals.

Accordingly the first indentation of paragraph 1 will read:

"-- All American . . . point 6, will be withdrawn within six months after this statement of principles is signed. For example, if this statement is signed on March 1, 1972, these withdrawals will take place by September 1, 1972. The terminal date . . . is signed."

TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
The last three sentences of paragraph 2 will read:

"The release will begin . . . and will be completed within six months. For example, if this statement is signed on March 1, 1972, the release will take place by September 1, 1972. The completion . . . is signed."

Warm regards.
With the view towards keeping the record of current United States actions concerning the conflict in Southeast Asia complete, the U.S. Government is enclosing a copy of the text of President Nixon's speech of January 25. The speech reaffirms once again the U.S. desire to find a negotiated settlement to the Indo-China War, and present a plan whose outlines have already been given to Prime Minister Chou En-lai by Dr. Kissinger. This action completes each of the commitments made by Dr. Kissinger to the Prime Minister with respect to the conflict.

The United States has now taken every reasonable step to meet North Vietnamese concerns and respect the sacrifices and interests of all parties. These proposals go to the limits of United States generosity. They make it clear that there is no reason for the conflict to continue.

The North Vietnamese nevertheless seem intent to keep on trying to embarrass the United States by a major military offensive; the timing of their plans is noteworthy.

The People's Republic of China should understand that the United States would have no choice but to react strongly to provocative actions by the North Vietnamese which are designed to humiliate us. Such developments would be to no one's benefit.
The United States believes that all concerned countries have an interest in helping end this war and that its proposals mean that no country need trade in principles in promoting this objective.

This note is sent in the spirit of frankness and mutual understanding which have characterized our exchanges thus far.
Dear Mr. Chairman,

The speech I am making on Tuesday evening, January 25 reaffirms once again the United States desire to reach a negotiated settlement of the Indochina war.

We are offering a new plan for peace, the essence of which was transmitted to the North Vietnamese over three months ago. Hanoi has chosen to ignore this proposal, cancelling a private meeting with Mr. Kissinger at the last moment in mid-November. Since then we have had no reaction from the North Vietnamese except a step up in their military actions throughout Indochina.

This plan reflects the conversation Foreign Minister Gromyko had with me and Mr. Kissinger last September. It is specifically designed to take account of the obstacles to a solution that still remained after considerable progress during the summer. It offers a political process which would give all forces in South Vietnam a fair chance for political power, as well as committing the United States to total withdrawal within a short period. Alternatively, as I make clear in my speech, we remain ready to settle military issues alone, as we proposed privately last May. In this case, we would withdraw all American and
allied forces within six months in exchange for an Indochina ceasefire and release of all prisoners. The political question would be left for the Vietnamese to settle among themselves. The United States has now taken every reasonable step to meet North Vietnamese concerns and respect the sacrifices and interests of all parties. These proposals go to the limits of United States generosity. They make it clear that there is no reason for the conflict to continue.

The North Vietnamese nevertheless seem intent to keep on trying to embarrass the United States by a major military offensive. The Soviet Union should understand that the United States would have no choice but to react strongly to provocative actions by the North Vietnamese which are designed to humiliate us. Such developments would be to no one's benefit and would serve to complicate the international situation.

The United States believes that all concerned countries have an interest in helping end this war and that its proposals mean that the Soviet Union could promote this objective without in any way compromising its principles.

I am sending you this note in the spirit of candor and mutual understanding which have characterized our exchanges.