TELECON
Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger
7:15 p.m., September 22, 1970

S: We have just gotten the Israelis response.

K: They sent a copy here too.

S: They are faster than I thought.

K: I haven't seen it yet, just trying to save you reading it to me.

S: May I read it to you anyway and let you hear my sultry voice?

K: Could I call you back in 10 minutes, I've got some people here who I'm trying to get started on a paper.

S: I am trying to do the same thing myself.

K: All right, go ahead.

S: What the paper says in two sentences is that they would intend to act by air but if the situation requires, also on the ground. If the air action doesn't lead to Syrian withdrawal, air and ground would be against Syrian forces on the ground. Meeting with the King ...

K: .. with the Jordanians ..

S: .. to coordinate as soon as possible. With regard to the containment of Soviet intervention in question three, we want you to confirm to us our interpretation to our position with reference to our answer understand intervention to mean Soviet actions and measures against them including the Suez Canal front and the sea. Moreover, would not be restricted to time of operations undertaken with reference to the Jordan-Syrian situation, bearing in mind the possibility that Soviet reaction may be a delayed reaction.

K: Forceful enough.

S: Some relevance to the timeframe. Goes on to say, with regard to equipment, the operation may lead to resumption of hostilities in the Suez Canal in addition to the Syrian and Jordanian fronts. We shall therefore want to approach you on a number of concrete items
of equipment and expect to get better treatment than we have. They also intend to send a message to the King through you. My instinct is to propose that we would take a little on this tonight. No such answer should go tonight -- you and the others should discuss this very carefully in light of the situation that exists. Just call the Secretary on the essence of this feeling that we should consider this very carefully.

K: Hold on a second --

S: Now, got a little dilemma. The NSC meeting on Jordan tomorrow

K: No, no.

S: I am supposed to go to the Senate Foreign Relations.

K: Bureaucracy is trying to inundate everybody. NSC was on Germany but the President is now going to use it for the issue of preparing an answer. I just told him that an answer had come in. Can't you delay your appearance with the Foreign Relations. Call the Secretary and see.

S: If I can't get out of this Senate Foreign Relations Committee 9:30 is awfully early -- there should be some preliminary discussion before going into a big NSC meeting.

K: It is not a big NSC meeting, it is the same group that met before. Just calling it an NSC.

S: a suggested reply.

K: You and I have to be in touch on that.

S: Discuss what should be drafted and coordinate it then.

K: I will have a word with the Secretary.

wgh