

TelCon:9:38/10/6/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Ambassador Cromer

K: Hello.

C: Hello, Henry.

K: I just wanted to check in with you. There is no particular to. Our thinking is that we probably won't be able to avoid ~~calling~~ calling for the Security Council meeting tomorrow sometime.

C: No. That is OK.

K: But we really feel very strongly that a simple ceasefire is (a) short sighted in the present circumstances and I will tell you why. Our judgement is that within 72 hours the Israelis will be pushing deep into Syria. They may not go into - beyond the ~~Jewish~~ canal but they will wipe out what is there. And we may then find such a resolution extremely handy on getting them back. Oh, well

C: Oh, well I think . . .

K: In addition to the general principles which I stated earlier. Now we are quite determined that if the Israelis go beyond the present ceasefire lines that we will push them back.

C: Yes, that is the point I was trying to make. If they do do that then I think we are going to have a new situation.

K: Yes, but if we don't position ourselves now. Let me tell you Eban(?) is not eager to have a Security Council meeting.

C: I am sure he is not.

K: And he is -- well if there is one, he wants that return to the status quo ante because he - I have a friend that says shrewdness(?) is the national form of stupidity of the Italians. And I think Lebanon(?) is the national form of ~~stupidity~~ stupidity of the Israelis. He probably figures that no one will buy it and then they can do what they want.

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C: Yes. Did it come back ~~for~~ here from the UN in New York? That our man out there was trying to introduce to us - breached ceasefire. That - does that appeal to you.

K: Invisioned a ceasefire?

C: In reach of the ceasefire.

K: Yes, well that we rather like.

C: Yes, well I hoped you would. I mean we put that thought forward as being constructive in trying to find the right wording.

K: Yes. Now that we still had to turn it down.

C: Oh, you did.

K: I mean not that part of it but ah

C: No, no I know you did. Well do the words or word of effect of in breach of the ceasefire.

K: They help.

C: Do they help.

K Yes.

C: I think it is a very difficult one.

K: Now what we will do - it will go to the Security Council tomorrow and I am just telling it to you people so that they can think about it. We do not intend to fall on our ~~source~~ ^{WORDS} to get a vote tomorrow.

C: No.

K: What we will do is to introduce our resolution. And then we don't mind going at a stately pace.

C: No. I think that is probably very sensible don't you.

K: But what we need is to have it in front ~~of~~ of the Security Council so that the _____ go crazy at the General Assembly we can stonewall



on the ground that it is before the Security Council and we won't participate in the General Assembly debate.

C: No. What General Assembly debate is really the worst of everything.

K: Exactly, but we need to have a _____ position because if isn't to anything else we have to speak before the Assembly.

C: Yes, I am with you. I absolutely see that point.

K: I think you should ~~include~~ include return to the ceasefire line because this is something that by the time that this thing goes along for a while we may all want.

C: Well, this is the whole problem on timing. It could well be. This is exactly what we will all want. On the other hand we don't want to antagonize the Arab world, any of us. I mean not just us here - you as well by doing it _____.

K: Well it can't you know . . .

C: This is a problem, isn't it.

K: Well it is hard to say it is not evenhanded when you want to return to the status quo ante, but what we will do - we will make the decision around 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

C: Well, all right I will be around.

K: I will call you but just in case they want to do some thinking in London.

C: Yes. Quite.

K: This is the way our thinking is now going.

C: Well I am very grateful to you for letting me know and I don't think there is a basic disparity between our approach. With such differences as there is it is ~~very~~ purely in tactics.

K: If you had been here during the summer. Everything

C: No on this subject.

K: No, no on the other subject. Everything that did happened would have



happened but you would have made me believe that it wasn't happening.

C: (Laughing) Is that _____

K: Well we will have to talk about that some other time. But this is where we are now Rollie.

C: But believe me Henry

K: No, I don't consider us to be in a - confrontation isn't the word

C: Oh, good heavens no.

K: In a basic disagreement here.

C: Yes, but if you remember Henry earlier this evening you were saying it was similar to the India/Pakistani situation which to some extent it is. I won't _____ that we happened to be turn out to be right.

K: Who was right?

C: The UK.

K: In the UK- In the India/Pakistan.

C: Yes, from the diplomatic point of view.

K: How did you figure that out.

C: Well because it wasn't going to work. I mean in the way that ~~you~~ ~~you would~~ you would have liked it to work to which I had considerable personable sympathy. It wouldn't have been such a success at all.

K: Well we will have to talk about this. We achieved what we wanted to achieve in IndianPakistan.

C: Well to some extent but to a very limited extent.

K: Well, our primarily concern in India-Pakistan was China.

C: Oh, I know that.

K: And there we achieved exactly what we wanted.



- 5 -

- C: Yes, ~~h~~ but not through that. But anyhow these are the . . .
- K: And our relations with India are no worse today
- C: No, they are a little better.
- K: In fact they are somewhat better . . .
- C: But very little better.
- K: I beg your pardon.
- C: Very little better.
- K: No, no but they are not much worse than they would have been if we had taken the principality (??) in 1971.
- C: Well I don't know if they aren't worse. They are very little better. Because I was talking the other night to the Indian Foreign Minister here. But any way be it as it may
- K: Well that is not the . . . they are very little better than they were when - in 1971?
- C: Yes. It is undoubtedly the view of the Indians.
- K: Well, in that case you should have heard him when he was at the State Department.
- C: (Laughing) Well you should have heard him at the Indian Embassy. But any how I am not arguing - the ~~idiot~~ _____ ~~either~~ over there. We were trying to give you step on this but the reality of the situation which we do need to work very carefully on because there is very much more at stake in this whole situation.
- K: I agree.
- C: And I am not trying to make scoring points. I want to try to get together on the thing.
- K: Right.
- C: And as I say - it is very useful to have this conversation.
- K: OK, good.



- 6 -

C: OK.

K: Good.

C: All right Henry. Bye.

K: Goodbye.