TELCON
Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger
October 6, 1973
4:25 p.m.

K: Our worst mistake was to throw you out of the Canal zone.

C: And a little late, it was a mistake.

K: Our first mistake was to push you into the Canal zone.

C: What did they do now?

K: I wanted to give you -- and this is for the Prime Minister only -- the general strategy. We hope to work as closely as we did in September 1970.

C: I'm sure we would wish to do that too.

K: Whatever the situation in Copenhagen, it doesn't apply with regard to the Eastern Mediterranean. Let me give you our reading of the situation. We are quite confident that the Arabs started this and we in fact were given assurances, when we transmitted to the Egyptians and Soviets our request not to launch pre-emptive attack. We told them that if Israel launched an attack, we would oppose them publicly.

C: Was this recently?

K: That was during the night, but it was too late to be ... to affect decisions. Once we had the information. Now the ... our assessment of the situation is this. We have approached the Soviets and proposed calling a Security Council meeting and that there be a simple resolution calling for a return to the cease fire lines and a cease fire. We are doing this because that is a neutral type of resolution which requires no condemnation and we suspect within a couple of days, unless our judgment is really off, the Arabs will be on their knees begging us to do this. We want to have a platform of having moved in this direction before that.

C: Before that, yes.

K: If the Soviets support us in this we are home free. If they do not, we will have to move quite drastically to make it clear that the Arabs were the aggressors in this particular instance, and more or less side with the Israelis. The reasons for this -- We are beginning, as you could see from the newspapers, and as I have told you, a series of diplomatic moves in an attempt to make at least some progress and this action depends on being able to convince the Israelis, to make other security guarantees.
C: I discussed with....

K: If they are not even prepared to see what we can do, then no guarantees by us will have the slightest significance. If the Soviets don't join us in quieting things down, you have to assume collusion before ——. We are not prepared to take them on. It is in the interest of everybody, including Western Europe, not to run across us in this particular instance.

C: When would the Security Council meet?

K: I have called Dobrynin. We have had already a reply from the Soviets. -- and I will not give anybody else the full flavor of this -- if the General Assembly turns into a propaganda battle, we will be unreachable for the rest of the week. No matter what beautiful speeches are given in New York. We will not then be as easy to deal with as we are now. On the other hand, we are willing to cooperate now to proceed on a neutral line.

C: Sure.

K: We will wait... I have given him until 5:00 and we will wait an extra hour until 6:00 this evening, to produce a reply from Moscow. If not, I have been asked by the President to ask Ambassador Scali to call for a Security Council meeting. We will not be condemnatory at the meeting unless the Soviets turn towards the Arabs. We will be very grateful. If your representative could be instructed to coordinate support.

C: I will get on this right away.

K: Let me know what your representative is instructed to do?

C: Was this completely out of the blue, as it is to me?

K: Oh, yes, the first time -- and this is for your Prime Minister -- we were requesting intelligence reports, even called in the Israeli Ambassador to check our intelligence, they predicted fully defensive preparations. I got a report this morning. They were still maintaining that last night. We received the first confirmation this morning. Then I got on the telephone, gave assurances to everybody... but three hours later it started.

C: You have got friends, like in North VietNam and other parts of the world, they are a little unreliable.

K: In Moscow, you mean?
C: No, I mean among the Arabs. Don't you think they have been clever.

K: Oh, yes, very clever. Whether they have committed suicide depends....depends on how the military operation goes. Our information is, though we don't have the complete picture, is that they have crossed at 5 points, only 2 are left.

C: 2 left?

K: 2 are under attack now.

C: OK, I'll get on it right away.

K: And 20 Egyptian and 12 Syrian airplanes.