MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Dr. Edward Teller's Views on SALT

1. Last week Dr. Edward Teller requested a meeting with some of my staff in his capacity as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. At this meeting, Dr. Teller expressed some very negative views about the strategic arms limitation agreements. He outlined a scenario under which the Soviets would exploit the "loose language" of the agreements to their own advantage and with serious consequences for the US. After reading about his views as outlined below, you may wish to meet with Dr. Teller and brief him on the various factors considered by the Administration in the SALT negotiations.

2. Dr. Teller believes there is a "real possibility" that the Soviets have entered into the strategic arms limitation agreements with the intent to acquire what would amount to a first strike capability within the next five years. The scenario he envisages includes the following elements:

- A postulate that the Soviets broke ground for some 400 new ICBM silos between the end of May and 1 July 1972, which they would be permitted to complete under the terms of the offensive agreement.
- The Soviets would produce, but not immediately deploy, enough mobile ABM radars to give their SA-5 sites a point-defense ABM capability. These radars would be rapidly deployed after a Soviet declaration terminating the agreements.

- The Soviets might be able to solve the ASW problem sufficiently within the next five years to neutralize the US submarine missile force. The chances are "not negligible"—perhaps somewhat less than fifty per cent.

- The Soviets would acquire a mobile ICBM force without our knowledge.

- The Soviets would equip SS-9's or follow ons with twelve to twenty MIRV's—

- The Soviets would have a civil defense capability to disperse almost all of the population within 48 hours.

- Some four or five years from now, when they have acquired all these capabilities, the Soviets would terminate the agreements. They would either engage in political blackmail or launch an attack that would destroy most of our ICBM's, bombers, and SLBM's before launch; their augmented ABM capabilities would take care of most of the remaining warheads. This together with the dispersal of the Soviet population would limit Soviet casualties to one or two per cent while the US would suffer casualties of more than fifty per cent. Dr. Teller said the Intelligence Community would be remiss if it did not include this scenario as an option for the USSR in the forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic capabilities.
3. Dr. Teller said that he would support the strategic arms limitation agreements but only under certain conditions—that the US undertake the following:

- Maximize its military research and development programs.
- Cooperate closely and completely with its allies for joint defense.
- Exploit to the maximum Articles 13 and 6 relating to the Consultative Commission.
- Establish a rudimentary civil defense program.

4. Much of the available time was taken up by Dr. Teller's expression of his own views, and there was little opportunity for give and take or rebuttal. It seemed clear to those who heard him that Dr. Teller was not familiar with the painstaking work of the Verification Panel. It is for this reason that I think you may want to talk to him.

Richard Helms
Director