MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Your Luncheon with the FIAB at 1:00 p.m., Thursday, June 4, 1970

During the course of your luncheon today with the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board you may want to make the following points:

-- Since this will be your first meeting with the Board under its new Chairman, Admiral Anderson, you should begin the luncheon by conveying the President’s confidence that the leadership of the Board is in extremely capable hands and his hope that the Board will proceed with renewed vigor to help increase the effectiveness of our foreign intelligence activities.

-- Review for the FIAB the reasons for the Cambodian decision and the tangible and intangible results to date. (An updated copy of the "Four-Week Report", as well as the latest fact sheets, is at Tab A.) You may want to show them the large map which was prepared for the President’s statement last night. On the map a red dot represents a cache of at least one ton. There have of course been many additional caches found.

-- Discuss with the FIAB the Special National Intelligence Estimate on Laos. Point out that you noted several problems with this particular estimate which may be indicative of other problems in the approach to these reports:

  • The SNIE should give the full historical context of a situation and not just the Communist view (in this document the Communist interpretation of offensive activities by Laotian forces is given but not what prompted the actions by friendly forces).
The SNIE should give the gamut of estimates concerning Communist intentions rather than providing the least common denominator of views within the intelligence community.

John Holdridge's memo to you on this subject is at Tab B. Ask the Board to review several SNIES and provide their opinion on the validity and soundness of present techniques.

The Board may raise the following subjects:

-- What is the status of Admiral Anderson's memorandum to Bob Haldeman concerning the financial plan for operation of the Board during the remainder of this fiscal year and for fiscal year 1971? (Tab C)

Tell them that:

. You are not a budget expert but that the general concept appears to be an excellent one and that Haldeman's staff is in the process of completing their assessment of the financial plan.

. You are pleased that they are undertaking such an ambitious inspection program and you will be most interested in seeing the results of their endeavors.

-- Admiral Anderson may comment that there appears to be a lack of appreciation of intelligence needs by key State Department officials.

Ask Admiral Anderson:

. To explain on what he bases his assessment.

. Ask him to provide recommendations on what should be done to correct the situation.

. Inform him that you will make an effort to see that this matter receives serious attention. [You could raise this problem informally with Elliot Richardson and Ray Cline during your periodic meetings.]
The Board would like guidance on the subject matters they should address in the next few months.

Tell them:

. You prefer to have them use their own judgment in finding weak points in our intelligence system and are most anxious to have their independent assessments of our capabilities.

. You would be particularly interested in their recommendations for improving our intelligence capability:

  .. to collect and utilize human intelligence;
  .. to determine the threat of Communist sponsored insurgency in Latin America;
  .. to obtain better information on the situation in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.

. You would appreciate their estimate as to whether we are sufficiently watchful for developing problems in low temperature areas of the world while our attention and energies are focused on the hottest problems such as Vietnam and the Middle East.

At Tab D is a list of FIAB members. All are expected to attend the luncheon except Frank Lincoln, however, it has not yet been ascertained whether Governor Rockefeller will attend.

Attachments

AMH:JTH:wgh 6/4/70
ALLIED OPERATIONS AGAINST COMMUNIST BASES IN CAMBODIA

-- A Four-Week Report -- (Updated)

The Decision

On April 30, President Nixon announced to the American people that allied forces had launched attacks to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodia-Vietnam border. The President explained that our purpose was not to occupy the sanctuary areas, but to quickly drive out the enemy forces and destroy their military supplies.

President Nixon laid out the compelling reasons for his decision:

-- As Commander-in-Chief, to protect allied forces now in Vietnam and those remaining after our next withdrawal.

-- To assure continued progress in our Vietnamization program and the pace of our withdrawals.

-- To increase our chances of shortening the Vietnam war and our involvement in it.

-- To make clear to the enemy that they cannot repeatedly ignore our warnings and escalate their attacks in Indochina as they have in Laos, Cambodia, and within Vietnam.

-- To forestall miscalculations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere around the world which could lead to dangerous confrontations in the future.

This decision was taken against the background of relentless enemy challenges in Indochina in the face of American restraint and warnings.

By the time of the President's April 20 speech the situation in Cambodia was already serious. The President pointed to Communist escalation and warned against actions that would threaten the security of our
forces. He nevertheless announced the further withdrawal of 150,000 Americans, and the U.S. continued to practice restraint along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. The President also reiterated our continuing preference for a negotiated settlement fair to all parties.

Within several days of that speech, the Communist response was painfully obvious. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong moved further out of their Cambodian bases with the intent of linking them up. They were changing the border area from a series of isolated enclaves into a solid band of self-sustaining territory stretching to the sea.

We faced the prospect of Cambodia becoming one large base area for attacks on allied forces all along the 600 miles of the frontier with South Vietnam.

President Nixon moved forcefully and purposefully against these threats. The results are already impressive.

The Results to Date

After just over a month of these limited operations, it is abundantly clear that the enemy has been struck a heavy blow.

In our operations in Cambodia thus far we have captured at least 95% of the food and 78%-93% of the ammunition captured in South Vietnam in 1969.

A breakdown on the latest available figures of arms, ammunition and supplies captured in Cambodia is:

-- 96,000 mortar, small rocket and recoilless rifle rounds

-- Nearly 1,600 large rockets

-- 132,000 anti-aircraft rounds

-- 10 million rounds of machine-gun and rifle ammunition

-- 11 million pounds of rice

-- 15,200 individual weapons
More than 2,100 crew-served weapons

359 vehicles

72,000 pounds of explosives, including dynamite and plastic charges and 1,000 satchel charges

3,200 mines

186 radios

34,800 grenades

The significance of the capture of these supplies is illustrated by the fact that the 11 million pounds of rice would be sufficient to feed for three months all enemy combat battalions estimated to be in South Vietnam. The 15,200 individual weapons and more than 2,100 crew-served weapons would be sufficient to equip 50 North Vietnamese infantry battalions at current strength levels.

While the purpose of this operation has been to destroy the enemy sanctuary bases and capture supplies, and not necessarily to engage the enemy in combat, they have taken a substantial loss of manpower. Already 9,100 of the enemy have been killed in action and 1,900 prisoners captured and detained.

The Implications

Some American forces already have withdrawn from Cambodia and all will be out of the sanctuaries by June 30. The future implications of these limited operations against Communist controlled territory already are taking shape.

We have disrupted the enemy's logistics network and lines of communication. With the rainy season beginning, it will be difficult for the Communists to start restoring their supplies, even with no allied interdiction efforts.

We have thus struck hard at the enemy's offensive capability. We have reduced the capability of his main force units to threaten our forces in Vietnam. We have limited his ability to interfere with the
progress of pacification in South Vietnam. And we have seen a tremendous boost in the morale and confidence of the South Vietnamese armed forces.

The most significant results of these operations will be measured in the course of the war and the prospects for peace in Southeast Asia.

The President could have avoided his difficult decision. He could have ignored enemy actions and avoided domestic dissent.

But he knew that inaction would have meant:

-- higher American and allied casualties

-- disruption of Vietnamization and our withdrawal schedule

-- the prospect of longer American involvement and prolonged struggle in Southeast Asia

-- a serious challenge to American leadership and steadfastness around the world.

Instead of this gloomy picture, the attacks on the Communist bases in Cambodia will:

-- lower American and allied casualties over the coming months

-- reinforce the President's announced Vietnamization program and withdrawal schedule

-- hasten the day when all American forces can safely return home

-- make clear to all adversaries that the U.S. will not hesitate to take firm action when its interests are at stake.

In conclusion, after a month, it is clear the operation has been a major success.