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NOTES ON PHONE CONVERSATION WITH

DON PIERSON - UNIONT, IOWA

Friday, November 7, 1958

The major problem resulting in the election losses was the fact that the state party organization wouldn't get rid of dead timber in its own conventions, etc., so the voters kicked them out on Election Day.

Right-to-Work, although not a ballot issue in Iowa, stirred up unnecessary problems in the state. Pierson feels this issue hurts in all states, not just those where it is up for vote, because it stirs up labor to greater political activity nationally. Iowa has a right-to-work law and Murray, candidate for Governor, endorsed the current law. This gave organized labor a talking point on which to fire people up against the Republican ticket.

The farm vote apparently went Democratic in its traditional seeking for a handout. Benson is still impossible to sell, even though he has gained some support.

In general, the record of the Administration on foreign policy and most domestic policies was accepted by the people. The notable exception was the farm program. Some people thought the Administration was spending too much money, others thought not enough.

Pierson doesn't think the Democrats will be in very good position for 1960. In fact, they will probably be worse off than if they had lost the election.

He doesn't feel the Democrats will be able to keep the people any happier than the Republicans have.
A key problem is the fact that the Republicans have been fighting amongst themselves and most Republican criticism has been directed at the Administration instead of the opposition. They don't realize you can't knife people for 22 months and then try and unite for two months. The only people the Republicans criticize seem to be their own fellow party members.

The candidate for Governor did all the work in the campaign, the others on the ticket didn't turn a hand. Murray was an excellent candidate, but "got caught in the outhouse when the lightning struck". The lower state house office candidates were no asset to the ticket and are people who have hung on for years. Even the newspapers questioned Pierson as to why the other members of the ticket didn't campaign.

Republicans still have control of the state legislature, but the leaders in the legislature are Knowland-type Republicans who will tend to go it alone rather than trying to unite the party. They have been consistently playing petty politics and will continue to do so.

There was obviously a voters' switch to the Democrats, but Pierson feels the Republicans can win back the support they lost. He feels we must not go clear to the right. Even Iowa is becoming Liberal. The party must figure a way to win people over by being progressive ourselves. Midwest party leaders must realize that they have to subscribe to an overall program that will permit Republicans in the rest of the country to win as well as in the Midwest.

The worst thing that has happened in Iowa is that all of the strongly pro-Administration state leaders have stepped aside in the last couple of years to return to business, but they could be brought back into
active participation, given proper encouragement. The current leaders are providing no administration support, all are going in different directions, motivated by petty personal ambitions.

The Administration side of the party has lost a lot of good loyal people. It is vital to reactivate them and give them power to control the state conventions. Most of these people now are just sitting on their hands, primarily because no one has asked for their help. For example, there is a strong group of very able administration people who worked long and hard, who could have helped this time, but were not asked.

It would probably be wise if possible, to make changes in national committeemen and state chairmen. The current national committeeman did no speech making, and very little other work in the campaign. The state chairman tried, but was unable to control the state committee. Pierson feels many of the good people who are currently inactive, could be signed up by an appeal from Ike or Nixon.

Pierson feels Murray should probably be run again to take advantage of the effort spent in building him this time. He is now back teaching school. Waggoner is probably going back to Washington to try and find a job. Pierson is ready to help in any way possible.

The Vice President's appearance helped the campaign tremendously, especially in the case of Bob Waggoner. It should have been a week earlier in order to give the local people a chance to capitalize on the visit. There were a lot of comments to the effect that this was the best political speech Nixon ever made.

Pierson feels that if it had not been for the corn husking contest, the Nixon visit in Fort Dodge would have substantially outdrawn Ike's visit to Cedar Rapids.
Nixon's appearance was the first time anyone has stood up for the Administration and outlined its accomplishments in specific details. People believed what he said. To most of them, it was new material. The Republicans had no argument before.
January 20, 1959

NOTES ON KNO MO POPER TALK AT
J. WALTER THOMPSON LUNCHEON MEETING

November 25, 1958

1958 Recession

32% of the voters reported in March of 1958 that they were directly affected by the current recession. By October only 25% said they were affected.

70% of those who said they were affected by the recession in October said they were going to vote Democratic.

33% of those who said they were not affected by the recession said that they did, however, defer expenditures because of the recession.

In most cases, the blame for the recession was laid on Washington, not on state governments.

Major Election Issues — 1958

First and foremost was the pocket book issue.

Second, was the growing distrust of our foreign policy. The average voter wants very strongly to stay out of war and doubts that the current foreign policy is truly effective in keeping us out of war. He feels we don’t really have peace.

Third, a growing doubt that Eisenhower is picking the right men for his team.

Fourth, a general public confusion as to what “modern Republicanism” is.

Fifth, a growing feeling of lack of leadership (Koper says that Eisenhower hasn’t changed, but the public mood has. When Eisenhower came in in ’52, the people didn’t want strong government leadership but now they do).

Voting Habits

About 9% of the voters plan to split their ticket, but when they are actually in the voting booth they don’t, either because they become confused or are afraid to split it.

Koper’s Recommendation to Rehabilitate the Republican Party

First, erase all of the sub-brand names. Build up men such as Case, Cooper, Javits, and Rockefeller. They are in step with the philosophy of the times.
Second, determine what people want in a President. It is essential at this point to get a brand image of what the voting public wants.

Voter Image of the Two Major Parties

Democrats are viewed as the party of imagination, daring, interest in the common man, and potentially dangerous.

The Republicans are viewed as the party of big business, stability, good when things are going well but not when changes are needed.

Voter Image of Nixon

The public is confused as to whether Richard Nixon fits as a modern Republican or in some other category. The desirable image would be in the pattern of Case, Cooper, etc. mentioned above.

H. R. Haldeman
NOTES ON PHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CHARLES HALLECK - RENSSLER, INDIANA
Monday, November 10, 1969

Two of the candidates couldn't have been saved with any sort of deal from Indianapolis. We should have saved a. Republican congressional vote lost by 134,000, Handley by 250,000. Should only have lost two.

State committee is meeting today to talk about reorganization.

Deal hasn't been right in Washington either. Big problem confronting Halleck. He won't stand still for Joe Martin leadership again -- part of problem all over country -- like Will Knowland running for Governor.

Congressional candidates were all right but Handley hurt them.

Indiana has a cynical deal like that in California.

Right-to-work did hurt. No good. After all, a matter of contract. Should let it rise and leave it to states. Haven't got union job contract. Why should we split to prevent them from trying.

Halleck wasn't invited to state committee meeting today. Neither was Capehart. Wishes he had been. They're keeping all in own hands.

Handley - Indianapolis trying to throw everybody out. Tried to throw Halleck out. Will throw out all county chairmen that they think did not do very well. Taking active steps to organize in wrong direction.

Unfortunately, Handley didn't have to give up old job (Governor) to run for Senator.

Halleck hasn't said anything publicly, but will blast them when he does. (Date depends on when and how the state meeting today comes out.)

Talked to Jerry Persons today. Will have to set up better White House - Hill relations and working procedures.
The Challenge to Conservatives

By RAYMOND MOLEY and RAYMOND MOLEY, JR.

1. WHAT HAPPENED NOVEMBER 4, 1958

As election returns streamed in across the country through the November hours last fall, what the authors had anticipated became an accomplished fact. Like the implacable rise of a floodtide, swelled by important tributaries and the outpouring of mighty forces, setting new and alarming high-water marks, the Democratic-labor coalition increased.

Election day, 1958, may well be remembered as the date when the political force of organized labor achieved substantially what it had, for two decades, been striving for—majority representation in the United States Senate and House of Representatives, as well as virtual control of many houses of state legislatures, by those who had received its endorsement and benefited from its political action.

The political talents of organized labor had been multiplied to a point where they were a major influence in American politics. What they accomplished was clear in all parts of the country and is perhaps most graphically shown in the composition of the United States Senate.

Preliminary research concerning the new Senate reveals a clear majority's identity with the ideas and aspirations of the AFL-CIO's national political machine, the Committee on Political Education. This majority is called "the Liberal Lineup" by labor publications. It is predominantly Democratic, consisting of a huge block of Northern Democrats, an increased number of "liberal" Southern Democrats—in accord with COPE in all things save "civil rights" and a handful of Republican followers. Four times. Of the three new Republican Senators, two have met COPE standards in the House of Representatives. Thus, COPE may expect a total of 53 usually reliable votes.

The triumph of COPE's political strategy is reflected in the rail unions' national weekly, Labor: "A key fact to hold in mind is that the liberal majority in Congress remains a slim one. In the past Congress, 180 members of the House out of 435 and 43 senators out of 96 voted 'Right' for the public interest on three-fifths or more of the key issues tabulated by the AFL-CIO. These, roughly speaking, might be called the liberals. In the last Congress they were still a minority. In the new Congress, nearly all these liberals will be back again. In addition, nearly all the new faces will be liberal ones, replacing conservatives for the most part. On balance it seems likely that around 220 or 225 House members and about 53 or 54 Senators will be found usually in the liberal camp in the new Congress."

There are even greater dimensions to this impressive picture on Capitol Hill. They are found in the halls of convening legislatures and in the Governors' mansions of many states. In November, union leaders could boast "heavy liberal victories in state legislatures [which are] important to labor." And union forces backed 17 of 23 successful candidates for Governor.

COPE explains in the official labor publication, AFL-CIO News, that owing to COPE's general though not exclusive backing of Democrats, "In three states—California, Connecticut and Ohio—they [the Democrats] won both houses of the legislature from the Republicans. In five other states where they previously had only one house, they now control both houses. And in eight states, they captured one house of a previously all-Republican legislature. In no state did they lose control."

Republicans and conservatives alike may take grim warning from any of the following figures. Republicans lost nearly 700 seats in state legislatures...
In 1958: They have lost more than 1000 since 1952. Whereas Republicans controlled both houses of legislatures in 26 states six years ago, they now control both in only seven, one less than in 1956. In 1952 there were 30 Republican Governors; today there are 14.

To derive meaning from these formidable statistics, the dual nature of the 1958 election must be recognized. On the one hand, it was a prodigious achievement by a virile, hard-working, determined, and politically astute minority. On the other, it was a stunning defeat of a conservative majority which was lacking in all things that the minority had in abundance.

The 1958 election was not another 1952 or 1956. A deep trough of depression cannot be blamed. Nor did the “liberals” have a politician of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s luster heading the Democratic party. While unemployment in certain areas and a decline of business activity were factors, these cannot explain the extent of the conservative defeat.

Second, it cannot be implied that the Democrats received a great mandate from the people as they did in the early Roosevelt years and as did the Republicans in 1952.

In a word, the major factor that won the political field for the “Liberal Lineup” was organization.

II. THE TECHNIQUES OF VICTORY

What Human Events has noted for a long time has been reinforced in the 1958 campaign and election. The alliance of the Democratic party and the unions’ political-action forces is stronger and more cohesive than ever.

Organized labor, especially the CIO, has for nearly two decades demonstrated a capacity to engage in political work, since union organization and discipline are quite adaptable to the rigors of ward, precinct and block work. Union treasuries suffered none of the restrictions imposed upon corporations until the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947. Then it became only a matter of charging to “education and citizenship expenditures” for materials which are customarily the most essential tasks of political parties. The PAC of the CIO, the AFL’s counterpart, and many lesser political-action groups of various unions thus continued to use the memberships’ general funds to advance the political fortunes of the “Liberal Lineup.” Above all, there was the driving zest among labor leaders for the things that may be gained in politics.

But to designate the “liberal” and dominant wing of the Democratic party a “Labor” or “Socialist” party is an ineffectual way of conveying the real situation to the public. Both Democratic party figures (an increasing number of whom come from the labor movement) and union leaders will disclaim such labels. It is understandable that Walter Reuther, George Meany and other union officials desire to avoid the name “Labor party” while achieving the substance through a venerable and established party. Furthermore, the American people will not believe such a characterization.

Yet by the alliance with the Democratic party and the assumption of its political tasks, the unions’ political leaders have profited by an old trade name. They have profited by the votes of many who cast their ballots for that party because of long-established tradition, and others who are unable to comprehend what is happening to their party.

In recent years the Democratic party has delegated more and more of its authority and responsibilities to its powerful ally. Conscientious application to its allotted tasks over these years assured organized labor of notable gains before and after the Eisenhower sweep of 1952. By 1956 union politicians, and many non-politicians as well, were subjected to COPE’s big guns. They had learned from reversals. For example, the severe rebuff suffered in 1950 in Ohio when they viciously attacked Taft with local and state funds, caused them to be more discreet.

Most important, they learned that political victories are fashioned by workers in city blocks and precincts, by votes for local and state office as well as for Congress must receive adequate attention. Getting a heavy vote for endorsed candidates for local office almost invariably helps approved candidates for higher office.

In 1954 the unions clearly indicated their power by winning for the Democratic party control of both houses of Congress. Twenty-one House seats were switched from the Republicans to Democrats. Four Democratic and one independent went Republican. In the net of 16, political action of unions was decisive in 10 or 12. Moreover, control of the Senate was changed by the victories of Neuberger and McNamara, both decisively backed by union forces and funds.

Going into 1956 there appeared in union headquarters throughout the country a manual of directions, issued by COPE, called How to Win. It is the most readable text on practical politics to appear in many years, giving detailed instructions on such things as setting up an organization, training and encouraging workers, campaigning at the block level, getting people registered and to the polls, rewarding volunteers, etc. A second publication of great importance in 1956 was the compilation of voting records. Fifteen million copies were given wide distribution, reaching every union member and his family.

When COPE ROLLED in 1956 it was with extreme mobility, over state lines into strategic districts, often striking for Senate and House seats where union activity was least expected. Paid workers canvassed there vigorously,rang doorbells, saying something like, “I’m a Democrat and I’d like you to read this literature and vote for so-and-so.”

Many politically minded unions were able to throw thousands upon thousands of workers into the job of mobilizing the vote, and it was estimated that they were able to put 100,000 cars on the streets election day.

Michigan’s Democratic party had long since been a CIO party. In 1956 Oregon, Maine, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and California, among many others, were subjected to COPE’s big guns. California is a vivid example of how successful the Democrats’ giant ally can be. The Republican party’s position in the state appeared as sound as a block of reinforced concrete when its national convention convened in San Francisco in 1956. The party had control of the state legislature, the Governor’s mansion, two US senators, 19 of the state’s 50 House members, and illustrious figures in exalted offices.
office—Nixon, Knowland and Warren. Its national ticket had swept the state with 700,000 votes to spare in 1952.

But forces were at work to smash this supremacy. Early warnings were already appearing. Republican congressional candidates in 1948 had received 59.4 per cent of the vote; but in 1952, despite the Eisenhower triumph, that percentage fell off to 54 per cent, and in 1956, when Ike was again piling up a huge majority, the percentage was to drop to 46.8.

COPE’s thousands were at the bottom of this erosion of Republican supremacy—persuading and cajoling Democratic voters to register themselves, their families and their neighbors, working side-by-side with Democratic party officials and workers at all political levels, coaching candidates in speech-making and letter-writing, blanketing whole districts with propaganda from state and national headquarters and, on election day, checking on sympathetic voters, telephoning, canvassing blocks and precincts by automobile and shoe-leather, watching the polls, and even providing baby-sitters while wives went to cast their ballots.

Then came a long, two-year offensive, climaxing last November with COPE-backed Democrats winning the Governorship, one US Senate seat, and three House seats to gain a majority of California’s congressional delegation. Republican dominance, an era, has also seized control of both the state senate and assembly by large margins—26-13 and 47-33 respectively. Republican difficulties in California merely made the inevitable more substantial.

Techniques used in California are applied from one end of the country to the other. Officials and shop stewards of many unions regard political work as part of their job, and at registration and election times they have thousands of paid workers and “members” trained in precinct work.

Finally, throughout the year scores of union newspapers and journals reach entire memberships. They are mailed to workers’ homes where they will reach the wives and, perhaps, guests. Content is therefore tailored for the housewife as well as the member. These publications are devoted in large part to political matters—office-holders and candidates, the political parties and issues, and, during election years, appeals for contributions for direct support of candidates in Federal elections (the only item which must be reported under Taft-Hartley) and on occasion for the Democratic National Committee. Always there is the message, implied or pronounced, that politics and government should be of concern to every union member.

III. HOW TO MEET THE ‘LIBERAL’ CHALLENGE

A Third Party?

There are serious abuses in the unions’ political activity, and they should be eliminated by legal means. The use of the general funds to support candidates and parties should be stopped. So far as Federation elections are concerned, this is illegal, and the law should be enforced.

But even if these things were done, the amazing political efficiency of the unions in getting out their vote would remain formidable. So we must seek political balance by activating every possible element in the voting population by the most effective methods possible. Merely to bewail labor’s activity and denounced it will not be effective.

In the realm of human endeavor there is a common need to return now and then to fundamentals and to begin again. The farmer must periodically turn to the individual in his community and start over. The businessman finds occasions when he must replace obsolete machinery or bring new methods to his operation. Even in our national pastime a manager must cut and add to his squad, verse his players in the fundamentals of the game—batting, fielding, etc.—and work out new strategies.

L I K E W I S E T H E R E C O M E times in our political life when we must go back to fundamentals. Let us grasp this fundamental, once and for all: the individual should be the center of our concern. The state exists for the citizens. The community is merely a cluster of individuals seeking what they conceive to be in their interests. But politics has forgotten the individual and makes its pitch for the group. We must turn from that tendency and focus on the individual. The individual forms the community: the communities form the state. So let us turn to the individual in his community and start from there. Each community is where political life is generated. It is not where laws are made, but it is where lawmakers are made.

The means by which the individual, through his community, community and communities, through the political party. And we have, as has Great Britain, found the perfect freedom and stability of government through a two-party system.

Rehabilitating the Republican Party

The Republican National Committee has recently put forward a promising program for party reconstruction and increased efficiency. But the National Committee is essentially a service organization, having no authority over the many, many state and local units of the party.

Republican strength must come from these state and local organizations. Instead of sitting around and complaining about the National Committee or the President, every local unit must rebuild on its own level. It should emphasize professionalism with certain year-around, paid officials. The training of these leaders should encompass all details of political work, down to the most humble detail. In turn,
these men and women should train volunteers for systematic, vigorous precinct work. Selection and development of attractive candidates, too, have a definite place at the local level.

The Auxiliary Group

Ideally, everyone should become a member of a party organization and work for its success. But there are millions who simply will not do so. This is where the auxiliary comes in. In a great many communities auxiliary groups must be formed to work in getting people activated politically who are not regular party members. Such an auxiliary may take an innocuous name like “Good Government League” or perhaps no name at all. Its members may even call themselves “independents.”

Such auxiliary groups should work closely with the more conservative party, faction or candidate. Above all, they should not antagonize the regular party people. Instead, their job should be to help with money and manpower, particularly during campaigns. This is what the “Republican Associates” in Los Angeles have done with marked success.

The Responsibility of Businessmen and Businesswomen

Never before have businessmen and business organizations been so aware of the necessity that they take a more active interest in politics. They have been so neglectful of their political responsibilities that they have permitted the labor-liberal people to use them as whipping boys and to mark them as political untouchables. But in recent months more individuals among them as well as corporations and trade associations have prepared or are preparing political action programs.

At the moment it is clear that many corporations, trade associations and businessmen generally are vividly aware of the consequences of their neglect of political responsibilities. They know that they must bestir themselves and that they possess collectively the managerial talents essential to change the national political picture. Some have done a lot of thinking about ways and means, and some have programs either in fact or in plans. We believe that we are stating the essentials of their best thinking in the following conclusions:

1. Railing at labor for its participation in politics denies the essential truth that all Americans should try to influence their Government. From a practical standpoint it merely gives politically minded labor leaders more pretexts for charging that business is anti-labor and serves to unite union leaders and business leaders.

2. The responsibility of businessmen in political life is not to create a pro-business party or movement. It is a constructive objective to create a better and more vital citizenship generally.

3. The place where political action is needed is at the local level—in thousands of communities of the Nation where Representatives in Congress and state legislators are elected.

4. To energize, to encourage, and to further political activity, including contributions to a political party, the corporation with a nation-wide business should, first make clear to all members of the corporate body—employees at all levels, including management, dealers and workers, and stockholders—their responsibility to promote a healthy government with a strong two-party system. This embraces the dissemination of information by the corporation concerning the methods by which the individual can make himself effective in community affairs, including politics.

It should then (a) remove restrictions, now present in many corporations, upon political activity; (b) encourage, not compel, such participation in all levels of management; and (c) make known to all the individuals upon whom its existence and progress depends, including customers, what its interest is in current legislative issues.

Beyond this the corporation should not and, probably under the law, may not, go. But since the corporation has its legal existence under the law to serve the needs of the Nation and its communities, since it draws its income from the Nation’s citizens, it has a civic as well as an economic responsibility to do no less than what is enumerated above.

5. The exact form and methods of civic and political activity at the community level must be of a do-it-yourself nature. Each community will present its own problems, and the pattern of activity must be adjusted to them.

The Forgotten Majority

The great majority of adult Americans are members of no group concerned with political action, be it a labor union or a political party. William Graham Sumner had in mind in his essay “The Forgotten Man” the individual of this majority who “delves away in patient industry . . . he works, generally he prays—but he always pays . . . he gives no trouble . . . he is not in any way a hero . . . or a problem . . . nor a burden . . . nor one over whom sentimental economists and statesmen can parade their fine sentiments . . . Therefore he is forgotten.” Moreover, he has no leadership—no one to rally those who share his interests for the work of shaping the kind of Government which in the long future will serve the interests of his children. This leadership must be provided. It should not be pro-labor or pro-business or pro-any-special-interest. It should be simply be “pro” a sound and stable republic.