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October 7, 1960

Mr. Daniel Hofgren
Pan American World Airways
135 East 42nd Street
55th Floor
New York, New York

Dear Dan:

In addition to the names sent you in our letter of October 6th, would you please add Bob's name:

H. R. Haldeman
43 Bramble Lane
Riverside, Connecticut

Thanks a lot.

Sincerely,

Christine F. O'Polka
Secretary to H. R. Haldeman
Mr. Daniel Hofgren  
Pan American World Airways  
135 East 42nd Street  
55th Floor  
New York, New York

Dear Dan:

Per our phone conversation of this afternoon, following are the names and home addresses of our Advance Men:

1. John Ehrlichman  
   3820 Hunts Point Road  
   Bellevue, Washington

2. Stanley Lothridge  
   815 Virginia Terrace  
   Santa Paula, California

3. Robert G. McCune  
   1521 Elliott Place, N. W.,  
   Washington, D. C.

4. Richard Miller  
   4505 West Fifth Street  
   Los Angeles 5, California

5. Thomas G. Pownall  
   10815 Burbank Drive  
   Potomac, Maryland

6. Edward O. Sullivan  
   63 Rockland Avenue  
   Yonkers, New York

7. John Whitaker  
   106 Thicket Road  
   Baltimore 12, Maryland
Mr. Daniel Hofgren

- 2 -

October 6, 1960

8. James Murphy
   34 Dorchester Road
   Rockville Centre, L. I., New York

9. Robert Ogden
   1320 East 20th Avenue
   Spokane 35, Washington

10. J. Paul Marshall
    7721 Curtis Street
    Chevy Chase, Maryland

11. Sherman Unger
    3418 Ault View Avenue
    Cincinnati 8, Ohio

12. William Black
    9527 LaJolla Farms Road
    LaJolla, California

13. John W. Warner
    2816 R Street, N. W.,
    Washington, D. C.

14. Robert Krill
    1620 Belmont Street, N. W.,
    Washington, D. C.

15. Renouf Russell
    Sea Street
    Manchester, Massachusetts

16. George Aldrich
    Meyer Road
    Hamilton, Massachusetts

17. Paul O'Brien
    109 Summerfield Road
    Chevy Chase, Maryland

18. William Bumpus
    5805 Dawes Avenue
    Alexandria, Virginia

It was good talking with you. Don and his wife were down about a week ago
and Don was inquiring about you. He is now Minister of Christian Educa-
tion in Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania, a suburb of Pittsburgh and he is enjoying
his work very much.

Sincerely,

Christina O'Brien
TO: Lou Ouyay

FROM: Bob Haldeman

RE: PUBLICITY DIRECTORS CONVENTION

Thank you very much for your letter of August 17 and the enclosed copy of the tentative agenda for your Publicity Directors Convention.

I will, of course, be very happy to accept your invitation to speak to this group on Wednesday morning, August 31.

Thank you very much for including me.

August 25, 1960
August 17, 1960

Mr. Robert Haldemann
Nixon for President Headquarters
1146 19 Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of our tentative agenda for the State Publicity Directors Convention, which will be held on Tuesday and Wednesday, August 30 and 31.

This conference will be sponsored by the Republican National Committee, the Senatorial Campaign Committee, and the Congressional Committee. All state publicity directors will be present, as well as the publicity men for the incumbent Senators. We held a similar conference in 1956, and it proved to be very helpful in coordinating the publicity, TV and advertising functions in the several states with the national effort.

In consultation with Chairman Morton, Len Hall, Bob Finch, Senator Goldwater and Congressman Miller, we have worked out the attached agenda. You will note that we have scheduled you for the Wednesday morning session, and I hope that you will accept.

Sincerely yours,

L. Richard Guylay

LRG:MN
Enclosure
TENTATIVE PROGRAM

GOP PUBLIC RELATIONS CONFERENCE
FOR STATE PUBLICITY DIRECTORS

HOTEL WASHINGTON
15th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Tuesday, August 30, 1960
Wednesday, August 31, 1960

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, ALL SESSIONS
WILL BE HELD IN THE NORTH ROOM OF HOTEL WASHINGTON

MONDAY EVENING, August 29 ......

Arrivals and check-ins during afternoon

8:30 p.m. - REGISTRATION
Washington Room
Get-acquainted reception - cocktails
TUESDAY, AUGUST 30
"WASHINGTON CAN HELP YOU - HERE'S HOW"

9:00 a.m. - WELCOME - L. Richard Guylay, Director of Public Relations
Republican National Committee

Importance of a unified public relations drive.

Brief remarks by Jack McDonald, Vera Glaser

9:20 a.m. - Hal Short, Executive Assistant to Chairman Morton.
Operation and setup of Chairman's office.

9:30 a.m. - Mrs. Clare B Williams, Asst. Chairman, Republican
National Committee and Women's Division

9:40 a.m. - Mrs. Catherine Gibson, National President,
Natl. Federation of Republican Women

9:45 a.m. - Tom Van Sickle, Chairman, Young Republican
National Federation

9:55 a.m. - AB Hermann, Campaign Director

Nationalities - John Hvasta
Minorities - Val Washington
Labor - Robert Gormley
Farm - Rollis Nelson
Veterans - Curtis Jewell
Arts & Sciences - Arthur Peterson
Senior Republicans - Bernard Van Rensselaer

10:25 a.m. .................. COFFEE BREAK ..................

10:40 a.m. The Speakers Bureau - Mrs. Vera C. Ash, Director

10:50 a.m. Research - Dr. William Prendergast

11:05 a.m. Presentation - Precinct Organization - J. J. Wuerthner

12:00 noon - LUNCHEON - Chairman Thruston Morton presiding

Mrs. Clare Williams...."Fat for First Lady"
James Hagerty .... "The President's Role in the Campaign"
TUESDAY, AUG. 30 - Contd.

2:00 p.m. - Mr. Guylay presiding.

"OPERATION DIXIE" - Lee Potter, Spec. Asst. to Chairman, RNC

2:15 p.m. - REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

Hon. William Miller of New York, Chairman
"The Case for a Republican Congress"
Organization and Operations - William Warner, Executive Director
Field Operations - Chauncey Robbins
Radio, TV & Publicity - Paul Theis
Congressional & Campaign Aid - Lee Wade, Director

3:15 p.m. .................. COFFEE BREAK ..................

3:30 p.m. - REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE

Hon. Barry Goldwater of Arizona, Chairman
"Elect Republican Senators"
Organization, Operations and Publicity - Victor Johnson
Watching the Record - Irv Swanson

QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD

4:30 p.m. - SERVICES OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS DIVISION OF THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Gus Miller - Buttons, Decoration Kits, Graphic Campaign materials, etc.
Jim Ellis - Radio and Television
Don Baldwin - Literature
Bernard Esters - Clip Sheet
Vera Glaser - Women's Division Literature

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

7:00 p.m. Cocktails and buffet supper (Ballroom, Washington Hotel)
Showing of several films after dinner.
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31

"THE NIXON–LODGE TICKET"

9:00 a.m. - Honorable Leonard Hall

(Importance of state activities to national effort. Outlines difficulty of task ahead. A few reflections on '52 and '56. How this campaign differs).

9:20 a.m. - Robert Finch

(Which areas require the most work. Specifies on what should be done)

9:35 a.m. - Peter Flanagan, Volunteers for Nixon
Pat Gorman, Dick Nixon Clubs

(Explain setups, how public relations people can tie in)

9:50 a.m. - James Bassett

"Scheduling the Candidates" - Preview of travel plans, if possible - scheduling problems and how state public relations people can help.

10:10 a.m. - Robert Haldemann

"Advance Planning" - how state public relations people can help advance preparations for Nixon–Lodge appearances

10:25 ..................................COFFEE BREAK ..................................

10:40 a.m. - James Shepley

"Issues and General Strategy, 1960"
Followed by questions and answers

11:20 a.m. - Herbert Klein, Press Secretary to the Vice President

Specifics on how publicity chiefs can help the Nixon press effort

Ambassador Lodge's Activity
Vincent O'Brien, Press Secretary, Cam Newberry, Campaign Director

Questions and answers

12:00 noon - ADJOURN
WEDNESDAY, AUG. 31, (Contd)

12:30 - LUNCHEON (To Be Announced)

2:00 p.m. - SPECIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES - Mr. Guylay presiding

2:10 p.m. - "Answer Desk" - Oliver Gale, Director

2:20 p.m. - "Departmental Team Play" - Hon. Robert Merriam, Deputy Asst. to the President for Interdepartmental Affairs.

2:30 p.m. - "GOP TRUTH SQUAD" - Sen. Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania

SPECIAL CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUES - Mr. Guylay presiding

2:50 p.m. - "Radio and Television" - Carroll Newton, Vice President, BBD&O

3:00 p.m. - "Tips for TV Appearances" - Ted Rogers, Consultant to Vice President Nixon

3:10 p.m. - "Public Opinion Polling" - Dr. Claude Robinson

3:25 p.m. - "Newspaper Advertising in Politics" - John Holzapfel, XNPA

3:40 p.m. - "Speech Writing" - John Franklin Carter

3:55 p.m. - "Direct Mail" - Walter Wentz, Direct Mail specialist

4:00 p.m. - "Posters and Materials" - Lee Greenhouse
August 25, 1960

Mr. Edmund S. Power
Suite 1505
53 West Jackson Boulevard
Chicago 4, Illinois

Dear Ed:

Thanks so much for your letter. I too, was sorry to have missed you during the Convention. Some time I hope I can have the details on your trip around the world.

There was some discussion of your name in connection with security work with the Vice Presidential candidate prior to Convention and I had intended to recommend strongly that you be approached regarding this assignment.

However, after Ambassador Lodge was nominated, it developed that he had some thoughts in this regard and he and his staff worked out an arrangement with another man to take over this area of his campaign and of course I was not able at that point to interfere.

We certainly appreciate your interest and sorry it didn't work out that we could get together. When we get to Chicago during the campaign I trust there will be an opportunity to at least say hello and perhaps to work together.

Sincerely,

H. R. Haldeman

HRH:cf0
August 10, 1960

Dear Bob,

I am sorry to have missed you during the convention; however, I too was engaged in activity mildly exciting at that time. Briefly I was on an investigation that took me around the world.

Recently I learned that I had been recommended, or at least my name mentioned in connection with advance work or security matters for the Republican Vice Presidential candidate. Since there is a chance someone attempted to contact me while I was away, I was wondering if you know anything about it or if you have any suggestions. I am interested enough to want to discuss it with someone. I would appreciate any thoughts you might have on the matter.

Gratefully,

Edmond S. Power
The Truth About Nixon
by WILLIAM V. SHANNON

There are five tests by which we should measure a man seeking the Presidency in the 1960's.

First, the Presidency is a place of moral leadership. A President should be an educator and a spokesman of a people whose destiny is greatness.

Second, a President must be a sagacious politician. The best of intentions are vain if the man in the White House is not practiced in the arts of political leadership and astute in party management.

Third, the Chief Executive must be just that: an effective executive. He is at the apex of a vast governmental structure employing millions of persons and spending billions of dollars.

Fourth, a President in the 1960's governs under the shadow of nuclear danger. He must have sound judgment and steady nerves in a time of recurring crises.

Fifth, a President should have sympathy for and comprehension of the needs and emotional drives of the colored and the impoverished and the restless peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, whose national and social revolutions may transform the world scene in the last forty years of this century. America should have a leader who can communicate and collaborate with the leaders of the underdeveloped countries.

By each of these five standards, Richard Milhous Nixon, the certain Republican candidate for President, fails.

The truth about Nixon is that he is not big enough for the biggest job in the world. No man, in the full sense of the term, is qualified to be President of the United States, but measured against the standard of the ideal candidate, Nixon falls so far short he is demonstrably unfit.

Nixon's strongest qualities are intelligence and industriousness. He is neither brilliant nor notably talented, but he is somewhat above average in intelligence; his mind seems quick, alert, orderly, and logical. His speeches and arguments, if dully phrased and often disingenuous, are invariably lucid and well-organized. He has roughly the same order of mental competence as the usual run of lawyers and business managers.

His industry is perhaps more than average. He has always been fiercely ambitious. As a student in high school, at Whittier College, and in Duke University Law School, he had to carry outside jobs, but he pushed himself to find time for extra-curricular activities and maintain scholarship grades. These accomplishments are no different from those of thousands of other students, but they are nonetheless praiseworthy and, in Nixon's case, particularly important because hard work, tenacity, and single-minded ambition are still his outstanding positive character traits.

Having cited his intelligence and industriousness, one has about exhausted the list of Nixon's strong points. An additional factor often mentioned by his advocates is a certain inner toughness, but this is, in Nixon, a considerably more ambiguous and complex strain than is usually described. The self-confident and the cruel are both tough, but if self-confidence is a strength, cruelty is a weakness.

Innocence until proved guilty is an adequate position in criminal court but it is no persuasive plea for making a man President of the United States, the grandest, most honored, most powerful public office to which an American can aspire. What is wrong with Nixon is his negative, empty record, the absence of his accomplishments, the paucity of his talents, the very ordinariness of the man.

This emptiness and these glaring deficiencies are more significant than the intermittent squalor of his methods or whether he is conservative or liberal. Every politician has enemies and is the object of controversy. He uses practical means that may sometimes be impugned. Nixon is probably the most hated major politician in American life today, but this would not matter if he had substantial achievements and a positive record. Nixon, however, has no visible claims to the office of President. A specious availability caused him to be placed on the ticket as a makeweight with General Eisenhower in 1952, and for eight years he has managed to retain that post. For five of those eight years, the President's fragile health has given Nixon an unusual leverage on the party machinery; there has been widespread awareness that he might, at any moment, become President through an act of fate. Nixon has been the man on the scene. He has blocked off potential competitors on the avenues to the throne by his presence and his manipulations.

Reprinted from The Progressive • Madison, Wisconsin • 1960
Nixon Stirs Doubt,
Antagonism, and Anxiety

Throughout the 1956 campaign, Richard Nixon told audiences: "Now at last we have a President we can hold up to our children as an example." If Nixon himself occupies the White House, will we be able to make that statement? It is in this context that Nixon's shabby record as a campaigner counts heavily against him. Our best and greatest Presidents were men of character and moral worth which enabled them to serve as exemplars for their own and later times; one has only to think of Washington and Lincoln and Wilson, each so different from the other but alike in their fierce integrity. The weight of the charge against Nixon is that he has not given any hint that he could provide this kind of high example; on the contrary, he has stirred doubts, antagonism, and anxiety.

The campaigns on which these misgivings are founded were his first, in 1946, when he defeated incumbent Democratic Representative Jerry Voorhis in the Cooperative League of America; then in 1950, when he defeated for the Senate Mrs. Helen Gahagan Douglas, the famous actress and wife of actor Melvyn Douglas; in 1952 when, as General Eisenhower's running mate, he made several reckless speeches, and again in 1954 when he tried to keep alive anti-Carthyism and Communistic in-government as profitable issues but with no success. These four campaigns, one local, one statewide, and two nationwide, are the basis of the picture of the "old Nixon." During those eight years he established the pattern of behavior from which the more recent "new Nixon" is said to depart.

Stewart Alsop, the former member of the team of brothers who wrote the famous syndicated column and now an editor of the Saturday Evening Post, is favorably disposed toward Nixon as a potential President and makes an almost plausible case in his defense. For this reason, it is worth quoting from Alsop's recent book, Nixon and Rockefeller, on this phase of Nixon's career. The motif of the old Nixon's career, in Alsop's words, was the use of "specious and sleazy debating tricks."

"Consider a few of these debating tricks. There is the juxtaposition of words, as when Nixon, in 1952, in the course of accusing Truman and Stevenson of tolerating Communists in the government, called them 'traitors to the high principles of the Democratic Party.' In the context of those days when McCarthy rode high, the words 'traitor' and 'Democratic Party' were the words that remained in his hearers' minds. There is the use of the undeniable statement with a false implication. An example from the fund speech: 'Every penny of it was used to pay for political expenses that I did not think should be charged to the taxpayers of the United States.' In fact, the purpose of the fund was to meet expenses which could not be charged to the taxpayers of the United States. There is the trick of the coupling of categories, as in the 1954 campaign statement: 'We have driven the Communists, the fellow travelers, and the security risks out of government by thousands.' It is true that several thousand so-called 'security risks' were dropped in the early Eisenhower years to appease McCarthy. But Nixon failed to point out that the vast majority of these people were not security risks but simply having nothing to do with subversion, that many of them were hired initially by the Eisenhower Administration itself, and that the total included not a single known Communist. Thus again, the implication of what he said was false."

In discussing these and other examples of Nixon's political techniques of smear and innuendo, Alsop notes that 1954 was a year of particularly flagrant behavior. "In that year," he writes, "Nixon came closest to justifying Walter Lippmann's description of him as a 'ruthless partisan'... [who] does not have within his conscience those scruples which the country has the right to expect in the President of the United States." Alsop cites a classic example of Nixon's technique which occurred in the spring of 1954 when in the course of a telecast defending the Administration's foreign policies, he made a famous aside, "Nixon looked up from his script and asked, as though on the spur of the moment: 'And incidentally, in mentioning Secretary Dulles, isn't it wonderful finally to have a Secretary of State who isn't taken in by the Communists?"'

"Nixon didn't say that Dean G. Acheson and George Marshall were taken in by the Communists." But he very clearly implied it, and the implication is grossly misleading. To make his implication, Nixon made use of both an essentially specious "Communist issue" and a sleazy debater's trick, the rhetorical question. He asked his rhetorical question, moreover, not a madman Congresswoman... but when he had already been Vice-President of the United States for two years... That rhetorical question explains why, to some reasonable and fair-minded people, the case against Nixon is a convincing case.

Having quoted Alsop at such length, I must in fairness add that he deprecates the importance of this evidence in making his over-all assessment of the man, but the evidence he cites is nevertheless incontrovertible; each of us is entitled to make his own assessment of its significance.

Nixon Tries to Tidy Up
For the Eastern King-Makers

One counter-argument adduced in Nixon's favor is that these "sleazy debating tricks" are only words and, after all, are not most politicians heated or somewhat careless in their use of words? The fact is, however, that a politician's words are his deeds. Understanding communications is an executive office—whence does not—his words, next to his votes in Congress, are the most important materials we have on which to base a judgment. Moreover, political men do not habitually use words lightly, or regard them as of no lasting importance. A reporter has only to misquote a politician slightly or criticize him mildly to arouse an extraordinary outraged reaction. Most politicians most of the time value, or overvalue, what they say, choose their words with care, and have fairly clearly in mind what effects they hope to achieve by their words. Nixon's repeated use of reckless, inflammatory, and defaming language is not a series of momentary indiscretions; it is a considered procedure for which he must be held responsible.

A different argument often advanced in recent years in Nixon's behalf is that he has "matured." The "new Nixon," it is contended, is great-
ly changed from the "old Nixon." However, we cannot allow the matter to rest there. The question arises: why did he change? The change-over would be persuasive if his defenders could point to some single event or series of events that caused this beneficial transformation. They never do. The change is simply dated from the end of the 1954 campaign when his "white collar McCarthyism" failed to hold Congress for the Republicans. Or it is blandly suggested that with the passage of the years he has grown.

If anything would properly account for a dramatic change in a man's character and outlook, it would be a traumatic experience of some kind. In Nixon's case, the near-catastrophe of the "secret fund" disclosures leading up to his Checkers speech called into doubt his political methods and put his career in jeopardy. Yet patently it had no reforming effect. Two years later, he was back on the stump using the same tricks and techniques he had used before the trauma of the fund fight. Here certainly was no great divide in Nixon's career.

Another explanation is more logical. The new, smoother, more unctuous, more careful Nixon began to emerge only in the winter of 1955-56, after President Eisenhower's heart attack. Up until that time, Nixon had carried out the job for which he was chosen by the party managers in 1952: the job of hatchetman and handshaker for an Administration headed by a politically inexperienced general. Nixon's hope of future reward depended upon his doing that job well, and he did it the only way he knew. He was a slugger in what he himself called "rocking, socking campaigns" and, alternatively, he cut up his opponents by fast debating methods.

After Eisenhower's heart attack, Nixon, for the first time, realized in a palpable way that the Presidency might be within his own grasp. The one great danger was that he would be vetoed by the Eastern, internationalist faction which controls the Republican Party. This group repeatedly blocked the late Senator Robert A. Taft because it suspected his isolationist views. Nixon determined to pay court to the financiers and politicians who had successively nominated Willkie, Dewey, and Eisenhower. At that very time, these same men of power decided to "take up" Nixon as a protege and give him a close inspection. They were motivated principally by the consideration that their faction had no suitable candidate to replace Mr. Eisenhower. If Governor Nelson Rockefeller had captured the governorship of New York four years earlier, subsequent national political history might have been much different. But as it was in the winter of 1955-56, Nixon, if he proved satisfactory, was about the best available.

Nixon proved quite satisfactory. He had early begun to cultivate former Governor Thomas E. Dewey, who had been instrumental in selecting him as Eisenhower's running mate in 1952. Now he began to be drawn more fully into the inner circle of the "Dewey crowd" in New York. He attended several skull sessions arranged by Dewey to exchange views and hear expert briefings, particularly on foreign affairs. A close associate of Nixon in this development was William Rogers, later to become President Eisenhower's Attorney General in the second Administration. Rogers began his Washington career back in the 80th Congress of 1947-48 when he served as a Dewey contact man with the "wrong side" of the Republican Party, the isolationists and Midwestern conservatives. His formal job was as legal counsel for Senators Owen Brewster and Homer Ferguson, the fumble-and-stumble twins. Rogers was a talent spotter with an eye for bright young men. He soon met Nixon, introduced him to Dewey, and laid the basis of later events.

The result of Nixon's courting of the New York financiers and politicians and their extended period of looking him over was the emergence of the "new Nixon." The ambitious Vice President dropped his hatchet and began to impersonate a statesman. This is why he abruptly shed his "waste and extravagance" in foreign aid. He proved satisfactory. He was building credit with the influential bankers, politicians, and publishers. If Paris was worth a Mass to Henry IV, the White House was worth a few unpopular speeches to Richard Nixon.

The truth is that the new Nixon, like the old Nixon, has never sacrificed his interests to his convictions. He has kept his positions on issues sufficiently flexible to make them accord with his political needs. He would have been glad to be Taft's Vice President in 1952 if Taft had looked like a winner. He could defend doing nothing on civil rights in 1956 and defend the use of troops in Little Rock in 1957. He could be the cut-throat debater of 1954 and the sleepytime sandman of politics in 1956. The new Nixon, like the old Nixon, is fundamentally a man
on the make. His commitment is to
nothing larger or more impersonal
than his own ambition. He is on fire
with no ideal, dedicated to no great
cause, champion of no enduring
philosophy or consistent viewpoint.

There are numerous pieces of evi-
dence that might be cited other than
his disreputable campaign techniques
and debating tricks. There are his
years as a go-between... and an
accomplice of the McCarthyites when
they rode high in the early Fifties.
But let us limit ourselves to a single
item: Nixon's lack of eloquence and
literary skill. Nixon, commendably,
drafts his own speeches in longhand.
These speeches are never graced with
a felicitous phrase, never illustrated
with an interesting quotation or apt
literary allusion, never charged with
strong, passionate conviction. Noth-
ing lifts them above the common-
place. They are invariably cagy,
routine, dull. One is reminded
of the late MacKenzie King, the
plattitudinous prime minister of
Canada, who once remonstrated with
a speechwriter over some colorful
line: "I cannot say that. It would be
remembered."

Here is a random sample of phrases
from Nixon speeches and interviews:
"All we need is a win complex..."... Lip-service Americans... Jefferson
and Jackson would turn over in their
graves... The same old Socialist
baloney any way you slice it... You
hear some yakkity-yacking that cam-
paigns should be limited to ivory-
tower, philosophical discussions of is-
sues... A rocking, socking cam-
paign... If that is the way the ball
bounces."

These are not the words and
phrases of a man fit to stand in Lin-
coln's place and bear witness to the
American dream. This tired, banal
language reflects the banal, shallow
mind that produces it.

If Nixon's credentials as a moral
leader and an eloquent spokesman
are below the standard we have a
right to expect Presidents to attain,
his talents as a politician are rarely
called in question. Yet here his na-
tive sagacity has been much overrated.

Two of the darkest marks on his
record in the view of independent vot-
ers were his campaign speeches using
the "softness on Communism" argu-
ment against Jerry Voorhis in 1946
and Mrs. Douglas in 1950. In both
those years, the Democrats lost every-
where, and worst of all in California.
Earl Warren, William Knowland,
and many less well-known California
Republicans won easy victories with-
out using the so-called Communist
issue. Nixon would have defeated
Mrs. Douglas if he had not done
much more than praise California's
oranges and sunny climate. Even as a
crass opportunistical device there was
no need to smear her by dishonestly
linking her with the late Representa-
tive Vito Marcantonio of New York,
who fairly consistently followed the
Communist Party line.

In 1951-52, Nixon collected a fund
from his business backers to finance
various political activities. This
meant taking an enormous risk for a
nominal gain. When the fund became
widely known in the 1952 campaign,
the uproar nearly knocked Nixon off
the ticket. Was it worth risking the
loss of the Vice Presidency to gain
a few free trips to California and the
cost of a few thousand Christmas
cards?

Nixon's enemies have often stig-
mated him for his duplicity within
the California delegation at the 1952
convention. Warren, then governor,
was making his last bid for the Presi-
dency. Although Nixon pledged to
support the governor, Nixon
worked tirelessly to weaken Warren's
hold and spread support for Eisen-
hower. What is often overlooked
in accounting this little tale of inside
politics is that it was, in fact, Nixon's
own interests, extremely dan-
gerous and wholly unnecessary. It
was needless because the Eisenhower
years as Vice Presidential candidate
for reasons having nothing to do with his power or lack
of power to deliver the California
degation. It was dangerous conduct
because it transformed Warren from
an unsympathetic colleague into a
sworn enemy. If Warren had wished,
he could have kept Nixon off the
Eisenhower ticket in 1952 by inter-
posing his veto when the party man-
gagers "cleared" Nixon's name with
him. Nixon is lucky that Warren is
a magnanimous loser.

Another incident that raises ques-
tions about Nixon's political judge-
ment occurred in the 1952 campaign
when he made his famous speech mag-
ifying Adlai Stevenson's remote, un-
important connection with the Alger
Hiss case. Eisenhower's 6,600,000
majority showed Nixon's gratuitous
assault on Stevenson's character was
not necessary. The only purpose it
served was to blacken Nixon's reputa-
tion with a great many independent
voters.

During the first two years of the
Eisenhower Administration, Nixon
busted himself as "the bridge" be-
tween Joe McCarthy and the Ad-
ministration—a self-assigned mission.
Nixon did not seem to realize any
more than did the politically inex-
perienced Eisenhower that McCarthy
could not be appeased or tamed
or made a docile member of the
team. From first to last, he misread
McCarthy's character. The only re-
sult of Nixon's two years of futile and
devious maneuverings was to get him-
self identified in the public mind
with various ignominious deals and
surrenders such as the "chicken lunch"etwee Army Secretary Stev-
ens and McCarthy which Nixon
arranged.

In the 1954 campaign, Nixon
toured the mountain states where
several Senate seats were at stake.
He charged James Murray in Montana
and Joseph O'Mahoney in Wyoming
with being soft on Communism. Such
an attack was patently ridiculous
against men who are old-fashioned,
Roman Catholic politicians with long
public records. Not surprisingly, Nixon's tactics failed and both Democrats won. Nixon did even worse with his speeches in the next off-year campaign, in 1958, when he charged a Democratic victory would mean socialism and regimentation. One wag, after that campaign ended in Republican catastrophe, noted the number of miles Nixon had traveled and the states he had visited and proved statistically that the more Nixon traveled the worse his party did and that the Republicans fared better in the areas he did not visit than in those he did.

From time to time there have been other incidents that make one doubt Nixon's much vaunted prowess. The most famous of these was in February, 1956, when he foolishly dragged Earl Warren's nonpartisan office into a political speech, calling him "a great Republican Chief Justice." The roof practically fell in on Nixon as Republican newspapers joined in deploiring this lapse of taste.

It was clever and it was dirty for Nixon to link Voorhis and Mrs. Douglas with the Communists, to distort Stevenson's connection with Hiss, to knife Warren at the convention, to play both ends against the middle in those he did.

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This explains why he is sometimes called a “young fogey.”

On social welfare legislation such as social security, minimum wages, and the school lunch program, Nixon occasionally voted for such measures on final passage because the battle is usually over when the final roll call comes. But on the votes on the crucial amendments, he repeatedly sided with the enemies of these welfare programs. In 1947, as a freshman in the 80th Congress, he supported the House Republican leadership in favoring a cut in the school lunch program of $30,000,000. The next year he voted against adding 750,000 workers to the social security program. In 1949, he voted for a particularly unfair amendment that success- fully deprived 1,000,000 low-paid workers the protection of a 75-cent minimum wage. As a Congressman, Nixon at Congressional hearings and at Labor Department hearings in California participated actively on behalf of the big corporate farms that employ migratory Mexican laborers at low wages and sometimes under frightful conditions.

Nixon voted several times during his four years in the House and his two years in the Senate in favor of the tidelands oil giveaway, for abolition of federal regulation of natural gas prices, and against reduction of the 27.5 per cent oil depletion allowance.

On civil rights for Negroes and other minorities, Nixon has a mixed record. He voted for an anti-poll tax bill in 1949. In 1962, he joined with Taft in signing a minority report opposing a Fair Employment Practices Act with enforcement powers. But as Vice-President, he has used his authority as presiding officer of the Senate to assist in bringing liberal civil rights bills to a vote.

On some matters, Nixon’s position has shifted with the pressures. He was vaguely for federal aid for school construction when the Eisenhower Administration was sponsoring such a bill but subsequently he went on record against federal aid to education when the President’s interest in the matter waned. It was Nixon’s vote that broke the tie and killed a major school aid bill early in the present session of Congress. And that vote against federal aid to education came less than a week after Nixon told a Republican dinner in Chicago that “inadequate classrooms, underpaid teachers, and flabby standards are weaknesses we must constantly strive to eliminate.”

Nixon’s tendency to swing back and forth on major issues shows up vividly in the field of foreign affairs. As a Senator, for example, he endorsed the old Bricker Amendment which would have undermined the President’s constitutional authority on foreign policy, but as Vice-President he supported the Administration when President Eisenhower opposed the amendment.

He supported the Marshall Plan, but voted a ‘no’ on Point Four appropriations. He seemed to favor the liberalized tariff program of reciprocal trade, but voted for crippling amendments. He seemed to be on both sides of American policy regarding Korea and Indo-China.

Thus, on August 31, 1955, speaking before the American Legion Convention in St. Louis, Nixon said that in his decision to halt Communist aggression in Korea, former President Truman was right and “deserves the credit for it. Let’s recognize right now that the decision to go into Korea was right because the Communists had to be stopped.” But a year later, in his 1954 election eve speech, he charged that the Truman Administration’s “wrong policy” had “resulted in a war in Korea that cost us 140,000 American boys as casualties.”

Similarly, on April 16, 1954 speaking to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, Nixon said: “If, to avoid further Communist expansion in Asia and Indo-China, we must take the risk now by putting our boys in, I think the executive branch has to take the politically unpopular decision and do it, and I personally support such a position.” A fortnight later, Nixon was quoted by the New York Herald Tribune as saying that the Administration must avoid sending America troops to fight in Indo-China or anywhere else “if we can.” In later speeches, he praised the Administration for avoiding hostilities in Indo-China although he had told the newspaper editors that he personally supported intervention with American boys.

Perhaps the cruelest analysis of this curious political behavior came from Richard H. Rovere, writing in Harper’s: “What stands out in any consideration of the whole record is the flexibility that suggests an almost total indifference to policy. Nixon appears to be a politician with an advertising man’s approach to his work. Policies are products to be sold—this one today, that one tomorrow, depending on the discounts and the state of the market. He moves from intervention to anti-intervention with the same ease and lack of anguish with which a copywriter might transfer his loyalties from Camels to Chesterfields.”

Nixon Is Concerned With

Techniques More Than Issues

Nixon’s voting record as a legislator ended, of course, when he became Vice President, but he has had seven opportunities to break ties during his incumbency as presiding officer of the Senate. The issues at stake involved major conflicts between the liberal and conservative blocs and dealt with significant controversies on federal aid to education, agriculture, veterans and organized labor.

“In each case,” the New York Times reported recently, Nixon “has reflected the Eisenhower Administration’s policy against more liberal proposals sponsored by the Democrats.”

Since he never talks about his own voting record, Nixon can easily offer a verbal commitment to Eisenhower Republicanism or any other kind of Republicanism that may be fashionable. He can link hands with liberal Senator Jacob Javits of New York and reactionary Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois. He could campaign for the displeasure Senator Joseph McCarthy in Wisconsin and for respected Senator Clifford Case in New Jersey.

Beyond the negativism and evasiveness, however, Nixon’s hallmark as a politician is his preoccupation with the techniques and artifice of his craft. Having learned much from Chotiner, he has still the fascinated interest of a sorcerer’s apprentice.

On September 14, 1955, the same month in which Chotiner was addressing the GOP campaign school, Nixon spoke to a meeting of the Radio and Television Executives Society in New York. The report in Variety was headed—“MEMO TO
Nixon had been such a success in his talk that one advertising agency representative had jokingly offered him a vice-presidency.

Variety's account said: "Nixon showed the over 500 attending experts that he's as hep to the realities of good drama and to the theories... of successful time-buying as any of them. He gave about 30 minutes worth of advice on 'what a candidate should do to use this medium [television] effectively.'

"The disparity was taken to be slight between the way the No. 1 veep would have the advertising profession handle political candidates on video and the way advertising men already conduct campaigns for admittedly more commercial products... He advised use of saturation selling of candidates through one- and five-minute 'spots' as he called them because, he said, a 'great number of voters vote only names, not platforms.'"

Between insulting the informed voters by rebutting every argument with a diversionary attack and manipulating the uninformed voters by playing upon their emotions and their ignorance, Nixon betrays a notably cynical attitude toward the democratic process. But the point here is not the ethics of Nixon's political style, but what it reveals of his curiously detached and manipulative attitude toward political work. No politician caught up in the great issues and political projects of his time, whether he was conservative or liberal, would waste his time giving such a speech or even thinking of such matters. It is hard to imagine a natural politician, a Harry Truman or a Robert Taft, bothering himself with this kind of thing. This is the stuff of dilettantes and technicians, not of statesmen.

The political tasks of a President are to keep control of his party's machinery in order to use it in behalf of his legislative program, rally public opinion behind his objectives, create unity on the great issues of war and peace that transcend party politics, and cooperate, if need be, with the opposition party. Nixon could be counted upon to play the objective of his party's machinery. But for what purpose? Nothing in his political career indicates he has any national goals toward which he is working. His consciously acquired techniques and his experience have all been in beating down an opponent and not in rallying support for positive programs. He is such a partisan, such a divisive figure that he would find it difficult to organize national unity and enlist the cooperation of the Democrats. He has political skills, but they are not those of a national leader in times of recurring crises.

Nixon's record as an executive is a blank page. This tends to be true of any national politician who made his principal reputation in Congress. The difference is that Nixon has assiduously attempted to create the impression that he has acquired some useful executive experience during the eight years of the Eisenhower Administration. His apologists lay heavy stress on the fact that he has attended Cabinet meetings and National Security Council meetings, and Vice-Presidents have always been attending Cabinet meetings for forty years. Such attendance keeps a Vice-President informed, but by itself it provides no executive experience. Nixon attempted to get an executive post in 1957 when he sought the chairmanship of the Operations Coordinating Board, an obscure but fairly influential group which works at the secondary level of the Administration pulling together defense, foreign affairs, and propaganda. Eisenhower turned him down. The evidence from the Cabinet meetings reported by Robert Donovan in his book, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, clearly indicates, moreover, that Eisenhower consults Nixon and respects his opinion on strictly political matters but ignores him on questions of broad governmental policy, and has at times cut him short.

The two committees that Nixon has chaired are both paper outfits. He is chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth. The infrequent reports of this impressive-sounding committee are the occasion of much merriment among professional economists. The reports are thick with solemn affirmations of the obvious, such as: "Prices of industrial commodities have been rising in wholesale markets and this is usually followed by rises at retail." Professor J. K. Galbraith of Harvard, writing in the February *Harper's*, analyzed the first three reports of this committee. He noted that Nixon ascribed inflation to two causes: (1) the pressure for more public spending and (2) the implaceable upward pressure of wages on prices."

Record Shows Nixon Achieved Nothing On Inflation Problem

Having verbally attacked inflation, Nixon began his list of remedies by telling what he would not recommend. He would not urge wage and price controls. But, Galbraith pointed out, "if wages and prices are untouchable, then nothing directly can be done about the wage-price spiral which both the President and Mr. Nixon hold to be a cause of inflation. And unless some substitute action can be effective, then inflation won't be controlled.

"... Moreover, if prices reflect the power of the unions and the compensating action of the corporations, then government intervention does not have the damaging consequences that Mr. Nixon and his colleagues condemn. For then such intervention doesn't interfere with the reading of priorities and scarcities—the unions and the corporations have already spoiled that. What intervention does is substitute public regulation for what Mr. Nixon and his associates have condemned as bad private control by unions and companies."

As remedies, Nixon proposed a Congressional resolution making "reasonable price stability" a specific goal of federal policy, a curtailment of government spending, and permission to the Treasury to raise the rate of interest on long-term government bonds.

Galbraith and other economists quickly pointed out that price stability "has been a goal of federal policy for generations. It has been proclaimed repeatedly and with passion. The new resolution... would give the Administration no power it does not now possess."

The suggestion for curtailed government expenditure, the Harvard economist observed, "runs into the familiar problem that some of the things for which higher expenditures have been sought—schools, housing, defense, law enforcement, conservation—are rather urgent. To this Mr. Nixon is indifferent. He describes the pressures for increased spending as 'irresponsible.'"

"... More important still, while a budget deficit when the economy is operating at capacity can certainly be a cause of inflation, to balance the budget does not cure the inflation. That is because balancing the budget
will not arrest the wage-price spiral. Mr. Nixon, though he blames the spiral, makes no claim that budget-balancing would stop it.

Nixon's third recommendation, for an increase in interest rates, "represents a continuation of the [high interest rate] policy he was asked to implement."

Galbraith concluded: "The judgment to be rendered seems to me clear. Mr. Nixon has done nothing. Nor in seeking to persuade us that he has done something does he show a high regard for intelligence."

Nixon is also chairman of the President's commission on nondiscrimination in government contracts. This group provides Nixon with a useful sounding board for speeches about what he has done for the Negro. The commission, in fact, has accomplished very little. Cases move through its toils at a leisurely pace, often taking three or four years and not getting anywhere.

The business about being "the best-trained Vice-President in history" is a myth. The speech-making, traveling, hand-shaking, and paper-shuffling Nixon has done for more than seven years provide no clues as to what kind of chief executive he would be.

Opinions on Foreign Affairs Follow No Clear Pattern

The most crucial area of a modern President's responsibilities is that of foreign affairs. The country could stand any number of mistakes and regressive policies in the management of its domestic affairs. What it might not survive would be a President with bad judgment and erratic instincts in foreign policy. To elect a man to the high office is to cast a vote of confidence in his character. It is here that Richard Nixon poses the greatest difficulty. There is little in his demeanor and his public record to inspire confidence and much to provoke anxiety.

It is awkward to question a man's character because we will never know for certain what kind of a President Nixon would make unless he becomes President. There are those who are cheerily optimistic that he would grow in the job. They belong to what I call the "reform school theory" of the Presidency. The White House is hardly a training school where political delinquents are made into statesmen by the magic of their surroundings.

There are grounds for deep concern. A politician so reactionary as Nixon on domestic economic issues cannot convincingly portray himself abroad as the liberal champion of the oppressed and underprivileged. The case with which demonstrators were whipped up against him in his disastrous tour of Latin America proves how hard it is to wear one face at home and another abroad.

Nixon has a weakness for heroics and theatrical gestures. He is also a man of violent passions beneath that tightly controlled exterior. It was purely a play to the galleries, for Nixon to visit Saigon and plunge into the howling mob after his previous narrow escape in Lima and the repeated warnings of danger. Nixon is also enamored of the idea that words are a substitute for policy. His stated opinions on foreign affairs follow no clear pattern, now bristling with threats of massive retaliation, then later enthusiastically endorsing friendly talks with the Russians. In 1953, Nixon boasted that the Administration had extricated the country from the land war in Korea but the following year he came out in favor of involving our forces in another land war on the continent of Asia if it was necessary to save Indo-China.

Preoccupation with appearances is a weakness Nixon has sometimes indulged to fantastic extremes. The most extraordinary of these episodes occurred in August, 1955 when President Eisenhower returned from the Geneva summit conferences. His plane landed in Washington during a driving rainstorm. Nixon and all top officials were on hand to greet him. Most had umbrellas but at Nixon's request they did not open them. He feared the unfortunate symbolism of the umbrella which had been Neville Chamberlain's trademark when he met another dictator seventeen years earlier at Munich.

In describing the kind of President America needs, Nixon in January 1960 said: "The American people and the free world need in the Presidency a man who has judgment, a man who in a crisis will be cool, a man who won't go off half-cocked and give an appearance of leadership when, actually, his speaking out might be disastrous to the whole world."

Ironically, Nixon in this passage summed up several of the reasons why the country cannot risk putting him in the White House. He is intelligent enough. He is industrious enough. What is in grave doubt is his judgment, his inner calmness, his self-confidence. He has always been preoccupied with the "appearance of leadership" rather than leadership itself. He has repeatedly said foolish and demagogic words that are bad enough coming from a Senator or a Vice President but would be disastrous coming from a President. He is frequently going off rashly and half-cocked, whether to libel a political opponent, put American troops into a ground war in Indo-China, drag the Chief Justice into partisan politics, plunge himself into a mob in Caracas, or charge some innocent state Department employee with "undercutting" the Administration. No one could feel safe if the hydrogen bomb were in such imprudent hands.

The Presidency is a place for greatness. Richard Nixon's soiled record as a campaigner, his reactionary views as a domestic legislator, and his evasive, opportunist, and self-con contradictory record in foreign affairs disqualify him. Ambition alone is not enough.