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MR. NIXON AND THE NEGRO

NATIONAL COMMUNITY

(A Proposal)

FOREWORD

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It is now clear, in the light of the finalized work of the Democratic National Convention, that the Republican Party's nominee does not now have any escape hatches to the South. To any Public Relations man that would seem to make fast the resolution that the campaign must now be fought north of Washington.

And if that is conceded, it then looms that it must be won, in the main, in six key spots. These are the industrial centers of Philadelphia, New York, Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland and Los Angeles. As regards these, the victory does not depend upon carrying these "Command Positions"; rather, in our judgment, it hinges upon the degree to which these can be made comparatively immobile.

In at least four of these six spots, the Democratic calculation begins with what it feels to be a solid base of Negro votes. In the round, that calculation is correct; subject of course to the exigences that every battle creates in its unfolding. However, even Democrats do not know how "solid" this Negro base will be; and even they admit that its solidity is, for them, crucial.

The proposals we make, hereinafter, are based upon some unfriendly facts: 1) that the regular Republican organizations in these six spots are all but in shambles, as far as Negroes are concerned; 2) that the Republican National Committee, as of this watch, is without either prestige, or impact in this field; and, 3) that whatever is done must come from the top-most Negro leadership downward and not from any phoney "grass-roots" upward.

This means, in all of its starkness, that the Republican Party, per se, cannot be sold to Negroes with any measurable success in this campaign. Its record, as an entity, is vulnerable; its leaders, in too many respects, wholly suspect.

In our thinking, then, this leaves the task of "selling" the only commodity in sight with any appeal to this Democratic "solid base": the Vice President himself.

All of what we propose, here, is hitched to this one star.

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THE PROPOSALS

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In the light of our "foreword", we propose the following:

1) That in each of the "Command Positions" two Negro leaders be chosen as liaison with the top leadership of Negroes in that city.

The Role of these persons would be to serve as funnels for specific information designed for the eyes of the Negro leadership--that leadership consisting of Ministers, professionals of the healing arts, heads of organizations and principals of small-business concerns, such as beauticians, barbers and corner-store owners.

The information, to be discussed later, would go out from our Firm directly to those people whose addresses we have, or such as would, in addition, be supplied by our key leaders.

The object of this would be to make as intelligent as possible those leaders whose attitudes might be reflected by thousands.

2) That a steady flow of sharp, short, information be maintained to these key leaders who total approximately 40,000 in the "Command Positions". This information would go from us and would not bear any political stamp, as such.

This would consist of information dictated by the day-to-day shift in the winds of things and would not, in great degree, be determined in advance.

3) That a pictorial booklet titled "Of Such As This" be prepared in a lot of 100,000 showing Mr. Nixon in proximity to Negroes the world over.

The material for this is appreciably at hand in Mr. Klein's files and in other places such as newspaper morgues. In addition, our recent "off-record" dinner with the Vice President provided additional material.

The objective of this is rooted in the fact that Negroes, by and large, will not read long and burdensome tracts on politicians. Moreover, words do not impress them nearly as much as proof-positive that the individual does not shy away from physical manifestation of his regard.

4) That we be given the task of handling Press Relations in the "Command Positions".

We ask for this in an effort to be of service in concentrating such spending and maneuvering as must be done in areas where a dividend logically can be expected. It will be foolhardy to follow an old

National Committee policy of putting a check in an envelope and sending it to Negro publishers, broadside, without any concept of what his paper could do in the master scheme of things.

5) That subsequent issues of the "Industrial Statesman" be mailed to leaders.

We do not labor this, here, because we feel that understanding on this point has already been established, even if no financial agreement has been firmed up.

6) That if this Firm is retained, we be given the prerogatives and the means and allowed to do the job with a minimum of interference once it is under way.

We put this to paper only because our experience has taught us that as political programs get under way every important figure, from the President's cabinet down, will have plans proposed to them by their favorite Negroes--ranging from servants to hangers-on--for which they will press. Once a machinery like ours is in motion, however, it does not lend well to precipitate changes.

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