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October 24, 1968
C. S. Murphy

ORGANIZATION OF WHITE HOUSE OFFICE STAFF

General Objective

The President's personal staff is of critical importance in discharging the duties of the Presidency. The relationship is an intimate one -- staff members need to be almost a part of, or an extension of, the President's own person.

The staff should have the following characteristics:

(1) In total, it should be capable of providing assistance to the President across the whole range of his responsibilities. It should be relatively small and of very high quality.

(2) Enough different staff members should report to the President directly and regularly to minimize temptations to empire building and to make sure that he remains the Boss.

(3) The staff should be flexible enough to meet whatever problems and demands may arise.

(4) It should be organized enough -- that is staff members should have continuing areas of responsibility which are clearly enough defined -- so that they can plan and organize their work efficiently. Most of the time, each principal staff member ought to know what he is supposed to be doing and also what other staff members are doing.
(5) Staff members should not have directive authority with respect to Cabinet members and agency heads. Cabinet members and agency heads should have direct access to the President as a matter of right. Usually, all concerned will prefer to operate most of the time with and through staff members, but the use of this channel should be essentially voluntary.

(6) The staff should not be organized along agency lines, but rather by activities or functions that cut across agency lines in order to synthesize policies and coordinate operations on a government-wide basis.

(7) Staff functions should be arranged to provide automatic checks and balances within the staff as well as automatic cross-fertilization and stimulation.

Staff Meetings

Above all else, I would recommend that the President have a regular daily staff meeting with his top White House staff. I am convinced on the basis of first-hand experience that this can provide the President a greater return on the time invested than anything else he can do. A poor staff organization can do a better job if it has regular meetings with the President than a good organization can do without such meetings.

Some of the reasons why --
(1) If the staff is to be an extension of the President's person, they must see him -- hear him -- know him -- know what he is thinking.

(2) Staff meetings provide an efficient means for the President to make assignments and receive brief reports.

(3) They provide an efficient means for staff members to keep abreast of what other staff members are doing as well as the President's own activities.

(4) Such meetings will provide the best possible coordination of staff activities.

(5) They provide an efficient means of giving most of the direct access to the President which staff members need.

(6) They can be tremendous builders of morale and esprit de corps, which is vital to the President's success.

Format. The staff meetings should be short -- about 30 minutes. Problems would not be discussed at length or in depth. The agenda might run like this:

(a) Begin at 9:30 a.m.

(b) The President hands out assignments he has accumulated.

(c) He notices his schedule for the day and asks for relevant comments. (Does anyone have a particular warning or request for the President with respect to any appointment on his schedule?)
Are staff members to attend any of the President's meetings or to provide him any additional briefing?

(d) Anything about the schedule for future days?

(e) The President asks staff members for brief reports he may want or they may wish to offer.

(f) Appointments can be made for later discussion of matters that need to be discussed at length.

(g) Anything else?

(h) If any time is left, there is always something on the President's mind he would like to talk about or ask about.

**Place.** The staff meetings could be held in the Cabinet Room.

**Attendance.** The staff meetings should be attended by the Special Assistants (or equivalents) discussed below, the Executive Assistant (Bill Hopkins), and perhaps the Armed Forces Aide. I would be inclined to permit each of these to bring with him a deputy or assistant who could sit in the back row and keep quiet -- and could act as an alternate in the absence of his principal.

**Special Assistants**

Certainly, there are many variations in the way in which the staff might be organized and functions assigned among them, depending particularly on the experience and aptitudes of staff members. However, as a general pattern I suggest an organization
built around a number of Special Assistants to the President, of roughly equal rank and equal salary (comparable to the present Special Assistants; salary $30,000).

Each of these Special Assistants would have continuing primary responsibility for a given aspect of the staff work. In turn would have such deputies, associates, and assistants as were necessary and appropriate. Generally speaking, these assistants to the Special Assistants should be limited in number and high in quality. Where appropriate, a Special Assistant might carry a different title, e.g., Special Counsel, Press Secretary, Legislative Counsel.

As a point of beginning, I suggest the following:

(1) Special Assistant for Domestic Affairs. Responsibilities:
- Department and agency operations (excluding international); operations of the Domestic Policy Council and supervision of its secretariat;
- handling task forces on domestic affairs. Assistants: 6 or 8.

(2) Special Assistant for International Affairs. Responsibilities:
- Operations of Departments of State and Defense, National Security Council, Office of Special Trade Representative, OEP, handling task forces on international affairs. Assistants: 5 or 6.

(3) Special Assistant for Legislative Programs. Responsibilities:
- Content of legislative program, messages to Congress, coordination of State of the Union, Budget, and Economic Report Messages. Assistants: 2 or 3.
(4) Special Assistant for Speeches. Responsibilities:
Speakers, Presidential statements, Executive Orders, airline cases, special assignments. It is not necessary that this man have a talent for writing speeches himself, although that would be very helpful. It is more important that he be capable of knowing what the speeches ought to say. He should have the time to think "long thoughts" across the whole spectrum of Presidential responsibility and give advice about any and all of it. Assistants: 2 or 3.

(5) Special Assistant for Congressional Liaison. Responsibilities: Facilitating consideration of the legislative program. The Congressional liaison operation has become increasingly effective over the past 16 years. It would be worthwhile to get a detailed exposition of its techniques from those recently engaged in it. Assistants: 3 or 4.

(6) Special Assistant for Appointments. Responsibilities:
President's schedule, appointments to see the President, supervise administration of White House Office, arrangements for ceremonies and functions (other than those handled by the Social Office). Assistants: 2 or 3.

(7) Special Assistant for Press. Responsibilities:
Press, radio and television. Assistants: 2 or 3.

(8) Special Assistant for Personnel. Responsibilities:
Personnel policies, Presidential appointees, talent search. Assistants: 3 or 4.
(9) Special Assistant for Correspondence. Responsibilities: Presidential correspondence, historical records, archives, Presidential libraries, culture. Assistants: 2 or 3.

Other Officials

The Executive Assistant to the President is a nonpartisan career official who supervises the administrative and other supporting services in the White House Office. His duties and these supporting services are described at length elsewhere.

The Armed Forces Aide supervises the extensive supporting services provided by the Department of Defense, especially in the fields of transportation and communication.

Domestic Policy Council

This memorandum assumes that there will be a Domestic Policy Council.

I suggest strongly that the President himself chair this Council. Its membership might well include the Vice President, all Cabinet members except State, heads of some independent agencies such as Veterans Administration (which spends a lot of money on a lot of people), NASA, Small Business, and Atomic Energy Commission. Agencies in the Executive Office of the President, such as CEA, BOB, and OST, should be used in a supporting role, but probably should not be members of the Council.
The Council should have a secretariat to be supervised by the President's Special Assistant for Domestic Affairs, who should be generally responsible for the effective functioning of the Council's operations. It should be quite possible to use the Council framework as an effective means for the orderly accomplishment of the "domestic affairs" part of the business of the White House Office. To a considerable extent, this would correspond to what was done by OWMR in World War II and has been done in varying degrees by The Assistant to the President, the Operations Coordinating Council, and other successors of OWMR on and off at the White House staff since then.

Comments on This Organization

The suggested organization has the following virtues:

(1) It provides a framework for covering everything, at least once.

(2) It provides meaningful lines of demarcation between responsibilities of different staff members that should give everyone a pretty good idea of what he is supposed to do.

(3) At the same time, it provides useful interlocking in a functional way which will (a) give some leeway for strong staff members to help others carry the load (e.g., the Assistant preparing the legislative program will be working with the Assistant for Domestic Affairs on the same problems, and the
point where one leaves off and the other takes up can be shifted),
(b) provide automatic checks and balances (the legislative program
man, the speech writer, or the Assistant for Correspondence will
have a crack at most of the important matters coming up through
others), and (c) provide ready means for one part of the staff to
stimulate another (e.g., If the speech writer thinks something is
being neglected, he can suggest making a speech on the subject.
This raises the issue; and if the cause is good, action may be
forthcoming to provide a basis for the speech.)

(4) The arrangement tends to encourage cohesion in
Presidential activities rather than fragmentation along depart­
mental and agency lines.

Interchange of Work

Because of the natural interlocking of responsibilities
between certain of the Special Assistants, there would be in many
areas a flow of work that should lead naturally to an interchange
of work between them and their respective assistants. e.g., An
assistant to the Special Assistant for Domestic Affairs might bear
the brunt of the work in developing a Food Program. He could then
move on to write or help on the Message to Congress under the
supervision of the Special Assistant for Legislative Programs --
and similarly on the speech with the Special Assistant for Speeches.
Speech Writing

Presidential speeches might be divided into two kinds:

(1) Those that are made because there are occasions that require speeches -- dedications, state dinners, etc. For these it is nice to have speech writers with a gift for words, good judgment, imagination and a broad background.

(2) Those that are made because the President wants to say something about something. For these, it is my view that substance is even more important than form. Consequently, the staff system should operate so that people work on these speeches who are competent to deal effectively with the substance.

Feedback

Arrangements should be made so that staff members who work on policy development, messages, and speeches will be aware of the reaction to Presidential statements and actions as evidenced by the mail, etc.; and their guidance should be made available to assist in responding effectively to the mail.

Attendance at Meetings

The question of which staff members attend which meetings of the President with which groups is important. As a general rule, a few, but not many, staff members should be at most such group meetings -- Cabinet, Congressional leaders, NSC, etc. The principal assistant on speeches should be at almost all important meetings --
it can make the speeches much more meaningful if he knows what is going on. For example, if the President has regular conferences with the Secretaries of State and Defense and other top Assistants on international affairs, this man should be there.

**Collegiate Atmosphere**

I would encourage staff members to engage in extensive and wide-ranging discussions among themselves concerning the matters with which they deal -- each a little bit skeptical and recognizing that for many of these matters there are no certain answers. These discussions should be tempered with --

Responsibility -- for the final judgments can be of awful importance. Humor -- it helps keep down the ulcers and retain sanity. Discretion -- talk rather freely to each other but carefully outside.

**Other Agencies**

White House Office staff can improve their effectiveness and lighten their own burden by the skillful use of assistance from other agencies in the Executive Office of the President, particularly the Bureau of the Budget. Operating functions should be kept out of the White House Office insofar as possible.

**The President's Daily Schedule**

The Presidency is an impossible job and makes inordinate demands upon the man who holds it. This is all the more reason why
a schedule should be established to enable him and his staff to operate as efficiently as possible, and why the schedule should be adhered to with reasonable fidelity. This may seem a simple thing, but like the daily staff meeting it is enormously important to the success of the Presidency.

(I will make more specific and detailed suggestions on this if desired.)
MEMORANDUM

30 October 1968

To: RN

From: Robert C. Hill, Chairman
Foreign Affairs Advisory Group

Re: Initial Meeting, October 23, 1968

Ten members of the Foreign Affairs Advisory Group met in New York City on October 23rd:

Robert C. Hill (Chairman); Gerard C. Smith; Henry Kearns; John Davis Lodge; Charles Burton Marshall; Robert Strausz-Hupe; Eleanor Lansing Dulles; Milorad M. Drachkovitch; G. Warren Nutter; Richard V. Allen (Staff Director).

Four members were unable to attend: Bradford Morse and Frances Bolton were campaigning in their districts; Mr. Adolph Schmidt was out of the country; and William Scranton could not make the meeting.

1. With respect to campaign issues, the Group discussed in detail a possible bombing halt and the question of negotiating arms control agreements with the Soviet Union under conditions of United States superiority. Suggested language for statements pertaining to these issues are attached.

2. The Foreign Affairs Advisory Group puts itself at the service of the President-Elect in the matter of the transition process. It is felt that, subject to your wishes, the professional expertise of the members could be put to constructive
purposes by presenting its thought on various problems relating to the conduct of foreign affairs. Recognizing the sensitivity of the question of personnel, the Foreign Affairs Advisory Group has no desire to be involved in this area.

3. As a minor matter of protocol, the Group strongly recommends that some mechanism be set up, with an appropriately knowledgeable person in charge, to receive, process and acknowledge messages sent on and after November 6 by heads of state and other important foreign dignitaries.

In this connection, the Group strongly recommends for your consideration the establishment of an appropriately manned "VIP" lounge, either in New York or Washington, to accommodate those foreign visitors whom you will not be able to see personally. Such an office, staffed by persons of your choice, might be of assistance in disposing of matters not requiring your immediate attention. Such an office would be coordinated with your own Chief of Staff.

4. Subject to your approval, the Foreign Affairs Advisory Group plans to meet again, as suggested in your original invitation to join the Group, in the period November 8-12.

Attachments:

Suggested statements:

1. Bombing halt
2. Arms control
Attachment 1: Bombing Halt

Any man of good will must pray that this time the bombing halt announced by President Johnson will prove to be more than a breather for the adversary, that it will not entail added sacrifice of American and allied lives, and that it will prove to be a substantial step beyond the preliminaries of negotiation and toward the achievement of a peace on honorable terms that will justify what the war in Vietnam has cost in blood and treasure.
The de-escalation of the arms competition will be an abiding objective of my foreign policy. Not only has the strategic purpose of the U.S.S.R. been unpredictable and the Soviet expenditure on arms rising, but our own effort towards maintaining U.S. strategic power has been eroded by the policies of the Administration.

The very condition of meaningful arms control negotiations with the Soviets is a dynamic research and development program in national defense. This is not a matter of piling up missiles and nuclear bombs. What is needed is the continued flow of knowledge in the defense realm which will permit us, if the need arises, to deploy new weapons systems quickly and effectively. This capability is needed as the essential backstop for arms control negotiations that will yield agreements consonant with the best interests of world peace and our national security.
Subject: Department of State Administration: Misuse of Foreign Service Reserve.

Recommendation: Appointments to Foreign Service Reserve, including subsequent appointment as Foreign Service Officers, should be examined to determine the extent of the misuse of the appointive power and the evasion of the intent of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, through the assistance of the successive Deputy Undersecretaries (William Crockett and Idar Rimestad), a series of appointments have been made to the Foreign Service Reserve (FSR) Officer category which violated the spirit of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Only a strictly limited number of Schedule C positions (policy-making or political-type jobs) are open in the Civil Service. The number of FSR's appointed increased substantially during the period, partly to supply needed skills on a temporary basis but partly because it was discovered that the FSR category could provide attractive jobs without examination—an easily available mechanism for political patronage. It was also discovered, in further derogation of the career principle, that, with a short stay in the FSR category, one could qualify for lateral entry into the career Foreign Service Officer (FSO) ranks.

According to the Foreign Service Act, FSR's were to be appointed from government agencies and outside the government "on a temporary basis" in order to have outstanding and specialized skills available, as might from time to time be required. His term was not to exceed five years. An FSR may properly be described, according to the intent of Congress, as a temporary officer.

Cases have been reported of appointments of FSR's up to ten years and of their assignment to non-specialized work replacing career FSO's. Any investigation of the FSR category of officers should reveal a series of individuals whose work is nonessential and non-specialized, and should be terminated.

Of special importance in this connection is P.L. 90-494, which was signed into law on August 20, 1968, which provides for a career category of officers in the U. S.
Information Agency (USIA). A kicker to the USIA career bill is the Hays Amendment which permits the Department to bestow unlimited tenure—or career status—on all FSR's. This dangerous amendment makes the career Foreign Service even more vulnerable to abuse, making it much easier to appoint persons with political or other influence into a career system and creating a parallel career category. The amendment is further suspect because its sponsor, Rep. Wayne Hays (D.-Ohio), Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Department of State Operations, has been notorious in his efforts to destroy the Foreign Service and to bend it to his will and whim. He is feared and avoided by his fellow Congressmen because of his caustic tongue and vicious nature; and, in the past, has not hesitated to berate unmercifully and unreasonably Department of State officials in private and in public.

A thorough investigation of the possible effects of this hastily-passed amendment should be instituted and it should not be implemented quickly. Consideration should also be given to its repeal. For what it may be worth, and after representations from the Foreign Service Association, the current Deputy Undersecretary for Administration (Rimestad) has promised that "the legislation will be used solely for the strengthening of the Foreign Service....there will be no crash program....it is recognized that such changes in the personnel structure as may be indicated must, of necessity, be developed slowly over a period up to five years."
Subject: Some Approaches to the Problem of Dealing with the Russians

1. The fabric of dealings with the Soviet Union should be approached from the perspectives of the short term and the long term.

2. Over the short term (several years) it will be necessary to maintain and increase U.S. economic/political and military strength with relation to the Soviet Union, to revitalize the will and encourage the strengthening of West European resolve to withstand alternately Soviet military blandishments, and to meet firmly probes of Soviet or Soviet-supported forces which, if successful, would endanger clear U.S. interests. Solutions to basic issues will almost certainly not be attainable in the short term.

3. Despite a rapid growth in Soviet strategic forces and a strengthening of its general purposes forces, it is unlikely over the near term that the Soviet Union would directly challenge U.S. forces in areas vitally strategic for both countries. Tactically, however, Soviet political or military moves will be influenced by U.S. policies or by what the Soviet leaders think are U.S. policies. Risks of miscalculation would become dangerous if Soviet leaders have a mistaken expectation of reduced American opposition. With the lesson of Czechoslovakia fresh in mind, where American silence in the face of Soviet threats to Czechoslovakia was taken as acquiescence and almost certainly contributed to the Soviet decision to invade, U.S. leaders must respect a fundamental rule in dealing with the Soviets: U.S. intentions must be expressed clearly and explicitly at various levels and, where necessary, at the highest level. Because of their experiences, training and isolation, Soviet leaders see the world and, in particular, the U.S., through a distorted prison. Nuances and delicate signals are not enough to correct these misinterpretations. In order to avoid the dangers of Soviet miscalculations, it is incumbent upon U.S. leaders and diplomats in discussions, interviews and negotiations with Soviet officials to make U.S. positions and policies clear, precise and unambiguous.
4. Part of the problem is psychological—we impute to the Soviets a manner of logic and thinking which is Western. We see a mirror image of our attitudes and believe that the Soviets think this way too. We tend to see both sides of a question and use compromise as a negotiating tool. We like to be liked and are disturbed by persistent hostility.

5. A good negotiating technique is, "How does it look from Moscow?" The Soviet mind is suspicious, hostile, distorted by antiquated Marxist framework, stunted by an age-old lack of association with the outside world, and highly sensitive to official and unofficial words and actions of the United States, which is, after all, still the most powerful nation in the world and the only major obstacle to the realization of Soviet aims and goals. This exercise of looking at the world from Moscow, should reveal more clearly the variety and depth of the internal and external problems facing the Soviet Union.

6. Over the next few years there should be opportunities for meaningful negotiations, in limited situations where U. S. and Soviet interests overlap. But traditional American optimism should be guarded, since the resolution of the basic sources of conflict in U. S.-U.S.S.R. relations will be difficult and prolonged. However, if viewed pragmatically and without undue expectations, all opportunities for bilateral and multilateral negotiations in various forums should be seized. However, if negotiations are bilateral, every care should be taken to consult with, and to seek acceptance from, our allies prior to and at all stages of the discussions. Our Western European allies are always jittery over any U. S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations, especially those dealing with security matters in which they have an interest. Some possibilities for negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, are: (1) Cooperation in joint scientific and technical projects, such as space travel and nuclear energy; (2) Joint exploration of the ocean beds; (3) Expansion of existing U. S.-U.S.S.R. exchanges in educational and cultural fields; (4) Trade relations, including a trade agreement and reciprocal opportunities to establish trading and business offices; (5) Opening of consulates; (6) Establishment of joint industrial enterprises; and (7) Additional arms control measures. However, progress in a period of Soviet hostility unavoidably will be slow,
and the proposals should be made only after realistic calculation of how they would appeal to Soviet self-interest.

7. In Europe, which should be in the forefront of U. S. foreign policy, the basic problems posed by a divided Germany and a divided Europe are no nearer to a solution; and the division of Europe and Germany involves wider issues involving the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. Our relations with the Soviet Union should be viewed mainly in the context of Europe. Soviet leaders would be delighted if the U. S. abdicated its interest in Central Europe and acquiesced in a Soviet "sphere of interest".

8. Europe has the potential to be a third major power center, and its political orientation will continue to be critical to U. S. security. A movement in the direction of European unity would provide greater stability although a more unified Europe would be likely to act with greater independence and, on occasion, contrary to U. S. interests. In the long run, however, the United States should not expect to exercise a permanent tutelage in Western Europe, and should avoid the advocacy of plans implying the permanent division of Europe.

9. Reasonably, the United States should have in mind and work for a European settlement which probably can evolve after an extended period of "normalization". The prospect of a European settlement being imposed by force is highly remote. Normalization means growing trade, industrial and cultural ties between Western and Eastern Europe; increasing contacts in many fields between West and East Germany; and efforts to establish a framework of closer cooperation with all-European problems, especially in the economic field, in which the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. could participate.

10. An objective of an ultimate European settlement should be the withdrawal of Soviet forces beyond the Soviet borders, which, in all likelihood, could not be obtained without a similar withdrawal of U. S. forces. A German settlement is a prerequisite for European unity but the unification of Germany is not possible as long as her neighbors feel a security danger in German reunification. Another objective should be the removal of artificial and arbitrary restraints on the nations of Eastern Europe, which would probably involve limited and specific restraints on the military and diplomatic freedom of Germany. The U. S.
should recognize, of course, that it may have the power to help shape a European settlement, but it certainly cannot impose one.

11. The process of liberation of Eastern Europe will come about through the normalization of all of Europe. The U.S. can do little by direct diplomatic and economic means to force the dissolution of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. But that situation is not necessarily going to continue, nor should it, for all time. The latest "bridge building" efforts in Eastern Europe were doomed because they underestimated the intensity of Soviet determination to maintain its hegemony and military position there, and to crush any local movements which could subvert Soviet power. The Warsaw Pact (established after the defection of Yugoslavia, constitutes the most important institution for the maintenance of Soviet political and military interests in Eastern Europe.

12. The ultimate aim of our policy toward the U.S.S.R. must be based on remaining and continuing efforts toward the resolution of basic issues. Genuine settlements will not arise from good will but will come when the Soviet leaders are convinced by experience that their expansionist aims are not feasible or too costly, and that there are more attractive alternatives than unprofitable conflict. In addition to restraining Soviet ambition, our policy should hold out opportunities for the satisfaction of legitimate Soviet interests. However, the essence of our policy should be that the key to the resolution of basic issues must be a change in Soviet attitudes which will permit U.S.-U.S.S.R. accommodation.

13. The basic elements of an effective and continuing U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R. should include:

(a) Harbor no wishful illusions about Soviet intentions, and watch closely what Soviet leaders say and do.

(b) Maintain, with our allies, an adequate margin of military and economic power.

(c) Repeatedly offer negotiations on outstanding issues on terms which take into account the
legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, but on no other terms.

(d) Extend guarded cooperation to moderate tensions while remembering the threats which Soviet power and commitments pose.

(e) Press efforts to get the Soviets to open up their society, thus assisting its evolution in the direction of accommodation.
Subject: Strategic Arms Control Negotiations

Recommendation: The United States should agree to meet with the Soviet Union as early in the Nixon Administration as possible to negotiate a possible agreement on strategic missiles after (1) disassociating the opening of any talks from other European issues, especially the political and military implications of Czechoslovakia, (2) through consultations in NATO regarding aims and possibilities, and (3) a candid, in-depth presentation of the stark problem of nuclear strategic missiles to the American people and the available approaches to it.

Vice President Humphrey said in Ohio on October 28 that the first thing he would do is to try to find some way to engage the Soviet Union in missile talks. The N. Y. Times in an editorial of October 25 called for an immediate opening of talks by the Johnson Administration. Characteristically, the editorial misstated and overstated its arguments: "a plateau exists in the arms race" and "a nuclear balance has been achieved"; and Washington and Moscow had decided "before Czechoslovakia to limit offensive and defensive strategic missiles."

Both Humphrey and the Times ignore or disregard important facts and circumstances.

1. It would be a profound error to move precipitately into strategic missiles negotiations, which are only part of a complex of necessary arms control negotiations, without further and thorough consultations with our NATO allies who also have vital interests in arms control negotiations. It is especially important, because of likely Western European concern, that the negotiations be thoroughly discussed both before and during these talks.

2. The Soviet Union's clear and relative lack of concern for the beginning of the missiles talks was demonstrated by its deliberate choice of invasion of Czechoslovakia instead of talk; which, in fact, was a direct affront to the United States and the Johnson Administration. The historic effects on Europe, both East and West, of the
Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia should be reassessed. The U.S.S.R. has previously used disarmament negotiations for propaganda purposes, and there is a fundamental need to ascertain how genuine is the alleged Soviet willingness to negotiate.

3. Humphrey either does not know, or even worse cloaks, the conditional nature of the Soviet willingness to begin strategic missiles talks. The Soviet Union expressly stated, in a diplomatic communication of August 29, 1968 (10 days after the invasion of Czechoslovakia) that the post-invasion remarks by the U. S. representative in the UN Security Council were "unfriendly"; and, while the Soviet Union was willing to conduct negotiations of mutual interest, the U. S. must understand that Soviet actions within the Socialist camp could not be questioned. When eventually agreed upon, the Soviet Union should be informed that any arms control negotiations would be disassociated from outstanding European issues and especially from any implications of "spheres of influence".

4. Of course, decisions have not yet been made "to limit offensive and defensive strategic weapons" as erroneously stated by the N. Y. Times. It should be recalled that in July, eighteen months after the U. S. invitation was extended, the U.S.S.R. agreed to begin to open strategic arms talks. The scope of the talks is still undecided, there is no hint of Soviet accommodation, and Soviet positions are still obscure and apparently unchanged. The missiles talks could last many months and probably years, and in view of the Soviet attitude, there are no compelling reasons for immediate haste to open the talks.

5. Working-level officials in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency say that they were prepared to begin negotiations, but in a few months will be even "more prepared".

6. American negotiators will have to determine whether the Soviet Union is willing or prepared to negotiate at this stage in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. For example, the Soviet leaders have appeared to be more interested in using the talks for exerting leverage on American defense policy rather than on getting a formal agreement. The Soviet leadership almost certainly does not expect an early agreement in an area which would have far-reaching implications for the whole range of Soviet policies, and some elements probably do not believe that one is possible
at all. Some leaders see an opportunity to reduce the economic burden of a new and costly round in the strategic arms race—others probably fear that an agreement would perpetuate U.S. military superiority.

7. Basic, then, to strategic arms control negotiations is the U.S. approach which should emphasize a willingness to negotiate at proper times and with proper preparation, an evident determination to maintain our military preparedness and position and a demonstration to the U.S.S.R. that the absence of an agreement would force us to introduce innovations in our nuclear defense and offense.
Subject: U. S. Policy towards Cuba

Recommendation: It is most likely that Castro will not seek accommodation with the U. S. and, despite depressed economic conditions, he should continue in power over the next year or two; however, the U. S. should be prepared to engage in definitive talks with any successor Cuban government.

When Fidel Castro came to power in January 1959, he looked upon Latin America as a vast, fertile field for Cuban-style revolutions. Persistent failure has decreased the attractiveness of Castro-Guevara theories of guerrilla warfare and peasant-based revolution, and Castro's insistence on revolutionary tactics has alienated the orthodox, pro-Soviet elements which dominate the Latin American Communist movement. In the face of an increased resistance by other Latin American countries to guerrilla movements and a Soviet damper on "premature" revolutionary activity, there seems little chance of any significant Castroist successes over the next several years. The U. S. should insure this continued lack of success, by extending assistance in training and equipment to Latin American countries which lack the resources to handle serious subversive and insurgency problems.

Castro currently lacks offensive weapons and transport capabilities, and Cuba does not pose a military invasion threat to the countries of Latin America, except possibly against Hispaniola. Castro also presumably realizes that open attack would invite unmanageable U. S. and Latin American retaliatory measures. Recently, Castro---perhaps because of adverse economic developments in Cuba and the Bolivian fiasco---has shown little interest in the "export of revolution" to the rest of Latin America. However, Castro has committed himself to the path of violence and has given notice of an intention to continue providing propaganda, training, leadership and financial support to selected revolutionary groups in Latin America. Nevertheless, chances are that his revolutionary objectives will continue to be frustrated.

The Castro regime probably will continue to provide us little room for flexibility in our Cuban strategy. We
should continue in our efforts to isolate and ostracize Castro and to increase pressure on Cuba's economic relations with the non-communist world. Castro is unlikely to agree to our basic terms for a U.S.-Cuban accommodation—cessation of his exportation of subversion and revolution and discontinuance of his military dependence on the U.S.S.R. Also, he is unlikely to provoke us to intervene militarily in Cuba. We cannot expect the mere passage of time to solve our problems with Cuba.

The Soviet Union probably sees no alternative to him, even if he is expensive and recalcitrant; and there are distinct advantages in the situation. It is unlikely that Castro's economic difficulties or his contentious relationship with the U.S.S.R. will cause him to turn toward the U.S. for assistance or trade. It seems equally unlikely that he would be responsive to direct overtures by the U.S. on any issue.

Castro gives every evidence of being in firm, domestic control and of remaining that way, barring accidents, over the next couple of years. Even if economic conditions were to deteriorate, he would still have the advantages of a powerful political machine and a formidable military-security apparatus.

If Castro should leave the scene, the successor regime might well resemble the current one and pose similar problems for the United States, but it is doubtful that such a regime would be as totally intransigent as Castro and our possibilities for maneuver likely would be greater. With Castro no longer in power, we would have an opportunity for a more flexible policy toward Cuba. We, accordingly, should be prepared to engage in talks with a new Cuban government and with our C&S colleagues in search of an acceptable arrangement with Cuba.

In any discussions with the successor Cuban government, the United States should insist on the regime's renunciation of the exportation of revolution and of its primary dependence on the U.S.S.R. We should be prepared for frank discussions concerning (a) the status of confiscated U.S. economic assets in Cuba, (b) the future of the Guantanamo Naval Base, (c) the restitution of some sort of Cuban sugar quota in the U.S. market, and (d) the
future of the Cuban exile community in the U. S. In such discussions the United States should be sufficiently flexible to maximize its opportunities to regain influence in Cuba and to facilitate, if feasible, Cuba's reentry into various inter-American organizations as a responsible member.