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STUDY OF THE 1960-61 PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

Memorandum No. 8

"Personnel Problems of the Incoming President"

November 15, 1960

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PERSONNEL PROBLEMS OF THE INCOMING PRESIDENT

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PERSONNEL PROBLEMS OF THE INCOMING PRESIDENT

This memorandum is intended to be a general introduction to the problems of personnel management which the President-elect will face as Chief Executive of the United States government. It is assumed that he will quickly draw upon the materials, the facilities, and the personnel of the United States Civil Service Commission to get more thoroughly acquainted with the situation. It is assumed also that the President-elect will encourage his prospective department and agency heads to make contact with the administrative assistant secretaries, executive officers, and personnel officers in their respective departments and agencies, in order to acquaint themselves with the peculiar personnel problems and practices of those agencies.

Three further assumptions concerning the new President's attitude on personnel matters should be made explicit:

- (1) He will be interested in getting into his Administration the strongest possible group of political executives.
- (2) He will be equally concerned with making the civil service as strong as possible.
- (3) He will wish to handle patronage in an orderly way, making the best appointments possible and minimizing its disruptive tendencies.

1. Early Actions

The following actions would be especially helpful to the formation of the new Administration if taken promptly after election:

i. Selection of a personnel assistant on the President-elect's staff to take the lead in recruitment of political executives and to be the control point for political clearance. (A well-organized recruitment program for executive talent should be set up as soon as possible on a continuing basis.)

ii. Definition of policy to guide the President-elect's staff and the future department and agency heads in filling political executive positions--a policy covering objectives, standards, procedures, and political clearances that is simple and flexible but clear enough to avoid confusion.

iii. Selection of a civil service adviser on the presidential staff to begin formulating policies and programs with reference to the federal civil service and the various personnel systems which it contains.

iv. Selection of the person to be designated Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (its executive) so that the government's central personnel agency will operate with minimum uncertainty in the transition period, and the designee can start planning the necessary steps to carry out the new President's personnel program.

v. Public statement of policy on the professional civil service to make clear the President-elect's purposes and intent, and to minimize uncertainty and confusion.

vi. Steps to set in motion a review of the government's personnel systems and practices, especially their adequacy at higher civil service levels for present and future needs.

2. The President and Personnel Administration

The selection, direction, and control of personnel are at the heart of the President's power as Chief Executive. He (alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate) and the department heads whom he chooses appoint all of the employees of the Executive Branch. The Constitution provides no other means of appointment. It makes the President the responsible officer for appointment (and removal) of executive personnel, an authority consistent with and essential to his duty "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Control of personnel is also consistent with his constitutional duty to formulate a coherent legislative program, for much of the work of developing and advancing the program must be entrusted to his subordinates.

The positions with which the President is concerned fall into six broad categories involving different levels of responsibility for the President. Three of these require direct presidential action and three action by the department head or someone to whom he delegates the authority.

Presidential Appointments

i. Positions which the President himself fills, making the actual selections as well as the formal appointments himself, in most instances (but not all) with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Here he has broad, practically unlimited, removal power. There are some 90 positions in this category: the principal department and agency heads, their deputies, and a few of their more important assistants. (Judicial and diplomatic appointments are not included in this number.)

ii. Positions which the President is responsible for filling but which in fact are filled largely on the advice of White House staff and the department heads.

There are approximately 178 positions in this group: 75 deputy under secretaries, assistant secretaries, and general counsels; chiefs of some 34 bureaus or "services" in the executive departments; 33 members of commissions, boards, and other multi-headed agencies (only early vacancies are counted); heads of 7 lesser executive agencies; and 29 appointments to international agencies. (Again, judicial and diplomatic appointments are not included.)

iii. Positions which are so numerous, so far from the President in the chain of command, and which have so little impact on policy that the President does in fact rely almost entirely on others to make the selection.

There are thousands of jobs in this diverse group which includes various positions of administrative importance: U. S. attorneys; members of commissions and committees; representatives to lesser international agencies; and the traditional "patronage" jobs (collectors of customs, U. S. marshals, officers of mints, and last but not least some 23,000 postmasters who take civil service examinations and serve without term but are nevertheless subject to political "clearance" for their initial appointments).

The distribution of positions into these three categories varies somewhat with the interests, the policies, and the available time and energy of the President, but the classifications suggested here are nonetheless real in terms of the President's actual role in the process. Some sort of system has to be employed to fill the positions and keep them filled.

Appointments by Departmental Authority

- i. Positions for which there is an established merit system, either general or specialized;
- ii. Positions for which the competitive procedures of the merit system are not in force because they are judged to be inappropriate;
- iii. Positions deliberately placed outside of any governmental merit system for political reasons.

In all of these cases, the Chief Executive is responsible for the quality of the appointments, even though he does not make them and has little if anything to do with them directly.

The departmental appointments, under a merit system, include the vast majority of government personnel--roughly 2,300,000 positions. Most of these positions are in the general civil service supervised by the Civil Service Commission. The remainder are in the various special merit systems established by law, such as the Foreign Service, the Public Health Service, or the personnel systems of the TVA and the AEC.

The President is responsible for the quality of such personnel in a two-fold way. First, as the constitutional Chief Executive and through statutory powers vested in him, he has ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of the personnel system. He has great rule-making power. For example, he may include or except positions from the competitive service and he may establish particular policies within the limits set by Congress. Historically, this has come to include responsibility for leadership in improving personnel systems. Most major improvements in the government's

personnel systems have been the product of strong presidential leadership and sustained support.

Second, the President is responsible for energizing the system of personnel management. Systems without people are inert abstractions. People act, not systems, and the leadership which the President gives to his subordinates in matters of personnel management largely determines what happens within this "system." Active, alert interest on the part of the Chief Executive makes for vigorous personnel management all down the line. Apathy or inattention at the top makes for lackadaisical administration below.

The two groups of excepted positions (ii and iii above) are like the presidential appointments in that there is no governmental system to find, screen, and qualify potential appointees. They are unlike the presidential appointments in that the President is involved not directly, but only as an administrative superior--as the Chief Executive. He can fulfill his responsibility for the quality of the appointments chiefly through setting an example in the appointments he makes directly--fixing standards, stating a policy, and prescribing procedures for review and clearance.

Positions are excepted from the competitive merit system in one of two ways, either by Act of Congress or by order of the President under authority given to him by statute. Either the Congress or the President (within his broad statutory authority) may except from the civil service laws either single positions or whole blocks of positions. The presidential exceptions today are contained chiefly in three "schedules" of the Civil Service Commission:

i. Schedule A, over 100,000 positions authorized to be filled without examination because examination is thought to be inappropriate or ineffective. A large number of these are temporary, seasonal or intermittent jobs.

ii. Schedule B, 2,000 positions authorized to be filled by non-competitive examination, because there is little or no competition for these jobs.

iii. Schedule C, 1,200 positions (300 now vacant) authorized to be filled without examination by departmental authorities because the personnel in these positions are confidential aides (some with ministerial duties) to political executives, or because they hold "policy determining" positions in which their political executive superiors prefer to have men serving at their discretion. The discretion is complete as to appointment but less so in removal.

3. Personnel as a Transition Problem

Why are the authority and responsibility of the President in personnel administration a matter of peculiar concern for the President-elect? One reason is obvious, and there are several others which are less readily apparent. The obvious reason is the difficulty of selecting persons for a relatively large number of key political executive positions quickly. There are plenty of people with proven executive capacity and many with political experience. But to find talented appointees, dedicated to the public interest, who are both politically wise and administratively effective is not easy. This sort of talent is scarce and there are no established sources which surely produce it. Not many of the names thrust upon the President-elect measure up to standard when checked out. An active search for talent is necessary.

Time is a major problem--to get at least the first echelon selected soon so that they can share the initiative in further recruiting and can make up their own staffs in time to take over the responsibilities of governing on January 20.

Civil service morale is a problem for the President-elect. Every national election creates some disturbance in the ranks of government employees. Wholesale removal went out of style with McKinley, although there were extensive exceptions from the competitive service in early New Deal days. But there is always a demand for jobs by some members of Congress and by the party faithful. There is also pressure for political clearance of high level appointments within the merit system. Some Presidents have yielded to this pressure. Until the new Chief Executive's policy with reference to the civil service is known, there will be some anxiety, particularly at the higher levels of the civil service.

A special problem within the civil service in 1961 will be Schedule C, set up in 1953 as a reform, but which had the effect of reducing the number of high level positions within the merit system. Over half of the incumbents in these positions (as of March 31, 1960) are persons who had competitive status before being put into Schedule C jobs, and more than 100 incumbents are in the anomalous situation of having retained some appeal rights in the event of removal. This suggests that Schedule C is not the solution to the government's problem of creating an adequate higher civil service and that it should be reviewed at an early date, although caution is required lest any change in this category be interpreted as a patronage move.

Although the traditional patronage--political appointments to lower positions in the administrative hierarchy--will be something of a nuisance and not much of a benefit to the President in office, he must be prepared to deal with it soon after election. The patronage system has existed in the federal government for a long time and one President after another has whittled it away until it is but an archaic remnant of the 1860's, albeit a burdensome one. But until it is further trimmed, it has to be borne.

Physical Limitations on the President's Participation
in Presidential Appointments

The President's need for assistance in executive recruitment for high level positions is clear. Even if a dozen men for each post were available, the task of checking out the names would be formidable. Data on probable competence, integrity, possible conflicts of interest, political acceptability, and personal availability have to be gathered and weighed. Each President since the mid-thirties has had an assistant on the White House staff assigned to this task, one whose work will continue throughout the four years, not only at the outset.

Even with full-time assistance, the President-elect will find it difficult to give adequate attention to all the selections in Group No. i (see above, p. 3, and the Appendix). At some point in Group No. ii the essential decisions will tend to pass into the hands of others--primarily White House staff members and the department heads. The benefits of concentrating the President's limited time and energy on filling the more important positions are apparent. After the top 150-250 selections are made, the quality of the

President's appointments is going to depend on the judgment of his subordinates and the system of standards, policies, and procedures which he has established for making appointments.

Since lower level presidential appointments are necessarily perfunctory so far as the President himself is concerned, there is much to be said for trimming the list and converting the surplus into departmental appointments, either discretionary or subject to the civil service laws. This requires legislation, which can be obtained at the beginning of a new Administration with less difficulty than later.

4. Department Heads and Their Subordinates

There are several half-hidden dilemmas in the choice of men for top presidential appointments, e.g., department heads, under secretaries, assistant secretaries. Should the emphasis be upon program capacities? Administrative abilities? Political strength? Factional and regional balance of the entire group? At this level it is not difficult to argue that creativity in putting together a constructive program should have precedence. Administrative skills and operational know-how are readily available from the ranks of the professional civil service.

It is easy to overlook the importance of the political-educational role of political executives at the departmental level. Much of their effectiveness will depend upon their ability to advocate particular measures, to explain policies, and to defend programs. This advocacy, explanation, defense, over and over again, to committees, members of Congress, and the public, will take a large

part of their time. Either the Secretary or his under secretary should be very good at it, and the assistant secretaries should be able to share the load. If they are ineffective in this role it tends to devolve upon the bureau chiefs, who then are encouraged to become independent political powers in their own right.

In choosing his department heads, the President-elect must ask several fundamental questions: Will the department head and his associates direct and control the powerful services or bureaus under them, without becoming their captives? Will the department head follow the President's lead as his agent committed to the national interest above all lesser interests or will he lapse into parochialism in his point of view, interests, and values?

One point emerges clearly from a systematic look at past experience. When a President appoints a Cabinet Secretary or head of an agency, he is not just making one appointment out of many. He is making a fundamental decision about the entire area in which the department or agency operates. This decision will determine whether it will be creditably administered in accordance with the President's program and intentions, or whether inept or merely undistinguished leadership will cause the President future grief in any one of a variety of ways. The reason why this can be so positively asserted is that the quality and capability of the Secretary will tend always to be reflected in the second and third echelon appointments, and these in turn are the positions that make or break the over-all performance of the department.

If it is said that political reasons sometimes dictate low-quality appointments which a President must occasionally make, the rejoinder is clear:

The short-term political gain resulting from an undistinguished appointment will, almost without exception, be far outweighed by the long-term disadvantage to a President of being burdened with a person of less than top capacity. Conversely, a first-rate man or woman named to a top spot, even if the immediate political advantages of the appointment are minimal, will make this up many times over in the public credit brought to the President by effective performance, in the prevention or avoidance of the blunders so often committed by second-raters, and in the strengthened condition in which the department or agency is left for the Secretary's successor.

The idea is not to take "politics" out of Cabinet-level appointments. The point is, rather, that political advantage and top quality are the ideal combination for Cabinet-level appointments wherever possible, and when this is not possible, quality without immediate political advantage will be far the best politics in the long run.

Appointees to positions at the under secretary level require the same qualities as the heads of agencies. They act for the Secretary in his absence and they frequently move into his position when he resigns. The early strength of the under secretaries tends to determine the later strength of the Cabinet. The President-elect, therefore, is fully justified in giving his personal attention to appointments at this level.

Although not always done, there is much to be said for selecting the deputy in conjunction with the department head. The Secretary will tend to have greater confidence in his deputy and probably use him more effectively. Also, there will be a better chance that their strengths complement each other.

The goal should be an under secretary of a stature equal to the Secretary, not his inferior. The President's only chance of achieving this is to control the selection himself.

In the post-war years there has been some tendency to use assistant secretaries for continuing supervision of particular bureaus or divisions, and to select men of specialized background for this purpose. The policy has some consequences which should be noted. Putting a specialist in charge of other specialists tends to leave the program concerned without broad policy guidance immediately available. Technical understanding is no substitute for political wisdom.

There is another difficulty: Most programs nowadays involve so many techniques that a specialist in one is little more than a layman in others; and some important programs, in fact, are unique. Thus an apparently relevant technical background in a high level executive may be so only to a very limited extent. The quality of the man is fundamentally more important than his vocational history. Intellectual capacity, judgment, political wisdom, integrity, and force are the important assets at the highest levels, not technical expertise.

5. The Commissioners

The positions of commissioners in multi-member federal agencies are a transition problem for the President-elect chiefly in two ways. 1) In most of those agencies the President designates the chairman, who has the executive function of directing his agency's staff and operations. These agencies will tend to become more than ordinarily inactive until the new chairman is named

and on the job. 2) The President-elect's selection of the chairmen, and what he does about his early appointments to the commissions and boards, should be consistent with his long-range plans for these agencies.

In general, the multi-headed independent agencies suffer from a combination of executive neglect and excessive legislative attention. The President appoints the members and the public holds him responsible if the commission gets into trouble. Yet despite the importance of some of these agencies it is hard for the President to give them much direction or to supervise them. There are too many of them for him to do so directly, and their legislative sponsors, the committees of Congress, have given them multi-membership and independent status to minimize presidential supervision (except in certain specific matters), and to maximize their own control. The President's chief means of control is through his appointments, since Congress, by statute, has in many instances limited his power of removal. Recent Presidents have tended to let the commissions alone and have given relatively little attention to the appointment of commissioners. As a result, the quality of appointments has declined and the positions have tended to become "patronage" from which the President frequently has gained little benefit.

Several courses are open to the President-elect:

- i. To drift with the tide and to allow the jobs to be filled by various patrons in his party. This requires minimum attention on the President's own part, although careful screening would be necessary to avoid appointments which might later embarrass him.

To follow a much more positive policy with reference to these positions: while still treating them as patronage, to use them for trading purposes, never giving one away without getting something in return. Again it would be necessary to set minimum standards to avoid appointments that would discredit the Administration.

ii. To make a positive effort to upgrade the caliber of appointments and regain the distinction of the commissions' earlier years. This would be essential if the President-elect plans to strengthen governmental activity in the fields of economic policy which the commissions represent. His program aims should then guide his appointments. This course would require a well-organized recruiting program and sustained attention. It would demand an effort, and no doubt would provoke some grumbling among disappointed patrons. But it would make possible reinvigorated economic regulation and probably avoid the scandals that have embarrassed the last two Administrations.

iii. To postpone action on appointments, except the naming of commission chairmen. This would be in order if the President-elect's ambitions for the Administration in the area of economic policy go so far as to include structural changes to permit better coordination of the activities of the commissions, tying them in more closely to the national Administration and the national economic policy. In that case it might be desirable to make as few new appointments as possible until decisions are made on organizational changes. This could not be long delayed, however, lest it bring the commissions to a standstill and cause them to lose key staff members.

6. Appointment Policy and Political Clearance

The number of political executives who have to be recruited for high administrative positions in order to launch a new Administration is large, compared with other western democracies. It has been a problem for all administrations since the advent of big government. Two remedies are possible. Either would reduce the problems of a President-elect, and both may be necessary to make possible a quick and effective change of administration in the national government.

One remedial step would be to build up the supply of political executives, as was proposed, for example, by the Hoover Commission Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service. Strong presidential leadership would be essential in such an effort.

A second and complementary course would be to relieve the pressure on the political executive supply by building up the higher civil service and creating a cadre of administrators within the service distinguished in their qualifications and proven in their capacities. This step, too, would require strong presidential leadership.

Both steps would take time. Measures of this sort doubtless will be considered by the next President, and conceivably, by taking action he could simplify transition problems for all of his successors. But they are of no help to him in launching his Administration in 1961.

The President-elect must improvise a personnel system of his own that will provide the needed political executive talent. This presents two practical problems. One is to tap the sources. The other is to deal with the "clearance" question.

Names flood in upon a President-elect; all have to be checked out against the judgment of people who are familiar with their qualifications, past performance, and personal integrity. The system of relying on volunteered names, judging from past experience, does not supply enough candidates of high caliber to satisfy the standards which the President should set. He must actively search for talent. His "recruiter," to be effective, must have contacts with many walks of life in addition to politics.

The department heads and their deputies, when selected, can greatly broaden the contacts of the Administration and take over much of the responsibility for finding and evaluating potential appointees. But unless the President-elect, through his own staff, also seeks out suitable candidates, thereby indicating the standards he expects of his department heads, he will to some extent lose control of the shape of the new Administration. The negative act of vetoing misfits is not enough where high posts are concerned. He must have a qualified person, in whom he has full confidence, to keep watch over the adequacy of the departmental effort.

One of the considerations which the President-elect will have in mind more clearly than any of his department heads is the breadth and balance of his Administration. He needs appointees with diverse experience and backgrounds, who are representative of his party and of the principal regions of the country. But above all he must have persons who will put the national interest above all lesser interests no matter how important, and who will work together under his leadership, not at cross-purposes. His continued initiative after inauguration

in the selection of men and women for positions of high responsibility is equally important in making sure that these same qualities will be present throughout the course of his Administration.

Political Clearance

There are several questions to be considered in handling political clearance. What should be the relation of the President to his party organization, national and state, and to the members of his party in Congress in matters of presidential appointments? At the outset, it is clear that from the Chief Executive's point of view the term "clearance" is a misnomer. So far as high level positions in the Executive Branch are concerned, he may and frequently will consult people in his party organizations and in Congress, but he cannot give anyone a veto on his choices without jeopardizing his independent position as Chief Executive and also the strength and integrity of his Administration. From the moment of his election, he is more the party leader than anyone else in it. For the next four years the party's character and success will depend largely on him. There is no one else who can so well decide what is an appropriate appointment to a political executive post.

The clearance process involves the unity of the Administration and the President's control of it. The Chief Executive, although he is constitutionally the head of the Executive Branch, is not in undisputed control of it. Many interests in American life compete for control of it, piece by piece. For nearly every government bureau there is an interest group or groups that would like to dominate it. Some interests approach the President directly to make

their wishes known, but in many instances they approach him indirectly through party officials or members of Congress. When the special interest is thus concealed, it is more difficult to deal with than the direct approach. Clearance of appointments with party organizations or with Congress, therefore, must always be advisory or consultative, and at the President's discretion.

Clearance procedures can be useful, and, also, they can be overdone. They can bring to light useful information in evaluating the probable performance of the appointee. They also reveal the prospective appointee's degree of acceptability to the senators and representatives of his own state. They further serve the courtesy function of prior consultation with committee chairmen before names are submitted formally for Senate confirmation. These are positive values.

The danger of overdoing the clearance process arises particularly when names of prospective appointees to important posts in Washington are cleared with national, state or local party committees. As an organization concerned heavily with national conventions and national campaigns, the national committee has relevant information on those men who have been active recently in the party's behalf but not much on others. To get more information, the national committee has to consult state or local committees. But the data which these groups can provide is frequently of little significance in evaluating a person for a position of national, not local, scope.

The mechanics of clearance have a bearing on its content. For how many presidential appointments can the President's staff handle the clearance? At what point should the function pass to department heads? Should the national

committee handle clearance with members of Congress, or only with state organizations? All varieties and combinations have been used, but there is much to be said for the President's keeping full control of the process through his staff and official subordinates, and for consulting directly on the highest appointments rather than through a middleman. If satisfactory understandings and defensible rules are not established at the outset, there is likely to be continuous dissension in the party and considerable uncertainty about exactly whose Administration it is.

7. The Civil Service and the Problem of "Control"

The question of "control" of the government will probably come up again for public discussion although probably not in the ^{extreme} way it did in 1953. In the 1960 campaign the civil service was not under attack, as it was eight years ago. Nor were the basic economic and social programs of the federal government, which the civil service administers, challenged by either party. The commitment of civil servants to those programs is thus more or less excepted from partisan criticism. An unemotional assessment of the problem is now possible.

The question of control has four interrelated aspects: How many new political executives does an incoming President need to bring in with him in order to gain control? In what positions should they be placed? What flexibility should the new managers have in reassigning individuals within the higher ranks of the civil service? What responsibilities and status are needed at the higher levels of the civil service in order to make sure that

government service will attract and hold the able men it now must have?

On some points there is no disagreement. One is that as the government is now organized and as Congress now operates, through its numerous and specialized committees and subcommittees, a large number of political executives is needed. There is a preponderant opinion also that, with some few exceptions, the positions of Secretary, under secretary, assistant secretary (and equivalent posts under other titles, e.g., general counsels in the executive departments) are appropriate posts for political executives who are identified with each President as his responsible agents and representatives, whom he brings into office, retains at his discretion, and who leave when he leaves.

The principal exceptions are the administrative assistant secretaries. These positions were established pursuant to recommendations of the first Hoover Commission as jobs for experienced professional civil servants (appointed by the department head with the President's approval, but not presidential appointments confirmed by the Senate) and they have been so treated by both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. There are also a few assistant secretaryships with specialized functions which by tradition have been accepted as nonpolitical career posts, e.g., Fiscal Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

There is a minority view, strongly held by some who have occupied the positions, that most of the assistant secretaries in the Department of Defense and the armed services departments should be "nonpolitical." No one suggests that they should not serve at the President's pleasure as his politically responsible subordinates. But this view favors nonpartisanship, or at least

bipartisanship, in filling these positions, without challenging their functions of policy, leadership, and responsibility. The view assumes the probability of change but not automatic or complete change with each new Administration.

There is agreement that top political executives need the privilege of bringing with them some aides and assistants as discretionary appointees serving at their pleasure. Some of these are ministerial helpers, now placed in Schedule C because their duties are "confidential." How many such assistants there should be may be disputed, but the principle is generally accepted.

There is very general support also of the principle that most of the government, including posts of high responsibility, must be staffed by capable, trained, and experienced civil servants for whom government employment is a career or profession. Although the President must bring his principal subordinates into office with him, not every executive in the hierarchy can do so. This would mean a complete turnover in the executive chain of command, right down to the end, an impossible policy today.

The question on which there is disagreement and uncertainty is where to stop the line of dominoes from falling. It is generally accepted that top political executives operating at the departmental level need some experienced civil servants as assistants (along with political aides) and to man secretariats, budget and personnel offices, and to perform other staff functions at the departmental level. The unsettled question is where in the line of command the experienced civil servant should take over from the political executive.

The argument over this point usually centers on the bureau level of management (the major operating units within the departments which contain more

or less coherent programs). The long-term trend over the decades until 1953 has been to include more and more bureau chiefs in the competitive civil service. Only thirty-four out of nearly 300 are now presidential appointees and experienced career employees have frequently been appointed bureau chiefs even when the positions were excepted from the competitive service. The Eisenhower Administration stopped and partially reversed this trend by putting most bureau chiefs into Schedule C and also some positions at still lower levels. Although thought to be necessary at the time, the wisdom of the action was challenged (by a not unfriendly critic, the Hoover Commission) and the subsequent history of Schedule C has cast doubts on the original logic behind its creation. Four-fifths of the Schedule C positions now occupied, according to the last published report of the Civil Service Commission, March 31, 1960, had been filled from the government service. (They were not brought into the government fresh from private life.) More than two-fifths of the incumbents, in fact, came from the competitive service. Roughly half of the incumbents today have competitive status.

A new department head needs flexibility within the civil service, as well as among his political executive subordinates, in putting the right men in key jobs. This principle is generally accepted. A position which is best staffed by someone who knows the program and is an "old hand" in the government is not necessarily best staffed by the incumbent after an Administration changes. Another individual, also a career man, might do better. The possibility of making such reassignments to give the department head a man of his choice without the government's losing the services of the man replaced seems not to have

been fully understood by many political executives who came into the government without previous federal experience in 1953. This doubtless contributed to the creation and to the expansion of Schedule C.

The Eisenhower Administration has continued the policy begun by the Truman Administration of fixing authority and responsibility for statutory functions in the department heads rather than the bureau chiefs, an observable long-term trend which is increasingly realistic in the big government of today. It has also moved appreciably to clarify and confirm the department head's role of providing leadership and accepting full responsibility for the conduct of all departmental affairs. The logic of this trend implies a more subordinate and less political role for the bureau manager.

The political status of bureau chiefs (and lower administrators) in Schedule C is also challenged by many who are concerned about the strength of the civil service--the adequacy of the system to produce men capable of dealing with today's tasks and tomorrow's problems. They do not see how it will be possible to attract and hold the caliber of men needed for the federal service if most of the positions of bureau chief are not within the range to which successful civil servants may normally advance, without undue risk of terminating their careers at the next change of Administration.

The problem of control is aggravated or reduced by two characteristics of the department heads and other key men in the new Administration. One is policy and the other is experience. To the extent that department heads have in mind clear objectives and reasonably precise program specifications, the control problem is minimized, for then it is easier to give direction to

subordinates, and it is easier for the latter to catch on and to contribute effectively to formulation of the Administration's program. There is less likelihood of misunderstanding or of working at cross-purposes.

To the extent that new department heads and their key associates have had experience in or understand the national Administration they will be aware of the capacities of the federal civil service, of the existence within it of many outstanding administrators, and of their responsiveness to positive leadership. The experienced political executive moves quickly to identify the talented men in his organization, to explain his plans and objectives to them, and to utilize their know-how in the development of his program. He does not find it difficult to spot the misfits or the laggards, nor does he find them more numerous than in other large organizations.

The great majority of political executives who have served the government in departmental high commands have come to appreciate the competence, the responsiveness, and the dedication of career administrators. Incoming doubts cyclically give way to outgoing testimonials. The transition problem is to bridge the gap quickly, to learn by using the civil service, exploiting its experience and resources to the full. If the political executive who is new to the government is not himself confused or insecure in spirit, he should not find the break-in period abnormally difficult or trying. This is the gist of the testimony of those who have been through the mill.

If this review may be accepted as a reasonable approximation of the situation, what points does it suggest for consideration by the President-elect? Five may be noted:

people in whom he can have confidence into the key positions around him. The possibilities for selection through promotion, transfer, reassignment, and various forms of entry into the service are extensive. Adjustments of this sort are normal and less involved in red tape than the newcomer to the government may have been led to expect. On the other hand, the executive who tries to disregard regulations and cut corners may have trouble. Knowing the system is the key to using it.

v. A thorough review and re-evaluation of the civil service systems of the government as they apply to higher civil servants is in order. Do they attract the government's fair share of the best talent? Do they fully develop these men and hold a sufficient proportion of them through their years of greatest productivity? Do the terms and conditions of employment encourage optimum performance and maximum utilization? These questions need to be answered authoritatively as a prelude to whatever measures the new President may wish to take to strengthen the effectiveness of the government for its exacting task over the years ahead. If there is to be such an assessment, it is desirable to plan for it so that it can be started promptly in the new Administration. It would include the problem of Schedule C and go much beyond it.

Thorough briefing on the government's personnel practices is probably desirable for all new political executives of high rank. The first stage could be arranged by the President-elect's civil service adviser, working closely with the Civil Service Commission. If, after this general introduction to the system, department heads sat down with their administrative assistant secretaries or executive officers and discussed specific matters of personnel administration in their particular agencies, they would shorten the awkward period of adjusting to a new system, and would minimize the possibility of mistakes.

8. The Patronage Push

Each new Administration must deal with a demand for patronage, even though these politically dictated appointments to more or less routine jobs many echelons below the President cannot measurably help him in his own task. Nevertheless, the considerable administrative burden must be borne and handled carefully lest these appointments do damage to the Administration by turning out badly.

In addition to the burden of screening and processing the political appointments, there is a subtle and probably more serious aspect of the patronage push to be considered. It is the effort to penetrate the merit system sub rosa by insisting on political clearance of appointments which occur through promotion or through presumably competitive entry to higher positions in the civil service. The effects of such subversion of the merit system go far beyond the positions concerned by arousing anxiety among government employees and creating public misgivings about the integrity of the Administration's personnel policies. Since the President has clear authority to except positions from the competitive civil service if he chooses, political clearance of appointments to merit system positions has about as much to offer him in the long run as cheating at solitaire.

A President-elect has several courses open in dealing with traditional patronage. One possibility is to curtail it, transferring the positions in question to the competitive service. This would have the benefit of lightening the administrative load of filling the positions politically. The civil service system has grown chiefly through presidential actions of this sort, beginning

with Grover Cleveland and Theodore Roosevelt.¹ Such action would tend to emphasize the Administration's interest in the government's effectiveness and would bring it some prestige. But such action usually causes anguish among some members of Congress and among the state and county party organizations which are the beneficiaries of the patronage. Possibly to avoid this distress, and preoccupied with other more urgent matters, most Presidents have tended to defer these reforms until the latter part of their terms of office. This delay has given them a chance to "restore the balance" in political appointments. But unfortunately the timing of the action tends to impeach their purposes, and the benefits accrue chiefly to their successors.

A second course of action is to set the standards high in terms of minimum qualifications for appointment, insisting that patrons put forward candidates clearly capable of handling their jobs successfully. If the President is firm in rejecting substandard nominees for presidential appointments, he will carry his point and will also set the example for handling departmental patronage, although explicit instructions as to standards probably will be necessary in addition. The disadvantage of this course is that it

1. If the President-elect should decide to reduce the patronage, an obvious group to begin with are the postmasters in first, second, and third class offices. These positions are anomalous among presidential appointments. They are filled either by promotion from the competitive service (about one-fourth of the appointments), or by persons from outside chosen through competitive examinations but subjected to political clearance before being selected from the list of eligibles. This clearance system, with its pressure and finagling, tends to undermine the integrity of the examining process. It is within the President's power to end this anomaly very quickly, simply by instructing the Postmaster General to forward to him the names of the best-qualified candidates without subjecting them to political clearance. There would be a squawk, but probably not much real pain, and it would not be prolonged if the President is firm.

Other similar possibilities for the pruning knife are the U. S. marshals, and political appointments in the Bureau of Customs and the U. S. mint--venerable hang-overs from 150 years ago. The customs appointments in particular have

requires considerable energy to overcome the inertia of political patrons and get them to produce acceptable candidates. In some instances the President and his agency heads might have to dig up suitable appointees themselves (a laborious task) or leave the jobs unfilled. The President would carry his point in a relatively short time but he would have to be firm and it would be a brisk battle while it lasted.

A third course is to spend the least possible time and energy on patronage, merely screening to keep out the more obvious bad risks and misfits, accepting the inevitability of mistakes, and getting rid of them as quickly as possible when they come to light.

Still a fourth possibility should be considered--active use of patronage to buy legislative support for the Administration and its program. There have been times when Presidents have found it useful to have something of value to offer when votes were hanging in the balance. But the possibilities of carrying this policy very far are doubtful and diminishing. In seeking support on a particular issue, an important post such as a judgeship may be significant, but appointments to routine jobs are not likely to mean very much when compared with other methods at the disposal of the President and his Administration for building up general support for their program.

embarrassed a number of Presidents, but no one yet has modernized the system. There is no reason today except political inertia for the President's making such appointments, but it would take legislation to shift the appointing function to the department heads.

Among the appointments by departmental authority in which political favoritism is involved are the rural mail carriers. Like the first, second, and third class postmasters, the list of eligibles is determined by competitive examination, but the Post Office Department subjects them to political clearance before making the appointments--largely vitiating the effects of the competitive examinations. This could be ended by presidential action. No legislation is required.

Only one point is clear among these alternatives. It is that there is no advantage at all to the President in being anything but firm in any course he follows. Patronage is the Chief Executive's prerogative. No one else has any "rights" to it, traditional or otherwise. If he knowingly appoints any but the best possible man to any job, or if he allows a department head to do so, there ought to be a very good reason for it. There are scarcely any situations now in which a low-quality patronage appointment can be advantageous to the President on balance. It is the total performance of his Administration that determines a President's chances for a second term; nothing else matters very much. The President has everything to gain and nothing to lose by being tough and unequivocal in his policy with reference to patronage.

9. The President and His Civil Service Adviser

Since 1939 the President has had in the Executive Office or on the White House staff an adviser (most recently called the Special Assistant to the President for Personnel Management) to assist him in handling matters affecting the civil service. Before 1939 the President frequently used a member of the Civil Service Commission as a personnel adviser, and for the 1953-57 period President Eisenhower used the Chairman of the Commission for this purpose.

Whatever arrangement the President-elect may prefer, it will be advantageous to make the decision reasonably soon after election and to get his civil service adviser on the job at once. To be fully effective, the person chosen should know problems of large-scale personnel management in general and something about the civil service system in particular. He should be familiar

with the interested House and Senate committees and with the most significant employee organizations. He should also have the President's full confidence. This is most important of all, for the adviser can draw on experts in civil service problems, but unless he himself has the President's confidence, he will not be effective.

There are a number of ways in which the adviser can be useful to the President-elect:

i. First of all he can brief the Chief Executive-to-be on his powers and duties with reference to the various personnel systems of the government. To exercise them wisely he needs to have some idea of the characteristic features of these systems, and of their peculiar problems and difficulties. This he can get most easily from his own adviser.

ii. On such specific questions as whether to undertake any early changes in the civil service rules, the addition to or subtraction from the competitive service, the shifting of presidential appointments to the department heads, the adviser can be most helpful. He can make clear the pros and cons; and when an action is decided upon, his advice as to the best means will be of value.

iii. He can help to plan for the orientation of new political executives in personnel matters. Some general introduction to the system probably is desirable before department and agency heads begin to work with their administrative assistant secretaries, executive officers, and personnel officers, who can carry further their orientation into the administrative policies and procedures of the government.

iv. In looking ahead to longer range improvements in civil service systems which the President may wish to undertake, the adviser can be quite useful. Improvements are needed, especially in the provisions for higher civil servants. The President and his department heads will note some of them in due course, but the performance of the government employees is good enough that some of the real possibilities for improvement will go unnoticed, except by an alert and sophisticated student of personnel administration. Planning ahead for constructive changes is necessary if they are to be made in time to help the Administration. A fast start will make a difference.

v. The adviser can help the President to play an important role in day-to-day personnel management throughout the government. Unless the Chief Executive takes some interest in effective personnel management, and encourages his department heads to do so also, the systems tend to bog down. The Chief Executive sets the tone. In the government there are great opportunities for the development of all varieties of talent, for example through successive placement of career officers in different assignments at increasing levels of responsibility, as well as through formal training programs. These possibilities have hardly begun to be exploited. The federal government could be for its employees the most intellectually stimulating and professionally rewarding place to work in the world. But to become this kind of employer, there has to be not only leadership and vision but also attention to each individual's capacity for performance and growth.

vi. The President-elect will also find his adviser helpful in the perennial battle over pay legislation and related matters. It takes sophisticated

guidance to deal with the special pleading of employee unions without losing their support on other measures which are more clearly in the public interest.

There is a question for the President-elect to consider as to where his civil service adviser should be located. Should he be on the White House staff, in which case he will not be expected or, probably, permitted to appear before committees of Congress? Or should he and his small staff be in the Executive Office of the President (but not the White House staff) where the President can use him as a spokesman on matters of personnel policy? It is convenient to have an expert witness who can speak for the Administration on personnel questions; some who have followed the handling of such matters over the years feel strongly that for this reason the Executive Office attachment is better. After an ambiguous beginning in 1939, however (the adviser was listed publicly in the Executive Office, but was^{on} the White House payroll), the practice has been to attach him to the White House staff, where he is today.

10. The President and the Civil Service Commission

The Civil Service Commission is the Chief Executive's principal agent in administering the general civil service laws. At times the Commission has been relatively close to the President, and they have worked together in making important changes in the civil service system. Most major improvements have come about in this way. This is natural since large administrative discretion is needed to administer the civil service laws, and important changes in basic civil service rules require the President's approval.

The Commission was drawn closer to the Chief Executive in 1949 when the Chairman was made the "chief executive and administrative officer" of the

Commission, and the President was authorized to designate the Chairman who, as such, serves at the President's pleasure. Until 1956 Commission members served without term and customarily offered their resignations after a presidential election. Since statutory changes made in that year, the three Commissioners have been appointed for overlapping six-year terms. The terms of two of the current Commissioners will expire during the next four years.

As an executive agency, the Civil Service Commission has a peculiar status. It is regarded by many members of Congress as a "watch dog of the merit system," checking any tendencies of departmental administrators to "play politics" with the merit system, and, on appeal, reviewing personnel actions affecting individuals, particularly those arising under the Veterans Preference Act of 1944. To some extent, the House and Senate Committees on Post Office and Civil Service have regarded the Commission as their agent for defending the interest of rank and file employees against policies or decisions of "management" which might be unfavorable to the mass of employees. These two committees have kept the Commission under rather close surveillance. Perhaps because of their double responsibility for postal and civil service matters, the committees' point of view on personnel policy has tended to be somewhat similar to that of the employee union officials, especially the postal unions.

The substance of this situation is that the Civil Service Commission tends to be "in the middle." The President is responsible for administering the civil service laws largely through the Commission; but the legislative committees control changes in law, particularly pay legislation. The staggered six-year terms instituted in 1956 moved the Commission toward a position of

formal independence of the President but without explicitly limiting his removal power. The present position of the agency is thus somewhat ambiguous.

This situation poses two questions of policy for the President-elect: How closely does he wish to work with the Commission? And what should be the Commission's relationship to him? He does not have a completely free choice, for he is constrained by his need to give continued leadership to the Commission as the chief instrument for carrying out his constitutional responsibilities in the personnel field, and by the critical importance of an effective civil service in government today. There are several courses which could be followed:

- i. The simplest course is to leave the Commission in its present anomalous position "in the middle," between the Chief Executive and the House and Senate Committees on Post Office and Civil Service. The President could give direction to the Commission immediately by deciding on his Chairman, and by reappointing or replacing members as their terms expire. He would in fact find the Commission responsive to his leadership in all measures which he might wish to undertake to strengthen the civil service and to improve federal personnel administration.

By working closely with the Chairman and by using the Commission as a central personnel agency, the President would at the same time establish his leadership and the Commission's executive role. This could be done with little or no change in personnel, and with no structural change. In essence, this course simply requires the President to pick a Chairman in whom he will have full confidence, to keep in touch with him regularly, and to maintain an interest in what the Commission is doing.

ii. A course of action in sharp contrast to this acceptance of the status quo (and of the 1956 legislation) would be to move along the lines proposed by the Brownlow Committee of 1937, and more recently restated in the Clark bill. This proposal, in substance, is to move the Civil Service Commission into the Executive Office of the President where the Chief Executive will be clearly responsible for it; to substitute a single personnel director (roughly parallel in status to the Budget Director) for the present three-man Commission; and to limit the function of a civil service board or commission to appellate and investigatory matters. Such a change is based on the assumption that personnel administration is a prime management tool in directing the government's affairs, a tool which the Chief Executive needs and for which he should be directly responsible. Sentiment for this change has been growing over the years among those who feel that as presently organized the government's central personnel activities are too negative, too largely regulatory in emphasis, and too much under the domination of legislative committees, which, it is asserted, are limited in their point of view.

If this proposal should be carried out successfully, the President would not need any other adviser on civil service matters on his staff. His director of personnel would be that adviser.

iii. A middle course is possible between accepting the status quo and establishing the central personnel function of the government in the Executive Office. One possibility is to seek legislation eliminating the present fixed terms for Civil Service Commissioners, thus returning the Commission to its historic status as a presidential commission. This move would meet resistance

in the Committees on Post Office and Civil Service, but not insuperable resistance. It would be a fight for principle--the re-establishment of formal presidential control--but it would not add substantially to the President's power inasmuch as he has retained the right of removal even though commissioners are appointed for specific terms.

An alternative procedure would be deliberately to change the Commission by changing its members. The President's discretion is complete. He might appoint another "TR" who would give aggressive political leadership in civil service improvement, or he might use one or more of the positions simply as patronage. Both policies have been followed at times by past Presidents. In modern times there has normally been at least one commissioner (sometimes the minority member) who has been an ardent believer in the merit system and who has taken the lead in advancing measures to improve the civil service.¹ Since 1949 the Chairman has tended to be the controlling figure in the Commission's program, although he has to have the support of at least one of his colleagues to make important changes. If the President has hopes of a strengthened civil service, he cannot afford to toss more than one position to a patron of his party. If he has ambitions for significant constructive innovation in federal personnel administration, he will need maximum strength and quality in all three positions.

1. The present Commission, generally regarded as a "good commission," is unusual in its composition. Two members have spent almost their entire careers in the federal government, the Chairman 27 years, and the minority member 39, most of this in the competitive civil service. Although both later held high political executive positions in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, they are essentially career types. Only the third member comes from a background of participation in electoral politics.

Whatever course is adopted, an early decision on the chairmanship of the Commission would have the advantage of keeping the central personnel agency of the government running smoothly in the transition period and of providing the President-elect with a highly useful counselor.

PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS

I.	Presidential appointments which the President makes himself, although with considerable staff assistance	41
II.	Presidential appointments which the President makes, normally relying largely on White House staff and department heads for the selection	45
	A. The deputy under secretary--assistant secretary group. .	45
	B. The bureau level within departments and agencies. . . .	47
	C. Commissions, boards and other multi-headed agencies--vacancies during 1961	49
	D. Various single-headed agencies.	53
	E. International agencies	53
III.	Presidential appointments in which the President's personal involvement tends to be limited	55
	A. Appointments of considerable administrative importance.	55
	B. Appointments to various boards, commissions, and committees not included in I or II.	56

I. PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS WHICH THE PRESIDENT MAKES HIMSELF, ALTHOUGH WITH CONSIDERABLE STAFF ASSISTANCE

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>White House Office</u> ²		
1-6	Administrative Assistant (6) [The President may allocate	2 at \$22,500
7-14	the salaries to the posi- 3 at 21,000	
	tions as he deems proper.] 7 at 20,000	
		3 at 17,500
(Includes Exec. Secretary, National Security Council)		
15	Special Assistant to the President for Personnel Management	---Fixed by President
<u>Bureau of the Budget</u>		
16	Director-----	\$22,500
17	Deputy Director-----	20,500
18-20	Assistant Directors (3)-----	20,000
<u>Council of Economic Advisers (3 members)</u>		
21	Chairman (S)-----	\$20,500
22-24	Members (2) (S)-----	20,000
<u>National Security Council</u>		
25	Executive Secretary-----	See information on salary under White House Office above
<u>Operations Coordinating Board</u>		
26-27	Members (2)	
<u>Central Intelligence Agency</u>		
28	Director (S)-----	\$21,000
29	Deputy Director (S)-----	20,500

¹ Not including ambassadorial or judicial positions, or positions normally filled by ex officio appointments.
Data for these lists are taken from several sources, which in some cases conflict. Conflicts have been reconciled insofar as possible, but some inaccuracies may still exist.

² Positions listed in this section are in accordance with a July 1960 government publication. However, it appears likely that there may be nine special assistants and other authorized positions in the White House Office filled by presidential appointment.

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>National Aeronautics and Space Council</u>		
30-33	Members (4; one to be from Federal Government) (S)	\$100 p.d. and expenses [for members appointed from private life]
34	Executive Secretary (S)-----	\$20,000
<u>Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization</u>		
35	Director (S)-----	\$25,000
36	Deputy Director (S)-----	22,500
37-39	Assistant Directors (3) (S)-----	20,000
<u>President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization</u>		
40-42	Members (3*)-----	without compensation [* Presently three members; however, no statutory limit on membership.]

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

State

43	Secretary of State (S)-----	\$25,000
44	Under Secretary of State (S)-----	22,500
45	Under Secretary of State for Political [or Economic] Affairs (S)	22,000

International Cooperation Administration

46	Director (S)-----	\$21,000
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United Nations

47	Representative of the U. S. (S)-----	det'd by President
48	Deputy Representative of the U.S. (S)-----	det'd by President

Security Council

49	Deputy Representative of the U. S. (S)-----	det'd by President
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United States Information Agency

50	Director (S)-----	\$21,000
51	Deputy Director (S)-----	20,500

Treasury

52	Secretary of the Treasury (S)-----	\$25,000
53	Under Secretary (S)-----	21,000
54	Under Secretary [for Monetary Affairs] (S)-----	21,000

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>Defense</u>		
55	Secretary of Defense (S) -----	\$25,000
56	Deputy Secretary (S) -----	22,500
<u>Army</u>		
57	Secretary of the Army (S) -----	\$22,000
58	Under Secretary (S) -----	20,000
<u>Navy</u>		
59	Secretary of the Navy (S) -----	\$22,000
60	Under Secretary (S) -----	20,000
<u>Air Force</u>		
61	Secretary of the Air Force (S) -----	\$22,000
62	Under Secretary (S) -----	20,000
<u>Justice</u>		
63	Attorney General (S) -----	\$25,000
64	Deputy Attorney General (S) -----	21,000
<u>Post Office</u>		
65	Postmaster General (S) -----	\$25,000
66	Deputy Postmaster General (S) -----	21,000
<u>Interior</u>		
67	Secretary of the Interior (S) -----	\$25,000
68	Under Secretary (S) -----	21,000
<u>Agriculture</u>		
69	Secretary of Agriculture (S) -----	\$25,000
70	Under Secretary (S) -----	21,000
<u>Commerce</u>		
71	Secretary of Commerce (S) -----	\$25,000
72	Under Secretary (S) -----	21,000
73	Under Secretary [for Transportation] (S) -----	21,000
<u>Labor</u>		
74	Secretary of Labor (S) -----	\$25,000
75	Under Secretary (S) -----	21,000

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>Health, Education, and Welfare</u>		
76	Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (S)-----	\$25,000
77	Under Secretary (S)-----	21,000
<u>Atomic Energy Commission</u>		
[5 members, 5 year terms]		
78	Member (S) (one vacancy)----- President designates Chairman at salary of \$22,500	\$22,000
79	Chairman, Military Liaison Committee-----	20,000
<u>Civil Service Commission</u>		
[3 members; 6 year terms; not more than 2 of the 3 members to be of same political party]		
80	Member (S) (first vacancy, February 28, 1961)----- President designates Chairman at salary of \$20,500	\$20,000
<u>Federal Aviation Agency</u>		
81	Administrator (S)-----	\$22,500
82	Deputy Administrator (S)-----	20,500
<u>General Services Administration</u>		
83	Administrator (S)-----	\$21,000
<u>Housing and Home Finance Agency</u>		
84	Administrator (S)-----	\$21,000
<u>National Aeronautics and Space Administration</u>		
85	Administrator (S)-----	\$22,500
86	Deputy Administrator (S)-----	21,500
87	Chairman, Civilian Military Liaison Committee-----	20,000
<u>National Science Foundation</u>		
88	Director (S) [6 year term ending in 1963] -----	\$20,000
<u>Small Business Administration</u>		
89	Administrator (S)-----	\$20,000
<u>Veterans' Administration</u>		
90	Administrator of Veterans' Affairs (S)-----	\$21,000

VI. PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS WHICH THE PRESIDENT MAKES, NORMALLY RELYING
LARGELY ON WHITE HOUSE STAFF AND DEPARTMENT HEADS FOR THE SELECTION.

A. THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY-ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>State</u>		
91	Deputy Under Secretary [for Administration] (S)-----	\$20,500
92	Deputy Under Secretary [for Political Affairs] (S)-----	20,500
93	Counselor (S)-----	20,000
94	Legal Adviser (S)-----	20,000
95	Asst. Secretary [for Public Affairs] (S)-----	20,000
96	Asst. Secretary [for Congressional Relations] (S)-----	20,000
97	Asst. Secretary [for Policy Planning] (S)-----	20,000
98	Asst. Secretary [for Inter-American Affairs] (S)-----	20,000
99	Asst. Secretary [for European Affairs] (S)-----	20,000
100	Asst. Secretary [for Far Eastern Affairs] (S)-----	20,000
101	Asst. Secretary [for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs] (S)-----	20,000
102	Asst. Secretary [for African Affairs] (S)-----	20,000
103	Asst. Secretary [for International Organization Affairs] (S)-----	20,000
104	Asst. Secretary [for Economic Affairs] (S)-----	20,000
105	Asst. Secretary [for Administration] (S)-----	20,000
<u>Treasury</u>		
106	Asst. Secretary (S)-----	\$20,000
107	Asst. Secretary (S)-----	20,000
108	Asst. Secretary (S)-----	20,000
109	General Counsel (S)-----	19,000
<u>Defense</u>		
110	Asst. Secretary [Comptroller] (S)-----	\$20,000
111	Asst. Secretary [Health & Medical] (S)-----	20,000
112	Asst. Secretary [International Security Affairs] (S)-----	20,000
113	Asst. Secretary [Manpower, Personnel & Reserve] (S)-----	20,000
114	Asst. Secretary [Properties & Installations] (S)-----	20,000
115	Asst. Secretary [Public Affairs] (S)-----	20,000
116	Asst. Secretary [Supply & Logistics] (S)-----	20,000
117	Director of Defense Research & Engineering (S)-----	22,000
118	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (S)-----pay as prescribed by law for Chief of Staff, U. S. Army	
119	General Counsel (S)-----	20,000
<u>Army</u>		
120	Asst. Secretary [Financial Management] (S)-----	\$20,000
121	Asst. Secretary [Logistics] (S)-----	20,000
122	Asst. Secretary [Manpower, Personnel & Reserve Forces] (S)-----	20,000

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>Defense (Continued)</u>		
<u>Navy</u>		
123	Asst. Secretary [Personnel and Reserve Forces] (S) -----	\$20,000
124	Asst. Secretary [Material] (S) -----	20,000
125	Asst. Secretary [Research and Development] (S) -----	20,000
<u>Air Force</u>		
126	Asst. Secretary [Financial Management] (S) -----	\$20,000
127	Asst. Secretary [Research and Development] (S) -----	20,000
128	Asst. Secretary [Materiel] (S) -----	20,000
<u>Justice</u>		
129	Solicitor General (S) -----	\$20,500
130	Asst. Attorney General [Antitrust Division] (S) -----	20,000
131	Asst. Attorney General [Civil Division] (S) -----	20,000
132	Asst. Attorney General [Criminal Division] (S) -----	20,000
133	Asst. Attorney General [Internal Security Division] (S) -----	20,000
134	Asst. Attorney General [Lands Division] (S) -----	20,000
135	Asst. Attorney General [Tax Division] (S) -----	20,000
136	Asst. Attorney General [Civil Rights Division] (S) -----	20,000
137	Asst. Attorney General [Director, Office of Alien Property] (S) -----	20,000
138	Asst. Attorney General [Office of Legal Counsel] (S) -----	20,000
<u>Post Office</u>		
139	Asst. Postmaster General [Bureau of Operations] (S) -----	\$20,000
140	Asst. Postmaster General [Bureau of Transportation] (S) -----	20,000
141	Asst. Postmaster General [Bureau of Finance] (S) -----	20,000
142	Asst. Postmaster General [Bureau of Facilities] (S) -----	20,000
143	Asst. Postmaster General [Bureau of Personnel] (S) -----	20,000
144	General Counsel (S) -----	19,000
<u>Interior</u>		
145	Asst. Secretary [Fish and Wildlife] (S) -----	\$20,000
146	Asst. Secretary [Mineral Resources] (S) -----	20,000
147	Asst. Secretary [Public Land Management] (S) -----	20,000
148	Asst. Secretary [Water and Power Development] (S) -----	20,000
149	Solicitor (S) -----	19,000

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>Agriculture</u>		
150	Asst. Secretary (S) -----	\$20,000
151	Asst. Secretary (S) -----	20,000
152	Asst. Secretary (S) -----	20,000
153	General Counsel (S) -----	20,000
<u>Commerce</u>		
154	Asst. Secretary [for Administration] (S) -----	\$20,000
155	Asst. Secretary [for International Affairs] (S) -----	20,000
156	Asst. Secretary [for Domestic Affairs] (S) -----	20,000
157	General Counsel (S) -----	19,000
<u>Labor</u>		
158	Asst. Secretary [for Labor-Management Relations] (S) -----	\$20,000
159	Asst. Secretary [for Employment and Manpower] (S) -----	20,000
160	Asst. Secretary [for International Labor Affairs] (S) -----	20,000
161	Solicitor (S) -----	20,000
<u>Health, Education, and Welfare</u>		
162	Asst. Secretary [for Legislation] (S) -----	\$20,000
163	Asst. Secretary (S) -----	20,000
164	Special Asst. to the Secretary [for Health & Medical Affairs] (S)-	20,000
165	General Counsel (S) -----	20,000
B. THE BUREAU LEVEL WITHIN DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES		
<u>Treasury</u>		
166	Commissioner of Internal Revenue (S) -----	\$21,000
167	Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue (S) ----- [Assistant General Counsel, Department of the Treasury]	19,000
168	Commissioner of Narcotics (S) -----	17,500
169	Treasurer (S) -----	17,000
170	Director of the Mint (S) [5-year term ending in 1963] -----	16,095
171	Comptroller of the Currency (S) [5-year term ending in 1964] -----	20,500
<u>Justice</u>		
172	Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization (S) -----	\$20,000

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>Interior</u>		
173	Commissioner of Reclamation -----	\$19,000
174	Director of Geological Survey (S) -----	18,500
175	Commissioner of Indian Affairs (S) -----	18,500
176	Director, Bureau of Mines (S) -----	18,500
177	Commissioner of Fish and Wildlife (S) -----	18,500
<u>Agriculture</u>		
178	Administrator, Rural Electrification Administration (S) ----- [10-year term ending in 1966]	\$20,000
179	Administrator, Farmers' Home Administration (S) -----	18,000
<u>Commerce</u>		
180	Federal Highway Administrator, Bureau of Public Roads (S) -----	\$20,000
181	Chief, Weather Bureau (S) -----	18,500
182	Director, Census Bureau (S) -----	18,500
183	Director, Coast and Geodetic Survey (S) -----	Armed forces pay schedule
184	Assistant Director, Coast and Geodetic Survey (S) ----- [4-year term ending in 1962]	Armed forces pay schedule
185	Director, Bureau of Standards (S) -----	\$18,500
186	Commissioner of Patents, Patent Office (S) -----	20,000
187	First Assistant Commissioner of Patents (S) -----	Classification Act
188-9	Assistant Commissioners of Patents (2) (S) -----	Classification Act
<u>Federal Maritime Board</u>		
	[3 members; 4-year terms; not more than 2 members to be of the same political party]	
190	Member (S) [first vacancy June 30, 1961] ----- President designates Chairman at salary of \$20,500	\$20,000
<u>Labor</u>		
191	Commissioner of Labor Statistics (S) [4-year term ending in 1963]-	\$18,500
192	Administrator, Wage and Hour Division (S) -----	20,000
193	Director, Women's Bureau (S) -----	17,310

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>Health, Education, and Welfare</u>		
194	Surgeon General, Public Health Service (S)----- [4 year term; present term ending January 1961]	\$19,000+ allowance
195	Commissioner of Social Security (S)-----	20,000
196	Chief, Children's Bureau (S)-----	18,500
197	Commissioner of Education (S)-----	20,000
<u>Housing and Home Finance Agency</u>		
198	Commissioner, Federal Housing Administration (S)----- [vacancy existing; 4 year term]	\$20,000
199	Commissioner, Public Housing Administration (S)-----	20,000
C. COMMISSIONS, BOARDS AND OTHER MULTI-HEADED AGENCIES- VACANCIES DURING 1961 ¹		
<u>Civil Aeronautics Board</u>		
[5 members; 6 year terms expiring December 31; not more than 3 members to be of same political party]		
200	Member (S) (one vacancy, December 31, 1960)----- President designates Chairman at salary of \$20,500	\$20,000
<u>Federal Communications Commission</u>		
[7 members; 7 year terms; not more than 4 members to be of same political party]		
201	Member (S)(position now held by recess appointee)----- President designates Chairman at salary of \$20,500	\$20,000
<u>Federal Power Commission</u>		
[5 members; 5 year terms expiring June 22; not more than 3 members to be of the same political party]		
202-3	Members (S) (two positions now held by recess appointees)-----	\$20,000
204	Member (S) (first vacancy, June 22, 1961)----- President does not designate Chairman	20,000

1 Includes present vacancies, positions now held on recess appointment, and positions now held by appointees whose terms expire before the end of 1961.

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>Federal Trade Commission</u>		
[5 members; 7 year terms expiring September 25; not more than 3 members to be of same political party]		
205-6	Members (S) (two positions now held by recess appointees)-----	\$20,000
207	Member (S) (first vacancy, September 25, 1961)----- President designates Chairman at salary of \$20,500	20,000
<u>Interstate Commerce Commission</u>		
[11 members; 7 year terms expiring December 31; not more than 6 members to be of same political party]		
208	Member (S) (position now held by recess appointee)-----	\$20,000
209	Member (S) (first vacancy, December 31, 1960)----- President does not designate Chairman	20,000
<u>National Labor Relations Board</u>		
[5 members; 5 year terms; 3 expiring August 2; 2 expiring December 16; members shall not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment]		
210	Member (S) (position now held by recess appointee)-----	\$20,000
211	Member (S) (first vacancy August 27, 1961)----- President designates Chairman at salary of \$20,500	20,000
212	General Counsel (S) [4 year term, shall not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment]-----	20,000
<u>Securities and Exchange Commission</u>		
[5 members; 5 year terms expiring June 15; not more than 3 members to be of the same political party]		
213	Member (S) (position now held by recess appointee)----- President designates Chairman at salary of \$20,500	\$20,000
<u>Federal Reserve System: Board of Governors</u>		
[7 members; 14 year terms; not more than 1 member to be selected from each Fed. Res. district, with due regard to a fair representation of financial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests]		
214	Member (S) (present vacancy)----- President designates Chairman for 4 year term at salary of \$20,500	\$20,000

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>Tariff Commission</u>		
[6 members; 6 year terms; not more than 3 members to be of same political party, and in making appointments members of different political parties shall be appointed alternately as nearly as may be practicable]		
215	Member (S) (first vacancy June 16, 1961)----- President designates Chairman annually at salary of \$20,500	\$20,000
<u>Export-Import Bank of Washington</u>		
[Board of Directors: 5 members; not more than 3 members to be of same political party]		
216	President (S)-----	\$21,000
217	First Vice President (S)-----	20,500
<u>District of Columbia: Board of Commissioners</u>		
[3 members; 3 year terms; third member appointed from Army Corps of Engineers as Engineer Commissioner with rank of Captain or higher]		
218	Member (S) (first vacancy July 1, 1961)-----	\$19,000
219	Member (S) (one position held by recess appointee)-----	19,000
<u>Public Utilities Commission</u>		
[3 members; 3 year terms; Engineer Commissioner of the District to constitute third member of the Commission]		
220	Member (S) (first vacancy June 1, 1961)-----	\$16,295
<u>Foreign Claims Settlement Commission</u>		
[3 members; no statutory limitation on terms]		
221-3	Member (S)----- President designates Chairman at salary of \$20,500	\$20,000
<u>Federal Home Loan Bank Board</u>		
[3 members; 4 year terms; not more than 2 members to be of same political party]		
224	Member (S) (first vacancy July 1, 1961)-----	\$20,000
225	Member (S) (position now held by recess appointee)----- President designates Chairman at salary of \$20,500	20,000

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>National Mediation Board</u>		
[3 members; 3 year terms; not more than 2 members to be of same political party and no person interested in any organization of employees or in any carrier shall be a member of the Board]		
226	Member (S) (first vacancy February 1, 1961)----- Chairmanship rotates annually at salary of \$20,500	\$20,000
<u>Subversive Activities Control Board</u>		
[5 members; 5 year terms; not more than 3 members to be of same political party]		
227	Member (S) (first vacancy August 9, 1961)----- President designates Chairman at salary of \$20,500	\$20,000
<u>Renegotiation Board</u>		
[5 members; no statutory limitation on terms; the secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of General Services shall recommend one person from civilian life to serve as member of the Board.]		
228-232	Members (5) (S)----- President designates Chairman at salary of \$20,500	\$20,000

No appointments within the first year to Tennessee Valley Authority, Commission on Civil Rights, Indian Claims Commission, Railroad Retirement Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

D. VARIOUS SINGLE-HEADED AGENCIES

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service</u>		
233	Director (S)-----	\$20,500
<u>Selective Service</u>		
234	Director (S)-----	\$20,000
<u>Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation</u>		
235	Administrator (S)-----	\$20,000
236	Deputy Administrator (S)-----	17,500
<u>National Capital Transportation Agency</u>		
237	Administrator (S)-----	\$19,000
238	Deputy Administrator (S)-----	18,500
<u>Commission on Civil Rights</u>		
239	Staff Director (S)-----	\$22,500

E. INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES¹United Nations

240	U. S. Representative, Economic & Social Council (S)-----det'd by President	
241	U. S. Representative, Trusteeship Council (S)-----det'd by President	
242-51	5 Special Representatives: 5 alternates, General Assembly(S) det'd by President	
252-61	5 Representatives; 5 alternates, UNESCO (S)-----	\$15,000

¹ The President appoints the Governors and their alternates, and the Executive Directors and their alternates to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank. All serve without compensation. Presently, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Under Secretary of State serve as the Governor and alternate, respectively, of the three organizations. Officials from the Treasury and State Departments now serve as Executive Directors and alternates.

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
<u>World Health Organization</u>		
262	U. S. Delegate (S) -----	\$12,000
263	U. S. Alternate (S) -----	10,000

International Atomic Energy Agency

264-5 Representative and Deputy Representative (S) ----- det'd by President

International Refugee Organization

266	Representative of the United States -----	\$12,000
267-8	Two alternates -----	10,000

III. PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT TENDS TO BE LIMITED

A. APPOINTMENTS OF CONSIDERABLE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPORTANCE

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>
Librarian of Congress (S) -----	\$20,000
Public Printer (S) -----	20,000
Architect of the Capitol -----	19,000
Heads of nine bureaus and offices, Department of the Navy -- Rank, pay and allowances of rear admiral, upper half, unless appointed to a higher grade	
Chiefs and deputy chiefs, Mutual Security Program Special Missions, International Cooperation Administration ----- det'd by President	
Examiners-in-Chief, Patent Office, Department of Commerce -- Fixed by Secretary of Commerce (not in excess of maximum rates for Grade 17)	
Governor of Guam, Department of the Interior [4-year term] (S) -----	\$19,000
Governor of the Virgin Islands, Department of the Interior (S) -----	19,000
Governor of the Canal Zone (S) -----	19,000
U. S. Attorneys (one for each judicial district) (S) [4-year terms] -----	12,000- 20,000
Commissioned officers of Regular Corps (S) and Reserve Corps, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare	
Commissioned officers, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department of Commerce (S)	
Foreign Service Officers -----	\$ 6,345- 17,250
Miscellaneous positions, including U. S. Marshals, Collectors of Customs, Postmasters, Officers of Mints, Assayers, and others. Twelve different types of positions are included in this category; in most cases, no fixed terms are provided for.	

B. APPOINTMENTS TO VARIOUS BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES NOT INCLUDED IN GROUPS I OR II

To 14 advisory boards, commissions, etc.

In seven of these agencies, no fixed terms are provided for; more than 30 offices in these agencies are filled by presidential appointment.

In the remaining seven agencies, terms of from two to six years are provided for; more than 70 offices in these agencies are filled by presidential appointment.

To 7 memorial and monument commissions and other agencies.

In four of these agencies, no fixed terms are provided for; 22 offices in these agencies are filled by presidential appointment.

In the remaining three agencies, terms of from four to eight years are provided for; 12 offices in these agencies are filled by presidential appointment.

To 5 international boards and commissions.

No fixed terms are provided for; 29 offices in these agencies are filled by presidential appointment.

To 34 miscellaneous other boards and commissions.

In eighteen of these agencies, no fixed terms are provided for; more than 115 offices in these agencies are filled by presidential appointment.

In the remaining sixteen agencies, terms of from three to ten years are provided for; 139 offices in these agencies are filled by presidential appointment.