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October 8, 1968

This statement was made tonight at a $100 a plate dinner for Democratic Senatorial candidate, Paul O'Dwyer in New York.

Paul O'Dwyer has also refused to endorse the Democratic presidential candidate.

McCarthy once again declined to endorse Hubert Humphrey.

"A call goes out for party unity just as it did a year ago. It was not acceptable then and it is not any more acceptable today."

McCarthy said his efforts to change the direction of the Democratic Party were not aimed at getting anybody elected.

"There is no reason why the direction of the Party could not be changed with a presidential candidate this year." (That is the exact quote though it does not track).

There are three conditions which McCarthy set forth which would have to be fulfilled before he endorsed Hubert Humphrey.

1. A change in the Vietnam policy.
2. Restructuring the draft.
3. Restructuring the Democratic Party Machinery.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman
FROM: Rose Mary Woods

Pat Hitt also mentioned in her telephone call that she feels there is too much loose talk in our own camp about "plants" on the HHH plane, etc.

She feels that only two or three people (need-to-know-basis) should have this information. Apparently when Bob was in New York at 445 last week one of the secretaries mentioned it (Murray's) and also Jean Croft and Pat Hillings knew all about it.

She knows that it was probably perfectly natural for the girls to tell Bob - knowing he is secure -- but if this is told to anyone else it might be bad. Also - even to Bob -- she thinks we need to tighten up the ship -- that this is the sort of knowledge that should not be bandied about.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman

FROM: Rose Mary Woods

You may be interested in seeing a copy
of the memorandum Leone Baxter sent to Herb on September 21st.

(In fact, if you think well of the idea I would
suggest you start a fire somewhere so it can be done).
Memorandum to Herbert Klein
from Leon Baxter

Herb, as will be obvious shortly, I have no secretary here. Hence will keep this short, but inclusive enough to supply basis for a decision.

In view of your budget problems and time limitations, as promised I have thought through what could be done on a more limited basis than first planned and discussed with you, Mr. Mitchell, Bob Finch and others. Concentrating in a few places where the need may be greatest and the work most effective, I've reduced the action to New York, Illinois, California, Pennsylvania and Ohio, possibly Florida and elsewhere where we have especially good avenues of the kind that can assure some self-generating support for Nixon.

These notes will indicate what could be accomplished on such a basis, how the work would be done and what it would cost. To recap:

2. Paragraph. As discussed, the plan is to congeal were and articulate public support spontaneously in Nixon's behalf; to build public evidence in the face of bitter attack on his integrity, that people increasingly trust his judgment politically and have confidence in him personally; to call to public attention from outside, non-political sources, that Nixon has warm, enthusiastic, vocal backing as a statesman and as a man that he doesn't stand in a vacuum. Since he cannot do this for himself, his friends must initiate it, even if we have to build a fire under them.

2. Basis of Operation. The objective would be approached first directly with leaders whose interests are in a dozen major areas—industry, education, women's affairs, interracial matters, crime prevention, government, labor, taxes, safety, health, church, youth, the arts and many others.

Several score of such leaders with whom we've talked since last April, before writing to Dick and to Rose Mary Wood, have indicated they would react warmly and well if they felt Nixon wants them and they are called on. Many say they are inclined toward Nixon but haven't been asked for anything but money. (And who can fight with that?)
Among such potential "spokesmen" for Nixon are men and women who
a. have their own access to media, press, radio, television interview
b. have speaking engagements before election day
c. have public relations departments

These P.R. men and the facilities they command can be enormously helpful. We have talked tentatively with many, if not most, of the men who actually sit with their boards and help make policy, particularly as it concerns participation in public affairs. Most are lukewarm. None has been unwilling to help. All see clearly the advantages to their chiefs in participating in any reasonable program set up for Nixon. They post particularly want to be asked to do something. Their lukewarm attitude is simply because they have not been asked to participate and don't feel part of the action. They will react well to Nixon making them a party to this rather than going separately over their heads.

3. Mechanic. We would sift all Nixon position statements in order to match the \( m \) appropriately with potential "spokesmen".

We would sift Nixon support lists on the same basis, matching the two in terms of
\[ a. \text{ subject} \quad - \quad \text{that is, crime, youth, war, woman's interests, education, taxation, moral issues, interracial affairs, etc.} \]
\[ b. \text{ interests of the potential "spokesman", his access to media, podium, press conference, leadership in that group, geography} \]

Good groundwork has been laid in the past four months. Scores of conversations indicate that putting this together in the short time available won't be horrendous.

4. Procedure. If the decision is to proceed, here are the steps we would take at once:

A. I would call over now, for me a meeting before I leave New York, the Vice Presidents in charge of P.R. for a dozen or so major corporations and associations in this area. Included participation would be only the men whose politics I know, and who do sit with their boards on policy matters and their chiefs on politics. I would include the man representing the National City Bank, Insurance Information Institute, Stock Exchange, DuPont, Manufacturers, and also Bart Goos of Hill & Knowlton, George Hammond of Carl Byoir, whose advice to their many weighty clients
can be considerably helpful; also Bill McGough, the
P.R. light behind N.A.M.'s resurrection, whose facilities
are enormous. I might call several past presidents of
FMA who happen to be in this area, since some are very
effective in their field. They would be told specifically
how their people can help.

B. I would have the San Francisco office simultaneously
begin talks in California with opinion leaders who should be
spreading out publicly in Nixon's behalf, and preparing them
to do so. They would begin with business leaders like Bob
Rovinsky, Hormby Warner, Rudy Peterson, Cain Pollar, and
others in the arts field such as Mastro Kurt Herberg, Adler,
women leaders outside of politics, some youth leaders, and
some Negroes and perhaps 50 others in assorted leadership
situations.

B. Before leaving New York I would talk as well with a
number of leaders in other fields than business, such as
Kenneth Twitchell, head of NAM, whose interest is in youth,
morale, patriotism, education; with Mary Roehling, Chairman
of Trenton Trust who has great access to media, platforms and
a strong following across the country both among business
and finance leaders and women. A handy combination. I'd
call Mary McGuin Taylor, Editor of the Federation of Women's
Clubs magazine, who has similar media access and a broad
following among women nationwide; the head of the National
Council of Negro Women and Millie Robbins, president of the
National and International Council of Women; George Alan
Smith, who brought out the Rockefeller Report on the
Performing Arts, but who's for Nixon. He can give strong
help here if we can get a position statement such as discussed.
I will ask George's suggestion on this, and if we can take
even a part of it, it will assure his help in an important and
yet untapped area, the arts. (Roehling is already in, as you know.)

B. In Chicago and Washington and possibly Philadelphia we
would have similarly strong P.R. meetings, as in New York.
In California this probably would be done better by phoning
or lunching with the very few who actually occupy strong
advisory positions with their companies and clients.

B. With the way cleared both with potential "spokesmen" for
Nixon and with the P.R. people where such exist, we would send
along to each, properly keyed quotes, with a special request
for vocal support, for reaction and for clips where appropriate.
5. Apple. As discussed with Mr. Mitchell and I believe with you Herb, it's possible some continuing informal grass roots help might grow out of this work which would be of invaluable future support to Richard Nixon as President.

At this point no definite designation of some kind is needed for the work, or an agiis to work under, it might be suitable for the present to call it simply "NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL"

For Richard Nixon

which seems to say enough without saying too much. We could easily set up a committee with a few telephone calls explaining exactly what its function is—to build outspoken public support for Nixon right now, backing his positions as needed.

"Counsel" is Mr. Mitchell's word—or perhaps he was thinking of "Council" in a slightly different sense.

Perhaps he would wish to act as Chairman. If not perhaps persons whom we can set it up in a day or two at most, with either your ideas or ours or a combination as to whom representatives may, of industry, church, law, education, health, arts, woman, interracial affairs, labor, crime prevention, etc. Rudy Peterson would be a solid chairman, and easy to work with.

If Mr. Mitchell doesn't wish to Chair it even nominally, perhaps somebody like Louis Lemborg, who has a foot in both the business world as Board Chairman of Bank of America and in the P.R. world, having come up by that route, would be excellent. I'm confident I can get him. Louis would understand exactly what we're trying to do and would be greatly helpful.

Such a nominal Committee could be dissolved or reactivated later as warranted.
Since the reaction we’ve run into often is the feeling that Nixon is a natural “loner” and would rather do it alone than ask for help, perhaps a good strategy would be to start this off with a warm signal from him. I’m convinced Dick after conversations with various people who ought to be involved and aren’t, that nothing would enhance their enthusiasm so certainly as feeling that Dick wants their outspoken public support.

I would suggest a note from him to the potential “spokesman” whose help we want—a medal of propriety that won’t commit him in any way, but will be warm, and will get the supporting action needed. It could be somewhat along this order:

Dear Mr. Smith:

This is to tell you how very greatly I appreciate your support—particularly at this time. I’m going to need it now and after the election as well.

I understand a volunteer group, the “National Advisory Council Committee” is going to ask you to help buck my position on various matters of vital importance to the country, and will ask, if you feel my views merit support, to say so at every public opportunity.

Frankly, the public needs to know the thinking of leaders on all major matters—and equally frankly, so do I, if we’re going to be able to offer the best possible programs to solve our country’s problems.

I understand the Advisory Council will send you from time to time memoranda of direct quotes taken from my position papers. If you feel these are correct and are able to use them, with a word indicating your confidence, in any of your speeches, comments, press conferences or writings between now and Election Day, it certainly will help strengthen us all in their accomplishment, and will be much appreciated.

Thank you very much.

Richard M. Nixon
6. Cont. The limited operation suggested here brings the cost down from around $40,000 as originally planned to $26,418.

You may wish to expand this in some way Herb, or to limit it further, which I hope for effectiveness, won't be the case. Call, and we'll get the wheels moving.

I'll be here at the Plaza for the weekend, until Monday afternoon.

GOOD LUCK! (I didn't realize I was such a good typist; my secretary is going to be proud of me.)

[Signature]

Leon Baxter
To: Bob Haldeman

From: Peter Flanigan

14 Sep 68
MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN
FROM BUCHANAN
September 25, 1968

The Time boys are really hot on this Agnew thing. They seem to think it is something of a disaster the way he is conducting his campaign, the foot-in-mouth disease, they think he has contracted.

What I am wondering is if perhaps we may be giving too little attention to this problem. It has not bothered me a great deal, but the variety of different "clarifications" he has issued is bound to be making some impact with the general public.

Agnew ought to be on the offensive, and I would think that all these negative stories are the direct result of uncontrolled situations, press conferences and the like, interviews. What he could use I think is a first rate writer to hammer the Administration and Humphrey twice a day and not be giving all these reporters others stories to write----He need not be as responsible as we are, thus his attacks can be made news out of the Agnew camp each day rather than having it be some clarification. I wonder if they don't need some more and better staff people over there working for this guy. Seriously, there must be some first-raters on the Hill who could do an effective job for him––with the two a day attacks. The apparent feeling of the Time guys that Agnew is a genuine disaster makes me think that this may have become a middling problem for us. For what its worth.
MEMO TO BOB HALDEMAN

From Buchanan

Read this first and see if you think RN needs to see it.

It is a good memo.

Buchanan
The trend evident in the Harris Poll published today scares me half to death.

The poll, based on interviews in mid-September, gives RN a 39-31-22 lead over Humphrey and Wallace. The Gallup Poll, taken in early September, showed 43-31-19.

Note that in both polls the "conservative" (Nixon-Wallace) majority is virtually identical (62-31 Gallup, 61-31 Harris); but that the later poll shows Wallace with a larger share of the conservative vote.

Since Harris is interviewing the same sample voters he polled in July, he is able to give an idea of how the Rockefeller-over-Humphrey and McCarthy-over-Nixon voters are going. Not surprisingly, RN has the bulk of the Rockefeller voters and Humphrey has an even larger bulk of the McCarthyites. My suspicion is that this is mostly a function of party allegiance and will not change substantially for the rest of the campaign.

The frightening thing is the wide acceptance George Wallace is winning as a serious candidate for the Presidency. The Harris survey indicates that nearly one in four of all decided voters are for Wallace. He even has one in ten of the July McCarthy voters. By any measure, he is the strongest protest-party candidate in history and is far closer to winning the Presidency than was the Republican nominee at this time four years ago.

Furthermore, the pat formulation that Wallace "hurts the Republicans in the South, and the Democrats in the North" no longer stands up. With Wallace out of the race,
according to Harris, RN's lead over Humphrey nearly doubles (39-31 to 50-36). Wallace voters say RN is their second choice by better than 2-to-1. The idea that Wallace is hurting RN not only in the South tends to be confirmed by the Oliver Quayle polls showing narrow Humphrey leads in Michigan (38-36-15) and Missouri (38-33-22)—two states in which the Wallace showing is especially strong. The electoral-vote projection of the Harris vote indicates Wallace victories in most of the South, and Humphrey victories in the more marginal Northern and Border states most affected by the Wallace tide. This would probably result in a "hung" election as of now.

The misconception we should avoid falling into is the idea (widely heard) that the Northern Wallace voters have some kind of phobia against pulling a Republican lever, and would simply return to Humphrey if they decided against Wallace. This is certainly not true of the huge bloc of Wallace independents—and I don't think it's true of the union-oriented Wallace Democrats. There is no doubt that in states like Michigan, Eisenhower won a huge bulk of this milieu in 1952 and 1956. They were dissatisfied with the Democratic candidate, and didn't hesitate to break. In 1966—running against the impeccable unionist Soapy Williams—the author of the Landrum-Griffin Law got 56% of the vote, cutting heavily into unionist precincts. Can there be any doubt that a lot of the Griffin Democrats are for George Wallace today?

There is no doubt that the Northern Wallace voters are mad, and that most of them will vote for RN if they are convinced that he represents a significant change. This is doubly true in view of Humphrey's new liberal line. There is also no doubt that until we are able to check and reverse the Wallace inroads in the North, we will not be assured of an electoral majority.
September 18, 1968
TO: ROBERT HALDEMAN
FROM: FRANK SHAKESPEARE

The TV production staff flew to Philadelphia today and must start booking the panel tomorrow for the Friday program. I was told last night that minority group representation was to be eliminated and "hostile" questioners avoided where possible. I must phone Ailes tonight with guidelines. What is the final decision?

The basic premise of the program is that the community is represented in microcosm by the panel...Democrats, Independents, Republicans, minority groups, press; the research shows the programs to be highly successful in reaching, holding and favorably influencing an audience... with about 50% of the viewers classifying themselves as Democrats or Independents; the print press and television news (in particular) have been giving surprisingly good exposure to the programs, in part because they are convinced of the integrity and fair cross-sectional representation of the panels. In my view, it would be unwise to unduly alter panel make-up. The audience appeal of these programs...12% average rating; 18% unduplicated rating...has been exceptionally high for "politics," reflecting the inherent excitement in a live "strong" situation. The positive effect on voters is evidenced by a 7 to 1 ratio of "more favorably
impressed" in the Cleveland research. To move toward a safer, more Republican, more White Anglo-Saxon panel will reduce both audience and effectiveness, and will doubtless not go unnoticed by the press.

I am disinclined to personally discuss this matter with RN. The panel can be made up any way he wishes and I simply wish to know promptly what his desires are.
Saturday 9/29/68

ADOLPH RUST called -- RN -- as you know his son is running for Congress against Rogers.

You promised him that you would campaign for his son -- back when he came to your apartment with Bebe and Bob Lee and another man for lunch - last November.

He (Rust) says he is still working for us -- still raising money and while he knows how bad the schedule is, etc. he says they have taken a poll and they are running about 50-50 - that Rogers has had help from LBJ in the way of government contracts.

He said WE NEED RN in WEST PALM BEACH for a meeting -- will you see what you can do.

-----

RN DID PROMISE THIS -- and this man has worked hard -- long before lots of people were willing to put up any money and/or work.

RMW

Can you handle - sugg. he come to Miami rally Oct 15 for pic with RN - and explain we can't get to West Palm Beach.
October 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM

MEMO TO RN
FROM: HRH

Bryce Harlow advises there is some concern among our Congressional leaders re: your reference in Orlando to Mel Laird as the "next Majority Leader."

Bryce suggests you not use this reference in the future. He has stilled the concerns of Arends, et al, for now.
To: Answer Desk - Washington D.C.
Speaker Bureau - Verizon - Washington D.C.
Surrogate Candidate - Harry Fleming - Washington D.C.
Marvin Chauncey -

The attached memorandum run by Marvin Anderson contains some valuable information that may be useful to the above. Please be sure that it is reproduced and distributed to those listed above.

From: Bob Haldeman
September 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: DO
FROM: Anderson

RE: The Humphrey vs. Humphrey Debates -- Contradictory quotes by HHH.

"...I must say, if I have any quality which can commend itself, I do believe in what I say. I just cannot get up before an audience and sell them something I don't believe in."

Philadelphia Inquirer, June 2, 1968

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CRIME

March 22, 1968

"...America is not embarked on a downward spiral of violence and counter-violence..."

(Democratic Rally, Milwaukee, Wisc.)

July 7, 1968

"The American people are confronted with what is often times almost what appears to be a revolutionary situation..."

(Issues and Answers)

October 29, 1964

"Don't let anybody kid you that this country is rotten, or degenerate, or swept with crime."

(Remarks, Committee for Johnson-Humphrey, New York City)

July 31, 1968

"...our nation is in trouble, serious trouble... we face nothing less than a grave national crisis."

(National League of Cities, Boston, Mass.)
CRIME  (Continued)

September 12, 1964

"I think that this constant charge of disorder and lawlessness which has been made, which has not just been referred to certain specific instances, but a general charge, is an insult and an unfair comment."

(Remarks, Denver Club)

July 7, 1968

"Lawlessness is the number one issue that troubles the American people today."

(Issues and Answers)

RESPECT FOR LAW AND ORDER

September 11, 1964

"A Presidential candidate should be saying and doing things to promote respect for law."

(Press Conference, Huron, S. D.)

July 18, 1966

Humphrey said that if he were forced to live in a slum area, "I think you'd have more trouble than you have had already because I've got enough spark left in me to lead a mighty good revolt under those conditions."

(National Association of Counties, New Orleans, Louisiana)
SPENDING

August 19, 1960

"...One cannot solve the problems of the world with money. One cannot do it by writing checks in every emergency... If the charge of 'spender' is to be made, let it be applied to those who have sought the most. Let it be applied to those who have exercised fiscal irresponsibility."

(Congressional Record)

April 16, 1958

"I have always said that between the platforms of Santa Claus and Scrooge, I will stick with Jolly Santa. I have never made a fetish to see how many dollars can be saved;......"

(Congressional Record)

INTERNATIONALISM v. ISOLATIONISM

October 18, 1967

"What kind of world do you think it would be if the U.S. didn't stand guard around the world?"

(N.E.T.)

June 30, 1968

"I must caution the American people, we don't want to get in the position of being the world's policeman...."

(Face the Nation)

LBJ - HHH

April 10, 1965

"There's no Humphrey program, just the Johnson program, and there are no Humphrey people, just Johnson people, and I'm one of them."

(Quoted in Saturday Evening Post)

April 10, 1966

"I have my own views. I have my own conscience. I wear no man's collar."

(Quoted by AP)
VIETNAM -- (Why We're There)

February 18, 1965

"Our goal is peace and freedom for the people of South Vietnam."

(Washington News)

October 15, 1967

"Our own American security is at stake. That's why we're there."

(Doylesstown, Pa.)

VIETNAM -- (U. S. Role)

November 3, 1967

"I think the future of mankind will be settled in this part of the world. I think we ought to be part of it."

(Baltimore Sun)

August 25, 1968

"...I happen to believe that the peace of the world does not depend ultimately on what happens in Vietnam, even though this is serious..."

(New York Times Magazine "Report on the Candidate Named Humphrey" (Victor S. Navasky))

VIETNAM -- (Military v. Political Settlement)

January 1, 1967

"I think they've lost the war militarily. I believe, in other words, that militarily we have won the war."

(Washington Post)

July 7, 1968

"This has been the objective of political settlement -- the negotiated settlement of the President. It has always been my objective. I have never felt that Vietnam was subject to a military solution. This is essentially a political struggle."

(Issues and Answers)
VIETNAM -- (Peace Negotiations)

February 21, 1966

"Including the Viet Cong in a South Vietnamese Government would be like putting a fox in a chicken coop: Soon there wouldn't be any chickens left."

(New York Times)

May 15, 1968

"The United States is now prepared to accept a role for the Communists in the political life of South Vietnam--....."

(Washington Evening Star)

VIETNAM -- (Escalation)

September 12, 1964

"This Administration has no plans of accelerating the war and extending it to the north."

(Question and Answer Session, Denver, Colorado)
TO: Len Garment
Frank Shakespeare

FROM: Roger E. Ailes

SUBJ: "Nixon In . . ." TV Programs

DATE: September 27, 1968

We have now completed four "Nixon In . . ." programs and I thought I'd put down a few general comments so we can constantly improve them up to the time Mr. Nixon becomes President.

This is not really a critique but some random thoughts. Critiques, in general, are not that helpful since we all do the best job we can every time at bat, but even (maybe especially) after he becomes President, his use of television will determine to a large extent how the people will respond to him. Television will not simply record a President for history, but the people's confidence in a President will be somewhat proportionate to his use of television.

If there is a "credibility gap" it will be spotted first and pointed out most widely by television. Once this exists and 40 million people know it, regaining confidence is incredibly difficult.

To quote from Nixon's speech on the Presidency, "The President has a duty to decide, but the people have a right to know why. Only through an open, candid dialogue with the people can a President maintain his trust and leadership."

Mr. Nixon is strong now on television and has good control of the situation.

I. The Look:

A. He looks good on his feet and shooting "in the round" gives dimension to him.

B. Standing adds to his "feel" of confidence and the viewers "feel" of his confidence.

C. He still uses his arms a little too "predictably" and a little too often, but at this point it is better not to inhibit him.

D. He seems to be comfortable on his feet and even appears graceful and relaxed, i.e. hands on his hips or arms folded occasionally.

E. His eye contact is good with the panelists, but he should play a little more to the home audience via the head-on camera. I would like to talk to him about this and how to make it work. This is important.

F. We have solved the problem of lightening up his eyes a bit by dropping the front two key spots slightly and lowering the platform four inches.

G. The "arena" effect is excellent and he plays to all areas well. The look has guts. The subliminal message of the "arena" works. Even if a viewer is not in favor of Richard Nixon, by 15 minutes into the program he almost subconsciously begins to root for him because of the odds:

1. he's alone.

2. he's standing while all others are comfortably seated.
3. He has no place for notes -- the panelists do.
4. He is surrounded by people looking into the pit at him and most people would think of that as a nightmare, i.e., all eyes focused on you in the center.
5. We've dispelled the feeling that he must be shot only from a certain angle. The "over the shoulder" shots show him to be an attractive man.
6. The occasional flare of lights add to the drama.
7. The feeling is that anyone who can do that on "live" television, keep his cool, and not be stuck for an answer, must certainly be admired. (Secondary comparison is that people really believe Humphrey could not do it.)

H. Color lights are hot and he has a tendency to perspire, especially along the upper lip.
1. He now is using the handkerchief well.
2. Whenever he is going to tape a show, the studio air conditioning should be turned up full at least four hours prior to broadcast and camera rehearsal should be limited as much as possible in this time period to keep the lights off and the heat down. If camera rehearsal is necessary, the air conditioner should be turned on sooner and the studio sealed off. Keep all studio doors (especially the large loading doors) closed.

I. An effort should be made to keep him in the sun occasionally to maintain a fairly constant level of healthy tan.

J. Generally, he has a very "Presidential" look and style -- he smiles easily (and looks good doing it). He should continue to make lighter comments once in a while for pacing.

II. The Questions and Answers:

A. First, his opening remarks are good. He should, perhaps, be prepared with an optional cut in his closing remarks in case we get into time trouble getting off the air. I don't want to take a chance of missing the shots of the audience crowding around him at the end. Bud can specifically tell him exactly how much time he has to close.

B. In the panel briefing we should tell the panelists not to ask two-part questions. This slows the overall pace of the show down and makes it difficult for the viewer to remember and thus follow. Instead, the panelists should be instructed that they can continue a dialogue with Mr. Nixon -- ask two questions in a row to get the answers.

C. Mr. Nixon has done very well in keeping the answers fairly short. With Hubert Humphrey getting more of a reputation for lengthy speeches at the slightest provocation, this is a plus. For your information and comparison:

Nixon in Illinois answers:
1. Approximately 3:00
2. 1:45
3. 1:50
4. 2:33 -- agriculture
5. 1:30 -- education
6. 2:37 -- European question, Dr. Ripa
   -- Question was longer than answer.
7. 2:09 - law & order
8. 3:22 - Justice Earl Warren
9. 2:15 - foreign aid
10. 3:00 - NATO aid
11. 2:23 - police in Chicago
   --(What he really said was that he had no comment).
12. 2:30 - urban renewal
13. 1:25 - detention camps
   --(Excellent answer - He didn't know but he was
   honest and the audience was with him completely.)
14. 1:53
15. 2:45 - income tax
16. 2:15 - priority of spending
17. 1:47 - money
18. 1:25 - Vietnam POWs
19. 1:49 - David & Julie
20. Wrap-up - perfect at 1:58.

Nixon in Ohio answers:
1. 1:15 - ending Vietnam war
2. 1:20 - law enforcement
3. 1:34 - foreign aid
4. 1:03 - non-violent demonstrations
5. 1:12 - Electoral College System
6. 1:20 - Strom Thurmond-Abe Fortis
7. 1:05 - Pueblo incident
8. 1:45 - Oil Depletion Allowance
9. 1:36 - Negroes as Americans
10. 1:55 - lessons learned from Vietnam war
11. 3:13 - Middle East situation
12. 1:27 - helping Israelis
13. 1:55 - deal with Strom Thurmond re V.P. candidate
14. 1:15 - collecting money lent to foreign countries
15. 1:40 - helping France
16. 1:46 - federal aid to education
17. 1:25 - spreading of power in administration
18. 1:33 - inflation
19. 1:41 - short talk about Negroes
20. 1:33 - law & order in regard to Negroes
21. 1:34 - postal system
22. 1:20 - funds for new systems with less taxation
23. 1:41 - cut down on foreign aid
24. 1:17 - agricultural program
25. 2:57 - Bud's question--Person who had influence on life

Nixon in California answers:
1. 1:55 - priority spending
2. 2:20 - crime & police
3. 1:00 - lowering voting age to 18
4. 2:41 - American prestige in foreign countries
5. 2:14 - Republicans appealing to Negro vote
6. 1:48 - summit meeting with Soviets
7. 1:38 - cultural relations with Soviet Union
8. 1:26 - fair share-world markets, agriculture
9. 1:26 - unemployment & under employment
10. 1:41 - anti-Semitic
11. 1:40 - government--minority situation
12. 3:44 - Communism
13. 1:43 - industrial military complex
D. Whenever possible, it is important he give an unqualified yes or no answer.

E. He is averaging seven "Let me be very clear about that point" in every program. It is beginning to seem like an evasive tactic. Perhaps a few new "time to think" phrases could be prepared.

F. He still needs some memorable phrases to use in wrapping up certain points. I feel that I might be able to help in this area, but don't know if you want me to or if he would take suggestions from me on this. Maybe I could have a session with Price and Buchanan.

III. General Comments:

A. Whenever possible, Mrs. Nixon, Julie, David, Tricia, and any VIPs should be in the audience. These are extremely important for reaction shots. Also, Mr. Nixon handles the introductions well and it gives him time to get the "feel" of the studio.

B. I have added extenders to the zoom lens on all cameras to allow closer shooting for reactions.

C. The panels have worked out well and Mr. Nixon is in complete control. I viewed the Philadelphia tape the morning after the show. Mr. Nixon came off the undisputed winner in the McKinney questioning. He knew the facts, the audience sympathy was with him (McKinney was not likeable), Mr. Nixon did not lose his cool but showed his emotion in firmness, and when he "turned it over to the television audience" to decide the semantics of "call for" or "welcome" victory by the Vietcong, it showed the strongest use of and confidence in television I've ever seen. This had a great, subtle, positive effect on the viewer.

D. I feel that the briefing sessions before these shows have been too hurried. Mr. Nixon should arrive a little earlier at the studio and have extra minutes to absorb the briefing. If he has just had a successful motorcade, his emotional level is different than if he hasn't done much that day and, thus, must get himself "up" for the show. When you figure the number of people reached and possible effect of one of these shows, a little extra time here seems pretty important. The briefings should not be rushed, too intense and hurried, or confusing. Sometimes I get the feeling with both Frank and me trying to brief him, it must be confusing. Also, he must have a few minutes alone before these shows, and by starting earlier on the briefing, this will be insured.

E. I sense a slight shift in the Humphrey TV strategy. Humphrey has been over exposed...he's talked too much, too long, and too negatively about Richard Nixon. He can't get elected doing only this. With the resignation of George Ball from
the U.N. to advise Humphrey, and the recent support of Arthur Goldberg. I feel this is the beginning of a trend. Ball flew from Washington to New York to do the Today Show with Frank McGee and have a longer interview than if he had taped it in Washington with a lesser known newsmen.

It seems that Humphrey will continue his "give 'em hell" bitter attack on Nixon. To counter balance this, they will book more and more Democratic VIPs on television to talk positively about Humphrey. The attempt is to:  
1. build Humphrey as a man of character,  
2. allude to the fact that Humphrey has been in on the sensitive Vietnam classified material and thus knows more about an "end in sight" than he can say.  
3. couch all statements about him with..."when Humphrey becomes President",  
4. separate the question of Humphrey's ties to Johnson, which Humphrey cannot do himself,  
5. cast doubt on Nixon's ability to excite the electorate and thus lead the country forward after January.

F. I am gathering a complete report on our VIP and Family bookings to see if we are covering the most ground most effectively.

Is anyone coaching these VIPs for TV or talking with the show writers or producers to set a line of questioning? This could be helpful.

G. In general, now that we know how to do these shows and that they work, I feel I can be of more help to you and Mr. Nixon. Don't feel I'm too swamped to handle anything. We've done four shows and have five left. We'll have nine out of nine winners.
October 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Finch
    Haldeman
    Harlow

FROM: Ellsworth

Bryce Harlow reports that John Tower is miffed concerned that he has been stiff-armed by Nixon in connection with his efforts to report to Nixon on his work on the Key Issues Committee. He was stiff-arming Nixon back and saying that if Nixon would prefer he could designate another individual to report on KIC work or he could disband the KIC or whatever.

Harlow has disabused Tower of the idea that Nixon was stiff-arming him and so Tower has now relaxed his stiff arm.

However, Harlow is now conveying to us (I will have this tonight at JFK) the full report of the most recent KIC meeting. RN should familiarize himself with this so that when he sees Tower in Dallas, he can satisfy Tower that the work of the KIC is getting through to RN. Tower will be testing to see if it has, and both Harlow and Ellsworth are the ones who are being tested.
Moreover, Tower points out the next meeting of the Key Issues Committee, set for October 16, is the biggest and the last. Everybody will be there -- all the Governors, Hatfield, etc., etc. Harlow and Ellsworth think Nixon ought to see both Tower and Brad Morse after the meeting and receive a final report from the Key Issues Committee. Otherwise, unnecessary hard feelings will be generated that will plague the White House after January for months to come.
1. PLS handle

- add Congressman McGregor, Long, Nelson, Quill, plus Mr. Polk land,
  plus a Long land (total 6) to Tricia - or Julie if needed.
  Same during it - for flu to Dem.

- add John Tower's wife, plus T. Jones
  plus one key issue member to Tricia for Dallas to Miami - and add
  them for overnite tour ride at K. Seac.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman
FROM: Charles S. Rhyne
DATE: September 23, 1968

Here is a "Confidential" letter I sent our State Chairmen. It is based upon your memo re RN's wishes, but rephrased so I take responsibility for the suggestions in case the memo goes astray and any comment is engendered.

I enclose copies of some of our weekly reports. Dick may wish to look these over. We are geared up, carefully planned, and are really rolling for maximum impact.

CSR:
Encl.
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

To: State Chairmen
From: Charles S. Rhyne

I here summarize some thoughts regarding the campaign--and transmit them to you in this form with the request that you make every effort to implement them within your areas of contact and responsibility.

As we begin the campaign, it is essential that we maintain the initiative. This will be primarily the role of the candidates, but now is the time for everyone in our organization who talks to the press, State and County Chairmen across the country to have the line and put it out as effectively as possible. Among the points that should be made are the following:

1. The Come-Back Theme: This has an immense appeal and it has not been adequately covered in columns or in the press. Find ways to get it out--pointing up the obvious--that Nixon accomplished this despite the overwhelming opposition of the financial establishment and the press establishment and without huge financial resources, PR gimmicks, etc.

2. The Calibre of the Nixon Team: This gives us the opportunity to point up the superb pre-Convention organization, that it has high intellectual quality, great morale and great loyalty. It will be recalled that one of Johnson's weaknesses is that very few people on his staff are really loyal to him. Apparently HHH has real staff problems too.

3. The Youth of the Nixon Organization: Because we have such an outstanding group of young staff members in very key positions--this story should be easily and effectively promoted, perhaps by emphasizing average age of Nixon staff or the number of key men under 30, under 40--or whatever such statistics might be most telling. Also, you can point out individual or group features on the young stars of the team, i.e., Buchanan, Price, Anderson, Bell, Gavin, Hart in research and writing; Chapin, Ziegler, Higby, Allan Woods, etc., in tour operations; the young crew working with Mitchell and Flanigan, such as Len Garment and Frank Shakespeare, et.al.; and in our United Citizens operation here at...
the Willard such stars of the team as Louise Gore, Ben Cotten, Craig Truax, Jay Wilkinson, Lamar Alexander, Jay Parker, J. J. Wuerthner, Mort Allin, Jack Padrick, Mike Gill, Lew Helm, Dick Wiley, Sam Williams, John Campbell, Bundy Clarke, Jim Berger and others we will mention from time to time. State-by-state we also have other young leaders who are just as much a part of the Nixon Team as we have at the Willard.

4. The Immense Effect of the Nixon Acceptance Speech: Dick Nixon prepared this speech on his own, and did not "try it out" or reveal any of the content to anyone except his Secretary. This story simply hasn't gotten across. This is a very impressive story to the average person who suspects that all politicians are simply parroting the lines their ghosts have written for them. This story should be gotten out broadly. Although many will say that we shouldn't build on events of the past, let us not forget that Kennedy made mountains of yardage during the first two years of his Presidency by referring to his Inaugural Address and having the press do likewise. Our people have not yet done an adequate job in this respect as far as this speech is concerned.

5. Nixon as Party Unifier: Even several of the less favorable press men pointed out that the week when we were at Mission Bay plus the swing to the major states was probably one of the major political stories of our time and would have been covered as such has the Czech Revolution not occurred in the same period. This story should be repeated over and over again--properly embellished--pointing out that Dick Nixon fights hard but then is able to unify and bring the best men into the final organization. This will also give a good impression as to how Nixon will handle the Presidency and unify the Nation once the battle is over.

6. Nixon--"The Man for the Times": Perhaps most important of all--there should be emphasis on Nixon, "the man for the times." The Churchill analogy is probably appropriate. Churchill was "in the wilderness" as he put it during the '30's but was called back to lead his country in a period of crisis. What we must do is to knock down the idea that, by manipulation and because of political debts that were due Nixon, he was able to get the nomination. We've got to point out that he won the nomination because of his own strength and not just because of the weakness and confusion of his opponents.

In summary, one weakness of our campaign in the past has been the tendency of our entire staff, and most of our supporters, simply to rely on Dick Nixon's speeches and activities for our campaign success. We are doing better this time than we have previously, but we can take a leaf out of the Kennedy book and recognize that at least 50% of the credit for his win in 1960, and also for his immensely good press after the 1960 election, was due to the fact that his staff and
friends were constantly running their own campaigns in his behalf, and not just waiting for him to carry the ball. This must be done at all levels—from our headquarters in Washington—as well as by all of our state and local leaders.

Of vital importance is the point that we must play the confident line from now until November, regardless of what developments occur. We are on the offensive and we must stay on the offensive. The Democrats are demoralized, and we must keep them demoralized. We should exude confidence, not cockiness, indicating that we're going to run an all-out campaign and pour it on, but that we do so knowing that we are ahead and that we plan to stay ahead and extend our lead so that we can elect a Republican House and a lot of Republican Senators as well. It is important that you and I and all of our leaders and speakers take this line, and particularly important, that those who talk with the press, exude it. We must not become over confident due to the fact that the polls are so favorable, and the well-established fact that Dick Nixon has always run ahead of the polls. We of the Nixon-Agnew "Army" must take as our "theme" the campaign slogan, varied slightly and say to our workers: "This time, work like your whole world depended upon it."

C.S.R.

P.S. Under separate cover we have sent you the back copies of "The Answer Desk," a publication which is extremely informative and helpful. Arrangements have been made for these to be sent to you on a daily basis. I suggest that you start a notebook for them so that you keep it up to date.

One additional request -- Please forward copies of favorable letters to editors to Miss Carol Harford, Information Department, Fourth Floor, Nixon-Agnew Campaign Headquarters, 450 Park Avenue, New York, New York. Communications Manager Herb Klein has asked for our assistance in this effort.
1. 3 Fieldmen attended Circle K Convention in Philadelphia with 1200 college participants. Lambda Chi Alpha, Delta Tau Delta and Beta Theta Pi national conventions were all attended by Youth fieldmen and Phi Gamma Delta was handled by Vic Kamber. Outstanding student leaders were enlisted as well as at least 50 solid contacts for campus Nixon organizational use this fall.

2. Met with Sam Williams and John Campbell, top directors of Rockefeller’s youth campaign (New Majority). Both will be playing important roles in our operations with 2 major responsibilities for Student Coalition: a means to involve top student leaders in developing youth participation in the urban problems. They will also be handling field operations and state youth organizations in New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio and Michigan. Requested David Eisenhower to talk with Richard Nixon on proposal.

3. Materials: second and probably last order of Victory Keys finalized. Work on youth-oriented poster begun through National Student Marketing Board in New York City. Discussed with new staff writer, Dick Williams, youth brochure which will be issue and endorsement oriented.

4. Additions to staff besides Williams and Campbell: secretary to replace Jane Alexander; field man/publicity man Bill Grier, past student body president of Ball State U.

Plans for Next Week:

1. Direct mailings to a) Reagan students, b) Rocky students, c) 500 student leaders (2nd half of initial list from major schools), d) 5,000 relatives and friends of Nixon contributors

2. Firm up contacts on key campuses who will set up sign-up booths during registration week and early days of school.

3. Goal of 25 appointed state youth directors and leads on remaining states.

4. Hiring of 2 additional fieldmen to give total of 4.


Additions to #3: Prepared state chairman’s guidelines, supplement to YFN organizational manual listing 25 projects for local youth groups and Mock Election Manual
MEMORANDUM

October 4, 1968

TO: RN
FROM: Glenn Olds
SUBJECT: President Bolling's Suggestions, RE: Mood of Eastern European Peoples Following Czechoslovakian Crisis from De-briefing Numbers of Quakers Working with Refugees and Returning Staff

The enclosed statement is brief and useful as a general, non-strategic assessment of mood and its consequences.

Of greater immediate significance to the campaign is the fact that President Bolling, who only a few weeks ago was uncertain about what he could do to help, came in yesterday to say he was ready to take leave to help us full time these next four weeks if we desired it. He explains that the swell of Wallace support has quickened the necessity for men like himself to do more than write papers and vote! I am seeking to find ways to mobilize others like him for a more direct and major impact among the independent-liberal-dissident democrat constituencies.

attachment: U. S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe

cc: Mr. Mitchell
    Mr. Garment
    Mr. Haldeman
    Mr. Keogh
Landrum Bolling  
President, Earlham College  
Richmond, Indiana

U. S. POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE

The crushing of the Czechoslovak liberalization movement by Soviet military power may in the end turn out to be the gravest mistake that the Kremlin leaders have made since the end of World War II. Certainly, United States policy toward Eastern Europe must be designed to take into account the widespread hostility and, among great masses of the people, total disillusionment with the Soviet Union and with Soviet-style socialism which have resulted.

A realistic assessment of the popular mood in Eastern Europe, including specifically Poland and East Germany, will show:

a) overwhelming contempt for the Soviet Union and its current leaders;

b) virtually total disbelief in the propaganda line of the Soviet Union and its echoing puppets;

c) enormous desire for freedom of thought and speech and for freedom of the mass media, (even though operated through socialist ownership), with perhaps the greatest passion for freedom to travel, including freedom to emigrate;

d) no expectation that armed revolt internally can succeed in breaking Soviet influence or that the Western powers will come to their aid in any circumstance other than a third world war, and they don't want that;

e) great desire for the widest possible expansion of human and cultural contacts with the West, including the United States;

f) widespread desire for substantial modification in the economic system: to reduce the powers of the central planners and to enhance the freedom of enterprise for the local managers; to allow greater freedom for individually owned and operated small businesses and farms; to encourage greater production, better quality, and lower prices for consumer goods;

g) little evidence of desire to abolish the socialist economy as such—they only want it to have a more human face, to become more flexible, and to become more productive;

h) great desire for expansion of trade with the West, including the United States, in order to curtail dependence upon the Soviet Union and to provide a general enrichment of their physical lives.

The implications for U. S. policy toward Eastern Europe are, I suggest, as follows:

1) The U. S. should continue to expand its cultural exchange programs with all countries of Eastern Europe—those contacts can only help further to subvert the old rigid communist ideas.

2) The U. S. should make travel to the United States much easier than heretofore for students, teachers, artists, religious leaders, scientists, and managers; we should even give consideration to special exchange arrangements and travel and entertainment subsidies, if these things can be done in an inconspicuous way.
3) The United States should grant most-favored nation treatment to goods imported from Eastern Europe, with the exception of East Germany; this we already do in the case of Yugoslavia and Poland.

4) The United States should agree to negotiate credits for the expansion of East European non-strategic purchases in the U.S.

5) The U.S. should provide guarantees to American firms wishing to invest and assist in the development of non-strategic industries in Eastern Europe.

6) The U.S., through the Office of Education, the Foundation for the Humanities, the National Science Foundation, and the State Department's Cultural Exchange Program, should give substantial encouragement for American scholars, students, and scientists to make study visits to Eastern Europe and to expand research, language and other study programs related to Eastern Europe on American campuses. All of these efforts can encourage progressive liberalization of ideas in Eastern Europe and the enhancement of U.S. prestige, influence and ultimate security—but only if there is a President whom the mass of the American people can trust and who has the skill to explain these policies to the Congress and the public convincingly.

Landrum Bolling was a war correspondent attached to Allied Force Headquarters in the Mediterranean during World War II, was one of the first U.S. reporters in Yugoslavia as the Germans were being driven out during the winter of 1944-45, and has visited Eastern European countries many times and studied their problems extensively since then. He has been in Eastern Europe twice during 1968 and was in Czechoslovakia during the last two weeks in July.
MEMORANDUM

To: R. N.
From: Glenn Olds
Subj: Conference with Frank Keppel, former U.S. Commissioner of Education, and President of General Learning Corporation

In conference with Frank Keppel, one of the brightest and most frustrated "quasi-republicans" of JFK's early team, he identified from that period in Washington two crucially related themes close to your own thinking for fresh attention:

1. The endless complication, red tape, and irrationality of federal-state-local relations. (The Republican coordinating committee's task force in this area has many publications, but none very decisive in proposing a new mechanism judged by effectiveness of the final local delivery of services)

2. The reconstruction of a modern federalism.

He proposed two people who might provide helpful insight in developing your own constructive policy in this area:

(a) Caspar W. Weinberger, Director of Finance for Reagan, and
(b) Elliott Richardson, former undersecretary of H.E.W., and Lt. Governor of Massachusetts.

This is an area requiring critical attention, as a matter of policy, and I do not know whether you would wish to push it further at this time. It strikes me it would be a good thing to have someone close to Reagan involved in a fundamental way now that the convention is passed, and Elliott is someone you may want to look at for a major assignment.

Agreed to set up a task force.

cc: Messrs. Allen, Anderson, Buchanan, Garment, Mitchell, Price
August 30, 1968

DC

A quick look at the attached memorandum of conversation will, I am sure, make you as glad as I am to have a real PRO back in the outfit.

Rose

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM

TO: Herb Klein
From: Murray Chotiner

PERSONAL

This is a follow-up of our conversation of Monday, August 26.

You probably have all of the following items in mind, but I am passing them on to you for whatever value they may be.

Please feel free to call on me for any assistance you may need in taking care of them.

1. "City-Desk" type of operation with definite responsibility for each of your personnel to take care of these specific assignments. One person may handle more than one assignment.

   a. Press servicing for Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, Julie and David. It may be that they prefer not to have a press person travel with them, and I can see the logic in such a decision if that be the situation.

      However, someone at headquarters should be servicing the press in connection with their trips, etc. There is a great opportunity for feature stories on the women's pages, and a qualified person to do this should be available at the earliest possible moment.

   b. Handling of schedules of the Nominee.

   c. Minority newspapers.

   d. Women's activities.

   e. Special groups such as veterans, sports figures, etc., etc.

   f. Answering questions from the press in the absence of yourself and Ron.
g. Someone to take care of press clippings of opposition stories.

h. Writer to prepare answers to opposition stories and coordinate with one of our political personnel to get the right person on whom to hang the answer.

i. Someone to handle TV monitoring of opposition speeches with answers to be prepared as indicated above.

j. Someone to plant and develop stories and feature articles for magazines.

k. Development of form stories for use by state and local committees.

2. Provide the key personnel of the campaign with a list of your entire personnel and their duties so we may know to whom matters should be routed.

3. Provide us and the Nominee with a list of key political editors, editorial writers and columnists so that the Nominee and our political people will have their names when they are in the individual states.

4. Provide us and the Nominee with a list of the Washington Bureau Chiefs for use when the occasion requires it.

5. Several advance runs of the news mailing envelopes should be available at headquarters for emergencies and weekends.

6. Coordination should be developed with the publicity departments of the Republican National Committee and Citizens for Nixon to avoid possible conflicts or duplications in key stories.

7. Modern equipment for producing stories at headquarters so we are not dependent on outside production.

8. Special news release paper to cover the releases from this headquarters, as distinguished from Citizens for Nixon and the Republican National Committee.

9. Personnel to service the traveling press with their requirements.

10. Keep the campaign personnel advised with news releases, etc.
so that everyone is cognizant of what is happening in the campaign. It's tough to feel one is living in a vacuum, and this may help remove that feeling.

11. A department to handle telegrams and messages from the Nominee to various types of meetings that he cannot attend. Requests of this nature should be channeled to a particular person to make certain they are filled; that individual will need the assistance of your department in formulating the proper message.

As you know, things move at a breakneck speed in a campaign, and hopefully this can be set up in its entirety before the end of the week. Again, please feel free to call on me for whatever assistance I can be to you.

With best personal regards.

MNC/jsz

bcc: Richard M. Nixon
August 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM (dictated from Key Biscayne via telephone)

TO: Ken Cole  cc: Bob Passwaters
FROM: John Ehrlichman
RE: Telephones

The following is standard procedure for the installation of telephones in all hotel stops:

CANDIDATE'S SUITE

LIVING ROOM:
One telephone instrument with buttons for 3 private lines in rotation, and 1 dial intercom line (station 3). No telephone bell. 50 foot cord.

BEDROOM:
Two instruments precisely duplicating the living room instrument.

Dwight Chapin's Room:
One instrument with buttons for the candidate's 3 private rotating lines, 1 private line to the outside, 1 dial intercom line (station 3). All lines ring. On a 50 foot cord.

Rose Mary Woods

Sleeping Room:
One instrument with dial intercom station (station 4). One outside private line.

Office:
Four instruments each duplicating the following:

- 4 private outside lines in rotation
- 1 dial intercom station (station 4)

Tour Office:
Two instruments with buttons for 2 private outside lines, and 1 dial intercom station (station 4).

The cord should be long enough so that either instrument may be placed on the "Page Boy" table in this office.
H. R. HALDEMAN'S ROOM:

One instrument with 2 outside lines in rotation, and 1 dial intercom station (station 10) on a 50 foot cord.

LARRY HIGBY'S ROOM:

One instrument with button for 1 dial intercom station (station 1), and duplication of Haldeman's private outside line (extension of Haldeman's numbers). 50 foot cord.

JOHN EHRLICHMAN'S ROOM:

One instrument with 2 private outside lines.

VERN OLSON'S ROOM:

One instrument with extension "duplicate" of Ehrlichman's outside lines.

ADVANCE MAN'S ROOM

One instrument with private outside line which should be installed as early as possible for the continuing use of the advance man.

The following listed staff members should have 1 private outside line installed in each room:

- James Keogh
- Martin Anderson
- Charles McWhorter
- Richard Moore
- Pat Buchanan
- Lt. Governor Finch
- Ron Ziegler
- Bob Ellsworth
- John Dow

In every case telephones should be installed on ample long cords so that they can be used throughout the room or suite.

John Ehrlichman

JE:leec
cc: Sent to John Ehrlichman's home
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Extension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Francis</td>
<td>433 - 4652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Line Rotary (RN)</td>
<td>Hotel Inn 871 - 8027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; - 0949</td>
<td>Chapin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; - 1289</td>
<td>Woods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; - 1981</td>
<td>Heldeman (2 lines) Rotary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; - 0945</td>
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