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MEMO

To: DC (cc: Mitchell, Kleindienst)
From: Bob Ellsworth
Date: May 6, 1968
Re: Washington delegates

On Friday, May 3, Governor Hickel met with Governor Babcock, Governor Evans, Washington State Chairman Johnson and Nixon State Chairman Clinton.

(1) Governor Evans does not want to move at this time even if it should mean drawing his keynote job in serious question — even if it should mean his exclusion from the delegation.

Hickel evaluates the delegation at the present time as 9 delegates who are actually for Nixon (and friendly to Evans); 9 delegates who are for Nixon but who would shift quickly to Reagan if given a chance (and who are strongly anti-Evans); and 6 delegates who are open to persuasion.

Since only 8 states have their state conventions after Washington (Montana: June 21-22; New Mexico: June 22; Illinois: June 28; Alabama: June 28-29; Arkansas: June 29; Missouri: June 29; Utah: July 12-13; and New York: late June), Governors Hickel and Babcock suggest that the possibility be kept in mind of an appearance by the Candidate at the Washington State Convention, to be handled as a major Western United States appearance, with the address to be syndicated throughout the West on television.
This decision need not be made until shortly before the convention, and the decision should be positive only if (1) a major West Coast television appeal would serve a useful purpose either by way of negating what might at that time be a Reagan surge or solidifying Western pro-Nixon strength in the face of a Rockefeller surge and (2) if local conditions in Washington are propitious, i.e., friendly, to a Nixon appearance so that crowds seen on television would be highly enthusiastic and so that a substantial majority of the delegates selected would be willing to identify themselves publicly with Nixon.

I strongly concur in the recommendation forwarded by the Governors, and would add the suggestion that the Candidate's scheduling take account of the fact that the Illinois State Convention will be held on June 28, and it might be highly appropriate for the Candidate to appear at that state convention also.

Related subject: At the Congressional dinner Sunday evening, May 5, Bow of Ohio and Arends of Illinois both urged that a meeting be scheduled with the delegations from their states. RN agreed this was a good idea.

The Ohio delegates are selected on May 7; 48 of the Illinois delegates will be selected on June 11 in the primary but the other 10 will not be selected until June 28 at the state convention.

In both cases, it was recommended and agreed that the appearance should be as soon as possible after selection, to take first advantage
of the tendency of leaners and doubters to be won over by personal contact.
April 8, 1968

Miss Rosemary Woods

c/o Nixon for President Committee
450 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Rose:

It has now been nine months since we began presenting our thoughts as to the potential of Ronald Reagan receiving the Republican nomination for the Presidency. It is my feeling that moderate Republican leaders, particularly in the Eastern part of the United States, are still unable to believe that Reagan has the ability, the money, the organization and the plan which can give him the nomination. I would only point out that those of us who work politics on a day to day basis in California and are close enough to the Reagan scene to observe it, more than ever before realize the threat and danger of the the Reagan movement.

I offer the following points of information, which substantiate the Reagan thrust:

1/ During the past week six additional professionals have been hired by the Reagan people to go to work in the Oregon Primary. Also, an additional $100,000 has been collected, and has been sent to their Oregon people.

2/ The professionals who have been working with Reagan on a day to day basis in California have sold Reagan and others, such as Henry Salvatori, on an intense program, which will tout Reagan as a moderate, in addition to his appeal as an actor and as Governor of California. The first stage of this program has already begun. And it was accomplished by Reagan meeting with negroes up and down the state, followed by his announcement that he will veto any anti-Rumford legislation. During the coming weeks he will make some surprising statements on his attitudes toward Civil Rights and Welfare Programs. He will try to make it clear that Nixon is the conservative candidate and that Reagan is the glamorous, moderate candidate. His people will attempt to move quickly into the void which exists on the so-called moderate Republican side.

- 1 -
The Reagan people are careful to point out to close insiders that they have made the Rockefeller people feel that Reagan would accept the Vice Presidency, if the moderates would just leave him alone. They also infer to anyone who gets close enough to ask, that there is some sort of commitment with Nixon and his people. Reagan has skillfully made sure that his two chief opponents will not bother him in any way, while he quietly builds an ambush against both of them. I might point out that this sort of gimmick is nothing new for Reagan. As you may recall, when he ran for Governor of California, an 11th Commandment was invented which made it a sin for one Republican to criticize another. In reality, however, the 11th Commandment kept George Christopher from waging an effective campaign against Reagan. It is my fear that everyone has fallen for the same old line all over again.

A Candidate does not hire the amount of people that now exists on the Reagan staff throughout the country, a Candidate does not raise the amount of funds that are currently being collected in many states throughout the nation in order to campaign for the office of Vice President. Reagan continues almost a daily poke at both Nixon and Rockefeller, but no one seems willing to pay any attention to it. The fact that he does have the potential of parading himself as a moderate was clearly evidenced in 1966. But again, everyone seems to have forgotten.

As I have written before, and as I am sure others continue to report from California, there still exists a nauseating void for anyone who chooses to help Richard Nixon. Anyone who asks Gaylord Parkinson or other so-called people "in the know," are told that there is to be no Nixon activity, because it might disturb the Great White Father in Sacramento. However, the Great White Father doesn't hesitate to throw knives into Nixon's back. I was pleased to see the Nixon network mailing so that people can at least sign their names to some sort of document. But what happens after that? I agree with the premise that any sort of face to face ballot contest in California would be wrong. On the other hand, actively working citizen committees, petitions, rallies and other signs of movement would have nothing to lose, except to show the nation that there are people in California who want Richard Nixon to be President.

I would like to modestly remind you that I was the one who created the concept of electing movie stars to public office with George Murphy. I think I understand more than most the assets of someone such as Ronald Reagan. I was also the one who directed the campaign against Shirley Temple, which proved that a movie star can be beaten. And I believe I understand what is
necessary to accomplish that type of goal.

In 1966 I saw miscalculations elect Ronald Reagan Governor of California. I cannot conscientiously sit by and let him be underestimated once again on a broader scale. During the coming weeks you will be seeing Ronald Reagan's face on television throughout the country and you will be reading about his moderate views in literature mailed throughout the nation. You will also see not too pleasant wordage issued against Richard Nixon. I would hope that the powers that be, begin acting now before it is too late. Once Reagan is allowed to gallop for a time on his white horse, he will be unstoppable.

Sincerely,

Sanford L. Weiner

SLW/cj

cc: Patrick Hillings
June 6, 1968

TO: DC
J. Mitchell

FROM: [Name]

RE: Rockefeller Campaign

At breakfast with Walter Thayer I told him how disturbed we were at the turn NR's campaign had taken, as evidenced by the Douglass telegram to N.J. delegates, NR's statements re RN, and the purported thrust of the NR television spot program. I pointed out that this effort was futile, as we now had the nomination won with strength to spare.

Regarding the television spots, Thayer said he had seen them all and that, as of now, they were not anti-Nixon. There are eight spots in the series, all issue oriented. The script is written but not yet produced. Thayer's comment re the content was that "RN could have said it". He said there is divided opinion on the project and it may well be scrapped.

Thayer went on to say it was entirely possible that the thrust of the spots would be changed to "anti-Nixon". He said the trend in this direction was also disturbing to him. He had not known of the Douglass cable. He deplored the negative note of some of NR's comments. He went on to say that he had put in writing to NR that he would withdraw publicly if NR's campaign became anti-Nixon and divisive.

Thayer went on to say that the NR campaign forces had split, with the pros (Hinman, Hughes, Douglass, Morton, Spad, Bill Miller, Hall, Dierdorf and Wilson) having pushed aside the amateurs (Irwin Miller, Whitney and Thayer). He said Douglass was nice, bright but ineffective, while Hughes was a difficult, complicated person. He was very high on Irwin Miller. Thayer said he did not sit in on the strategy meetings and did not use his office on 44th Street. He said that unlike the '66 campaign, where Pfeiffer and Rowan gave it real leadership, the current effort is confused and leaderless.
All the "amateurs" are equally firm in their conviction that NR should not be anti-Nixon. Thayer says this conviction is based on the belief that it won't help NR and will hurt the Republican Party. Thayer is satisfied that the game is up for NR. He will continue to urge him to be constructive, rather than destructive. If the latter is the course taken, he will withdraw.

Thayer was warm in his praise of the way NN is handling himself. It seemed obvious to me that he is uncomfortable with NR and would like to get back on our team.

Thayer negotiated with Cliff White to join the NR forces. He claims to have determined that Salvatori's contract with White was for $150,000 for consulting with the California delegation. White apparently was sufficiently interested in Thayer's proposal to have had the gall to ask Salvatori if his consulting obligations prohibited him from working with the NR people. The answer was a flat "yes". (Thank the Lord we didn't get White.)
April 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman
FROM: Rose Mary Woods

In trying to clean out my brief case today,
I came across the note I called you about when Don Nixon asked
RN to have someone contact Ed Biles in California. You will
remember Don said he was a former Johnson intimate but wants
to help RN now. His telephone number is Code 213 279 2856.

Don told RN that he wants to work with us - has
worked with Democrats and minorities.

1. Was a Johnson man - genl counsel, 14 years, very close
   when LBJ ordered us going to go for RN

2. if HHH gets nomination - he can't help

3. if it's Bobby n McCarthy - he'll join with us

Still concerned about anti-Semitism tag on RN.

Need to concentrate on Latin Americans - esp. in LA and Orange.
He'll put us in touch with all the leaders.
May 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Haldeman
FROM: Ellsworth

In case this should ever come up -- which I hope it doesn't, and I hope DC does not become involved or embroiled in any kind of comment on this -- you should know what it is based on.

Hinman called Bellmon to complain about pro-Nixon activity in New York state and to ask Bellmon to quash it. This was while Romney was still very much a candidate.

Bellmon called Hinman back and said that he, Bellmon, knew nothing about and was not behind any pro-Nixon activity in New York, and Hinman then said he wanted to show Bellmon newspaper clippings which he preceded to do.

Bellmon then said that he, Bellmon, would undertake to repudiate and otherwise dampen the Nixonites in New York state if he could be assured that Rockefeller was going to be a favorite son at least to the extent of insisting upon having all of New York's first ballot votes go to him, Rockefeller, and not to Romney.
Bellmon never "broached" the possibility of Rockefeller running for Vice President. Bellmon never said that things would be much easier for Rockefeller if he did not get in the race.

In fact, Bellmon states there is no foundation in fact for the Rockefeller statement reported in the news story.
MEMORANDUM

28 November 1967

From: Price

Subj: Recommendations for General Strategy from now through Wisconsin

We enter with these factors in the equation:

1) NH is the front-runner, maintaining or increasing strength in the polls with relatively little activity.

2) We can't be sure how solid his support is (e.g., the New Hampshire attitude that he's a good man but probably can't win, thus their votes are really being cast away -- or cast for LBJ).

3) Romney is certain to conduct a high-intensity campaign, with a lot of street-cornering and probably a lot of TV. This has apparently been effective in Michigan; whether it's transferable to a 1968 Presidential campaign is another question.

4) Rockefeller and Reagan continue to exercise their attractions from the sidelines. Rockefeller's strength derives principally from NH's can't-win image. He's riding high, not particularly because people like him, but because they've been told (which is something other than thinking) that he can win and that he thus is the only realistic alternative to LBJ. At this stage of the game, poll results don't particularly show what voters think about a candidate; they reflect in large measure what they've been told. They haven't begun thinking that intensively. Reagan's strength derives from personal charisma,
glamor, but primarily the ideological fervor of the Right and the emotional distress of those who fear or resent the Negro, and who expect Reagan somehow to keep him "in his place" -- or at least to echo their own anger and frustration.

RN is the overwhelming favorite of the delegate types; if we can lick the can't-win thing we've got it made. This is the one possible obstacle between RN and the nomination. Thus the whole thrust of our effort should be aimed at erasing this image.

How?
To answer this, we have to analyse the image.
Basically, it divides into two parts:
  a) He lost his last two elections.
  b) He somehow "feels" like a loser.

We can't alter the facts of (a), and probably our capacity to get people to look at those facts realistically is limited. We can make any number of poor arguments about the way in which those results should be interpreted: in 1962, one of the closest races in history against one of the most charismatic of American political figures, the effect of the Catholic issue, vote-stealing, defending the Eisenhower record, etc.; and in 1962, the bitter split in the California Republican party, the fact that he wasn't credible as a mere governor (too big for the job, and he showed it), etc. But politics is only minimally a rational science, and no matter how compelling these arguments -- even if we can get people to sit down and listen to them -- they'll only be effective if we can get the people to make the emotional
leap, or what theologians call "the leap of faith." If we can make them feel that he's got the aura of a winner, they'll rationalize away the past defeats by themselves; if we can't make them feel that, no matter what the rational explanations, they'll pull down the mental blind marked with those simple words, "he lost."

The natural human use of reason is to support prejudices, not to arrive at opinions.

Then how do we attack (b) -- the notion that he "feels" like a loser?

First, we bear in mind that to a lot of people he feels like a winner. It's the others we have to worry about. And we might oversimplify by dividing these into two basic groups: 1) those who themselves feel there's "something about him I don't like," or "something about him that spells loser;" and 2) those who themselves react altogether positively, but consider him a loser-type because of the way others react to him. The line between these two groups, of course, isn't sharp; and again we have to bear in mind that most people's reactions to most public figures are a mixture of positives and negatives. But for purposes of analysis, we can proceed from this division.

Polls showing him substantially ahead can be of considerable use, particularly with those of Group (2). But there's a caveat here: poll strength is bound to fluctuate, and to the extent that our defenses against "can't-win" are built on polls, they're insecure. A slight downturn then could have a snowball effect. But if we can erase the feeling of "can't-win," then we can survive a substantial buffeting by the polls.
The hard core of the problem lies with those who themselves feel there's "loser" somehow written on him -- i.e., with Group (1). If we can get these, we'll automatically get Group (2).

Again, we might divide the factors entering into the "can't-win" feeling into two broad categories: (a) historical, and (b) personal. The historical factors would, of course, include the fact of the two losses, but they run deeper. In a sense, they're all wrapped up in the fact that for years Nixon was one of those men it was fashionable to hate. It might take people a moment to remember why they were supposed to hate him, but they do remember that they were; even in communities where he was locally popular, it was well known that he was hated elsewhere -- and particularly in many of the First Circles.

Generally, the sources of this hate centered around the way he practiced, or was alleged to practice, his political craft. Whatever the strange complex of passions that went into the hysterical anti-anti-communism of the postwar and McCarthy years; whatever the emotional responses of those who disliked his style, the essence of the objections lay in Nixon's cutting edge. He was viewed as a partisan figure first, a national figure second; as devious and unfair in his debating tactics -- a master of unsupported innuendo, etc.

Let's leave realities aside -- because what we have to deal with now is not the facts of history, but an image of history. The history we have to be concerned with is not what happened, but what's remembered, which may be quite different. Or, to put it another way, the historical untruth may be a political reality.
We can't do anything about what did happen, and there's not much we can directly do about people's impressions of what happened; for better or for worse, these are part of the political folklore. Thus what we have to do is to persuade people that they're irrelevant to 1968. How? This has three prongs:

1. The passage of time; this has clearly worked in our favor. The sharp edge of memory has dulled, the image has mellowed; people don't maintain their passions forever. Also, Stewart Alsop makes an interesting point in his 1960 book, "Nixon and Rockefeller:" that with a couple of minor exceptions, "after 1954 the anti-Nixon dossier dwindles away into almost nothing at all.... the fact is that, since 1954, Nixon has very rarely gone too far, although the provocation has often been great." (152-153)

2. A dawning recognition on the part of some voters that they (or the chroniclers) might have been wrong, and that maybe the horror stories weren't all true after all; and

3. The natural phenomenon of growth. This is where I think there's the most gold to be mined. People understand growth, readily and instinctively; they expect people to mellow as they mature, and to learn from experience. Particularly in the case of a person with RW's recognized ability and intelligence, they'd be surprised if he didn't grow and change with the years. This doesn't mean a "new Nixon;" it simply means the natural maturation of the same Nixon, and in this context it makes the leaving behind of the old stereotypes perfectly acceptable and understandable. The great advantage of the growth idea is that it doesn't require a former Nixon-hater to admit that he was wrong.
in order to become a Nixon supporter now; he can still cherish his prejudices of the past, he can still maintain his own sense of infallibility, even while he shifts his position on a Nixon candidacy.

But what of the personal factors, as opposed to the historical?

These tend to be more a gut reaction, unarticulated, non-analytical, a product of the particular chemistry between the voter and the image of the candidate. We have to be very clear on this point: that the response is to the image, not to the man, since 99 per cent of the voters have no contact with the man. It's not what's there that counts, it's what's projected — and, carrying it one step further, it's not what he projects but rather what the voter receives. It's not the man we have to change, but rather the received impression. And this impression often depends more on the medium and its use than it does on the candidate himself.

Politics is much more emotional than it is rational, and this is particularly true of Presidential politics. People identify with a President in a way they do with no other public figure. Potential presidents are measured against an ideal that's a combination of leading man, God, father, hero, Pope, king, with maybe just a touch of the avenging Furies thrown in. They want him to be larger than life, a living legend, and yet quintessentially human; someone to be held up to their children as a model; someone to be cherished by themselves as a revered member of the family, in somewhat the same way in which present
families pray to the icon in the corner. Reverence goes where
power is; it's no coincidence that there's such persistent
confusion between love and fear in the whole history of man's
relationship to his Gods. Awe enters into it.

And we shouldn't credit the press with a substantially
greater leaven of reason than the general public brings. The
press may be better at rationalizing their prejudices, but the
basic response remains an emotional one.

Selection of a President has to be an act of faith. It
becomes increasingly so as the business of government becomes
ever more incomprehensible to the average voter. This faith
isn't achieved by reason; it's achieved by charisma, by a
feeling of trust that can't be argued or reasoned, but that
comes across in those silences that surround the words. The
words are important -- but less for what they actually say than
for the sense they convey, for the impression they give of the
man himself, his hopes, his standards, his competence, his
intelligence, his essential humanness, and the directions of
history he represents.

Most countries divide the functions of head of government
(prime minister) and chief of state (king or president). We
don't. The traditional "issues" type debate center on the
role of the head of government, but I'm convinced that people
vote more for a chief of state -- and this is primarily an
emotional identification, embracing both a man himself and a
particular vision of the nation's ideals and its destiny.
All this is a roundabout way of getting at the point that we should be concentrating on building a received image of RN as the kind of man proud parents would ideally want their sons to grow up to be: a man who embodies the national ideal, its aspirations, its dreams, a man whose image the people want in their homes as a source of inspiration, and whose voice they want as the representative of their nation in the councils of the world, and of their generation in the pages of history.

That's what being a "winner" means, in Presidential terms.

What, then, does this mean in terms of our uses of time and of media between now and April 2?

For one thing, it means investing whatever time RN needs in order to work out firmly in his own mind that vision of the nation's future that he wants to be identified with. This is crucial. It goes beyond the choice of a slogan, beyond the choice of a few key "issues;" it's essential to the projection of RN as the man for the 70s.

Secondly, it suggests that we take the time and the money to experiment, in a controlled manner, with film and television techniques, with particular emphasis on pinpointing those controlled uses of the television medium that can best convey the image we want to get across.

I know the whole business of contrived image-managing is repugnant to RN, with its implication of slick gimmicks and phony merchandising. But it's simply not true that honesty is its own salesman; for example, it takes make-up to make a man look natural on TV. Similarly, it takes art to convey the truth
from us to the viewer. And we have to bear constantly in mind that it's not what we say that counts, but what the listener hears; not what we project, but how the viewer receives the impression. I think it was Luce and Hadden, in their original prospectus for Time, who laid down the rule that it's not what the editors put into a magazine that counts, but what the readers get out of it -- and that rule is just as applicable to us.

The TV medium itself introduces an element of distortion, in terms both of its effect on the candidate and of the often subliminal ways in which the image is received. And it inevitably is going to convey a partial image -- thus ours is the task of finding how to control its use so the part that gets across is the part we want to have gotten across.

Our concentrated viewing of clips from the CES library left a clear impression that RN comes across decidedly unevenly -- sometimes rather badly, sometimes exceedingly well, and that the greater the element of informality and spontaneity the better he comes across. This spontaneity is difficult to get in the formal setting of a standard press conference or a set speech, when he's concentrating on the arrangement of words to convey a particular thought in a particular way. Apart from all the technical gimmicks, the key difference in LEJ's TV manner at his last press conference -- and what really brought it off so stunningly -- was that he was no longer trying to formulate sentences in a precise and guarded manner; he gave the impression of being no longer self-conscious about his manner of expression, but rather seemed to have his mind fixed on the thing he was talking about. It was this apparent unselfconsciousness that
unleashed the power of the man; and this unselfconsciousness is the essence of spontaneity. Suddenly, LBJ was transformed from a man with a can't-win television image to a man with a can-win image, and the lesson ought not to be lost on us.

We have to capture and capsule this spontaneity -- and this means shooting RN in situations in which it's likely to emerge, then having a chance to edit the film so that the parts shown are the parts we want shown. We need to build a library of such shots, which then will be available for a variety of uses -- and so that, in minimum time, we can put together a variety of one or five-minute, or longer films of the man in motion, with the idea of conveying a sense of his personality -- the personality that most voters have simply not had a chance to see, or, if they have, have lost in the montage of other images that form their total perceptions of the man.

The Paul Niven show came across brilliantly, and it was a fine example of an appearance in which the circumstances were right: a relaxed, informal setting; a "conversation" rather than a Meet-the-Press-type adversary proceeding; sufficient time and scope to expand on the ideas presented; a chance to bring out the qualities of the man. The people who say Nixon "can't win" tend to have a two-dimensional, black-and-white image of him; this kind of show makes it possible to bring out a third dimension, and it's in this third dimension that the keys to victory lie.

In this third dimension, style and substance are inseparable. And the substantive essence is not whatever facts may be adduced (though facts are valuable), but the sense of attitudes and approaches which have been thought through, not
only in depth, but also in terms of their relationship to those other processes of government and aspects of society that they may affect.

One of our great assets for 1968 is the sense that RN comes to the fray freshened by an experience rare among men in public life, and among those of his generation: after a meteoric rise, followed by eight years at the center of power and the grinding experience of a Presidential campaign, time as a private citizen to reflect on the lessons of public service, on the uses of power, on the directions of change -- and in so doing to develop a perspective on the Presidency that no serious candidate in this century has had the chance to achieve. It's a perspective that an incumbent cannot have, because one has to get away from the office to see it whole; and that an outsider cannot have, because one has to have been there to know its nature.

Another thing we've got to get across is a sense of human warmth. This is vital to the Presidential mystique, and has largely been the "hidden side" of RN, as far as the public is concerned. And it can be gotten across without loss of either dignity or privacy. It shines through in a lot of those spontaneous moments that have been caught on film. It would be helped by an occasional groping for an answer. Just letting the girls be seen can be a big plus. It came through at times on the Niven show, and strongly on the Carson show. One of the great plusses of the Carson show was that it hit a lot of people with the jolt of the unexpected -- it showed people a side of RN that they didn't know existed, and this jarred loose a lot of the old prejudices and preconceptions.
Getting across this sense of warmth does not require being a backslapper or a "buddy-buddy boy" or a hail-fellow-well-met. To attempt to be such would be not only transparently phony, but inappropriate; we're in a Presidential race, not at a Shriners' convention. It can and should be done subtly, naturally -- and this is one of the great advantages of the TV medium (which is a close-up medium) in a relaxed setting, and also of film. Here the warmth does come across -- in facial expressions, in the inflections of voice, in the thoughtful exposition of a problem in human terms and in a low-key manner.

Right now we should be concentrating as much as possible on "cool" uses of TV, and on "cool" impressions -- both to establish likeability (it's in the cool use that the warmth comes through) and to fit the rhythms of a campaign that's going to hot up later. That is, we want to leave room on the upper end of the intensity scale, so that as we move toward November, we've got reaches of intensity -- of "hotness" -- to expand into.

So: we should use TV, but we should be selective in our uses of it. We don't need exposure for exposure's sake. We don't have to establish recognition. But we do want to close the gap between old myths and present realities: we want to remind supporters of the candidate's strengths, and demonstrate to non-supporters that the Herblock images are fiction. The way to do this is to let more people see the candidate as we see him, remembering that the important thing is not to win debates, but to win the audience; not to persuade them to RN's point of view, but to win their faith in his leadership.

#    #    #
POSTSCRIPTS:

How does all this translate into practical, operational terms? Among other things, it means:

1. That for the next couple of months, at least, RN should be underscheduled rather than overscheduled. This may be the last opportunity for the concentrated thought required to work out those basic "directions" that will establish the thrust of the campaign.

2. That we resist the pressures which will inevitably be brought for streetcornering, coffee-klatsching, etc.

3. That priority be given to meetings with the news executives of key television stations in Boston, New Hampshire and Wisconsin. The time to impress them is now, before they get their patterns of campaign coverage locked into place.

4. That in scheduling any TV appearances, sufficient time be blocked out before the show to ensure that RN have a chance (a) to collect his thoughts, and (b) to rest -- and that this be an absolute and inviolable rule.

5. That RN submit to filming for use in TV commercial spots and a possible half-hour film.

6. That we proceed with the book, but that we reassess the publication schedule with an eye to the political climate in New Hampshire and Wisconsin. It's bound to contain things which, taken wholly or partially out of context, would upset conservative Republicans; if keeping the Right contented
is the key to victory in Wisconsin, then we probably ought to
delay publication until May -- though bringing out one or
two advance excerpts tailored to the ideological needs of the
primary.

7. That in forays into the primary states, one
public event a day is enough. There's only going to be one
news story, and by keeping down the number of events it covers
we can better control its content. (An exception, of course,
would be those trips on which it was necessary to hit more than
one city.)

8. That RN should strive to avoid getting tangled
up in the passing controversies over present legislative
hassles, etc. He doesn't have to have a responsive answer to
whatever question a reporter may choose to ask; to the extent
that he tries to, he loses control over his own timing.

9. That we seek out opportunities for relaxed
television appearances, while trying to avoid a surfeit of the
stand-up press conference sort of thing -- and that when he is
in a standard press conference, he continue salting it with
light banter, etc. The voters know he's smart; we want to show
them that he's also a nice guy.

10. That he continue meeting with columnists,
commentators, etc. This is one of our chief counterthrusts to
the Rockefeller drive: his candidacy is largely a creation of
the media, and particularly of the print media. To the extent
that they discover Nixon as a reasonable alternative -- and to
the extent that they become convinced of the "winner" quality --
the less likely they'll be to keep trying to push Rockefeller forward.
11. I would agree emphatically with Pat that we ought to avoid getting caught in a tug-of-war with Romney on some one particular issue. Even though we might well score debating points on him, we want to maintain the sense of a candidacy that's on a plane above his -- again, we're interested in winning the audience, not in winning the debate.

#    #    #
AN OUTLINE OF STRATEGY

The polls today show RN leading by a sizable margin in N.H.; Governor Romney is the one who must play "hurry-up" football. What sort of strategy should we map out now—for N.H.?

1) I would right now look into only the minimum necessary appearances in N.H., essential to holding our lead, and considering that George will campaign heavily. We must schedule enough so that Romney camp cannot argue "Only George Cared Enough to Come," and we must not schedule so much as to risk overexposure, to risk boring the electorate, so that, the Humphriesites, weary with the contentious disputants follow their own arbitrary natures and write-in someone.

We should thus look in only a necessary minimum—in terms of both tv and speeches and appearences. What is that minimum?

2) The Nixon Coalition in N.H. right now (a guess) consists of 40 per cent Republican Regulars, 40 per cent conservative Republicans, and 20 per cent moderates and liberals who think Rocky is out, Romney is out to lunch, and Reagan would be a disaster.

From the polls, from the reports we get, from the Presser memos, we get this reading on the Nixon coalition. Almost to a man it believes RN is the best qualified man to be President, most capable in foreign policy, most capable on the issues. There is widespread concern through this coalition that a) RN is a loser and b) he cannot generate sufficient enthusiasm and excitement.

The points immediately above indicate to me the necessity to do more traditional campaigning than was envisioned in that New York Times Story saying we would give lofty speeches, get in and out of the State. They already think we are the smartest candidate; what the majority want to know is can we win—and we can't convince them of this by talking about Vietnam and the Middle East. In Wisconsin, we will have the victory in N.H. to show we are winners—in New Hampshire, we must have winner written all over us.
We have said minimum essential appearances. Now, what kind?

First, we should give those lofty speeches on foreign policy which show our superiority over the opposition in clear terms. Such speeches as well re-inforce (we don't need to create the impression; it is already there) the concept of the great majority that we know more than anybody else what we are talking about. Thus, we "flash" our credentials of ability, experience and knowledge———while Romney has to have his inspected at great length.

Then, to hammer the loser thing, (at the same time we dispell the myths of RN being tough and mean and political and intense) we use the tv to show everyone in New Hampshire that RN is enjoying the hell out of this campaign. He is smiling, confident, easy-going (no cornball stuff) comes off well in "feature" settings, with kids, with folks etc. In short, while RN talks like the President-in-Exile, he is a good democrat (with a small d) who believes that communicating with the people is one of the great joys of seeking the Presidency.

While our mail and advertising ought to be providing polls and every other thing we can to hit the loser thing——RN's attitude as much as anything else will create the impression of a rolling bandwagon. (One thing we have going for us is that if Romney stays behind he may get George Christopher-like, testy, irritable and bitchy and those are the sure marks of a drowning candidate. They won't be missed by tv eye or press either.)

That is the kind of tv we do want. Our controlled ads, RN smiling when campaigning, RN the Statesman when speaking. We don't need any press conference type stuff where RN is being baited by reporters and saying why he would oppose the rat control bill or something. We just don't need that; and it should be considered a necessary evil when we have to have it.
3) Basic Strategy then: First class printed advertising, first class filmed spots and films of RN, plus *friends and the surrogates of RN* should carry the message into N.H. and bear the brunt of the campaign against George—while RN himself waits in reserve, watching the progress of the conflict. RN only does what is necessary and essential. If George fails to move in the polls, if he puts his shoe in his mouth a few times, we follow the same strategy. If he starts moving rapidly upward, we then start closing some of the options we left open—we start locking in to telethons perhaps; we start campaigning in earnest.

However, while RN has a schedule perhaps half that of Romney, our people ought to have the line out that RN has determined to do whatever is necessary to get his message across to the people of N.H., to go into the towns if need be and the city halls, etc. We will consider it an all-out campaign. That might well be the line.

4) Romney Strategy. All-out street corner effort certainly. Also, the necessity to talk a great deal on the issues to convince the people he can handle them. The press will be picking him apart on issues and specifics if he tries to duck them. If by three weeks before the election Romney has not moved up considerably in the polls— I would imagine a direct challenge would come to RN. Romney might well grab on end of an issue—of which RN held the other—and then try to have the election decided on it. Perhaps it might be Vietnam.

We should avoid this at all costs. If its decided on the best man and qualifications, we win; so let's avoid having it settled on the single issue. We ought to ignore challenges to debate; we are running against LBJ not George Romney—voters should choose who is better qualified, who can make a better case, who can win. We should avoid locking horns or getting into comparative situations with Romney.
(I have heard that it is expected that RN and Romney both will be on Meet the Press the day before election (rather the Sunday before). I would skip this drill, if we are well ahead.)

(If we bump into George and we can't avoid it, we ought to play the JFK bit when Johnson kept demanding he debate at the Democratic convention. If we are getting heat, we might pop in unexpectedly on Romney somewhere, take the floor, and give them about ten minutes of what needs to be changed in America, high-level, then say the Republican Party can provide that leadership. Within this party there are the human resources "to turn America around into the proper path of her destiny.

We have great Governors like George Romney and Senators like your own Norris Cotton. We will win if we stand together, and I say right here if Governor Romney gets that nomination, he will have no more loyal supporter than me! This type of drill, where there is no contest, no grappling of arms to wrestle.

5) ISSUES: It has been argued that RN should take a thematic approach, give his philosophy, tell what is wrong with America, point out the direction of the new solution, and perhaps a few major programs might be broadly defined. This is fine; and it avoids the petty issues that divide men. But the press will not let us get away with it; and for them RN should be thoroughly briefed on the major issues of the day with statistics and facts and phrases for the press conferences. While we might not want to get into the nitty-gritty; RN should be prepared for it. There is no need to antagonize the press by staying off of some issues RN is pressed on. RN has never had problems in this area, and he ought to level with the press. As one earlier memo said, RN's demonstration not only of convictions, but of tremendous knowledge and ability will be sharply contrasted in these writer's mind with George--and the contrast may be reflected in their stories.
Because of the nature of our coalition (conservative personally or politically) in N.H., we ought not to come up there and jolt their current impression of RN as Mr. Solid. Republican progressive is a good posture. Even if we are going to come out for something like the negative income tax, it ought to be delayed until after this type of thing is over.

However, I would agree with Ray that we ought not, when in N.H., lock the door to any proposal that might be worthwhile nationally later.

6) STRATEGY BETWEEN NOW AND NEW HAMPSHIRE

Our national coalition is exactly similar to that in New Hampshire; and to cement it the same rules apply. Demonstrate we can generate enthusiasm and excitement; demonstrate (partly through the primaries and partly in attitude) that we are a winner; demonstrate (again, just re-inforce impressions rather than create them) that as possible believe, we are by far the best qualified.

Thus, rather than political reporters walking through the office; I would like to see an AP feature writer maybe and some (friendl, only) magazine writers. (As for the political reporters, they should be sent away with the message of RN, by no means overconfident, but cool, calm, confident and fatalistic)

We would like to see some more (not very much) tv of RN, with the accent on destroying the old myths. Also, perhaps some feature shots, (again not overdone) of RN on a golf course or something that is legitimate feature without being cornball or contrived.
We could use some more feature stuff on the youth of the Staff, and the idea merchants etc. We ought to get the Draft piece around to youth of the country. We ought to be thinking in terms of material that will make points with the Negro. These people are not locked into LBJ; they are not particularly hostile to RN; they are indifferent to RN, and maybe some of them can be sold on RN.

On this feature stuff—whether tv or press or photos or situation—it ought to be such so as to surprise someone who has a stereotype of RN, but not so much as to make him think it is contrived.

What was ideal about the Carson thing was that it did three things in one.

First, RN with his very brief and articulate piece on "world peace" re-inforced the notion of his ability in world affairs; then with the needle about the "ten tickets" and the other gave the lie to the impression that PN is humorless—then with the girls, this tore into the mean image and dispassionate image.

# # #
Notes re Nixon for President Advertising in the Primary Campaigns

November 21, 1967
Consider this the first stab at an advertising strategy -- a combination guide and thought-starter for those who will be developing the Nixon for President advertising in the primary states.

Much that is in these notes has been said before. Some of the points are obvious. A few are less obvious and perhaps new. But all have a direct bearing on our problem and merit your close study.

There is nothing final about this document. It is a beginning only. Like Alaskan sour dough, it should be constantly kneaded with fresh ideas for best results.
We must start by answering three questions which are basic to all advertising:

- **What** do we want to communicate? This is the most important question. And once answered, all advertising should carry the same message, and be judged solely on how clearly and memorably it communicates it.

- **How** do we say what we want to communicate? With what words, what audio and visual techniques, in what style, what tone of voice?

- **Where** should we put our advertising message so that it will reach the most voters in the most effective way possible at the least cost? This is the media decision, and because it is a local problem it will be the subject of individual reports for each state.
The content, or the "what", of the advertising.

We must keep foremost in our minds the fact that we are developing advertising for a primary campaign. LBJ and the Democratic Party are not yet the opposition. Criticizing the present administration is merely a way -- and a good one, to be sure -- to present our candidate as the Republican most qualified to head a new administration.

Thus, the overall objective of the advertising will be to persuade voters, or confirm to the already-persuaded, that the Republican nominee in 1968 should be Richard Nixon, rather than Romney or Rockefeller or Reagan or Percy.

Issues will be discussed, but always in a way that clearly establishes Richard Nixon as the Republican candidate who is best equipped to deal with them.

And the advertising will certainly attack the record and policies of the administration. As the McDonald Davis Schmidt strategy states, "The most effective posture for a challenger to take is that of constantly challenging. The advertising should be directed toward 'what's wrong with things as they are.'" True. But it must always then lead directly, and without subtlety, into why our candidate is so uniquely qualified to right those wrongs.
It is part of the discipline of sound advertising to put down, as briefly as possible, the advertising "proposition" -- the simplest expression of the message we want to communicate. This is not the theme or slogan; the words of the proposition may never appear in advertising; yet all advertising must communicate the thought of the proposition.

The proposition for the Nixon for President primary advertising can be stated like this:

There's an uneasiness in the land. A feeling that things aren't right. That we're moving in the wrong direction. That none of the solutions to our problems are working. That we're not being told the truth about what's going on.

The trouble is in Washington. Fix that and we're on our way to fixing everything. Step one: move LBJ out, move a Republican president in.

And of all the Republicans, the most qualified for the job by far is Richard M. Nixon. More than any other Republican candidate for the Presidency, Richard Nixon will know what has to be done -- and he'll know the best way to get it done. We'll all
feel a whole lot better knowing he's there in Washington running things instead of somebody else.
A proposition has to be supported in the advertising by facts. What are our facts? What does Richard Nixon have that makes him "the most qualified by far"?

**Experience.** On the national scene. In foreign affairs. He knows how the Federal government works, and how to make it work for the people. He's got it all over the other candidates in this respect. His travels. His conversations with the world's thinkers and achievers. His years of intensive study.

**Knowledgesability.** Resulting from his experience. His travels. His conversations with the world's thinkers and achievers. His years of intensive study.

**Intellectual ability.** Formidable. A disciplined mind. Able to cope with the big problems, come up with new answers. Can more than hold his own in his dealings with other world leaders.

**Acceptability.** Where it counts. In the capitals of the world. In the top circles of business, politics, the professions. Not always loved, he is universally respected. Not glamorous, he does have a certain star quality going for him. Most doors are open to him.

**Ability to form a top team.** Running the country is not a one-man job. You have to have expert help -- and Richard Nixon knows where the talent is. He can bring the best minds in the country into
government, get them to working on our problems. He won't have to
depend on home-town pals; he has ranged too far for too long to be
thus hampered.

Toughness. A good man to have on your side. Won't be
shoved around. Will stick to what he believes. Can he be brain-
washed? Try.

Integrity. Although there were some doubts in the past,
these have been dispelled by the years. Richard Nixon is now gen-
erally regarded as honest, a man who levels with people. (The way
he is handled from now on should strengthen that impression --
particularly important in light of the credibility issue.)

Conscientiousness. He is serious. Hardworking. Selfless.
Thorough. When you've got Nixon on a problem, you've got the best
of Nixon.

Vigorous. He is young, healthy, energetic -- not really a
big advantage over the other Republican candidates, who are equally
vigorous, but still a fact.

Party unifier. Self-explanatory. Probably not of much use
in advertising.
There are also negatives -- but these don't have to be as damaging as some pessimists fear. If we recognize them, deal with them intelligently instead of worrying about them, their effect can be minimized. What, then, does Richard Nixon lack?

**Newness.** Which is not a total negative. Newness means excitement -- but it also means inexperience. And we don't have time for on-the-job training. When the chips are down, not too important.

**Glamour.** True. But again, when the chips are down, etc.

**Humor.** Can be corrected to a degree, but let's not be too obvious about it. Romney's cornball attempts have hurt him. If we're going to be witty, let a pro write the words.

**Warmth.** He can be helped greatly in this respect by how he is handled, by what he says and how he says it, etc. Will be discussed in more detail later.

There are other negatives which are supposed to be working against Mr. Nixon but -- in this writer's opinion -- they now seem to be part of a past that few people remember or much care about today. In this category we can place the "tricky Dick" image, the reputation for meanness and ruthlessness, for putting politics ahead of principle, etc. These now seem strangely out-of-date and no longer applicable to the man who is running in 1968.
A negative that does seem to hang on, however, is the loser image. This is a negative of special significance in the primaries; people don't want to waste their vote on a candidate who can't win the national election. Of course, there's nothing like winning to bury a reputation for losing. That's why Nixon's electability -- as shown in the polls, by what people are saying, in the first primaries, etc. -- should be an important element of our advertising content. More on this later.

The foregoing has been a discussion of what we want to communicate -- or, in the case of the negatives, what we may want to counteract. It can all be summed up in the next to last sentence of the proposition:

More than any other Republican candidate for the Presidency, Richard Nixon will know what has to be done -- and he'll know the best way to get it done.

It is imperative that this thought come through loud and clear in every single piece of advertising. If it doesn't, the advertising is not doing its job.
The execution, or the "how", of the advertising

In developing actual advertisements and commercials, we should observe two general guidelines.

First, the style of the advertising must be appropriate -- to the man, to his background, to the office he is seeking. We are representing in our advertising a former vice president of the United States, a man with specific and well known personality traits, a candidate for the most important office in the world.

Cuteness, obliqueness, wayoutness, slickness -- any obvious gimmicks that say "Madison Ave. at work here" -- should be avoided. They could, indeed, result in a public backlash that would hurt our candidate. Imaginative approaches, contemporary techniques -- yes. But we must beware of "overcreativity", and make sure that the basic seriousness of our purpose shows plainly in everything we do.

Second, we must not, in our zeal (or in our preoccupation with the loser image), forget that our candidate is the favorite.

In every race we're entering, the polls show Richard Nixon well out in front -- and pulling farther ahead every week. We do not, therefore, have to take the kind of chances which a lesser known or less popular candidate might be tempted to take. We can afford a
"careful confidence". (It's to be hoped that this would be reflected in Mr. Nixon's public appearances as well as in the advertising; there are times when his seriousness, and his determination to make a point, start coming across as defensive or even a little desperate. More cool is called for.)

At this point these notes will digress somewhat to analyze the forces behind the Nixon Resurgence (which are not too different from the forces which are moving Rockefeller to the fore) and comment on the "new Nixon" myth.

It's interesting to note that Mr. Nixon's growing popularity is not resulting from anything new he is saying or doing. What is happening is a political process of elimination on a mass scale, coupled with the cumulative effects of the "prior approval" factor. Listen to this dialogue with last year's typical Republican voter:

"We're in a mess," says the voter. "Gotta get LBJ out. Gotta get our boy in."

"You mean Nixon?"

"No, no. We've been there."

"Who, then?"

"I don't know. Ask me next year."

Time passes. Here we are in an election year. Can't cop out
any more. Have to face up.

"Okay, Mr. Republican voter, so if you don't like Nixon, who do you want?"

"Well, there's Romney -- old Super Square -- he looked pretty good until he started talking. Reagan -- a glamour boy and better than I expected but he still has to prove he could handle the Top Job. Percy -- attractive but I really don't know much about him. Rockefeller -- yeah, I could go with him, except he keeps saying he doesn't want to be President. That leaves Nixon."

"But you said you didn't like him."

"Yeah. But I can't seem to remember why. There's no denying he's qualified. In fact, he's really a good man for the job. And I've been reading some very favorable things about him. And I've heard a lot of savvy people are getting behind him. Nixon? Sure -- he'd get my vote!"
The point of all this is simply that it's not a "new Nixon" that's now at the top of the polls. It's the old Nixon with his strengths looking stronger and his negatives blurred by the years -- and, if he's not quite the White Knight we saw in our dreams, he's still the best man by far we could send to Washington. And remember all those new voters for whom there can't be a new Nixon because they never knew the original Nixon: for them there's only Nixon '68 -- and compared to the others (with the possible exception of Reagan) that ain't bad!

In short, it's the attitude of the voters that's new -- not Mr. Nixon. The advertising, therefore, should not strain to create a brand new image -- because the old one's doing pretty well. Add a little warmth, a touch of humor, an aura of confidence -- then publicize poll results, favorable articles, friendly quotes, and anything else that says, "winner" -- and we can stay in front to the end.

Summing up the creative guidelines:

- Make sure the advertising is appropriate.
- Remember that we are ahead.
- Forget the "new Nixon" nonsense. It's the new voter attitude that's important.
Now let's look at a few specific ways we can accomplish our objectives:

Endorsements. No advertising will ever have the influence that a friend's opinion has. Fifty million dollars worth of Ford advertising can't convince you like your neighbor's comment, "Best car I ever owned." This is the "prior approval" factor at work; he likes it, so maybe I would (or should) too. It's a factor that seems to be working now for Richard Nixon — and one we should exploit.

Think back to our typical Republican voter as he mentally eliminates the other candidates one by one. He wants to be for Nixon; all he needs is the kind of nudge he'd get from hearing that a lot of people he respects are also for Nixon. He needs assurance that his opinion will have acceptance, that he won't look like a loner, or a nut. Or, if he is still plagued by the old Nixon negatives, the fact that knowledgeable people all around him are swinging to Nixon could prompt him to say to himself, "Maybe I better re-examine my thinking. If all those people are for him, there's a chance I could be wrong..." etc. An endorsement is also an effective way of talking about the candidate in the third person; the endorser can say things quite naturally about the candidate that the candidate could not comfortably say about himself.
Of course, an endorsement could have a negative effect on a voter who doesn't like the endorser; this possibility can be minimized by always presenting more than one endorser (a series of six or seven or eight short endorsements in a TV commercial, for instance). This has the extra advantage of emphasizing the unifying and acceptability aspects of Richard Nixon -- as well as creating a bandwagon impression.
Polls. These are really tabulated endorsements, and can have the same kind of "prior approval" effect described above. They can, moreover, be used to promote the idea that Richard Nixon can win nationally. As we said earlier, the best way to bury a reputation for losing is to start winning. Advertising favorable out-of-state poll results in New Hampshire (where the wasted vote is a real concern) might convince voters that when they vote for Richard Nixon they're backing a man who can go all the way.

About RN on TV. There's a school of thought that says keep him off the tube, it's not his medium, etc. In this writer's opinion, that's giving up too easily. We know we're going to use television; it's our most powerful medium. But to use it for a series of commercials which do not show the candidate, as has been suggested, would inevitably arouse suspicion. What're we hiding? So let's decide now that Mr. Nixon will appear in our paid television announcements and start figuring out the best ways to present him. A few thoughts:

The more informally he is presented the better.

He looks good in motion.

He should be presented in some kind of "situation" rather than cold in a studio. The situation should look unstaged, even if it's not. A newreel-type on location interview technique, for example, could be effective. The more visually interesting and local
the location the better.

Avoid closeups. A medium waist shot is about as tight as the camera should get. He looks good when he faces the camera head-on.

Still photographs can be effectively used on TV. Interesting cropping, artful editing and juxtaposition of scenes, an arresting soundtrack, can all combine to make an unusual presentation. Added advantages: there's a wide range of material to choose from, and we'd be free to select only the most flattering pictures.

For short programs (a series of nightly 5-minute shows during the final two weeks is being proposed for New Hampshire) a "town meeting" format should be considered. Each one could take place in a different local meeting place -- school, store, fire house, home, etc.) A group of thirty or forty people would be invited. The program could open with an exterior establishing shot, show Mr. Nixon entering, applause, then a few brief comments, a question and answer period, and closing remarks. A voice over announcer could handle the opening and sign off.

The matter of Mr. Nixon projecting more "warmth" and "humaneness" has been discussed at great length. (This applies to all of his public appearances as well as the advertising.) Presenting him
informally as suggested above will help. Another suggestion: give him words to say that will show his emotional involvement in the issues. He is inclined to be too objective, too much the lawyer building a case, too cold and logical. Buchanan wrote about RFK talking about the starving children in Recife. That's what we have to inject — because all of our problems, from Viet Nam to the cities to race to inflation are all people problems. A casualty is not a statistic, it's an American boy dying. Inflation is not percentage points, it's the price of bacon. Mr. Nixon recognizes this, of course, but he should make more of a point of displaying his feelings, as well as his knowledge. It would also help if his choice of words and phrases was more colorful. He should be more quotable, use interesting and unusual labels, dynamic references — occasionally new similes or metaphors.

Other visual techniques. We are wide open for ideas which are in keeping with the guidelines and objectives previously discussed. A new way of visually expressing inflation, for example. Or a dramatic way of symbolizing the frustration of Viet Nam. These do not have to be far out graphics, necessarily. The main thing is that they communicate quickly, clearly, and memorably.

Radio. An underrated medium. Used massively and imaginatively, radio can be a way of getting to a lot of people effectively at a relatively low cost. Let's keep it in the mix for the time being. Also, let's remember that Mr. Nixon's voice is quite good, with none
of the problems associated with presenting him visually.

**Direct Mail.** Traditionally accepted as an effective medium but seldom used in a new or interesting way. Need some fresh thinking here. The San Francisco simulated telegram (Frank Lee to HT) looks like a good idea to consider. Should we consider distributing poll results via a post card mailing? Or distributing reprints of favorable newspaper columns? An appeal to women? Would a TV script for a 5-minute Q. and A. show be an interesting mailing?

**Outdoor.** Another traditional medium for political advertising that seldom reflects any fresh thinking. Let this be notice to all concerned that a layout with only a big formal picture of the candidate and "Richard M. Nixon for President" won't even get into the meeting.

**Newspaper.** This will probably represent only a minor media investment. If we use newspapers at all, let's use them boldly. Full pages. Layouts that are a departure from the usual political advertisements. In cities where we can count on good reproduction, we should experiment with layouts that are almost totally pictorial. In areas where reproduction is poor, a non-pictorial approach is obviously called for. Since newspaper closing dates are so close to date of issue, and because newspapers will probably be used in the final weeks only, we can wait until we're well into the campaign before finalizing our
approach. Ideally we would tie in with the TV approach.

**Miscellaneous.** To be determined: the procedure for developing promotional material other than paid advertising -- buttons, bumper stickers, car tops, etc. The button developed in Wisconsin looks great. Perhaps we should decide right now to use the same design everywhere. (And the lower case treatment and modern type face could be used in all advertisements)