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MEMO TO RN
From Buchanan

You might tell these Texans to demand of their Congressmen
---before voting for them---that they support the popular winner
in the House of Representatives---if the thing should go there.
Make them take a stand etc.

I wonder if this is something we could do nationally.
Get every Republican Congressional Candidate to make that pledge
and then demand that it be made of Democrats as well.

BUCHANAN
MEMO TO RKX Haldeman

From Buchanan

Two points.

One---RN says it is too late for this----but is it really. According to his scratched out note he was ready to try it. We might just implement it with a series of telegrams to every Congressional Candidate.

Two---Thimmesch has a bit of a problem. He is the RN expert. Has written some excellent stuff. Wants to do a piece on Nixon and Kennedy the last two men of the War Generation. (That is JFK) and Nixon being the last etc. He says he will be the Nixon Columnist if RN gets into White House. To make along story short---he wants five minutes with RN.

Buchanan
MEMO TO RN
From Buchanan

To reiterate briefly one point on Vietnam. I don't believe most people in this country really know precisely where either RN or HHH stands. They get impressions of the positions of both—but I am sure they could only give the vaguest outlines of those positions.

But Humphrey has begun to give the impression in recent months and weeks especially, as a man who doesn't know where he stands. RN ought—without restating his own position I think—point up its consistency—and indict HHH constantly on waffling on the central issue of our time.

"If you don't like Mr. Humphrey's position on Vietnam, just wait till his next press conference." You might also if you are asked about HHH saying that your position is escalation etc answer:

"Listen, Mr. Humphrey hasn't even been able to get his own position on Vietnam down right—to his satisfaction—you can hardly expect him to report mine accurately." Essentially, my position now is what it has been for the last etc. etc.

"Mr. Humphrey on the other has an advantage in that he has been able to take both sides of every issue involving the war etc. etc. etc.

BUCHANAN
I have consistently refrained from public criticism of our national leaders in foreign and national security affairs, even though severely provoked on not a few occasions since January 1961.

But I cannot withhold an expression of my concern over recent developments of great importance to our country's military operations in Vietnam, the Paris talks and domestic politics.

The sudden announcement of still another -- the 10th -- bombing halt at a critical point in the Presidential campaign -- the evident hastiness of decision revealed by the indignant reaction of President Thieu -- the apparent lack of trustworthy guarantees of reciprocal restraint by the men of Hanoi -- the resultant impairment of our military effort and the acute embarrassment our country has suffered for its demonstrated failure to obtain the cooperation even of its wartime ally -- all together constitute a misfortune for our country.

I deeply deplore both the timing and the consequences of this action and I must urge my countrymen to voice their discontent as I now have.
MEMO FOR DC
FROM HARLOW

I have dictated the enclosed proposed Eisenhower statement to Bob Schulz. He will try to get medical permission to take this up with DDE at approximately 7 o'clock this evening.

The General is extremely upset over these recent developments -- has read a Philadelphia Inquirer editorial which clobbers LBJ -- and he has been stewing around wishing he could "do something."

General Heaton is likewise browned off.
Bob is working wholeheartedly with us on this and will try to maneuver it to make it most likely for the General to approve.
Schulz will telephone me at Los Angeles to tell me what the decision is.
Both Dirksen and Ford have approved this idea, and Ford was very pleased with the proposed statement.
I have asked Ford to check again with Westmoreland. Westy is at the Army-Penn. football game, so cannot be reached until this evening. I have arranged with Ford to call him at 10:45 his time to get a report.
Stress RN position which has consistently supported a strong policy which would lead to peace. RN has been the candidate who has taken a positive position in support of American efforts. His position is that he supports a bombing halt if assurance is given that no American lives will be lost as a result. Heavily support RN statesmanship.

Question timing, announce Nov. 1st with first meeting Nov. 6th, day after election. Why was the President evasive and what even not possible aides?

What quid pro quo won. Unilateral action with no concessions which will assure peace, unless there were North Vietnamese concessions made secretly. What were they?

Stress hope that bombing halt will bring peace, but point out that it does not mean peace.

Cite fact that there have been nine previous bombing halts.

Point out that minutes before President spoke, Viet Cong rockets hit Roman Catholic Church and killed 19 persons.
Point out that whatever result must be credited to the President, not HHH who studiously sought to disassociate himself.

Point out that there is little or no likelihood that this move will influence presidential election. Nixon will win and he is best prepared to go beyond bombing halt and win peace. Be confident!
MEMORANDUM

To: R.N. Date: September 18, 1968
From: Glenn Olds
Subj: The Role of the Vice President

Bob suggested I forward Fred LaRue's memo on the role of the vice president.

Apart from the term "Executive", which I believe should be reserved for the president, I believe this suggestion makes very good sense. Some of the timing is now lost, but it is not too late to implement important recommendations.

cc: Messrs. Mitchell
    Haldeman
    Garment
MEMORANDUM: AN EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR THE UNITED STATES

An Innovative role for Spiro T. Agnew in the National campaign and the new Republican administration

RATIONALE

The American electorate accepts the fact that the Presidency is too big a job for any one man. The President is expected to provide the "thrust" of national purpose, definition of broad goals, and inspirational leadership, and to make the final decisions on major matters. But Americans, through experience with military service, corporate and institutional employment, and virtually all group activities, are accustomed to the delegation of responsibility and authority. And there is precedent for Presidential delegation of specific responsibilities to the Vice President.

PROPOSAL

Emphasizing (as in other policy statements) the importance of strengthening the role of state governments in America and (in that frame of reference) the importance of Mr. Agnew's background as a state governor, announce at once--pre-empting similar Democratic Party interest before it can be projected--the following...

(1) As President, Mr. Nixon would delegate to his Vice President a clearly-defined, coherent set of major responsibilities, establishing a new, higher and better utilization (and training) of the man elected Vice President, and achieving vastly improved management by the Executive Branch of the domestic functions of the national government.

(a) State that, as Vice President, Mr. Agnew will chair a subcommittee of the Cabinet consisting of the Secretaries of Departments whose major functions are domestic or internal (exclude State, Defense).

(b) State that the Vice President will function as the coordinator of all Federal domestic programs and activities, personally providing their "interface" with state governments (plus multi-state regional groupings and other subdivisions of government).

(c) State that he will establish personal contact with each of the 50 state governors, providing them a direct line of communication and offering them participation in the process of determining what is to be the federal-state relationship in any given program, project or activity under consideration by the national government.

(d) State that, as the now-lacking management system is established under Mr. Agnew's direction for improved coordination, decision-making and evaluation at the national level, the refined mechanisms and techniques, along with technical assistance in their application, and training programs for state employees, will be made available to the state governments as a federal grant.

(2) With this new role and program as the theme of the Vice Presidential candidate's participation in the campaign, schedule Mr. Agnew into every state Capital City for the announced purpose of discussing with each present governor (without regard to party) the potential for improving the federal-state relationship and the management performance of both levels of government.

(3) Establish publically a special task force headed by candidate Agnew which will evaluate and expose during the campaign the gross duplications, conflicts and waste demonstrable in the Executive Branch agencies now dealing with the states across a broad spectrum of federal programs. Include as many state governors as are willing to participate in the task force, plus diverse "intellectuals" from academic and corporate "think tanks", and representatives of private sector management. At the outset of the new administration, under the Aegis of the President, this Agnew task force, already publicized during the campaign, could follow through to detail and implement a modern management system capable of achieving vastly improved efficiency in the utilization of federal resources, participation of state government through the inputs and playbacks from the governors, and leadership of the state governments toward better management of their own internal affairs--both by example and by providing unencumbered assistance.
MEMORANDUM

September 18, 1968

TO: RN

FROM: Clean Olds

SUBJECT: An enlarged concept of the "White House Fellows"

Bob has communicated your interest in an enlarged role for bright competent young interns or fellows of the White House. Because of its importance to the campaign, relating as it does to quickening the interest of youth, the academic and corporate community, and interest in competence in government generally, I offer one major enlargement of the concept you could play up substantially in the campaign.

Announce that you intend to enlarge and rotate White House Interns or Fellows with Junior Ambassadors of the President to each of the 50 states; six months in Washington and then six months in the State Capital and then into service in either.

It would have the immediate following effects.

(1) Reinforce your emphasis on returning the power and influence of government to State and local sources;

(2) Under-score the importance you give to young leaders;

(3) Accent the two way communication between the White House and State Houses;

(4) Provide a vehicle, related to, but outside the direct power structure for communication of the general feeling of the people, fresh suggestions, almost a Junior ombudsman-ship;

(5) Neutralize the fears of State Governors, Congressmen, and Senators, that all White House appointments, interns and leadership training "stays in Washington", by reversing the flow in a total cycle - federal - state - either!

(6) Provide a vehicle of youth and enthusiasm for continuing the positive values of the "listen in - speak out" activities that have proved valuable in the campaign, through your "Junior Ambassadors."
(7) Symbolize the importance of a "generalist" approach to government service, to develop the reservoir of younger top talent for subsequent major positions.

(8) Utilize local and state mechanisms for recruiting, screening, and recommending, after the fashion of service academy appointments to avoid the "intellectual elite" approach of so many fellowship programs.
MEMORANDUM

September 16, 1968

TO: RN

FROM: Glenn Olds

RE: The need for "reorganisation" of the maze in Washington, and a useful "illustration" for your speech purposes on the 'DC Rats'...

"The New Washington Government—Health Needs and Goals" was the subject of Thomas W. Fletcher, Deputy Mayor-Commissioner. Fletcher said all of the District's problems are related. "You can't separate one from the other." He suggested better coordination between departments and agencies within the District Government. He added that "fragmentation and proliferation of government responsibility made problem solving very difficult." He described the District's approach to RAT EXTERMINATION.

"FOUR AGENCIES DEAL WITH THE RAT PROBLEM," FLETCHER EXPLAINED. "THE DOWNTOWN RATS IN BUSINESS AREAS ARE HANDLED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH. THE RESIDENTIAL RATS ARE HANDLED BY THE CODE ENFORCEMENT PEOPLE. THE PARK RATS ARE HANDLED BY THE PARKS DEPARTMENT, AND THE ORDINARY RATS ARE HANDLED BY PRIDE, INC. AND YOU KNOW THE RATS ARE HAVING A BALL. THEY JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND THE JURISDICTION...."
MEMORANDUM

September 16, 1968

TO: RN

FROM: Glenn Olds

RE: "Leadership" or "Manpower" gap in Federal programs, as key campaign issue to emphasize.

Your political philosophy and major radio and campaign addresses all emphasize the primacy of persons in government. They indicate that money, bureaucracy, and programs cannot generate the right human resources and motivation to solve the problems for which they are designed. The "bankruptcy" of current Federal programs in HEW, HUD, OEO and other domestic areas to say nothing of foreign affairs turns, in no small measure, on failure to give adequate attention to personnel competent to give leadership which money, structure and formal programs cannot provide.

You could greatly strengthen your appeal to the youth, teachers, intellectual, and executive groups by focusing on this missing link in federal programming. Without basic attention to this problem, the best conceived programs will fail. You can emphasize that you intend:

1. To recruit competent young "leaders" for every level of governmental responsibility;

2. To refuse to authorize money or program for which there is not evident and adequate leadership competent to spend it wisely and well; (many of the poverty programs failed because of this!)

3. To develop new opportunities for developing leadership in both the private and public side of national life through

   (a) Designing a new and expanded form of the White House Fellow or Intern Program;

   (b) Rethinking a comprehensive form of National Elective Service in a wide variety of fields;

   (c) Reorganizing the research and training provisions of the various Federal programs to provide more and better opportunity for leadership development;
(d) Developing a Junior Ambassador program to and from the States as well as overseas;

4. To strengthen local and private initiative in leadership development and programming refusing to introduce massive, expensive, and duplicative Federal programs without proper coordination and assessment of available competent leadership.
MEMORANDUM

September 16, 1968

TO: RN

FROM: Glenn Olds

RE: Qualification of the Nathan proposal to Kendall re: Domestic "National Defense Bond" issue for rebuilding the Ghettos.

In conversation with Don Kendall this week I discover that he did not intend I should convey recommending action now on this proposal.

He thinks it is a sound idea, should be explored responsibly, and if the idea stands up before the critics, move toward implementation after the election. I had mistakenly urged in my memorandum of September third action now!
September 19, 1968

Dear Dr. Perkins:

I regret the unhappy breakdown of communication within our staff that has complicated the assignment and responsibility Glenn laid out with you and which enjoyed my enthusiastic support. The willingness of you, and your chairman and Board to encourage your personal leadership of this effort, was most gratifying to me.

You will understand, I trust, that in every national political campaign the pace and complexity makes possible separate initiatives that are not always in close communication. I regret the duplication of effort that has accrued but understand your desire under the circumstances not to assume the full responsibility we had counted on you to carry.

Please know, however, how much I hope for your continued interest in the campaign and help in whatever appropriate ways you may still feel inclined. Glenn has told me of the personal sacrifice you were willing to make to help.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. John Perkins
President
Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.
99 Broad Street
New York, New York
September 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: HERB KLEIN  cc: Holdeman
FROM: DC

I assume that letters are going out on a regular basis to the newspapers that may endorse us and to columnists and commentators who write or say good things about us. I will not have the time to look these over myself, but it should be standard operating procedure for us to follow up in this way, particularly if a good editorial or column is written to a state, a follow-up letter could be very helpful in getting some extra mileage out of the visit.

# # # # #
September 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Haldeman, Harlow, Chotiner

FROM: DC

This story by Apple on Humphrey's references to Benson should really be nailed with our Farm group. Let's don't get in bed with Benson but they can point out that Humphrey's talking about Benson compared with Truman is that the farmer jumped from the frying pan into the fire with parity going down lower than at any time in years, etc.

#  #  #
Humphrey extols the virtues of rustic life

By R. W. Apple, Jr.

Buffalo, Illinois -- September 20J -- Hubert Humphrey the country man has been at large in the Middle West for the last 24 hours.

... "I grew up out here and I am proud of it. I have had a few people say that possibly this dulls your vision, but I don't think so. I think the clean fresh air of the Plains gives us a better vision that the smog of otherplaces."

Then he had words of scorn for his city-bred Republican opponent, Richard M. Nixon, taunting the former Vice President for talking about "plowing a straight furrow with a corn picker."

"Now that's a trick, that one," Mr. Humphrey shouted. "I tell you, we can put it in the state fair and get rich."

And finally the Vice President went after Ezra Taft Benson, the Secretary of Agriculture under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, sounding more and more like the man he described as "that grand fellow from Independente, Mo., that great President, grand American, Harry S. Truman."

... "Mark my words, dear friends," Mr. Humphrey cried, clapping his hands together like a revivalist preacher, "if we lose this election Ezra Taft Benson will look like a social worker compared to what you'll get."
... W. Apple's story -- page 2 --

... The Vice President recalled seeing Mr. Nixon walking into joint sessions of Congress "arm-in-arm with that stalwart defender of backward movements and rural poverty, Ezra Taft Benson."

... "If you think you're going to get any comfort out of Nixon, Agnew and Benson, then you've been drinking something that I haven't."
September 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: CHOTINER, ELLSWORTH, HALDEMAN et. al.

FROM: DC

I suggest all of you read the memorandum from McCormack. (attached) It seems to be right on target, particularly the section on Page 7 which I have turned the memorandum to. This should be brought home emphatically. This fellow Komer in Vietnam is no good and is completely politically motivated. Predictions should be made immediately that they are going to announce bringing home troops in the six weeks before the election. Also, the people should be reminded of the rosey predictions that were made by McNamara in 1966.

This has got to be carefully handled so that we put the monkey on Humphrey's back and not on Johnson's back. I would handle it in a way that it appeared that Humphrey was trying to get the Administration to do this and that Johnson was resisting it since he did not want to play politics with the war.

I think too, that we have been very ineffective in failing to nail Humphrey for his vacillation on Vietnam. He has supported Johnson's position and then said that he could support the Dove position and then urged Nixon to join him in saying that the Administration would offer softer terms and then
made his statement with regard to the difference between the Vice Presidential and Presidential seal. He has played politics with the war and thereby has hurt the negotiations by his repeated public statements that progress is being made in the Paris talks -- statements that were later discredited by Harriman as well as by the Hanoi negotiators. I think that it should be charged that Humphrey's statements have had a definite negative effect on the negotiations.

On the other side of this whole question is the report that we received from Arthur Burns which is attached and in which Maxwell Taylor says that there are signs that North Vietnam may be willing to engage in substantive talks now that the presidential candidates are chosen. I have not yet talked to John McCone who should be on the phone list for today.

Along this line, I would like a message to get to Agnew -- possibly through Sears -- urging that when he sees Rusk, as RN asked him to do, that he press Rusk hard on the rumors to the effect that North Vietnam may be willing to engage in substantive talks. Agnew should directly tell Rusk that Maxwell Taylor is spreading the word in private conversations that talks will begin sometime before the election and that this is all assigned for its political effect. Make Rusk either deny or support this.

#  #  #
should similarly have their tours increased. Positive incentives should accompany the mandatory tour extensions.

V I E T N A M A N D U.S. POLITICS

For all those who remember the McNamara press conference at the LBJ ranch three days before the 1966 congressional elections, at which a massive reduction in draft quotas was announced and a rosy Vietnam picture presented to the then more gullible American electorate, there can be no doubt that Humphrey will attempt some similar coup.

Ambassador Komer's Deputy in 4th Corps, John Vann, has publicly reported that 100,000 troops could be now withdrawn with no harm to the military effort. Presumably these would be engineers, clerks, office club staffs, etc., etc. Imagine the impact of a pre-election LBJ fireside chat pointing out statistically progress in various areas, and concluding by announcing that because of the successful training of Vietnamese units, 100,000 of our boys will be home by Christmas, and more will follow. We should prepare for this contingency.

Humphrey's own position on Vietnam has bounced during the last week from one extreme to the other. He has supported President Johnson's position, declared that he could have supported the Dove Platform, retracted that statement, urged Nixon to join him in saying that no new administration will offer "softer terms" to Hanoi after January 20, etc., etc. Surely a statement blasting this vacillation is in order.
Otherwise, I strongly counsel extreme caution in making specific detailed recommendations on the war. A statement calling for a reduction of troops and a de-Americanization of the war could blow up in our faces if a TET #2 occurs. Let us continue with our position that any specific comment on Vietnam's future could jeopardize the negotiations in Paris; and that we won't trade American lives for a few political points. If constrained to speak at length on the subject later in the campaign, I urge that we have Governor Agnew do it, largely confining ourselves to blasting the many, many errors the Administration has made during the buildup, the surreptitious way the Administration duped the public while the buildup was underway; the tactical errors in Vietnam. We might also denounce Humphrey for having negotiations by his repeated public statements that progress had been made in the Paris talks (there are straws in the wind, etc.), statements which were later discredited by Harriman as well as by the Hanoi negotiators; and which I was informed by a high State Department official had a definitely negative effect upon the negotiations by leading the North Vietnamese to believe that any small concession or hint of concession by them would be immediately used as political ammunition by the Administration.

###
September 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM from Dick McCormack, staff member recently returned from Vietnam

SUBJECT: Recent promising developments in Vietnam

I. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

Ironically, if the War in Vietnam is won, it will be partly because of the attack by the Viet Cong at TET: for amid the smoke and ruins, and fear of a new thrust, desperately needed reforms both in policy and personnel were and are being implemented.

The most important of these reforms was in the Vietnamese Government itself.

Because every president to succeed Diem was essentially a compromise figure, large numbers of officials from previous administrations remained on the job. Their loyalty and responsiveness was directed, not at the new president, but at the respective power faction which had sponsored. Thus a presidential directive could be and frequently was ignored when it conflicted with the power faction's idea of its own best interests.

Since TET, President Thieu and his equally honest and respected Premier Tran Van Huong have rapidly and effectively consolidated the fragmented administrative structure under them. Three of the four powerful corps commanders, 21 of 44 province chiefs, and over 100 district chiefs were unceremoniously dumped.
To replace still more corrupt, unresponsive or incompetent officials, Premier Huong recently opened a ten week school for top administrators. A sign of the times is that he had difficulty getting candidates for jobs which formerly were bought for tens of thousands of dollars. For the first time since Diem's early days, the South Vietnamese Government is beginning to enjoy the respect of the people. Without this respect, U.S. forces could have fought almost endlessly without achieving victory. There still remains much to be accomplished in improving the Administration of South Vietnam, but the trends are all in the right direction.

II. VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE

Unlike the unwieldy administrative structure formerly representing Saigon, the Viet Cong had developed a superbly disciplined and organized political infrastructure comprising between 80,000 and 100,000 men. It is these political and administrative forces, rather than the roving North Vietnamese divisions, which must be eliminated if victory is to be achieved. This belated post-TET realization has resulted in a major shake-up of our fragmented pacification program. For the first time we have begun to coordinate our intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts. In this process, we made some astonishing discoveries. We found, for example, that we had in one district eleven separate and uncoordinated intelligence networks operating. Frequently agents belonged to and were aided by several intelligence agencies unknowingly. Thus one
The sheer mass of information generated by this process left much of it unused. In a country where timely reaction is of the utmost importance, this situation proved to be disastrous. The TET fiasco was only the most obvious aspect of this. But it brought matters to a head.

In the aftermath of the TET offensive, Ambassador Komer was able to coordinate the information gathering networks. Using this information, he was able to expedite project Phoenix, a massive undertaking to identify the elaborate V.C. infrastructure and to eliminate it by the most direct means.

Combined American/Vietnamese teams began suddenly visiting Vietnamese villages in response to intelligence reports. Concentrating on key personnel, this rapidly expanding program has eliminated more than 6,000 V.C. administrators within a few months.

III. MILITARY IMPROVEMENTS

Militarily, a number of improvements have recently manifested themselves. More than 100,000 soldiers, many elite troops of the North Vietnamese Army, were killed during and since the TET offensive. As a consequence, the careful planning and high discipline which characterized North Vietnamese actions has deteriorated. However, most military observers agree that massive infusion of replacements have brought the North Vietnam
strength numerically back to its pre-TET condition. In this period, however, our own strength has grown far beyond that of January, 1968.

The replacement of General Westmoreland with General Abrams has met with virtually universal appreciation. The character difference between the two men is best reflected by their respective valedictory and inauguration addresses. Westmoreland declared that it was impossible to stop the rocket attacks on Saigon and other cities. A few days later Abrams said he could and would; and did. He established a double ring defense system around Saigon and installed computerized radar to spot and silence rocket and mortar attacks. Beyond that, Abram's no nonsense character has made a singular impression on the Vietnamese Government. Abrams has demanded action and has gotten it.

Abrams has a reputation for being far more aggressive than was his predecessor. He has emphasized saturation small unit patrolling and ambushing. I am also told that staff changes which he has made have produced a marked qualitative improvement at MAC V headquarters and elsewhere.

Under Abrams, the training and arming of the South Vietnamese Army with the latest weaponry has been dramatically accelerated. He has recognized that South Vietnamese units armed with World War II vintage Ml rifles will not move aggressively against a foe better armed with the automatic AK 47.
It is difficult for me to emphasize what an enormous difference in morale I noticed among ARVN units armed with the M16. Already 100,000 have been distributed to them with 100,000 more on the way.

Abrams is also increasing the number of joint Vietnamese/American operations in marked contrast to his predecessors' preference to operate exclusively with American troops whenever possible. In the I Corps, the Marines are "marrying" 14-man squads of leathernecks with Vietnamese Popular force units. Abrams has also approved the formation and arming of civilian "Self-Defense Councils". Already more than 400,000 Vietnamese voluntarily enrolled and 40,000 have been armed. Many more will be shortly.

I do not wish by this report to infer that all is well in Vietnam—or that victory is around the corner. It took the British ten years to wipe out 15,000 hard core guerrillas in Malaya. I do, however, believe that the trends finally are in our favor, that the Army of Vietnam can assume an increasing degree of the responsibility, that we can pull out substantial numbers of our non-combat forces in 1969, and that with certain other changes we have now a winning recipe.
IV. SOME PROBLEMS

We must, however, steel ourselves against certain dangers. Saigon and all other cities and towns of South Vietnam have been infiltrated by thousands of Viet Cong agents. Countless other Vietnamese are subject to coercion by threatening exposed relatives with reprisals. These agents could, if coordinated, plant enough bombs, set enough fires, and throw enough grenades to thoroughly disrupt much of metropolitan Vietnam. If this were coordinated with an attack from the outside against Saigon, it could produce an impact of untold proportions on World Presses and U.S. public opinion. Worse, if the attack were prolonged, a siege on Saigon could drive prices to the point where the plaster would be virtually worthless. (Already beef prices are 300% higher in Saigon than in Kienlung province, some fifty miles distance.) A scarcity of food, a wildly inflating plaster, and a long series of block-destroying fire fights could eventually produce the kind of homeless, hungry masses which could topple the Government. It is this goal, after the cold shower effect of the McCarthy defeat in Chicago, that Viet Cong are counting on to bring them to victory.

Other reforms would greatly contribute to a quicker victory. THERE IS NO REASON WHY CAREER OFFICERS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO DO A YEAR'S TOUR IN VIETNAM AND THEN RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH ALL THE PAINFULLY ACQUIRED AREA AND COMBAT EXPERIENCE. Civilians in the higher AID, CORDS, and Embassy staffs
AGNEW REPLIES TO ATTACK ON USE OF 'JAP'

Honolulu, Sept. 23 -- AP -- Spiro T. Agnew, the Republican Vice Presidential nominee, said today the Democrats "really must be desperate" to accuse him of using a contemptuous word for Japanese.

Agnew was commenting on a statement by Rep. Spark M. Matsunaga (D., Hawaii) who charged Agnew with using the term Jap, which Matsunaga said is a contemptuous word for Japanese.

A story in the Washington Post today said Agnew visited the news reporters' section of the plane on which he was traveling and noticed a sleeping reporter of Japanese ancestry. The article quoted Agnew as asking, "What's the matter with the fat Jap?" Agnew said, "the reporter and I happen to be good friends, and kid each other a lot about that."

Agnew must be warned a candidate has no friends in the Press - they are all enemies - if they smell a story -
September 24, 1968.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Keogh/Price/Buchanan/Safire/Harlow/Gavin/Anderson/Moore

FROM: RN

Here are some general thoughts with regard to excerpts and statements for the next six weeks. I don't think we are yet quite hitting the mark as these comments will indicate.

As a general rule, an excerpt should be no more than 1 to 1-1/2 pages long. It should be meaty and quotable and should be material that I can easily work into a stump speech even if I am speaking outdoors without a podium.

A case in point is the statement for Sioux Falls. Something like this should never be put out as an excerpt for two reasons: (1) It is too long. (2) It is too localized. From now on anything on agriculture should generally just be dropped off as a statement for the local press and let our press give it whatever ride they want. The national press couldn't care less about what we say on Karl Mundt's pet REA project nor on our repeating our agriculture program. In fact, I think the less we speak nationally on agriculture in the next few weeks - the better. Just drop statements off where needed - Harlow knows what we can say -- they can just be cleared with Bryce -- I won't need to see them.
More often than not a statement dealing with a local subject and zeroing in on a local problem should be dropped off at most stops. This will enormous local coverage and since it will not require me to include the material in my speech it imposes no burden on me. Just read the advance information sheets and if you see that some place cares about Indians - put out a little statement indicating that we care about Indians, etc. A case in point was the statement Pat Buchanan prepared reacting to the Yippees that broke up the Catholic mass in Milwaukee. As a matter of fact, that statement deserved even a national play. I hope it got out in time to get not only the local press but also to be circulated among our national press.

With regard to our excerpts - they should zero in primarily on the four major themes. If we scatter-gun too much we are not going to have an impact. That is why I repeat we must have at least two excerpts a week which hit some aspect of the law and order theme and one or two a week which hit some aspect of the spending theme and two or three which hit the foreign policy-respect for America theme.

Let me take the spending theme as a case in point. I think a follow up on what we said in Milwaukee would be to find the memorandum that I dictated a couple of weeks ago and if you can't find it - I think you will recall it. In it I said that a survey would show that we could safely make the statement that no member of the Senate had introduced bills calling for more money than Hubert Humphrey. I think we should nail him
as the most expensive member of the Senate while he was in the Senate and that he would be the most expensive President in history if he were to be elected. He will have a very difficult time denying this because he would have to say that one of his supporters had introduced more bills — or called for spending more money — than he did.

I think we should start hammering him hard and regularly on the spending theme, particularly in view of the fact that he has introduced so many bills and talks about introducing so many new programs. On this score, it is now time to cost-out Humphrey's programs for spending and then make the charge that already in this campaign — with six weeks left — he has advocated programs which would add ___ millions of dollars annually to the budget. This does not have to be done in too technical a fashion — I don't want a Dunn and Bradstreet report on it.

On the law and order theme, I think we should start hammering on the fact that he defends the record of the Administration over the past four years. Demand that he name one instance in which he disagrees with the record of the Administration. Does he disagree with Clark in not using wire tapping — in not going after organized crime — in not enforcing the Narcotics Act. Demand replies. We must keep him on the defensive just as he is trying to put us on the defensive.

Another theme that can be developed is Hubert vs. Hubert. Pick out four or five major issues and use direct quotes where he has contradicted himself. These all don't have to be
big issues -- of course, Viet Nam offers the most inviting one. Get to work on this one immediately and give me a good excerpt on that one.

Some general guidelines:

Don't be cute or gimmicky -- just hit hard with crisp one-liners whenever they are appropriate.

I think we can make some mileage too out of everybody reading the press excerpts that Pat Buchanan sends in to me and then having our excerpt directly relate to one of those provided we are not simply answering Hubert.

It seems to me that most of our excerpts suffer from not being current and livelier. This could be corrected by simply spending a little more time reading the daily news summaries and zeroing in on some of those problems.

Another point that we want to develop is to demand Hubert disassociate himself from any of the Administration's policies with which he disagrees. Ask again and again for him to name in the field of foreign policy, in the field of domestic policy, in the field of law and order where - if at all - he disagrees with the Administration.

I think a good excerpt could be gotten out too on Hubert's not waging a national campaign. Why is he avoiding the South? Challenge him to go South.

Apart from these day to day excerpts, of course, we should drop in regular statements - about two a week from now on -- that are meaty, substantive - they will not have any impact on voters but they will impress the press -- the piece on the Presidency; merchant marine, etc., are ones in this
category.

It seems to me that we should have more of these statements in the bank than currently seems to be the case.

There is no reason why we should not get some rather safe statements on some of these issues, calling in effect for change so that we thereby counter the charge that we are not talking to the issues.

Sometime toward the middle of the week we should all get together and discuss this further but I would like for all of you to have a discussion on this tonight in Seattle and see how we can improve on our program in this respect.

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TO: HALEMAN
FROM: DC

September 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM

Billy Graham and his wife will attend the meeting in Atlanta and will sit with Mrs. N at the Southern Regional TV. Have arrangements for them to get transportation from North Carolina to Atlanta for that meeting. Billy is also going to the lunch for Byrnes the following day. I think he is joining us, however, on his own.

# # #

Work out with Tom Miller

Call Graham & get him straightened

Out of schedule

If think nit in Atlanta? From

Shalvey - I met RNR today
October 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: DC

FROM: Jim Keogh

We do not have an excerpt situation in Atlanta, but we (Gavin) offer you this for use in Q and A on law ... and order:

Recently I received a letter from the daughter of a minister, herself the mother of two young boys. Enclosed with the letter was an advertisement for books and pamphlets which could be described only as pornographic.

This woman began her letter by reminding me that we had been guests in her church a week before.

And then she wrote:

"I'll start first by apologizing for sending filthy literature to you ... but where else can I go? ... We have two good boys, one 14 and the other 10 so this is a personal concern. This is the third time we have received such literature by mail. We burned the first and returned the second ... now this.

Mr. Nixon, if there is anything you can do, please, for the sake of the children and our nation ... help."

This woman's cry is not alone. This mother's plea is but one out of many from those whose privacy and sense of decency are invaded and ignored by scoundrels who use the mails to send unsolicited pornography to unsuspecting children.
I say that a new administration will set as an important goal the protection of this woman and her children and decent people like them all over America.

We will demonstrate that the traditional American belief in privacy and the right to raise children in a moral atmosphere in full accord with the Constitutional provisions guaranteeing free speech. These provisions must not and will not be abused by those who send unsolicited pornography through the mail.
Last Sunday, in a nation-wide radio broadcast, I outlined a new program for establishing law and order with justice in this country. My statement was, in effect, a supplement to programs I had proposed earlier in the year during the primary campaigns. And one of the points I made is that the present Attorney General of the United States -- incredibly -- balks at using the tools Congress has placed at his disposal to fight crime.

He has publicly declined to use the authority granted him by Congress to penetrate the secrets of organized crime by means of electronic surveillance. He takes this position -- and Mr. Humphrey joins him in it -- despite the fact that responsible law enforcement officers all over the country feel that the use of wiretapping, under clear-cut safeguards, is the most effective weapon available to combat such crime.

Now, in the few days since I discussed this issue in that national broadcast, I have learned that the Attorney General is refusing to use still another tool at his command.

On August 30 his office issued a memorandum calling on all U.S. attorneys around the country to ignore Title II of the Omnibus Crime Bill that became law three months ago.
That title seeks to reduce the adverse impact on law enforcement of recent Supreme Court decisions. It aims particularly to facilitate the use of confessions and eyewitness identification in the prosecution of people arrested for crimes. Basically, it seeks to restore a better balance between the rights of the criminally-accused and the rights of the law-abiding public.

The Attorney General fought to block passage of that anti-crime legislation -- and it can be said that this was his right.

But, once the law was passed, the public had a right to expect it to be enforced. What the Attorney General is indulging in is a high level version of civil disobedience: he questions the law so he won't use it.

This is just one more reason why we need new leadership in the battle against crime in this country; leadership that will use all the tools it has to restore law and order with justice. And that's the kind of leadership I promise America.

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