<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box Number</th>
<th>Folder Number</th>
<th>Document Date</th>
<th>Document Type</th>
<th>Document Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>09/02/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Call to California. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>09/02/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Nixon to Mitchell Re: Launching Democrats for Nixon committee. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>09/02/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Calling major publishers. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>09/02/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Increase in television appearances and radio shows. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Buchanan to Nixon Re: Nixon position on Fortas from Herb Klein. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>08/12/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>Re: Call to Ezra Taft Benson. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box Number</td>
<td>Folder Number</td>
<td>Document Date</td>
<td>Document Type</td>
<td>Document Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>08/16/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From DC to Haldeman Re: Thank-you's and gifts for Convention people. Also, memo from Haldeman to Ehrlichman, Timmons, Bob &amp; Pat Hitt, Mitchell, Flanigan, Shakespeare, Ellsworth and Kleindienst Re: List of people to thank for Convention. 2 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>08/14/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Keogh to Nixon Re: Potential additions to R &amp; W team. 2 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>07/02/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From DC to Haldeman Re: Dates for Billy Graham. 2 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>Other Document</td>
<td>Handwritten note Re: Keogh meeting. Also, memo from Buchanan to Nixon Re: Proper use of research staff. 4 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>08/07/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Meeting after balloting. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>Other Document</td>
<td>Handwritten note Re: Nixon memos from October through end of campaign. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box Number</td>
<td>Folder Number</td>
<td>Document Date</td>
<td>Document Type</td>
<td>Document Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11/03/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Ellsworth to DC Re: Rockefeller statement on negotiations between VC and SVN. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11/04/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Ellsworth to DC Re: Scranton's statement on Paris talks. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11/03/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Ellsworth to DC Re: Scranton follow-up to Meet the Press show. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Ellsworth to DC Re: Gallop, Harris and Bucci polls. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11/03/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Ellsworth to DC Re: Republican leaders' reaction to bombing halt. 2 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11/03/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Ellsworth to Haldeman Re: Bucci polls. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11/03/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Ellsworth to DC Re: Michigan vote. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box Number</td>
<td>Folder Number</td>
<td>Document Date</td>
<td>Document Type</td>
<td>Document Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11/03/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Ellsworth to DC Re: Effect of bombing halt on Pennsylvania vote. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11/03/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Ellsworth to DC Re: Oklahoma poll. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11/03/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Ellsworth to Haldeman Re: Summary of calls to Rockefeller, Romney, Goldwater, and Scranton. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Excerpts from AP report on effect of SVN's refusal to attend Paris talks on Presidential candidates. Also, memo from Ellsworth Re: Requests for Nixon reaction to Thieu statement. 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>09/12/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Glenn Olds to Nixon Re: Report on Frank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on transition and tasks of new administration. Also, memo from Glenn Olds &amp; Hal Booth to Frank Lindsay, Phil Areeda &amp; Ernest May Re: Notes from Sept. meeting. 2 pg.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
September 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN
FROM: RN

George Jessel talked to Ed with regard to the California situation and wanted to talk to me. I would suggest that you give him a call, or have Finch follow up in the event that you are unable to reach him, prior to our taking off.

# # #
September 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: MITCHELL
FROM: RN

I can't emphasize the importance I attach to lining up as many prominent Democrats as we can in the next two weeks to join our Democrats for Nixon Committee when it is launched. This is probably the only time we are going to be able to make a significant breakthrough in this area. Of course, if we don't get enough big names, we won't launch the Committee nationally, but we can still with even minor league names have one in each of the major states. You can check with Danner on the status of the Lausche deal and any other names he might have come across.

# # #
September 2, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO: HALDEMAN
FROM: RN

On our second visit to L.A., I think calls both to George Hearst and to Otis Chandler as well as Norman should be scheduled. Also, in each of the cities that we visit, I think calls to major publishers who may be friends of RN's should be scheduled during the half hour that we make calls.

#   #   #
MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN
FROM: RN

One area where I think we are dropping the ball is with regard to the appearances on the Television and Radio Q & A Shows. The reason the Democrats dominate these shows is because we do not systematically offer the program producers names of attractive Republicans who will go on in our behalf. Now here, I think it is time for you to get hold of Ellsworth and whoever handles this kind of thing at the National Committee and see that on a consistent, regular basis we feed the names of Surrogate candidates and others to all slots on these shows that may be open. I have mentioned this to Shakespeare but, obviously, he has not had time to follow up on it.

To recap, what we need to do first is to find out what shows go on, on a weekly basis, both nationally and locally, and, second, we bug the producers to put on people for our side whom we will select.
MEMO TO RN

From Buchanan

I talked with Austin of Time tonight. He wanted to know if RN's position had shifted on the Fortas thing. I said not a centimeter since Fortas was named. He said that Herb Klein had led either him or someone to believe that RN's statement about opposing all filibusters was something of a movement toward the appointment. I don't know what Herb has been told to say, but if I were RN, I would sit right where we are. We have already gotten the benefit of our position—and paid the price. Why take a new position on this thing?

Buchanan
DC

Fred Schluter strongly recommends a call be made to Ezra Taft Benson. Some of the people in Idaho have started to put forth his name to run as VP on the Wallace ticket.

Schluter says Benson says he will do anything to help his country and to help Nixon -- but I gather he does need a call.

rmw does not have enough background to know whether there is any use making a call -- so just pass it along for RN's decision.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman
FROM: DC

I want you to take the responsibility to get our people to list the people who should be thanked in connection with the convention and the period prior to it. Follow through on this with Mitchell and all the others. Have Pat Hitt figure something out for the women who helped -- if we are sending cuff links to the men we cannot ignore the women.

(Bob -- I think each of these people should submit a list -- with the address and first name bit and then we should get a lot of letters out to the people who really deserve them and who will be working just that much harder between now and November. We also should have one of these fellows work up the list of RNC people and others who participated in the convention program, etc. so we don't leave anyone out. rmw)
August 18, 1968

TO: John Ehrlichman
    Bill Timmons
    Bob Hitt.
    Pat Hitt
    John Mitchell
    Peter Flanigan
    Frank Shakespeare
    Robert Eisenhower
    Richard Kleindienst

FROM: Bob Haldeman

As a follow-up to the great job done by all at the convention - and in the pre-convention period - RN has asked that you give him a list of those people who should receive a personal note of thanks from him.

Obviously, time is of the essence - so will you please forward to me as quickly as possible (hopefully this week - and certainly no later than September 1st) a complete list of those you feel should be included.

It is essential that you provide full name and address and indicate the appropriate salutation for RN. Be sure we don't leave anyone out.

Thanks.
August 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: RN
FROM: Jim Keogh

We're going to need two or three more writers on the R & W team. After considerable discussion among the group, we have come up with a list of possibilities. We don't know yet which of them will be available, but I thought you should have a look at the list and see if there are any that you would feel like vetoing.

The list of possibilities:

Hugh Morrow, an old hand on the Rockefeller staff, who also did some very good work for Ken Keating a few years ago. You may know him.

Douglas Bailey, also on the Rockefeller staff, who is highly recommended.

Jonathan Moore, a Rockefeller expert on foreign policy, who has worked largely as a research man but has writing capability.

Lee Huebner, president of the Ripon Society, who has been working for Rockefeller.
James Reichley, political writer for Fortune, who used to work for Scranton.

Jeffrey Hart, of Reagan's staff, who is said to be pretty far right but has a reputation as a good phrase-maker. Bob Finch thinks that with editing - which should be no great problem for me - Hart could do very well for us.

We have some feelers out now but will not make any commitments until we get your reaction.
July 2, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: HALDEMAN

FROM: DC

In the schedule planning, I would like to have some dates for Billy Graham. I would like him to give the invocation on the night of the Acceptance Speech.

On September 8, if it works into our schedule, I would like to be in Pittsburgh when he is closing (it is a Sunday night) his Crusade there on a national television broadcast. If I happen to be there, I would be introduced, and he would speak about me rather than my speaking at the meeting.

If we schedule a visit to North Carolina, it would be well to have either lunch or dinner at his home on that occasion.

For your confidential information, he is also prepared to state before the election that he plans to vote for RN, that he wants us to evaluate the situation to see whether we feel that would be helpful or on balance harmful at that time in that it might raise some objections in certain quarters.

With further reference to Graham, I think you should follow up with Conlon, the State Senator from Arizona.
My guess is that he could be pretty effective with this group.

Also, if we have any kind of a televised general meeting in the South -- any place like Atlanta -- Graham should be invited to give the invocation on that occasion.

# # #
Hold for Hopa meeting - if we bring him in.
MEMO TO RN
From Buchanan
April 17, 1983
RESEARCH

I have given some thought to our research situation and it
seems to me that our answer lies somewhere along these lines. First,
let us recognize that we have a very small staff, that we cannot expect
it to do first-tier research in depth where some great breakthrough.
What we can expect is that they will be equipped to brief us on any­
thing we want. We can expect that they will act as harvesters of
the available material.

HOW TO USE RESEARCH.

Given our situation, with this small staff, we must concentrate
upon relevant research, which is quite precisely what RN wants and
what RN himself can use. That has got to be our first priority. And
the only one who can determine that is RN himself. Thus Buchanan
recommends that either Buchanan or Chapin or someone designated get
from RN on a regular basis just what RN wants research to do for him.

Right now, research is not getting the necessary guidance, and the
necessary guidance can only come from RN. If RN asks for a great
deal, then research can expand according to RN's needs, or we can set
RN's demands in front of him and have him list priorities.

This sounds elementary, but the problem in research is that they
are flying blind; they are too small to turn out everything our assoc­
iates with a national campaign, positions papers from A to Z, etc. etc.

Their first purpose is to service the candidate, and only the can­
didate can know precisely what he wants done.

Now, for the second purpose.
When no demands are being made, research should yet be moving, continuing to gather and winnow material, and working in anticipation of future needs. For this also, however, Research needs guidance from RN as to just what areas to concentrate in.

(let me put it this way. The Research Effort we have today is nothing more than an expansion of the one-man operation we ran with in 1966. The research I did was a) specifically what Rb requested for his speech material and b) the regular reading and gathering and filtering through. I realize the Big Show requires a hell of a lot more---but the needs of the candidate still come first and only the candidate can know them exactly, and he is the one who can best project what he will need)

RECOMMEND: That RN on a regular basis tell Chapin or Buchanan or whomever he designates to be the pipeline just what he wants from the Research people and when---and I will have Shally keep a check list on the road.

Secondly, that RN tell research or rather tell the pipeline to research what priorities he wants set on long-range projects in what areas he wants them done.

Third, that the Research people be taken out of the Issue Mail Area if at all possible

Fourth, that the Research People submit to RN on a regular basis a brief progress report of what they are working on and where they are going, so that RN can cut off this or that project and tell them to move in this or that direction.
Let me add here a number of important points. We delude ourselves I think if we are expected the Research group we have, which is quality in my view and competent, to come up with position papers on a thousand different subjects. Basically what we have here is a small strong arm for the candidate to use as he sees fit.

If we do not keep in communication with it, if we do not provide guidance (which comes directly from RN's demands) then the research effort will be flying blind, and they will miss the mark time after time. I think, however, that with constant instruction from the plane we can get valuable service out of them.

We must remember I think that the only research that amounts to a damn is what gets into the public print and what gets into the public print is going to come nine times out of ten out of RN.

I think it would be a mistake to have a massive operation going here independent of RN and working on great research papers which are never going to get us anything which RN is never going to say. The important thing is that seven paragraphs that is all that is going to be run.

This does not preclude the need for more people which exists. It does not preclude the need for more writers which exists. It just argues for effective use of what we have.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman

FROM: Richard Nixon

I would appreciate it if you could meet with me tonight as soon as possible after the end of the balloting.

Please come to the Surratt Suite
Room on the Penthouse Floor (19) at the Hilton Hotel.

If you have any trouble, please check with Mr. Hamilton at the Reception Desk on the 19th Floor.

So as to avoid any possible confusion, please bring this memorandum with you.
... The Press: In fact, the reporters don't like Richard Nixon. As far as I've been able to find out, only two members of the 90-odd press corps are likely to vote for him: the U. S. News and World Report man, who was also for Nixon in 1960, and the Voice of America correspondent, who is thought to be Republican because he doesn't join in anti-Nixon bull sessions and smokes an unlit pipe. A few, notably Washington columnist Joe Kraft, are not against Nixon because they feel he's what the rest of the country wants and/or deserves. The rest seem to waver around between Cheerful Resignation and Silent Despair.
November 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: DC
FROM: Ellsworth

Rockefeller will "see what he can do" about getting a statement out right away so as to be in the Monday morning papers.

Substantively on the situation, he says the VC should never be sitting at the table, that he doubts if the SVN people would ever have even hinted at going to Paris if they had thought the VC were going to be at the table, that Harriman is undoubtedly the guy who engaged in the doubletalk necessary to convince Johnson it was all set, that the first thing Nixon ought to do Wednesday when he gets elected is to tell LBJ to get Harriman out of there immediately, that all Harriman is interested in is getting a deal put together for his glory, that if the SVN are forced into these negotiations with the VC it will end up with an imposed coalition government and -- say -- two years from now when the whole thing turns Communist Dick will take the heat for having sold out, not Harriman.

NB: Rockefeller was very appreciative for the call.
November 4, 1968

TO: DC
FROM: ELLSWORTH (The following is the text of Scranton's statement which went on the wire in Scranton at 8:30 A.M. today (PST):

Since President Johnson's announcement of the halt in the bombing, significant difficulties with the plan have arisen. Whether because of haste to make the announcement or for other reason, apparently the plan was not fully cleared with both Hanoi and Saigon.

South Vietnam's President Thieu's statement indicated he was led to believe that if the Viet Cong was to sit at the Paris Conference table, it was not as an independent fourth-voice representation. Hanoi, on the other hand, has been jubilantly claiming "a major victory" and making alarmingly bellicose statements. Others, at home and abroad, see political intention and ramifications, especially in the timing of the announcement and of the next after-election talk in Paris. The Johnson credibility gap remains wide and deep.

In all this, Richard Nixon has demonstrated exemplary statesmanship, for which he deserves great credit. He has supported the President. Although the candidate of the opposition party in a vital election campaign, he has refused to succumb to partisan criticism and attack, an easy reaction under these muddled circumstances. Most commendable of all, he has made a most helpful suggestion to get us out of the muddle and moving toward peace again: that the Paris talks go on this week and settle the seating arrangements, and he has volunteered, whether he wins or loses the election, to help solidify public opinion behind the President's effort in the critical days ahead.

# # #
November 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: DC
FROM: Ellsworth
RE: Scranton

Scranton, who is here in Los Angeles at Norton Simon's house overnight, was highly impressed with the Meet the Press show, and is working on a follow-up statement as follows:

Mr. Nixon has properly been quite diplomatic in his treatment of President Johnson with regard to the arrangements for the Paris talks, but speaking for myself, I want to say it is clear this is a major diplomatic blunder on top of a series of diplomatic blunders. Obviously the understanding and agreement which was fundamental to any Paris negotiations and to the bombing halt were not worked out, this exposes our troops to additional risks, and therefore it was all the more important to elect Nixon on Tuesday -- Nixon who has promised to help Johnson and whose help Johnson obviously needs.

Scranton, however, will not be able to get the statement out tonight. He is going to work on it and call me very early in the morning.
TO: DC
FROM: BOB ELLSWORTH
RE: POLLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poller</th>
<th>Nixon</th>
<th>Humphrey</th>
<th>Wallace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GALLOP</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARRIS</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BUCCI (DELAWARE -- WHICH HAS BEEN WITHIN .3% OF NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE RESULTS IN THE LAST TWO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nixon</th>
<th>Humphrey</th>
<th>Wallace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIXON</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BUCCI - PENNSYLVANIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nixon</th>
<th>Humphrey</th>
<th>Wallace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIXON</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Here are some Republican leader reactions to the bombing halt:

Jerry Ford: "I don't think we should read too much into this development, and I would not like to believe that the timing of the bombing halt has anything to do with Tuesday's election. This development does indicate to me that a policy of firmness toward Hanoi -- the policy of Johnson and Nixon -- produces better results than the policies embraced by HHR."

Dirksen in Chicago -- said that RN was "one of the citizens who stood in the President's corner and helped make this come about. This is an end we have been striving for for many months." He cautioned not to expect too much now. "It is only a beginning."

John Tower said the announcement of what he called "unconditional cessation of bombing" raised questions concerning what the U.S. received in return, the timing of the announcement and the safety of U.S. troops.

Senator Hickenlooper: "We've been wondering if this wouldn't happen on the eve of the election for political purposes, and now it has."
Senator Javits called the halt a "great development."

Mayor Lindsay said it was "an important breakthrough."

Governor Rockefeller said he was "deeply gratified."

Senator Percy said it was a last-ditch effort to end the war but wondered "what knowledge do we have of the commitment from the other side?"

George Romney expressed the hope that the bombing halt would lead to substantive negotiations but the American people were inclined to be skeptical and they better be on the alert against getting "brainwashed."
November 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Haldeman
FROM: Ellsworth

John Bucci this evening has a significant comment on the Presidential preference sentiment, based on his breakdown of Delaware -- which he says can be projected nationally.

Nixon has substantially more strength among Independents than Humphrey has, and he also has considerably more strength among Democrats than Humphrey has among Republicans. As Bucci recalls, the reverse was true in 1960 with regard to RN-JFK.

The breakdown, based on field work completed last night:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dems</th>
<th>Reps</th>
<th>Inds</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Adjusted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
November 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: DC
FROM: Ellsworth
RE: Michigan

Elly Peterson says it is even. Movement in recent weeks has been from Wallace to Humphrey, due to COPE work. They hope to win some Wallace votes to us with the Agnew rally tonight. Romney has taped a 2-minute radio spot for use Monday and has drafted a full-page ad for Monday's papers. Romney and Milliken will be on the streets all day Tuesday. Percy will be in the Detroit metropolitan area Monday.

If the vote is there, Peterson says they will get it out.

She says the biggest problem is the Negro vote in Detroit. We will get virtually none of it, so the hope is for the Negro vote in Detroit to be small. They will know by the middle of the afternoon Tuesday how the Negro precincts are turning out.
November 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: DC
FROM: Ellsworth
RE: Pennsylvania

Jack Jordan says the bombing halt announcement Thursday helped our side and turned the corner for Nixon in Pennsylvania -- even before Saigon's refusal to go to Paris. In Pennsylvania, there is widespread distrust of LBJ, and it was widely regarded as a crude political ploy.

At our behest, Shafer will issue a strong statement on Monday praising RN and urging his election.

Jordan predicts a Nixon win in Pennsylvania by 182,000. Bucci predicts 184,000.

(NB: After the Pennsylvania returns are reported fully, have in mind that the Nixon ticket will still have a margin of an extra 30,000 votes from the absentee vote. There will be about 120,000 absentees all together, of which Wallace will get 10,000, Humphrey 40,000 and Nixon 70,000. This is the result of a special little operation in Pennsylvania, resulting, for example, in Ed Heinman of Delaware County being able to report tonight that all 13,000 absentee ballots in his county are for Nixon.
November 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: DC
FROM: Ellsworth
RE: Oklahoma

Today's Daily Oklahoman, which runs a scientific poll that has an excellent reputation for accuracy, shows Oklahoma as follows:

Nixon 43.5%
Wallace 29.5
Humphrey 24
Undecided 3

On the Senate race:

Bellmon 50.3%
Monroney 43.3
3rd Candidate 1.3
Undecided 5.1
November 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO:    Haldeman
FROM:  Ellsworth

Tentative wrap-up on my calls:
(1) Rockefeller as reported earlier.
(2) Romney's line is busy. Operator programmed to try every 30 minutes.
(3) Awaiting Haldeman signal (re Reagan) before I call Goldwater.
(4) Scranton as reported in separate memorandum.
AP -- RMN was assured by President Johnson that SVN had agreed to take part in the Paris peace talks, advisers to the Republican presidential candidate said today.

The Nixon camp reacted sharply to SVN President Thieu's announcement that his government would not participate in the next stage of negotiations -- triggered by Pr. J's decision to halt the bombardment of NVN.

Nixon himself had no comment on Thieu's statement.

But aides sought out newsmen and told them that Nixon had been assured by Pr. J that SVN would participate in the talks.

"We had the impression that all the diplomatic ducks were in position," said one aide.

He said Johnson had given the assurance by telephone to Nixon, and the other two presidential candidates, Dem. VP HHH and GW Am Ind party candidate.

He said that Nixon now believes that the Administration's credibility on the peace talks is in doubt. And the candidate is concerned that SVN could escalate the war on its own, or pull its troops back, the aide said.

Meanwhile, Cal JT Gov. Robt. H. Finch reported he had called some 60 pol leaders in major states and was told the bombardment halt was not helping HHH.

"I think this will boomerang," he said. "It was hastily contrived."
From: Ellsworth

Irwin and Kenworthy, speaking for themselves and others, say they want to know from RN what his reaction is to the Thieu statement. They say if they cannot get it from Nixon they will -- on the basis of the attached AP story -- write that Nixon refused to comment himself while instructing his staff to assiduously pump out the story that LBJ assured RN that SVN would participate.

They say Ziegler was not the source for the AP story.

They asked that their request for a statement from Nixon be relayed to him.
Efforts to push Senator Eugene McCarthy off the New York ballot gained an unexpected ally -- the Senator himself. The former Democratic challenger still declined to endorse Vice President Humphrey, but his action was seen by strategists as a help in increasing Mr. Humphrey's margin in the state. Harold Ickes, the leader of the McCarthy campaign here, explained that "it is one thing not to endorse Humphrey and another thing to do something that would be destructive to his candidacy."
MEMORANDUM

To: R. N. 

Date: September 12, 1968

From: Glenn Olds

Subj: Report on Frank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on the transition and tasks of a new administration

After review of Frank's 30-page analysis of August 15 for R.N., discussed with R.N. in January, Hal Booth (I now have on loan from State Farm doing the basic analysis of manpower need, input, and coordination) and I spent the evening with their group in Cambridge, getting their recommendations and input. They are willing to continue to work on this area, drawing on their rather rich resources. I worked out an agenda of work for them that I need not burden you with now. The agenda covered the substance of their report on (1) Personnel, (2) Substantive program, (3) Government organization, and (4) Transitional arrangements. (Note: see attached notes from meeting)

In the sensitive area of recommendations, however, they would like to tap discreetly the judgment of unusually broad gauged people in the area. It would strengthen their study if you were willing to indicate your interest in their results. They propose the following which I believe is both innocent, protective of you and the campaign, but useful.

"Mr. Nixon is aware that we are doing this study and has indicated that it could be helpful to him. However, this study has not been commissioned by him, but rather is entirely 'self-started' with the hope that advance work will help him and his advisers meet the urgent problems of staffing a new administration."

Your reaction as to whether you concur or not will help me proceed in using their help.

cc: Messrs. Haldeman, Garment, Mitchell, Keogh
To: Frank Lindsay, Phil Areeda, and Ernest May

From: Glenn Olds and Hal Booth

Subject: Notes from our meeting of September 5, 1968

We discussed the fourfold analysis of the paper to RN of August 15; i.e. (1) Personnel, (2) Substantive Program, (3) Government Organization (4) Transitional Arrangements, with action referral under each as follows:

(1) Personnel:
(a) Move forward immediately in identification of outstanding people from the several sources discussed,
(b) Booth to confer with Lindsay's aid to avoid duplication and aim at coordination
(c) Cambridge group to work at "qualitative" criteria, and attention to the vehicle and process of screening;
(d) Detail optional profiles with consequences in pivotal areas, (Ex: a "policy making" or "administrative" Sec. of State)
(e) Identify the 50 "toughest", not necessarily the most prestigious, positions,
(f) Identify the "structure of consent", as well as the "structure of authority or power" in the executive branch
(g) Identify the top civil servants in all departments;

(2) Substantive programs:
(a) Suggestions of substance or procedure re: translating policy into legislative program
(b) Assess policy options re: existing or proposed programs.

(3) Governmental Organization:
(a) Consider small staff for program design independent of bureau or department
(b) Identify omni-competent people for major integrating of ideas and policy to give coherence and focus to the initial phases of a new administration.
(c) Identify organization "hang ups", pitfalls, and conversely, resources and structures available for use in implementation.

(4) Transitional arrangements:
(a) Suggest special qualities required for the key liaison person;
(b) Identify the person enjoying R.N.'s absolute confidence & public trust to monitor the process of transition as Clark Clifford did for Kennedy;
(c) Develop detailed information on nature, scale and calendar of this process.
To: RN  
cc: John Mitchell  

From: Ellsworth  

Re: Report from Bucci, nationally-known pollster and Pennsylvania Republican Committee pollster

Bucci reported to me informally, in Philadelphia on Saturday morning, following the preliminary and tentative results on his first post-Democratic-convention survey. The results are not final. He still has one report to come in from a city in Ohio. Subject to that qualification, his informal report was as follows:

1) His polling has covered Ohio, Indiana, Connecticut, Delaware, and Pennsylvania.  

On a nationwide basis, his findings accord with the Gallup results published a week ago: approximately

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Pennsylvania, however, shows weaker than the rest of the country:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Without going into the technical details, Bucci refines the above gross figures to predict the actual November result in Pennsylvania, based on what he believes the final registrations will show,
to be as follows:

Nixon  46
Humphrey 44
Wallace  10

Detailed breakdowns as between the parties, comparing Bucci's current wave with his July poll, show Pennsylvania as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
<th>All Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: The discrepancy between the "All Voters" figures for September (45-45-10) and the Bucci prediction for November (46-44-10) is accounted for by the fact that in arriving at his prediction, Bucci includes the effect of the new registrations which closed last Monday and which affect the voters' participation in favor of RN, since substantially more Republicans registered this fall than Democrats (the first time this has happened since 1956).

Registration in Philadelphia which usually runs 2-to-1 in favor of the Democrats, this year is only about 1½-to-1.

NB: Notice the Wallace slippage since July--down from 15 to 10 among Republicans, down from 9 to 8 among Democrats, and down from 12 to 10 overall.
3) Directing attention to the reasons why Nixon is not doing as well in Pennsylvania as he is in the rest of the nation (he is not doing as well as in Connecticut, for example), Bucci says--without having been able to assemble his material to make a formal analysis--that the basic reason is the "Depression Syndrome." Pennsylvania has not kept progress with much of the country, and the new, fast-moving affluence, so there are still many members of organized labor who are only marginally employed or unemployed and whose presence and condition affects the thinking and feeling of other, more affluent Pennsylvanians. They fear the memory--the folk mythology, if you will--of a Republican connection with the Depression.

On the other hand, Bucci is clear that neither Humphrey nor Wallace (both are thought of as Democrats in Pennsylvania) has yet offered an appealing program even to Democrats, in Pennsylvania. He says both are regarded as extremists, in terms of programs--and that Humphrey's appeal has so far been solely on the basis of party loyalty. Humphrey has been attempting to exploit party loyalty, in support of unpopular and extreme programs. Therefore, Bucci suggests that the Nixon appeal in Pennsylvania focus on:
1) The prospect that Nixon can and will maintain prosperity and that he will do it while bringing peace and keeping peace. Over the last eight years, we have had prosperity but it has been accompanied by war and this is deeply disturbing in Pennsylvania.

2) Criticism of Humphrey but not criticism of the Democratic Party, and especially not of McCarthy or McCarthyites, as many of them have absolutely no interest in Humphrey but are beginning to take an interest in Nixon.

3) Specific emphasis on the fact that Humphrey could not and cannot unify his own party--and a man who cannot unify his own party cannot govern the nation. This seems to have special appeal in Pennsylvania.