

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
35	8	06/19/1968	Memo	From DC to Haldeman Re: Media plans for Ohio and Pennsylvania telethons. 1 pg.
35	8	06/08/1968	Memo	From DC to Haldeman Re: No talking to media about plans for upcoming appearances. 1 pg.
35	8	01/05/1968	Letter	From Robert Ellsworth to Haldeman Re: Meeting to discuss convention aid. 1 pg.
35	8	05/22/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Haldeman Re: Checking on New Jersey and Illinois write-ins. 1 pg.
35	8	01/25/1968	Memo	From Dwight Chapin to DC Re: Delivering Chicago Tribune to delegates and alternates during the Convention. 1 pg.
35	8	n.d.	Other Document	Handwritten note Re: Mrs. Ethel Kennedy, the news from California. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
35	8	05/08/1968	Memo	From Nixon to Buchanan Re: Huston discussion of simulmatics. Also, memo to Haldeman Re: Simultron Project. 8 pg.
35	8	05/06/1968	Memo	
35	8	05/17/1968	Memo	To Rose Mary Woods Re: June schedule. 1 pg.
35	8	05/13/1968	Memo	From DC to Mitchell, Chapin, Haldeman, Ellsworth, Whitaker, Sears, McWhorter, Kleindienst Re: Scheduling meetings and fundraisers for June and July. 1 pg.
35	8	03/17/1968	Letter	From Earl Mazo to Hobe Lewis Re: Nixon's better hold of Democratic and Independent voters than Rockefeller. Also, alternate draft of same letter with handwritten notes. 5 pg.
35	8	04/15/1968	Memo	From DC to Haldeman Re: Restricted contact between DC and Herb. 1 pg.
35	8	04/15/1968	Memo	From DC to Haldeman Re: Staffing for California situation. 1 pg.

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35	8	04/15/1968	Memo	From DC to Haldeman Re: Backing Charlie Rhyne with a good staff. 1 pg.
35	8	07/31	Memo	From Price to Nixon Re: LBJ's Secret Service sent to Paris. Also, LBJ remark on possible invasion of the North. 1 pg.
35	8	07/24/1968	Memo	From DC to Mitchell, Ellsworth, and Haldeman Re: Preparing a paper for Miami delegates emphasizing polls favorable to Nixon. This to counter Rockefeller's use of favorable polls. 1 pg.
35	8	07/24/1968	Memo	To Haldeman Re: Need for library of Humphrey's vulnerable radio and TV quotes; and family scheduling on state-by-state basis. 1 pg.
35	8	07/15/1968	Memo	From DC to Haldeman Re: Monitoring local and national TV broadcasts. 1 pg.
35	8	07/13/1968	Memo	From DC to Mitchell & Haldeman Re: Greater control over Citizens operation. Possible position for Erlichman and loss of Tom Evans. 2 pg.
35	8	07/12/1968	Memo	To Whitaker, Chapin, and Haldeman from DC Re: Mishandling of Illinois. No photos in similar events in the future. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
35	8	07/09/1968	Memo	From DC to Len Garment Re: Need for better TV producers and one-liners. 2 pg.
35	8	07/08/1968	Memo	From DC to Buchanan Re: Appealing to government workers.
35	8	07/08/1968	Memo	From DC to Buchanan Re: Gathering of quotations and parables for Nixon speeches. 1 pg.
35	8	n.d.	Memo	To Earl and Herb Re: Nixon preference for the Wicker quote. 1 pg.
35	8	n.d.	Other Document	Handwritten notes Re: Polling, Derge, and California. Also, notes Re: Haldeman, taking a confidential poll on the VP. 2 pg.
35	8	07/02/1968	Memo	From DC to Haldeman Re: Items to discuss with PR and Speech Research Groups. 1 pg.
35	8	07/24/1968	Memo	From Anderson to Nixon Re: Suggestions for communicating Nixon's position on current issues. Also, memo from From DC to Anderson, Research & PR Groups. 9 pg.

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35	8	05/15/1968	Memo	From DC to Haldeman Re: Getting a frank analysis of personnel. 1 pg.

June 19, 1968

Correct File Copy.
Please let Mr.
Haldeman know status.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman
FROM: DC

L.

I would like to know as soon as possible what the media plans are for running the 1/2 hour telethon in Pennsylvania and Ohio. I would like to get that decision made and when it is going to be done. My view being that a check on that one -- that one properly advertised may give an idea whether we should run it in other states.

June 8, 1968

*Sear
McIntosh
Klein
A. Woods*

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman

FROM: DC

You must be sure that all of our people -- both here in New York and Washington -- understand that there are to be no (absolutely no) backgrounders at this time. I do not want to hear of any of our people talking off or on the record to any writers with their ideas of what our strategy, plans, ideas, etc. are for the period ahead. I want you to make sure that everyone knows this - including, Ellsworth, Whelan, Herb Klein, Sears, etc. -- all of our people the press might be asking for some line on what we plan to do -- what kind of appearances -- etc. NOTHING is to be given out in this period.

Maybe you and John Mitchell should call all of the top people together and make this point.



NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE, P. O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036
PHONE (212) 661-6400

Robert Ellsworth, National Director

January 5, 1968

AIR MAIL

Mr. H. R. Haldeman
c/o J. Walter Thompson Company
6505 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90048

Dear Bob:

I have the following instruction:

"Bob Haldeman is to be given charge of the Convention and all arrangements. Timmons and anyone else who wants to work on this will be under Haldeman. (John Ehrlichman of Seattle, Washington, has volunteered to be of assistance in this matter as well.)"

I have visited with Bill Timmons about this, and we will be in touch with you in the next few days on what has been done and how the land lies, etc.

Warmest and best.

Sincerely,

Robert Ellsworth
National Director

RE:jl

cc: Bill Timmons

May 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman
FROM: RN
Re; Addition to Check List

While others have the responsibility --
please add to your check list -- New Jersey and Illinois write-ins.
Check on progress.

January 25, 1968

REMINDER TO: DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM: DC

Pass on to Haldeman my idea that I want some effort to be made to get the Chicago Tribune delivered to each delegate's and alternate's room as well as to each newspaperman at the Convention. The New York Times and Miami Herald will be there and we need one paper which will give another point of view.

#

Mrs Ethel Kennedy —

The ~~same~~ news from

Californ

Bob

Will you call
Huston on this?

Memorandum to RN

From Buchanan

May 8, 1968

Before the simulmatics idea is finally canned, if it is to be, would RN take a rapid reading of this thing from TCH. Huston says the cost of the thing will be less than the cost of the Youth Budget between now and convention.

Buchanan

go ahead (if 40g or less)
but get a new cost
figure - ships - 476 -
(of no use to RN)

This is on balance just an organized effort to get info that any decent campaign organization should have at its finger - But since we won't get it - lets buy it.

6 May 1968

MEMORANDUM TO BOB HALDENAN

SUBJ: The Simultron Project

In our initial memorandum explaining the simulation process, we listed six broad areas of information which can be made available:

- (1) a state-by-state ranking by degree of "favorableness" to Nixon, Kennedy, Humphrey, etc.
- (2) a weighted ranking of these states by favorableness and electoral vote, showing the most favorable and most valuable states for each candidate.
- (3) a ranking of the favorableness of the people who have been mentioned as possible running-mates with Nixon.
- (4) "voter-types" (ex., white, urban, Catholic, male, Republican, Easterner, upper socio-economic class) listed in order of preference for Nixon, Kennedy, etc.
- (5) the most important issues in each state.
- (6) the most important issues to each "voter-type".

Essentially, the above information represents only a rough product whose value is derived from its specific application to concrete campaign objectives, programs, and problems. The options available are almost limitless once the raw data has been programmed and is available on the computer. The following examples of application of this information are intended only to suggest some of the areas where we believe this program could be of great value. As the campaign progresses and as we begin to work with the data, new opportunities as well as new requirements will doubtless arise to be exploited. Since we intend to limit our hypotheses and allow the data to speak for itself, we believe that information which we did not anticipate will become available to guide us further in an effort to provide the utmost assistance in relating public opinion data to the practical aspects of the campaign. However, there are many applications which we can program for immediate use. Some of these are listed below.

I. STATE DATA.

1. Determining a winning electoral combination. The most immediate product of simulation will be a ranking of states based upon their favorableness and their importance electorally to RN. This will be a relative ranking (rather than an absolute percentage distribution), but

will tell us with a high degree of accuracy which states represent the best opportunity for a winning electoral combination. We can tell which states deserve the most attention based on their relative electoral importance and which should receive the least attention because of the likelihood they will inevitably go Democratic. Also, we will be able to determine which states are marginal and thus require particular attention.

2. Information for state leaders. As will be pointed out in further detail below, we will be able to analyze each state in terms of voter-types and issues. This information will be of great help to us in many ways, but one peripheral consideration is the possibility of making some of this state information available to state leaders to assist them in working not only for RN's election, but for a clean sweep for the GOP. This helps us guarantee a maximum effort for RN with the correct groups on the correct issues, but it also helps us build morale among state leaders by providing them invaluable information which would not otherwise be available to ~~them~~^{them} except at great expense. We could also do this for Congressional candidates. If in each state candidates down the line on the ticket are hitting on the same issues (issues selected by RN), it is bound to assist the national ticket and get us more exposure than otherwise might be available.

II. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.

1. Scheduling. Simulation data can provide assistance in determining the amount of attention which the candidate should devote to each state. In a presidential campaign, the candidate's time is the most precious commodity. We can determine the relative importance of states and postulate the attention which should be paid to each state. We intend to analyze the relative voter appeal of each of the recognized Republican presidential possibilities, e.g., Rockefeller, Percy, Reagan, etc., so that we could do the same thing for these people. On the basis of this information, we will know in which states they are particularly strong, with which voter-types, and on which issues. From this information, we can advise on the use of these people in support of the national ticket. If one of these should be the Vice Presidential candidate, this information would be particularly useful, but no doubt RN will want to use all the prominent Republican leaders in his campaign, and simulation will tell us where to use them to best advantage.

2. Campaign Spending. Simulation can also help determine the allocation of financial resources. This is an obvious deduction, but only if it is understood that resources of every type are to be principally allocated on the basis of the viable electoral combination which arises from our determination that certain states and certain activities are to receive priority because of their importance and potentiality.

III. VOTER-TYPES.

1. Holding a New Coalition. Presidential elections are not won on the basis of strict popular appeal. Electoral combinations are decisive, but the Democrats recognized with FDR that electoral votes are secured through the careful formulation of a winning coalition of interest groups, i.e., voter-types. Simulation will enable us to identify those voter-types within each state which are for RN or inclined toward him. It will enable us to determine which groups we have and which groups we need to get. Because we will also be analyzing the strength of each potential Democratic nominee, we will also be able to identify those groups which are traditionally Democrat but which may be dissatisfied with the particular nominee. In view of the fact that the Democrats may split this year, it is particularly important that we be able to readily define those groups which are disenchanted with the ultimate nominee. This we will be able to do regardless of whom the Democrats nominate in Chicago.

2. Citizens Operation. The Citizens for Nixon operation in Washington is organizing a series of special interest committees, e.g., Senior Citizens for Nixon, Doctors for Nixon, etc. Simulation will enable us to determine by states where these committees can be most effective because simulation data will parallel their own interest orientation. This information will not only make it possible to zero in on groups in those states which are electorally most important, but will make it possible to identify specifically which groups are most important and where and on what issues these special interest groups should be approached. Our data would also enable the Citizens operation to operate on a cost effective basis since we would be able to advise against contemplated projects which our analysis of each group by state indicated would not be productive.

3. Voter Registration. Certainly a major effort will be undertaken to register new voters in those states which we regard as crucial. Simulation, augmented by demographic information to determine population shifts and trends in voting, will enable us to pin-point those areas where intensive registration efforts would be most productive. We can determine specific voter-types within geographical areas which represent the most lucrative targets for a registration effort as well as point out specific communities which should receive priority attention.

IV. ISSUES.

1. Determining key issues. Simulation will enable us to determine key issues by state and by voter-type. This will enable us to tailor our appeals to specific groups which will make up the new coalition necessary for victory. More specifically, we can:

a. Advise RN and others campaigning on his behalf which issues are of paramount concern in each state and relate these issues to specific voter-types. As a corollary, we can advise which issues to avoid in particular areas so as to eliminate the possibility of unnecessarily generating disagreement in an area where it could easily be avoided.

b. Advise various campaign committees both at the national and state level on the type of appeal to include in printed campaign literature. This would be particularly helpful to the Citizens operation since we could provide specific information on issues of greatest concern to those groups which they are attempting to service. This assistance could also be rendered to state committees who would thus be able to concentrate on those issues of greatest concern within their own states.

c. Advise the advertising people on the type of copy to be used in particular states and in the media directed at particular voting groups. By working closely with media representatives, we could provide information on voter attitudes and issue-orientation for voters within recognized media-markets. This assumes, of course, that some advertising will be localized. However, even on national advertising, the type of issue information we could make available would doubtless be of assistance.

2. Public Opinion Data Book. We could prepare for use by key staff personnel a notebook containing public opinion data developed not only from our simulation operation, but also from demographic and voter trend studies as well as other public opinion research. This notebook would be broken down into various categories, e.g., a) demographic information, b) issue information (by states and voter types), c) states (voting trends, demographic information, voter-types, issue orientation), d) voter trends (by states and voter types on various issues), and e) group attitudes (on issues by states). As you can see, much of this information would be cross-indexed to make it easier to use. When preparing a speech, planning an itinerary, preparing advertising copy, or drafting a piece of campaign literature, this information would be readily available. We could put this information into such a format as to make it readily available to the working staff. Of course, this would not be a substitute for the more detailed analysis which would be made available to RN for planning purposes, but would simply be an additional effort in order to gain the maximum use of the information which we produced.

V. PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS.

1. Analysis of polls taken outside the organization. Our in-house personnel could study polls taken by people unrelated to the Nixon organization and evaluate it for the benefit of top staff planners.

This would include various public opinion polls appearing in the media. We could relate this data to our own to determine both the reliability of our own work and the political significance of the polls being published.

2. Analysis of local polls. Many polls of varying reliability will be appearing in the local press, e.g., the Gary Tribune's poll of Indiana's 1st Congressional District. We could collect this information and evaluate it, thus enabling us to compare it with our simulation data to further refine our analysis of state voter-type attitudes within states. Much of this type of information might not otherwise come to the attention of the campaign staff, but might nevertheless be of some value.

3. Periodic Report on Polling Implications. We could prepare a periodic analysis of published polls to be circulated among the campaign staff and others directly interested in the campaign. This activity would principally be of psychological value since we could point out encouraging signs and discredit obviously political efforts designed to make RN look bad in the polls, e.g., Harris. An example of this is the recent student poll conducted by Time magazine. We would point out that the margin of error in such a major effort is such that it is likely that RN has more campus support than Bobby, particularly in view of the fact that only the most politically-motivated students would take the time to go to the polling places and vote. The margin of difference in the two totals is so slight that we should realistically consider RN to have at least tied with Bobby for second rather than having placed third as Time would have us believe. We would support this contention by pointing out that other student surveys have shown greater Republican affiliation on the campus than does the Time study, and that many students who are "hung up" on the Vietnam question will swing around as the issue clears now that Johnson is out of the race. This sort of analysis (rough as it is here) might be valuable to our campaign workers who will be called upon to explain the meaning of polls occurring in the daily press.

4. In-House Polling. It is obvious that the most efficient arrangement would be for us to handle whatever in-house polling is necessary. From our simulation data, we can determine which states require polls in order to provide us with sufficient data. We can also determine the types of information we need based upon whatever deficiencies turn up in our simulation of a particular state or based upon issues which suddenly show up which we believe need to be examined further. However, if it should be decided to have current polling done by someone else, we should at least be provided with the raw data once the poll is completed and we should be consulted prior to the preparation of the interview questions. One of our first tasks should this project be authorized should be to evaluate the raw data from polls already conducted on behalf of RN.

VI. CONCLUSIONS.

We believe that the above represent some of the major areas where simulation can be of particular assistance. As mentioned at the beginning, we intend to let the data speak for itself, so we fully expect to find information which will suggest new avenues for both exploration and application. One of the main advantages of the simulation process is that it will enable us to identify problem areas which will require further investigation in special polls and further analysis of demographic information, voter trend studies, and issue surveys. To attempt to postulate these problem areas at the outset would be to defeat our purpose and ignore the process, but one of our major tasks will be to be on the lookout for them so that we can anticipate their impact before we are confronted with them on a political level.

We believe that the proper utilization of the data which simulation can give could easily result in the savings of more money than the simulation operation will cost. This is particularly true if financial resources are allocated among stages and voter-types on the basis of our determination of where they will do the most good. Thus, simulation can help campaign planners and financiers reduce the likelihood of money being spent in areas and for projects which, in the final analysis, will not materially assist RN in November.

We recognize that in many instances listed above wherein we suggest the use of data derived from simulation, it would be possible to arrive at approximately the same information by other means. For example, an electoral combination of states could be put together merely by sound judgment. It might or might not be as accurate as what we could determine through simulation. Also, it would be possible strictly from demographic information and voter trend studies to determine in which states you should concentrate your voter registration efforts. You could also determine the issue orientation of voter-types by states by non-simulation techniques but only through the extensive use of state polls -- at a cost of approximately \$300,000 if you were to do the job thoroughly.

We believe the advantage of simulation, particularly at this time, is the opportunity it provides for coordinated effort. There is not a single example listed above of information which we believe would of itself justify the expense of a simulation program. However, we believe the total program is certainly worth the expense. An important question which you might wish to ask yourself is this: Are you likely without the simulation program to get the same degree of information with the same degree of accuracy as rapidly and at less cost with the same degree of coordination and close attention? If the answer is yes, then doubtless simulation offers you little. If a candid appraisal is likely to force you to conclude that you would not, we believe simulation

is definitely necessary.

Two examples immediately come to mind to point out the type of service an in-house simulation effort could provide. First, there are at least 20 states which have state-wide polls available. Some, of course, are more reliable than others. We could analyze these state polls and determine how reliable they are. Those which we found to be valid for our use would enable us to avoid the expense of conducting our own polls in those states. Query: Without such an in-house capability would the Nixon operation take advantage of this opportunity? Second, the Republican House and Senate Campaign Committees are planning to survey 50 Congressional districts and 8 states during the campaign. If RN is the nominee, we could most likely gain access to this information and again eliminate the necessity for some original polling at our expense. Query: If there were not within the campaign organization a specific team working with this type of information, would this opportunity be seized?

It also should be pointed out that these types of information would be of value only if they augmented a simulation project, since otherwise it would be virtually impossible to relate them to data which not only verified their accuracy, but which provided the additional detailed information necessary to provide you with meaningful conclusions.

We believe that it is possible to provide valuable information for planning purposes in sufficient time to be of use and to do so at a reasonable cost. We believe that simulation is the most efficient means to provide this information and to guarantee the coordinated effort most likely to assure that raw data is translated into practical campaign assistance.

It is not our desire to over-sell the advantages of simulation. In fact, we believe we have tended to attribute less value to the process than we actually believe it has. We tend to think that more information will be available and more uses for it will present themselves than we have suggested to you. Simulation is not magic, nor is it pure science. It is, however, one important step along the road that leads from an educated guess to a calculated probability. It is valuable as a planning tool and as an aid in the formulation of decisions and the allocation of resources. This we feel is enough to justify its use, and should you decide to go ahead with the project, we will provide you with the most precise data possible upon which to make the crucial decisions necessary in the months ahead.

5/17/68

TO: Rose Mary Woods

RE: Schedule

The June schedule proposes a June 5 drop-by at the Links. For us to prepare this effectively we would like approval by Monday, May 20.

yes
 no

PMF

But no more of these ~~to~~ to be scheduled unless absolutely necessary.

17875

MEMORANDUM

5/13/68

TO: Messrs. Mitchell, Whitaker, Kleindienst, Ellsworth
McWhorter, Sears, Haldeman and Chapin

FROM: D.C.

I have seen a number of requests in recent days for consideration of speaking engagements after the Oregon primary and also for meetings with delegates in key states. Unless we begin to analyze these carefully now, we will be making decisions on a hit and miss basis and my schedule will probably get so crowded that I will arrive in Miami on August 5 like a rag.

Just as soon as we return from this week's trip I think a meeting should be held at which all the possible meetings in June and through the 21st of July are put on the table and considered. In this connection, Stans is pushing for four or five fund-raising receptions in various parts of the country. If possible, these should be given low priority because they, of course, do not serve our purposes in terms of getting delegates, however, they may prove to be necessary if the finance committee does not come through with what we need.

I would like to see a suggested schedule on this when I return from this week's swing. John Whitaker will have most of the invitations and Kleindienst et al will have the recommended conventions or delegate meetings that I would have to attend. In addition, time should be left open for telephone calls and personal visits with some VIP types. I cannot emphasize the necessity of keeping a lot of loose time in this period because a personal meeting whose name comes up on the spur of the moment may prove to be far more valuable than one that we might have scheduled a month or two earlier involving a full delegation.

March 17, 1968

Letter from Earl Mazo to Hobe Lewis:

Staff Note
Faldemon
note page 2
Put a good man
on this - priority

Dear Hobe:

The popular "line" that Nixon is a cipher at winning independent and Democratic votes, while Rockefeller is a giant needs examination in terms of reality. That propaganda will become a din as the Rockefeller operation intensifies.

Since the ultimate proof is in actual election vote counts, let's take the very latest -- New Hampshire:

Bothe Nixon and Rockefeller had to be written in on the Democratic ballot. Therefore, the "ballot listing" excuse was better forgotten, and the result was not even mentioned....The reason: Nixon's write-in by Democrats was 4.6 percent; Rockefeller's was .004 (four-tenths of one percent.)

The official count: 2,529 of NH's registered Democrats wrote-in Nixon: 248 wrote in Rockefeller...And incidently, only about 600 Democrats wrote in Bobby Kennedy.

The NY Times, in an election-eve editorial anticipating a massive Rockefeller vote (for which the Rockefeller apparatus had worked) declared: "Any sizeable Rockefeller vote...can be regarded as in the nature of an anti-Nixon protest vote."

Well, that one dies aborning. The Times next day neglected to note the "anti-Nixon protest" turned out to be a Nixon triumph and Rockefeller dud.

That was ballot-box reality, not needled propaganda and wishful fantasy.

And on that score, another fact-of-voting that ought to be remembered is Nixon's sizeable non-Republican (Democrats, Independents) vote in 1960. As I recall, Nixon got well over 5-million votes more than the Republican party turnout.

And his pulling-power resulted in a nation-wide net Republican gain of 21 Congressmen, two Senators, two governors, 300 state legislators and swarms of state, county and local officers. (Thus with Nixon at the top of the ticket, the GOP reversed a down-hill trend of two years before when the Democrats won an incredible net total of 16 Senate seats and swept to victory at all levels, coast-to-coast...)

One other thing:

I surely hope the Nixon people are carefully collecting tapes and film of all the post-NH Bobby, McCarthy and Johnson-Humphrey observations about each other. Like much of what we have seen and heard these past days (and might soon forget), the Kennedy statement that Johnson must go because America positively must have "new leadership" should be precious stuff to replay repeatedly in September and October. (A major flaw in the 1960 campaign was the failure to have leading Democrats make the case against Kennedy

via replayed tapes. No Republicans could state it so effectively as Fello-Demos Johnson, Rayburn, Truman, Morse and others had done.

Well. I suppose that's that for now.

All the best

Earl

Dear Rose -
This has ^{potentially} a (1) Statistic & (2) Suggestion for you Super

Personal

March 17, 1968

Dear Hobe:

The popular "line" that Nixon is a cipher at winning independent and Democratic votes, while Rockefeller is a giant needs examination in ~~the~~ terms of reality, ^{that} especially since the propaganda will become a din as the Rockefeller operation intensifies.

Since the ultimate ^{proof} is in actual election vote counts, let's take ~~back~~ the ~~latest~~ very latest -- New Hampshire:

Both Nixon and Rockefeller had to be written in on the Democratic ballot, ^{therefor} so the ~~ballot~~ ballot ~~list~~ listing ^{"excuse"} was ~~better forgotten~~ AND the result was not even mentioned..... The reason: Nixon's write-in by Democrats was 4.6 percent; Rockefeller's was .004 (four-tenths of one percent)! The official ~~count~~ count: 2,529 of NH's ~~registered~~ registered Democrats wrote-in Nixon; 248 wrote in Rockefeller....And incidently, only about 600 ^{Democrats} wrote in Bobby Kennedy.

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Well, that ^{OUR} ~~line~~ died aborning ^{and} the Times ^{Next Day} neglected to note the "anti-Nixon protest" ~~really~~ turned out to be a ~~combination~~ Nixon triumph and ~~Rockefeller~~ dud.

Rose

That was ballot-box reality, not needled propaganda and wishful fantasy.

And on that score, another fact-of-voting that ought to be recalled ^{is} Nixon's sizable non-Republican (Democrats, independents) vote in 1960. As I recall, Nixon got well over 5-million votes more than the Republican party turnout.

And his pulling-power resulted in a ^{nation-wide} net Republican gain of 21 Congressmen, two Senators, ~~2~~ two governors, 300 state legislators and swarms of ~~lots~~ state, county and local officers. (Thus with Nixon at the top of the ticket, the GOP reversed a ~~rather steep~~ down-hill trend of ~~two~~ two years before when the Democrats ^{won} ~~gained~~ an incredible ^{net} total of 16 Senate seats and swept to victory at all levels, coast-to-coast...)

One other thing:

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October. (A major flaw in the 1960 campaign was the failure to have leading Democrats make the case against Kennedy ~~dramatically remind the electorate, via replayed tapes, that~~ ^{NO} ~~Republicans could state it so effectively as Fello-Demos~~ of Johnson, Rayburn, Truman, Morse and others. ~~and so.~~)

Well. I suppose that's that for now.

All the best

L

April 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman

FROM: DC

You have to have an understanding with Herb that the contact cannot be with me except in extreme instances. (1) He can't call me with results of polls, etc. and (2) he must not have any responsibility for setting up appointments with newsmen. These requests are to go to Dwight Chapin.

April 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman
FROM: DC

Check Finch on the California situation. I think it is imperative to go forward fast on the double-pronged thing you mentioned to me. Put someone in charge -- Parky perhaps publicly and then a tough, able organizer who will keep his confidence on the group that is supposed to work on the delegates.

April 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman
FROM: DC

I think it is vitally important to back Charlie Rhyne up with excellent staff people. He is full of ideas -- he needs a top executive assistant. Tom Evans is a good guy but we need to have someone with great drive -- some ambition. We need another go-er someone who is brief on the phone and gets things done.

He wants to get toing on doctors wives, doctors, lawyers -- whole bunch -- he wants to open up an office with some fanfare, etc.

Be sure we appoint an assistant who will be in charge of the volunteer women (get Pat Hitt to appoint an assistant).

Get Pat and Charlie together and maybe they will really get something going.

file

wed 7/31

From: Price

To: RN

Subj: LBJ - Paris

1. Alan Greenspan has learned that several Secret Servicemen have taken off for Paris; the supposition is that LBJ is keeping his options open for a personal appearance. Also, LBJ apparently made a press conference remark today which at least carried the threat that an invasion of the North isn't ruled out, if they bring off their threatened new offensive in the South.

RL M - E

July 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mitchell, Ellsworth, Haldeman et al

FROM: DC

It is obvious that we will have to contend with Rockefeller's use of his Crosley and other polls that he will select. I think it is important that on an urgent basis we have our most skillful PR types develop a paper on polls which we can use to counteract this.

I have seen the materials that have been prepared by the news bureau and which I assume were distributed at the Governors' Conference and other places. They are, frankly, pretty sad because they emphasize quantity and lose impact completely. What is needed is to analyze those polls which really show RN doing well. For example, the fact that we do better than Rockefeller does in Illinois and Ohio. The fact that we carry New Jersey and Pennsylvania, etc. The fact that we do better than Rockefeller does in Florida and South Carolina. The fact that we do better than Rockefeller does in Iowa.

All of this must be prepared in a relatively brief summary and then attach the polls to back it up. This is an area where I think we have done a very poor job up to this point due to the fact that we are simply relying on collecting a great mass of polls without analyzing them and making an argument which is effective.

This material should be collected and analyzed now and then written up in a way that it can be delivered to each delegate when he arrives in Miami. It must not be simply put in the NOMINATOR. This should be prepared as a counter action to the whole Rockefeller deal.

TO HALDEMAN - A reminder

7/24/68

M? who's doing?

In view of Hubert's attack on RN as a racist I again emphasize that somewhere in this operation of ours we need a complete library of Hubert's most vulnerable quotes which have been recorded on radio or on TV. As I pointed out before, I doubt if the National Committee has anything worthwhile in this respect and it is urgent that we go beyond the ~~max~~ miniscule operation that Agnes has initiated in this field. She simply hasn't the staff or background to do this job alone.

Another reminder to Haldeman

W

I think it is important that the family schedule be carefully examined in terms of what we can do to zero them in in the marginal states rather than to have them ~~max~~ disipated in states that do not have the same importance. I realize that some of the pressure can be taken off of me by sending them to states I will not be able to visit but let us also remember that they can be extremely effective in the major states as well and that that should be the first priority.

Further reminder to Haldeman

E
KL

It is vitally important that the whole speakers operation be upgraded. Again I suggest that this be put in charge of a sophisticated Congressman or Senator. Perhaps Herb Klein should work with them - possibly Brock would be a good man to do this. Charlie McWhorter has some good ~~max~~ ideas on this point and, of course, the whole operation has to be blended with the Surrogate Candidate deal.

Calif *Whalen*
LK
file

July 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman
FROM: DC

I have been discussing - and I think we need a new in=put -- situation with regard to monitoring TV broadcasts both nationally and locally. I feel that that should not be under Frank Shakespeare. It is not really fair to Frank to put him into the situation where he has to be policing his own industry. For instance yesterday Whalen and others brought up the way Kiker and a few others have been kicking us - Cleveland coverage was very bad. I guess they criticized how we got the crowd and everything else and no one has done anything about it.

I want Herb to develop a plan and I want you to have it for me later this afternoon. This should be part of the Klein operation. Just set up the whole procedure whereby this is done. We should do it for national broadcasts and set up something in each area for the local ones. Herb should draw up a plan and have it ready today. No one likes to take these people on. I want you to check it out and give me a battle plan and get someone on this whole area of the counter-attack.

Also ask Herb what he has found out about the Surf Club press party which the Rockefeller people are giving on Saturday -- Walter Annenberg had his invitation. I think we should get one of the invitations and see what the score is. We know this is a club where they practice discrimination.

See Whalen
see Kiker

file

July 13, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: John Mitchell/ Bob Haldeman
FROM: DC

I have been giving a great deal of thought in the last few days, as I know you have, to the Citizens operation. I have reached the reluctant conclusion that we have to move now on it or be saddled with an organization that might make the difference between winning or losing in a few key states.

It probably is necessary to have Evans returned to the firm - although I would like to avoid such drastic action. We may have to ask Charlie Rhyne to gracefully step aside. Now - in suggesting that I am ready to consider such drastic action, I am only emphasizing how urgent I think it is.

What concerns me is that after your talk to Huston, Rhyne reacted in a completely negative way which means that Evans is in complete control of the organization and that means we could be saddled with an organization from now until November over which we have no control.

Looking at what has happened to date -- every positive move that has been made has been made inspite of instead of because of what the Citizens have suggested. Cubans for Nixon is now off and running but with no assistance of significance from the Citizens group. Had we waited for the Citizens to act we would not have had a group. The doctors group is on its way but Dr. Annis and Dr. DeLuccia are terribly distressed by the type of people they have had to work with in Washington -- their complete incompetence - the usual political hacks. That is why I gave them the go-ahead to run it their own way. The sports committee which Cy Laughter is working on is now on its way but through no credit at all to the Citizens group. Cy, in his very well-intentioned but bumbling way, has made some yardage but every bit of it has been ground out without any assistance - and many times over the objections - of the same little pipsqueaks who are trying to run the Citizens.

I use those areas only as examples because I know this can be duplicated in many fields, including particularly the women's organization.

The problem basically is that Charlie Rhyne is a superb front man but not a good organizer. Tom Evans is neither a good front man nor a good organizer but he is in charge of organization and he is obsessed by the usual phobia which infiltrates so many people who get into politics for the first time -- building a staff. We are simply submerged with deputies, executive directors, executive secretaries, administrative assistants, field men, etc. - with very little being accomplished.

I am writing this memo of course in confidence and quite directly because it is based on a number of reports that I have had and I am convinced that drastic action is necessary if we are going to salvage the situation. With regard to Charlie Rhyne, despite the fact that he is an old law school friend and was active in 1960, if you conclude he should go - just work it out with finesse. With regard to Evans we have to face the fact that he loves politics but he loves position more. He is not in this because he wants to do something but because he wants to be somebody.

I have suggested - without success - that Chotiner could come back and analyze the whole operation and give some recommendations. Short of that kind of action, I urged the meeting with Huston. Now that that has fallen on its face, what I fear is that we will simply drag along with the same organization building a little empire with plenty of "kings" and no "subjects."

I can't really express in words how strongly I feel on this matter. I do think it is of the highest priority to put somebody in charge of Citizens to set it straight. The only name that occurs to me at the moment that might fill this gap is Ehrlichman. Perhaps this is the best niche for him in view of his highly intelligent abilities for toughness and his no-nonsense approach.

I think your main problem is going to be Evans but the time to face up to that is now rather than after the convention. By facing up to him we can shift him aside. I think the approach here is that Garment is away from the firm and that Tom is needed there. That might not be the way -- but some move is called for far beyond anything we have thought of up to date.

#####

file

7/12/68

✓ Haldeman/ Whitaker/ Chapin -----from DC

One lesson that came out of the Illinois thing -- it was handled rather badly -- they had so many PR people around. These people had flown in from all over and they shoved them through - there was quite a bit of resentment.

1. Skip the pictures -- don't bother with them. They want to say hello and be treated like human beings.

(To herd them in and take a pictures and not have time to say anything to them is TERRIBLE)

From now on - NO PICTURES -- or if there are pictures do not have them pushed around.


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


July 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Len Garment
FROM: DC

With regard to Ailes, I believe we should try to get him as a producer if that is possible. If it is not possible, I think it is vitally important for us to get some other top producer immediately. As you know, I have felt for a long time that this was the weakest role in our television production. We have gotten by with catch-as-catch-can in this area for some time but a full time first-rate producer is urgently needed and I want you to go on this immediately.

I would like for you to make copies of Ailes' memo and to submit it to Price, Buchanan, Whalen, Shakespeare and Trelevan. Apart from his recommendation with regard to mixing up the length of answers, which is a good suggestion, he puts his finger on what I have felt for a long time is a general weakness in both our television and speeches. It is what I was trying to get at when I have compared the telethon "hard sell" with the more relaxed pace of Hillsboro and our documentary efforts.

What we need are some "one-liners" some "kickers" some "memorable lines." Perhaps the man who is most adept at this is Safire -- or -- no, he tends to come up with lines that sound "tinny and gimmicky" but the difficulty is that the rest of our crew do not seem to have a particular ability in this field. We are long on responsibility we are sometimes eloquent but we seldom come in with the good hard quote which audiences are going to remember.

I recognize that one of our problems here is that we cannot take the simple approach which a one-liner almost assumes. That is why a Reagan or a Wallace can come up with better lines than we do. On the other hand, I think that our speech writers, our excerpt writers, and everyone concerned, should put their minds to this problem and see what we can do to sharpen up our whole effort.

I still get back to my fundamental proposition that a hard sell on the issues in which people are most interested is more effective than the responsible analysis which I usually give in my responses to questions and which is always the earmark of our speeches.

What it comes down to is that intelligent people appreciate our style. For the great mass of voters it goes right over their heads. And, unlike Adlai Stevenson, we too seldom come up with a line which will hit them in the eye even when most of what we say is going right over their heads. This is a matter that I would like to discuss on Sunday with those who are included in this memorandum and with Frank Shakespeare if you can all come to Montauk Point. Speak to Chapin about making the arrangements.

On another subject, I think we should go forward on another hour to an hour and a half of the personal documentary -- try to schedule it on Friday afternoon. Chapin will set up the time.

file

July 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Pat Buchanan

FROM: DC

The next time the research group meets, let's try to develop some line with regard to the government workers which will be appealing to them.

They are a decisive block in Maryland and Virginia and, of course, there are more government workers in California than there are in Washington, D. C.

Our anti-big-government line may scare these people and I think we need a good program for them to counter-balance this. Here is a place where the Critical Issues Group might give us some assistance.

file

July 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Pat Buchanan

FROM: DC

Would you give an assignment to Huston and Gavin to prepare for RN the fifty best quotes from Woodrow Wilson and from Churchill - having in mind the fact that I am interested only in quotes that might be relevant today. Let each of them work independently on this project.

Also on that same subject, Jim Howard makes the point that we need to use more parables in our speeches. I have often raised this same question myself. Would you ask Gavin, Huston and Hume to come up with any further suggestions. Also, if there are any others on the staff who have any flair in this direction - get them to work on it too.

It is not helpful for me to receive a mass of material in this respect (I can buy books of quotations). I want each individual to put himself in my place and try to come up with parables and/or quotes that can be used in some of my speeches today.

File.

July 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: HALDEMAN
FROM: DC
RE: SENATOR MUNDT

*told Evans he was a
good friend of [unclear] -
his AA says this is a
complete foul ball.*

1) His first item was with regard to a Bill Wolfson, who claims to be a friend of Bebe Rebozo's but is primarily a leading New York Jewish figure. Wolfson believes that I should spend an evening with him at his apartment with a half dozen of his very prominent Jewish friends and that this will help us greatly in the Jewish community. My reaction is basically negative.

I would suggest you give Rebozo a call. I have some recollection that this character Wolfson is no good.

2) He asked also about Anna Chennault's suggestion that either I or a member of my staff talk to General Khien about Vietnam etc. This might be worth following up and I would suggest that Allen be the man to do the talking. Be sure that Anna Chennault is informed that we did follow up.

3) Item three was with regard to Ken Stofflmen of the National Farmers Organization. This is the rather radical group which up to this time has looked with favor on Kennedy, which Mundt says could possibly be oriented

BB doesn't know him at all

*Call Dave
BB
also JDE*

*Allen
w/ Han*

toward RN if we indicate some concern about Farm imports.

ch
Harlow

With further relation to this subject, Mundt pushed again for us to get Steve Nelson, who is Tom Kleppe's aide, as our permanent Farm man on our staff. As I recall Nelson, I don't remember that he was too bright but he was loyal and knew the people in the farm community.

For your guidance, you don't want to spend an inordinate amount of time on the Farm subject because we can make more hay with that time in other directions. What we need, however, is perhaps somebody on our staff like a Steve Nelson who can hold the hands of people like Stofflmen, and also for that matter, talk with Mundt and others in the Senate who simply want to bend my year. Kleppe is our friend; you can check with him to see whether this Nelson thing should be pursued. And Bryce Harlow particularly should be checked because he may have a veto on it; he should have the final word.

Eddie ^{McBinness} ~~McGuinness~~ apparently has a long song and dance about how Wilkie blitzed the 1940 Convention. He complained to Mundt that he had talked with Tom Evans and Evans was "too young" to remember the 1940 Convention and he didn't understand what happened. I learned ^{at} ~~that~~ the party for Finch and Don Hughes that Eddie ^{McBinness} ~~McGuinness~~ had also talked with Charlie McWhorter for an hour and Charlie said that his information is irrelevant to our situation

Hillings
today. I believe Charlie is right. On the other hand,
I would suggest that when Hillings comes aboard, that he
also message Eddie ^{McGinnis} ~~McGuinness~~ a bit, since he is a long
time friend from the past, and does have some stroke with
certain Veterans Organizations.

Citizens
With further reference to Veterans, this I
emphasize again is an area where we should really go gun-ho,
in view of Hubert's weakness in this field. I should like
to do so without having to address the two Veterans con-
ventions, although I realize this is probably very difficult
one to avoid.

#

File.

EARL/ HERB

RN thinks we should use the Wicker quote -- I told him Earl had mentioned this at dinner the other evening.

R -

Confipoll - add g's.

File. ~~urgent~~

impress not even Derge get results
very carefully kept

if Derge has to - OK

in each state

straight row N-H

N-H-W

→ also R-H-W

Derge - in Berkeley -

% Eugene Heath - 415-654-3985

at Claremont - 843-3000

in here Mon. AM. - flying late Sun.

conf. call Sat AM to set up g.

Mon AM final g.

be sure Derge knows this is confidential

Rush ✓

Call Derge

RN:rmw 7/4/68

Haldeman -- "We are taking a very confidential poll on the VP. Derge -- Now the purpose of this note is (1) To add a question that I want asked in this poll and (2) to impress upon him ~~that~~ because of the time ~~factor~~ factor we are not doing these through Bachelder -- ~~the~~ the results of this poll -- I do not want Derge, Haldeman or Mitchell to see them -- I want them to come directly to me. If Derge sees them he is to be told they are to come to me ONLY -- I will tell Haldeman and Mitchell -- I do not want anyone else to tell them or anyone.

In each of these states run just a straight race -- Nixon vs Humphrey (no VP)

- each state a race Nixon/ Humphrey/Wallace and I also want them to run.

{ Rockefeller/ Humphrey/ Wallace } in each state.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, Section 1.1
By RTP NARS, Date 4/6/87

file 

July 2, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: HALDEMAN
FROM: DC

In this memorandum I will list several items to be discussed with the PR Group and with the Research Speech Group.

The Gallup Poll dates, as to when they are in the field, coincide pretty well with our schedule as far as the first two polls are concerned, since we will either have television in the major states in that period or will have had it immediately before. The blank spot in our program, of course, is from July 28 to August 4. Perhaps we need to have now some discussion of what kind of re-runs or saturation TV and Newspaper advertising we could have in the field during this period in the major states. Would you have this considered and give me a recommendation?

#

Bob Haldeman
(file)

July 24, 1968
Newport Beach, California

MEMORANDUM


TO: Anderson, All Research Group, P.R. Group
FROM: DC
RE: Attached Suggestions from Anderson

1. This analysis is on target.
2. Research - follow up in areas RN indicates.
3. P.R. -- particularly note RN agrees with page 1 completely - This is point he has been trying to make. It is time to move away from fighting the old battle of image to the new battle of where RN stands - only this way do we cut the Wallace vote.

6/6/68

To: RN
Fr: Anderson

Here are some suggestions for future speeches or statements.



- To Anderson + all Research groups
as well as P. R.
- 1) This analysis is on target
 - 2) Remarks - follow up in areas P. R. indicates.
 - 3) P.R. - particularly note RN agrees with page 1 completely - this is the point he has been trying to make - It is time to move away from fighting the old battle of image to the new battle of where P. R. stands - only this way do we cut the Wallau vote.

MCA 6/6/68

COMMUNICATION OF ISSUE
POSITIONS

RN has now developed a well-structured position on issues that is clear, consistent and directly attuned to the convictions of the great majority of the American people -- including independents and democrats.

So far our major communications effort seems to have been aimed at dispelling myths about RN's personality and character. The thrust of this action has been successful, and the effect should be cumulative from now on.

However, relatively little has been done to communicate positions on issues. Audience response -- at rallies, dinners, shopping centers, etc. -- has been excellent in regard to the points RN has been making to them directly on issues such as the economy, crime, the role of government, poverty programs, Vietnam, riots and so on.

It seems that we should now turn our efforts toward communicating these ideas through the mass media to the great mass of people who do not yet have a comprehensive view of where RN stands. It takes months to effectively communicate an idea to the electorate, and if we don't start now, it is unlikely that we will be able to transmit a clear, coherent picture by November.

I suggest that we now take stock of all the points made so far, and condense and edit them into a brief, well-structured package that will spell out:

- (1) The basic theme of the campaign.
- (2) The elements of that theme and how they relate to and reinforce one another.

Then we should work with the communications people to develop a program for communicating this package of ideas to every person who is a potential Nixon voter.

#

MCA 6/6/68

*good
go forward*

OCEANS: THE UNDERWATER FRONTIER

*(see T
nominate)*

Draw analogy between the oceans and space. These are the last two great unexplored areas of the world, and compared with space, relatively little has been accomplished in our vast oceans.

- (1) The potential of the sea -- the untapped resources of minerals, oils and food.
- (2) The sophistication of the new ocean technology available for use.
- (3) The importance of the oceans for national security.

With regard to the exploration of the sea, we are now at the same point we were at in the early 1950's (at the start of the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration) with the exploration of space. What we need now is a national agency -- a National Institute of Oceanography (NIO) -- that can provide the kind of direction and coordination that was so vital to the brilliant successes of our space effort in the 1950's.

Advantages

- (1) Shows awareness of new technology, a forward-looking position by a modern candidate. Brings in the excitement of exploration.
- (2) Adds diversity and depth to policy position.

Disadvantages

- (1) It is relatively unimportant compared with the major crises of today.
- (2) In terms of priorities, we cannot afford to spend very much money on any effort like this.

MCA

6/6/68

*Put out to
platform
committee
on right of the
nomination*

THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

RN's position on the all-volunteer army is a sound one. However, at this time it is vulnerable because the reasons for such a step and its advantages have not been fully explained. To those who do not understand how a volunteer army would work, it may appear that such a move would undermine our national security.

We can forestall this reaction with a comprehensive statement setting forth the main advantages of an all-volunteer army -- increased national security, elimination of the draft -- and answering the main objections before they come up -- can't get enough men, lack of flexibility in crises, threat of a military takeover, etc.

#

COMPUTERS AND MAN

*good
to go forward -
mail to
interested
parties*

The idea is to show that RN is:

(1) Thoroughly familiar with technological developments in this area, and is the up-to-date candidate that can cope with the on-rushing technology of the last third of the 20th Century.

(2) Allay peoples' fear of computers. Used by an Administration that understands and appreciates their capabilities, they can benefit man, that they can make life easier for him instead of more difficult, that they can expand his freedom, not limit it.

#

③ Several tell me we are missing a bet with education at all by failing to put more emphasis on the "Research gaps" - the four plans in this field.

THE EXTREMIST LEFT

Demonstrate the dangers of the "new left" by tracing out their history, their views and their actions. While still very small this "incipient totalitarianism" must not be allowed to spread. Use examples of what has happened with similar movements around the world, and draw analogies between developments abroad and at home.

Call on democratic candidates to repudiate the "extremists of the far left" such as the SDS.

#

*Good idea
if handled
properly
(for later of the
Demo Committee
and particularly
if Hubert embrows
(him))*

THE NEW ROAD

Good idea

A short statement of principle, discussing the philosophy and principles of RN's approach to government. Not people, or parties, but the ideas that the "New Alignment" is based on. Discuss the nature of individual freedom and responsibility.

Develop the theme that the new road is that approach to government that recognizes that the purpose of government is to protect the rights of individual people -- their lives, their property, their chance for the opportunity to make something of themselves. This road is the only road in history that has made it possible for people to have -- at the same time -- security, freedom and prosperity.

Emphasize the morality of this new road, particularly in regard to the initiation of violence. Show that the approach is characterized by an idealistic morality that transcends party, race and creed.

#

file

May 15, 1968
Portland, Oregon

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Haldeman ✓
FROM: DC

Let's get a completely frank analysis of our organization and shake it up.

I think there is some outright disloyalty - some just passive acceptance - and others who are just incompetent. I feel we need to shake it up -- firing a few people might do just that!