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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10/16/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Anderson to Haldeman, re: Personnel salary scales, 2 pgs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10/01/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>To Buchanan, re: Post-November Planning, 3 pgs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12/06/1968</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>From Cartha D. De Loach to Bill Harman, follow up to previous conversation concerning White House security procedures, attached copy of the report on White House security procedures in October 1964, 12 pgs.</td>
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for Bob Holdeman
MEMO
October 8, 1968

To: Bryce Harlow/Bob Haldeman

From: Jerry Friedheim, Military Affairs Assistant to Senator John Tower
Staff Director, Nixon/Agnew Key Issues Committee

Subject: THE TRANSITION: National Intelligence Mechanics at the White House

A major factor influencing U.S. policy in Vietnam during the period 1964-1967 was the White House/national policy making machinery that formulated the policy. To wit: the process by which national intelligence and policy making decisions came together in the person of the President's Special Advisor for National Security Affairs, Mr. Walt Rostow.

The National Security Council played no significant role in the formulation of Vietnam policy during 1964-1968. The "Tuesday Luncheon Club"* was the vital decision making mechanism used by the President and as such this unofficial body constituted a grouping equivalent to, or superior to, the NSC. But to focus attention only at that mechanism is to overlook the decisive role played by the President's Special Assistant (Mr. Rostow) in staffing for those meetings and in the decisions arising therefrom.

In practice, the Special Assistant for Security Affairs became under LBJ a sort of "Chief of Staff" who put together for the President the policy recommendations submitted by the State Department and the Department of Defense. He also became the President's principal staff "intelligence officer" passing upon and passing upward the intelligence products of the entire national intelligence community. This is a dangerous combination.

*Informal weekly luncheon meeting of the President with those he regarded as his "key" advisors: Secretary of Defense, McNamara; Secretary of State, Rusk.
It became all the more dangerous because the "concensus" philosophy which pervaded the White House during this period, and the large degree of personal agreement on policy between McNamara, Rusk and Helms, contributed to an environment which effectively closed out argument against the general drift of the national policy as it also closed out intelligence products which would contradict or at least undermine the validity of the direction of this national policy drift.

One of the better specific examples of this restraint upon the intelligence product was the 1964 decision to close the military attache offices in Saigon because their reporting was not consistent with the view then being pursued in Washington. This effectively deprived the military services of any meaningful "check and balance" upon intelligence collection within the vital decision making centers of the Saigon government, and it rendered military intelligence in Vietnam virtually subservient to the U. S. Embassy there, though independent reporting channels continued to exist.

In Washington Mr. Rostow became the focal point of national intelligence produced by the CIA, which also utilized the products of the other members of the national intelligence community. He was also the focal point of policy recommendations and considerations generated by the State Department and DOD.

Experienced senior military commanders understand well the risks which are inherent in having their G-2 in any way subservient to -- or in any way related to -- the "planning" process. In such a situation, intelligence -- which is in the best of conditions not easily perceptive of the whole "real world" -- tends to become contaminated.

President Nixon's staff should include a Special Assistant for National Intelligence who would have direct access to the President and who would be completely independent of any part of the planning or decision making process. He should be responsible for providing the President (and his Staff) with the "facts" in so far as they are known by U. S. intelligence. When the intelligence community has different "answers", as frequently occurs, he should be obliged to advise the President that differences of opinion exist on the given point of issue.
It is commonly assumed that the Director of Central Intelligence performs the function described above, but in fact he never has — mainly because he is a busy administrator in his own right; and also because it is the nature of Presidential Staffs (all Staffs) to proceed along with the best information available at the moment in servicing their boss' requirements. Thus the President's Staff is apt to move a good distance along in the formulation of policy without benefit of the best intelligence simply because the DCI is not a part of the President's personal staff. An intelligence specialist, who knows the trade and the entire community capabilities, limitations, vested interests, etc., would greatly improve the quality of the intelligence product being utilized by the White House staff.

Mr. Rostow, able scholar and perceptive strategist that he is, was not such an "independent agent." From this lack of independence flowed many of the last Administration's Vietnam mistakes, vacillations, procrastination and "credibility gap."

-30-
Memorandum

To:  Haldeman
From:  Anderson
Re:  Personnel salary scales

The following are representative current salary levels.

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<tr>
<th>Major Departments -- State, Defense, Treasury</th>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary .............. $35,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under Secretary ........ 29,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Secretary .... 28,750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Under Secretary .... 28,000</td>
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<tr>
<th>Military -- Army, Navy, Air Force</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary .................. 30,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under Secretary ................ 28,750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Secretary ................ 28,750</td>
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<th>Commissioners -- major agencies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chairman .................... 29,500</td>
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<td>Member ...................... 28,750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member .................... 27,055</td>
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<td><strong>White House</strong></td>
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<td>Special Assistants</td>
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<td>Chairman</td>
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<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
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<td>29,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
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<td>28,750</td>
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1 October 1968
MEMORANDUM TO BUCHANAN
RE: Post-November Planning

In view of the likelihood of victory in November, I know that ultimately some serious attention is going to be given to identifying those people who will serve in a new administration. I want to pass along a few thoughts in this regard.

One of the few benefits of my job during the last year and a half has been the opportunity to observe at rather close range the activities of the top DOD management. In some areas I have been appalled by the incompetency, e.g., Systems Analysis; but in others I've been impressed.

I am not convinced that it would be wise to sweep the place clean in January. At least two Assistant Secretaries should be retained if at all possible: Robert C. Moot (Comptroller) and Dr. John S. Foster (DDR&E). Moot is a career bureaucrat, but an exceptionally competent one. He hasn't been here long, but he comes with an excellent reputation and from what I have seen, a well deserved one. Foster is, in my opinion, first-rate. He is terribly concerned about our failure not to spend more for strategic R&D and has fought as hard as possible within the inner-councils as well as on the Hill for more funds. He is sharp, diligent, and practical. He is hawkish as hell on the question of U.S.-Soviet strategic strength, particularly in areas of nuclear weaponry. He opposed the Test Ban Treaty and still believes privately that the Soviets would not hesitate to resume testing in the atmosphere if it were to their advantage to do so.

The basic decision, I suppose, must be whether we should retain some of the "old team". My belief is that we should where we can do so consistent with the Boss's long-range plans, i.e., where those whom we wish to keep can work comfortably with a new Administration. There is also the question of continuity, which I think ought to carry some weight.

There is yet another consideration. When Kennedy appointed McNamara it was with the understanding that he could appoint his own team. I understand this was McNamara's price, but it was too high a one. I think the President should retain the
prerogative to appoint directly key sub-Cabinet officials where the nature of the job is such as to be of particular importance. This does not mean that you surround a Cabinet Secretary with a group of people with whom he can't work, but some jobs are too important to be filled by a Secretary's crony.

Such a job in DOD is Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (ISA). This job will be of particular importance during the next few years since ISA is responsible at the DOD working level for operations in Vietnam and for the forthcoming strategic arms negotiations with the Soviets. This is one place where I would clean house completely, since what I have seen (particularly with regard to the proposed negotiations) scares me to death. Your friend Halperin should be one of the first to go.

I have noticed tremendous speculation in the press about Rocky for Secretary of Defense. For many reasons I hope it never gets beyond the speculation stage. My first choice would be Senator Henry Jackson. First, because I think politically it is imperative to have a Democrat in that slot, and second because it should be a Democrat who has good relations on the Hill. If we are to do what must be done, it will be vital to maintain close, warm relations with the key members of the House and Senate, and while we can hope for the best, it is likely that the Democrats will control at least the Senate.

My second choice for SecDef is Clark Clifford. All of us have been impressed by him since he took over, and I think it would not be at all unacceptable if he were asked to remain. In such an event, you would want to appoint a Deputy Secretary who was youngish and administratively oriented: someone who could handle the day-to-day administrative responsibilities as Nitze now does. Nitze should go.

I have had several calls regarding the Newsweek story that McGeorge Bundy might get the Secretary of State job. The reactions were unusually bad. I pleaded ignorance (easy to do), but was surprised at the overt hostility. Scranton doesn't seem to excite people much one way or another.

I have been getting together the names of some younger types who are program-oriented who might be good in some staff slots but I suspect there will be an abundance of these types coming out of the campaign. I am afraid we might have trouble recruiting some of the more competent, idealistic yet practical people who
have been in the vanguard of the independent sector programming since there seems to be increasing disillusionment over the Boss's failure to be specific with regard to contemplated programs and a gut fear that a new Administration will be staffed by left-overs from the Eisenhower years. Again, this might not pose any problem if you already have an abundance of good people in the campaign organization who you can use.

Although this may sound like a broken record, I do think one area which must be given consideration when contemplating a new administration is locating people of broad organizational and administrative experience who can help tie the package together. This will be particularly important if the Boss is to retain a maximum degree of relief from becoming tied down in routine administrative matters. It is almost impossible to imagine the organizational nightmare of the federal bureaucracy unless you are in it, and the key to the President controlling it is delegation of broad administrative authority to trusted subordinates across Departmental lines. It really boils down to a matter of developing the eyes and ears the President needs if he is to prevail over the bureaucracy.

I am going out to Indianapolis the 13th to talk to my bosses in the law firm and to see about buying a house, but I should be back the 23rd and would be happy to discuss these matters and others with you or Greenspan should you desire.
December 6, 1968

Mr. William R. Harman
Federal Office Building #7
726 Jackson Place, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Bill:

It certainly was a pleasure to personally meet you and have an opportunity to talk with you this morning. In accordance with our conversation, there is attached a copy of the results of the survey made of White House security procedures in October, 1964, for President Lyndon B. Johnson.

If I can be of further assistance in regard to this matter, please do not hesitate to call me.

Sincerely,

Enclosure
October 27, 1964

WHITE HOUSE PERSONNEL SECURITY PROCEDURES

Following the completion of our survey of personnel security matters at the White House, the FBI instituted a procedure of checking Security Investigation Data for Sensitive Position sheets, Form 86, through FBI Headquarters divisions.

This processing is designed to provide the White House Personnel Security Officer with basic information which is a prerequisite to establishing a logical priority system for requesting full-field investigations. This preliminary check system includes processing the security forms through the FBI Identification Division to locate any arrest record and through the FBI Employees Security Section indices to determine the date of the last White House full-field investigation. In addition, a search of the general indices of the FBI is being made to determine the nature and date of any applicant-type investigation conducted on White House personnel in the past.

This preliminary system of checks is currently under way and will be completed within the next several days.
**White House Full-field Investigations Currently in Process**

During the past two weeks, full-field investigations have been instituted on a number of key White House advisors and employees. These include investigations of Messrs. Reedy, Nelson, Carter, Watson, Clifford, Fortas, Mrs. Stegall, and Mrs. Roberts.

We will also immediately update the investigations of the Honorable Lee Calvin White, newly designated White House Personnel Security Officer, and the Honorable Bill D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President. Mr. White was the subject of a full-field White House investigation, completed on January 9, 1961. A full-field investigation of Mr. Moyers was completed on June 20, 1961.

**Investigative Priority Assigned by the White House**

Mrs. Stegall at the White House has conducted an initial audit of the security data sheets which were furnished her for submission to the FBI based upon her knowledge of "sensitive-type" job assignments within the White House. This categorization will be of material assistance to the FBI, and the forms for key personnel are being given priority processing by the FBI.
INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING
WHITE HOUSE CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES,
WHITE HOUSE MILITARY EMPLOYEES,
SECRET SERVICE AND WHITE HOUSE POLICE

1. White House Civilian Personnel

The full-field background investigations of White House civilian personnel, on whom specific requests for such investigations have been received, are being conducted by the FBI. These are being given the highest priority.

2. Military Personnel

Our survey of White House Security personnel reveals that there are approximately 600 military personnel assigned to the White House Staff in various capacities. These include drivers, communications personnel, a special group of warrant officer guards, and individuals assigned to the various Military Aide offices.

It is important that each military service conduct the background investigations of its own men. There is an agreement between the FBI and the Department of Defense regarding handling of investigative responsibilities, and the military branches are in the best position to conduct investigations of their own people. Military personnel who have not been investigated within the past year should receive such investigations.
Results of these military background investigations should be channeled to the White House Personnel Security Officer who has the ultimate responsibility for evaluating White House personnel.

A suggested letter to the Secretary of Defense has been delivered to the Honorable Bill D. Moyers. This communication requests that the Department of Defense undertake full-field background inquiries on all military personnel assigned to the White House. These investigations should include a check of the fingerprint identification records of the FBI.

3. Secret Service Personnel and White House Police

Normally, Secret Service has the responsibility for investigating its own personnel and that of the White House Police. This responsibility should continue.

It is recommended that the White House Personnel Security Officer confer in the immediate future with the Chief of Secret Service to insure that all necessary steps are taken to review the investigations concerning personnel within Secret Service's area of responsibility. Where necessary, current fingerprint cards should be forwarded to the FBI's Identification Division for an up-to-date check of criminal records.
Establishment and Control of White House Security Files

Attached to this memorandum is a sample of a proposed file for use by the White House Personnel Security Officer. It has been recommended that a simple alphabetical filing system be established with an index card control. The individual items in each file should be numbered consecutively, which will provide additional security for the material contained in the file.

It is recommended that these security files be checked periodically against payroll rosters and the master White House personnel records. This will insure that all individuals are incorporated into the security file system, and that each individual has received a current full-field investigation.

It is also recommended that these security files be maintained in a safe-type fireproof file cabinet.

It is further recommended that access to those security files be carefully limited and precisely defined, and that the President personally approve individuals who will have access to them. Basically, it will be necessary for the Security Officer, his Assistant, Mrs. Stegall, and a filing clerk to have access to them.
All security files should be returned to the filing cabinet each night, and a charge-out card system should be used to show the date and identity of the individual who checks out any of these files.

These charge-outs should be examined on a weekly basis. Any security files unaccounted for should be immediately located and refiled.

In addition, it is further recommended that strict controls be maintained on material added to or deleted from these files.

The attached sample file folder will clarify and explain this recommended filing procedure. It can be used as a guide in setting up the filing system.

These recommendations have been discussed with both the Honorable Lee Calvin White, Security Officer, and his Assistant, Mrs. Stegall, and they have approved these suggestions.

Washington Metropolitan Police Procedures for Handling Morals Arrests.

The FBI has been informed that the Washington Metropolitan Police Department is now considering a revision of its procedures concerning individuals arrested on morals charges. It is contemplated that in the future, all Federal agencies, including the White House and Congress, will be notified directly whenever one of their employees is arrested. Further, arrest records kept by the Morals Division of the Police Department will include information concerning the arrested person's
occupation. In addition, a full set of fingerprints will be taken from each suspected sex offender and forwarded to the FBI, whether or not the individual has been arrested previously.

Derogatory Information Concerning White House Personnel Developed by Other Government Agencies.

Consideration should be given by the President to the issuance of an Executive Order to all Federal departments and agencies instructing them to furnish the White House Personnel Security Officer with any derogatory data developed by them concerning any personnel associated with the White House. This procedure would correspond to the FBI's practice of notifying Government agencies at a cabinet level of any information received on an employee reflecting deviate sexual behavior or commission of a serious crime.

FBI Fingerprint Checks

Based on the background information available on the Form 86 being submitted by White House employees, the FBI Identification Division will make appropriate checks for fingerprints of each individual. In some instances, due to such factors as a common name, it will be necessary for the White House Personnel Security Officer to make arrangements with Secret Service to secure a complete set of fingerprints from the individual concerned. Every effort will be made by the FBI to keep requests for new fingerprint cards to a minimum.
Updating Investigations

The White House Personnel Security Officer should establish a follow-up system to insure that investigations of White House personnel are brought up-to-date periodically. This system should be established in a manner which will result in an even and regular flow of these requests to the FBI.

Corollary Investigations

The White House Personnel Security Officer should have the responsibility for making separate requests for full-field investigations of employees of the Alderson Reporting Service, and of any other individuals who may come in close contact with the President.

Maintenance of White House Fingerprint Records in the "Criminal Section" of the FBI Identification Division

In order that the White House Personnel Security Officer may be promptly advised in the event any White House employee is arrested, it will be necessary for the FBI to transfer all White House employees' fingerprint cards from the civil section of the Identification Division to the criminal section files. This will be done at once in the Identification Division of the FBI.
White House Resignations

The White House Personnel Security Officer should submit to the FBI, on a monthly basis, a list of all employees who have left White House service so that their fingerprint cards can be transferred from the criminal file section to the civil section in the Identification Division of the FBI.

Temporary White House Employees

It is understood that a number of White House employees are on temporary assignment and are expected to depart after the November election. It is suggested that no request for full-field investigations be submitted on any individual in this category.

Future Requests for White House Full-field Investigations

It is recommended that all future requests for full-field White House investigations, including updating investigations, be handled as follows:

A written request should be forwarded by the White House Personnel Security Officer to the attention of FBI Assistant Director C. D. DeLoach when requesting full-field investigations of White House Staff members and Presidential appointees. It is further suggested that the security data sheet, Form 86, be attached to this request in duplicate. It is also requested that a current fingerprint card, Form 87, be attached. This procedure will save considerable time and greatly facilitate the FBI's handling of the full-field inquiry.
White House Name Checks

All requests for name checks should emanate from the
White House Personnel Security Officer, or his Assistant,
Mrs. Stegall.

Liaison

Assistant Director C. D. DeLoach of the FBI will
maintain daily liaison with the White House Personnel Security
Officer to resolve any questions which may arise in connection
with the procedures set forth above.

Enclosure
TO: Mr. Cartha D. DeLoach, FBI
FROM:
SUBJECT: FBI Investigation

Subject's Name ____________________________
Date of Birth ____________________________ Place of Birth _______________________
Present Address __________________________

________________________________________ has requested:

( ) Copy of Previous Report
( ) Name Check
( ) Full Field Investigation

The person named above is being considered for:

( ) White House staff position
( ) Presidential appointment
( ) Position with another agency

ATTACHMENTS:

( ) SF 86 (in duplicate)
( ) SF 87, Fingerprint Card
( ) Biography

REMARKS:

REPORT SHOULD BE DELIVERED BY FBI TO:
To: President-elect Richard M. Nixon
From: Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr. December 4, 1968

FBI CLEARANCE PROCEDURES

On the basis of conferences between President Johnson's transition representative, Charles S. Murphy, Counselor to the President; the Attorney General; Director Hoover and myself, a procedure has been established for the conducting of personnel full-field background investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on prospective Presidential appointees.

The Attorney General outlined a procedure in his letter to Director Hoover, dated November 14, 1968. A copy of that letter is attached hereto. Paragraph 6 of this letter was later modified to eliminate reference to the furnishing of the results of any such investigations to the appropriate member of the present administration.

Additionally, we have conferred at length with Assistant Director C. D. DeLoach, in order to establish the necessary procedures for facilitating the requesting and reporting of full-field FBI background investigations.

For your information, full-field FBI background investigations have been completed on me and my
assistant, William R. Harman. These reports were sent to the Security Division of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On the basis of such investigations, both of us have been granted top secret security clearance.

The procedure for requesting full-field FBI background investigations is outlined in a memorandum to H. R. Haldeman, dated December 4, 1968, a copy of which is attached hereto. Outlined below are those types of clearances available and the appointees who should be subject to those clearances.

**TYPES OF CLEARANCES**

1. **FULL-FIELD FBI INVESTIGATION**

   The cost of each such investigation is $1305.00. The total cost of such investigations is figured into the FBI budget. We have been assured that the FBI will endeavor to complete an investigation within 2 weeks after the request is made.

**WHITE HOUSE**

   All members of the White House staff, including clerical personnel. Assuming no clerical personnel utilized by the
present administration were retained, this would involve approximately 200 individuals.

A full-field FBI investigation should also be conducted with respect to any individuals who come in direct personal contact with you and the White House, such as various personnel on detail to the Executive Office from various agencies, and additionally such persons as the White House chef, file clerks, painters and maintenance men. The FBI conducts investigations as to 700 such persons, including the White House staff and clerical personnel. The background of some of these persons will be investigated by the various agencies to which they are attached. It should be noted that the approximately 600 military personnel attached to the White House are investigated and cleared by their own military services. The Secret Service investigates and clears its own personnel and the White House police force.
LEGISLATIVE

A full-field FBI investigation should be conducted on the individuals to fill the 4 legislative positions that will be available for appointment:

- Architect of the Capitol
- Assistant Comptroller General
- Librarian of Congress
- Public Printer

DEPARTMENTAL

There are a total of 533 Presidentially appointed full time executive positions to be filled and they are summarily listed below. A full-field FBI investigation should be conducted on appointees to all of these positions.

- Cabinet--12
- Deputies and Under Secretaries--16
- Assistant Secretaries--70
- Military Departments--15
- General Counsels--12
- Miscellaneous Bureau Chiefs and others--102
- Ambassadors--121

The Department of State has its own security division which conducts investigations for Ambassadors. This investigation should not be
done by the State Department in advance of January 20, 1969, but should be handled by the FBI.

United States Attorneys--93
United States Marshals--92

These are term positions, the majority of which will expire between June and December of 1969. The Department of Justice conducts investigations as to these personnel.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

In addition, there are a total of 220 full time Presidentially appointed positions in the independent agencies. Of this number, approximately 95 will be available for appointment by you immediately. An additional 25 to 30 appointees in this category will be available in the calendar year 1969. A full-field FBI investigation should be conducted on each appointee to these positions.

An Internal Revenue Service check is part of every full-field FBI investigation. Normally the FBI sends its form requesting an IRS check to its contact in the Internal Revenue Service
requesting information on tax returns and litigation for the past 7 years. In turn, the IRS in Washington checks with the regional offices. The IRS attempts to ascertain whether there is any delinquency in filing of tax returns or payment of taxes and the existence of suits pending against the individual by the Government for taxes. This check takes approximately 1½ to 2 weeks and is done concurrently with the full-field FBI investigation. If the FBI has the social security number of the individual, this check may be completed in a matter of hours by computer. A data bank indexed by social security numbers and containing IRS information of this variety is used for this purpose.

2. FULL-FIELD INVESTIGATIONS BY OTHER AGENCIES

There are a number of positions, approximately 1600 which are not appointed by the President, but which would require nevertheless some type of background investigation. These are persons in policy and supporting positions categorized as the top of the Civil Service (GS-16, 17, and 18) and Schedule Cs. Under the present administration these persons are chosen by the heads of the respective departments and agencies.
The responsibility rests with the Department or Agency head to ascertain which positions in his Department or Agency are sensitive enough to require an investigation of the prospective occupant of that position. The investigations are ordered and reviewed by the Department or Agency heads. The Departments of State, Defense and Justice have their own investigative agencies within the Departments that complete this function. Where no investigative agency exists within the Department, a full-field investigation is conducted by the Civil Service Commission. Such an investigation is conducted by the Civil Service Commission and costs approximately $450.00. It should not be considered to be the equivalent of a full-field FBI investigation.

It is inadvisable to have the Department investigative agencies or the Civil Service Commission conduct background investigations on prospective non-presidential appointees before inauguration. These investigations should be handled by the FBI. After January 20, 1969, the new administration can shift this investigative function back to the Agency or the Civil Service Commission.
3. NAME CHECKS

On request, the Federal Bureau of Investigation will perform name checks on individuals chosen to fill part time positions on various Boards and Commissions. There are about 2200 of these part time positions and a full-field FBI investigation for each appointee has not been done in the past with the exception of the appointee to the United States Advisory Commission on International Education and Cultural Affairs, as requested by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The name check can be completed in a few days and involves submitting to the FBI information on the prospective appointee, such as his name, date and place of birth, and present address. This information is checked against the central files of the FBI which would contain records of all criminal convictions and additional information furnished to them by the intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State (S.Y.), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (civil and criminal), the Department of Defense (service records) and the House Un-American Activities Committee.