<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box Number</th>
<th>Folder Number</th>
<th>Document Date</th>
<th>Document Type</th>
<th>Document Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>09/21/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Bryce Harlow to John Mitchell, re: suggested program development plan for Nixon Administration, 2 pgs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>09/12/1968</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Anderson to DC, re: President Johnson's request for representatives on the problems of transition, 1 pg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10/11</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Simmons to Higby, concerning The Transition: National Intelligence Mechanics at the White House, 2 pgs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM

To: R. N.                      Date: September 12, 1968

From: Glenn Olds

Subj: Report on Frank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on the transition and tasks of a new administration

After review of Frank's 30-page analysis of August 15 for R.N., discussed with R.N. in January, Hal Booth (I now have on loan from State Farm doing the basic analysis of manpower need, input, and coordination) and I spent the evening with their group in Cambridge, getting their recommendations and input. They are willing to continue to work on this area, drawing on their rather rich resources. I worked out an agenda of work for them that I need not burden you with now. The agenda covered the substance of their report on (1) Personnel, (2) Substantive program, (3) Government organization, and (4) Transitional arrangements. (Note: see attached notes from meeting)

In the sensitive area of recommendations, however, they would like to tap discreetly the judgment of unusually broad gauged people in the area. It would strengthen their study if you were willing to indicate your interest in their results. They propose the following which I believe is both innocent, protective of you and the campaign, but useful.

"Mr. Nixon is aware that we are doing this study and has indicated that it could be helpful to him. However, this study has not been commissioned by him, but rather is entirely 'self-started' with the hope that advance work will help him and his advisers meet the urgent problems of staffing a new administration."

Your reaction as to whether you concur or not will help me proceed in using their help.

cc: Messrs. Haldeman
    Garment
    Mitchell
    Keogh
TO: John Mitchell  
FROM: Bryce Harlow  
DATE: September 21, 1968  
RE: Suggested Program Development Plan for Nixon Administration

1. Retain Dr. Milton Eisenhower as Honorary Chairman.

2. Retain Dr. Paul McCracken as Operational Chairman.

3. Employ Roger Jones (Special Assistant to Director, Bureau of the Budget) as Executive Director to direct entire effort under McCracken's policy guidance.

4. If Jones declines, Drs. Eisenhower and Arthur Burns and McCracken should promptly agree on a suitable Executive Director.

5. Until an Executive Director is employed, no additional task forces will be activated, but those already in motion will continue:

   (a) Two now functioning -- Budget and Tax.


   (c) Eleven other planned (stopped until Executive Director is named).

   (d) Five Advisory Groups in operation -- Economics, Defense, Law Enforcement, Agriculture, Foreign Policy.

6. If RN should desire it, Jones could handle transition, as well as program development. In any case, RN should meet with McCracken and Jones, to assure that objectives are clearly defined and to make Jones know he is RN's specific choice for this work.
7. Olds and Boothe will supply Jones, as requested, suggested names for task forces from academic community; Greenspan, et al. will furnish names of others, as requested. Neither Olds nor Research will be otherwise involved in this effort.

8. Task force members will be kept entirely confidential; only fact that the total effort is in progress can be publicized.

9. Jones will function in Washington, Michigan or New York City, as agreed between McCracken and Jones. He would doubtless be needed at least to the end of November and possibly until new Administration takes office. RN might wish to retain him permanently in a White House administrative role. Suspect his pay would have to be at roughly a $30,000 a year rate for this interim period, plus secretarial, etc. backup.

10. I consider this effort a highly important one for RN; if elected, and if this task is done well, he will save six months to a year in getting his new Administration in gear. Eisenhower lost a year (1953) for the lack of this.

BH/lac
Memorandum

9/12/68
Indianapolis

To:    DC
From:  Anderson
Re:    President Johnson's request for representatives on the problems of transition.

President Johnson has invited each of the three major candidates to send representatives to the White House to work with his representative, Charles Murphy, on the problems of transition.

It would seem that the two men who could handle this most effectively are Bryce Harlow and Maury Stans. I have run this idea by Buchanan, Keogh, Greenspan and Allen. They agree that Harlow and Stans would bring to this difficult and delicate task an unmatched combination of seasoned judgment, broad government experience and an intimate knowledge of the key people in Washington.

Henry Johnis
McCracken task force
Arthur Burns - Tom Evans

Frank Lincoln
MEMO TO LARRY HIGBY FROM SIMMONS
RECEIVED FOLLOWING MEMO TO HALDEMAN FROM JERRY FRIEDHEIM, MILITARY AFFAIRS ASSISTANT TO SENATOR TOWER, STAFF DIRECTOR, NIXON/AGNEW KEY ISSUES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: THE TRANSITION: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MECHANICS AT THE WHITE HOUSE

A MAJOR FACTOR INFLUENCING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM DURING THE PERIOD 1964-1967 WAS THE WHITE HOUSE/NATIONAL POLICY MAKING MACHINERY THAT FOMULATED THE POLICY. TO WHIT: THE PROCESS BY WHICH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY MAKING DECISIONS CAME TOGETHER IN THE PERSON OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, MR. WALT ROSTOW.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PLAYED NO SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE FORMULATION OF VIETNAME POLICY DURING 1964-1968. THE DUESDAY LUNCHEON CUB (INFORMAL WEEKLY LUNCHEON MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH THOSE REGARDED AS HIS KEY ADVISORS: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, McNAMARA; SECRETARY OF STATE, RUSK) WAS THE VITAL DECISION MAKING MECHANISM USED BY THE PRESIDENT AND AS SUCH THIS UNOFFICIAL BODY CONSTITUTED A GROUPING EQUIVALENT TO, OR SUPERIOR TO, THE NSC BUT TO FOCUS ATTENTION ONLY AT THAT MECHANISM IS TO OVERLOOK THE DECISIVE ROLE PLAYED BY THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT (MR. ROSTOW) IN STAFFING FOR THOSE MEETINGS AND IN THE DECISIONS ARISING THEREFROM.


IT BECAME ALL THE MORE DANGEROUS BECAUSE THE CONSENSUS PHILOSOPHY WHICH PERVADED THE WHITE HOUSE DURING THIS PERIOD, AND THE LARGE DEGREE OF PERSONAL AGREEMENT ON POLICY BETWEEN McNAMARA, RUSK AND HELMS, CONTRIBUTED TO AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH EFFECTIVELY CLOSED OUT ARGUMENT AGAINST THE GENERAL DRIFT OF THE NATIONAL POLICY AS IT ALSO CLOSED OUT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS WHICH WOULD CONTRADICT OR AT LEAST UNDERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE DIRECTION OF THIS NATIONAL POLICY DRIFT.

ONE OF THE BETTER SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF THIS RESTRAINT UPON THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT WAS THE 1964 DECISION TO CLOSE THE MILITARY ATTACHE OFFICES IN SAIGON BECAUSE THEIR REPORTING WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEW THEN BEING PURSUED IN WASHINGTON. THIS EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED THE MILITARY SERVICES OF ANY MEANINGFUL "CHECK AND BALANCE" UPON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION WITHIN THE VITAL DECISION MAKING CENTERS OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT, AND IT RENDERED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN VIETNAM VIRTUALLY SUBSERVIENT TO THE U.S. EMBASSY THERE.

IN WASHINGTON MR. ROSTOW BECAME THE FOCAL POINT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY THE CIA, WHICH ALSO UTILIZED THE PRODUCTS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

INDEPENDENT REPORTING CHANNELS CONTINUED TO EXIST.
EXPERIENCES SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS UNDERSTAND WELL THE RISKS WHICH ARE INHERENT IN HAVING THEIR G-2 IN ANY WAY SUBSERVIENT TO--OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO--THE PLANNING PROCESS. IN SUCH A SITUATION, INTELLIGENCE--WHICH IS IN THE BEST OF CONDITIONS NOT EASILY PERCEPTIVE OF THE WHOLE "REAL WORLD"--TENDS TO BECOME CONTAMINATED.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S STAFF SHOULD INCLUDE A SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WHO WOULD HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT AND WOULD BE COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF ANY PART OF THE PLANNING OR DECISION MAKING PROCESS. HE SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE PRESIDENT (AND HIS STAFF) WITH THE "FACTS" IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE KNOWN BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE. WHEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS DIFFERENT "ANSWERS" AS FREQUENTLY OCCURS, HE SHOULD BE OBLIGED TO ADVISE THE PRESIDENT THAT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION EXIST ON THE GIVEN POINT OF ISSUE.

IT IS COMMONLY ASSUMED THAT THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PERFORMS THE FUNCTION DESCRIBED ABOVE, BUT IN FACT HE NEVER HAS--MAINLY BECAUSE HE IS A BUSY ADMINISTRATOR IN HIS RIGHT; AND ALSO BECAUSE IT IS THE NATURE OF PRESIDENTIAL STAFFS (ALL STAFFS) TO PROCEED ALONG WITH THE BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THE MOMENT IN SERVING THEIR BOSS' REQUIREMENTS. THUS THE PRESIDENT'S STAFF IS APT TO MOVE A GOOD DISTANCE ALONG IN THE FORMULATION OF POLICY WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE BEST INTELLIGENCE SIMPLY BECAUSE THE DCI IS NOT A PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL STAFF. AN INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST, WHO KNOWS THE TRADE AND THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY CAPABILITIES, LIMITATIONS, VESTED INTERESTS, ETC., WOULD GREATLY IMPROVE THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT BEING UTILIZED BY THE

MR. ROSTOW ABLE SCHOLAR AND PERCEPTIVE STRATEGIST THAT HE IS, WAS NOT SUCH AN "INDEPENDENT AGENT." FROM THIS LACK OF INDEPENDENCE FLOWED MANY OF THE LAST ADMINISTRATION'S VIETNAM MISTAKES, VACILLATIONS, PROCRASTINATION AND "CREDIBILITY."
Prior 10/11/68

2,500 key people.
  C.S. - Can be transferred.
  - Problem of information.

- Put together small org.
  1. Tap Bus for Seasoned Talent.
     What do you ask for? Man that could run company some day.

- Start top down.
  1. Interview then check around.
     Must learn how to interview.
     Train those involved in campaign
     Kendall, O'Donnell.

Please call sec tonight.

Transition.
Transition

3 levels of priority:
1. Top: Cabinet Commision heads
2. Top insiders - key player for key post.
3. Top manpower pool.

1.
What types of people
Defense Dept. - Young Officers
Reacts
Recruitment
QPO - Bus.
Academic Pool
Orientation
What & Where we are going
Use Advancement for Recruiting
Young Presidents Org.
Competitor
Service has list of outstanding officers they would like to
keep. Hot young guys.
* What are the attributes top candidates category
as they civil service?
Pino - will put together a plan.

White House Staff.

3 levels. - 1. top insiders.
2. Top. People.
3. Top pool.

Salary levels in White House

E - Problem of the “Dreambook”

Ambassador’s Plume to fair degree.

Re: Possible financial arrangement for Campaign Foundation.

Stakes for Pino.