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November 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: J. Keogh
    P. Buchanan
    R. Price

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

RE: INAUGURAL ADDRESS

I assume all of you, with the assistance of the other writer and research people, are proceeding full tilt with collection of ideas for and preparation of initial drafts of the inaugural address and following that a State of the Union message which will present the new President's legislative program.

Obviously, you don't have adequate input and guidance at this stage for finishing these things up, but I know that RN is going to be turning to you with the expectation that a lot of preliminary thinking will have been completed. I expect this will happen about mid-December, after he has completed the naming of the Cabinet and is able to turn some of his attention to program development.

The best possible use of your time during this period, as I have suggested earlier, is in this area. At this point, there is nothing to be gained from sitting around the White House finding out what the other people do, because all of the studies we have been able to make indicate that ninety percent of what they do isn't the way we are going to do it.

Various key policy appointments will be made in the very near future and, as they are, these people should be able to sit down with you and start work productively on policy and program development. Obviously, this will require coordination with the task forces and their input, but there's a lot to be done on the basis of the campaign promises, the Republican platform and your own recommendations as to the nature and thrust of the new President's program.

H. R. H.
Memorandum

TO: Staff

FROM: SAIC Duncan - Nixon Protective Detail

SUBJECT: Classified Material

On Friday, November 29, 1968, a green paper bag is being placed in each office. It is requested that all classified material for destruction (including carbon paper or other possible impressions) be placed in these bags. Each evening, the bags will be collected, and the waste material destroyed by burning.

Please do not place any classified material in the hotel waste baskets because they will be handled separately by hotel employees.

You are also requested not to leave any classified material or other documents not intended for public knowledge on top of desks. Material of this nature should be kept in locked desk drawers.

Security on the 39th Floor is maintained on a twenty-four hour basis; however, maids, repairmen, etc., although under a security escort, may have visible access to this material.

Your cooperation in these matters will be greatly appreciated.

William L. Duncan
Special Agent in Charge

ERM: pr
November 27, 1968

TO: BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: LARRY HIGBY
RE: TELEPHONES IN NIXON RESIDENCE

Attached is a revised proposal of how the Signal Corps plans to configure telephones in the Nixon residence.

Most of the changes merely involve changing buttons on existing instruments so that each instrument presents a consistent pattern.

You will note that only two private lines will exist on all instruments.

The Signal Corps requests your comments for changes so that they may make proper installation during the next convenient opportunity for the President-elect and his family.

I would only note that it might be good to indicate which lines we wish to ring in which rooms, so that the disaster of last weekend does not repeat itself.
MEMORANDUM

November 27, 1968

TO: DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: URBAN COALITION

I discussed the question of a meeting with the Urban Coalition with RN this afternoon.

He agreed that such a meeting probably should be set before the time that the Cabinet is announced. Accordingly, I would suggest that you go ahead with Gardner to try to work out a suitable date. If it cannot be worked out prior to mid-December, when we expect to have covered the Cabinet, go ahead and work it out for later.

You probably should check with Finch first, since he is going to be talking to Gardner on Wednesday afternoon in San Francisco.
MEMORANDUM

November 27, 1968

TO: DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: FATHER HESBURGH APPOINTMENT

RN does not want to meet with Father Hesburgh unless he requests the appointment.
MEMORANDUM

November 27, 1968

TO: JOHN EHRlichMAN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: TOM EVANS, JR.

Herb Kalmback strongly recommends Tom Evans, Jr., (a different one) whose resume is attached.

He says he would be excellent for special assignments on the White House staff or as an assistant Secretary somewhere. He says he has very good judgment and absolute integrity, and did a sensational job for us during the campaign.

Since he appears to be a lawyer along with everything else, maybe you would like him in your apparatus.
MEMORANDUM

November 27, 1968

TO: PETE FLANIGAN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: DICK MILIANO

I have checked out Dick Milano per your request. (You will recall he was referred to you by Governor Volpe.)

All of my sources inform me that he is not someone we would want on the White House staff, and therefore I plan to take no further action.
MEMORANDUM

November 27, 1968

TO: DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: WALTER REUTHER MEETING

RN wants the Walter Reuther meeting to be set after the
Cabinet is announced.

That is, the meeting should be after the announcement, but
the appointment should be set now.

He suggests sometime around the 10th to 15th of December.
MEMORANDUM

November 27, 1968

TO: BRYCE HARLOW
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN

RE: WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE from Vo. CLXXII, No. 103, entitled "Locking Nixon In"

RN feels that copies of the attached article from the Wall Street Journal should be sent to all of our Congressional leaders, and that you should be fully aware of the problems covered therein.
MEMORANDUM

November 27, 1968

TO: PETER FLANIGAN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: RN's APARTMENT

What is the status of your investigation on the sale of RN's apartment?
November 27, 1968

TO: JOHN EHRLICHMAN
CC: BOB ELLSWORTH

FROM: BOB HALEYMAN

RE: ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS

I am not sure exactly whose bailiwick this falls into, but although it is not of primary urgency, it should not be allowed to pass unnoticed. I trust you two will get together and decide how it should be handled.

RN wants a careful and detailed analysis made of the election results for the purpose of determining what was, and what was not, effective in our various campaign techniques and strategies. The purpose, of course, would be for future planning.

Some of the specific questions or areas that he wants studied are:

1) The effectiveness, or lack of it, of our advertising—our slogans, our television spots, etc.

2) The question of why Humphrey rose so fast in the last two weeks, with an especial look at the way the east softened up, as well as the situation in Illinois and California where we were way ahead earlier.

3) The question of why we closed so strong in the south.

4) He feels that we were probably right to start fast and strong, as we did, but perhaps that we tried to stay high consistently for too long. Possibly we should have hit them hard in the beginning and then dropped off—and closed hard. Some analysis of this evaluation would be helpful.

5) He has the feeling that our television documentary did no good in winning votes, that it probably only affected intellectuals whose minds were already made up. Can we determine whether this is the case?
November 27, 1968

6) He especially wants a thorough study in New York, for instance in Nassau County where we did not do nearly as well as we should have. He also wants a study in Massachusetts, where at one point we thought we might win, but then lost 2 to 1. Then the question of why we took New Jersey and lost New York and Connecticut.

7) He also wants an analysis of the complete television coverage of the campaign, and the fact that the form of reporting may have hurt us. For example, the news showed Humphrey as a lovable underdog. Did we handle this adequately?

8) He wants an analysis of what really happened to the Wallace vote. These are some of the kinds of questions RN has raised. It is my feeling that we should get some astute political scientist to work on this matter quickly, before everything in the way of original material disappears.

One thought that comes to mind is George Grassmuck. RN had suggested Joe Batchelder. There is also, of course, the question of funding this. Perhaps some external source would be interested in doing it for historical purposes, or perhaps we should use Republican National Committee funds so that the information is our private property.

In any event, the project should be launched, and I trust the two of you will see that it is.
MEMORANDUM

November 27, 1968

TO:           JOHN EHRlichMAN
              DWIGHT CHAPIN
              KEN COLE
              LARRY HIGBY

FROM:         BOB HALDEMAN

RE:           WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS

As a back-up to the present White House communications network, RN has requested that one of our staff be available as duty officer at all times. He would assist the White House board and RN in communications and other matters as needed.

To facilitate this request I am asking you to become one of the people available for duty officer. Ninety percent of the time I will assume this role and be in a position to be in communication with the White House boards. If for some reason, however, I am unavailable, the board will contact one of you and request that you assume the role.

During that time you should be able to be reached on a continuing basis by the board should RN or the White House board require assistance.

Thank you for your cooperation.
TO: Nixon Staff  
FROM: Stephen Bull  
RE: TELEPHONE USAGE  

November 27, 1968

In order to best utilize the communications facilities provided us, the following points are offered regarding the use of the WHCA (White House Communications Agency) lines.

BACKGROUND

WHCA is a joint military agency under the Defense Communications Agency. Operators are military personnel assigned to this detail as a tour of duty. The telephone installers, however, are employees of the N.Y. Telephone Co. Requests for installation of phones should come to me, and I will direct the requests to the WHCA Trip Officer, who will then place specific installation orders with N.Y. Telephone.

RECEIVING CALLS

1. In order for you to receive calls you must keep the switchboard appraised of your location at all times. The WHCA operators maintain listings of each Staff member so that incoming calls can reach you. However, if you leave your desk for any significant period of time without advising the operator where you can be reached the operator will either waste a great deal of time tracking you down or the call may miss you completely. Most likely both will occur. In view of this, for your benefit please follow these guidelines:

   a) Insure that the telephone operator knows the primary lines on which you can be reached.

   b) When leaving your phone unattended for more than a few minutes, advise the operator of your temporary location. If you will be unable to receive calls at your temporary location, so inform the operator, who can subsequently advise the party calling you when to try again.

   c) Insure that the telephone operator knows your residence location and telephone number.
d) Should your position be such that you might need to be reached at any time or place, you should constantly keep the operator appraised of your location, e.g. the location of the restaurant where you are dining and the approximate time of arrival and departure at the restaurant.

2. The incoming N.Y. telephone (Signal) number is 421-3100.

PLACING CALLS

1. **Local Calls** – In nearly every case, the telephone instrument in your office contains WHCA lines and straight business lines. These business lines are entirely separate from the WHCA operation. For local calls, where you know the telephone number, you can just dial directly on the business line. If you do not have time, do not know the number, etc., ask the WHCA operator for the party you want and he will connect you. Please provide as much information as possible, e.g. "This is Mr. Smith. I would like Mr. Jones at ABC Corporation in N.Y.C. I think they're located on Park Avenue."

2. **Long Distance Calls** – You should try to place all toll calls through the WHCA operator for one very good reason: we do not pay for toll calls through WHCA, whereas we do on the business lines. As with local calls, provide the operator with as much information as possible.

3. **Inter-Office Calls** – Lift WHCA line and ask the operator for the party to whom you wish to speak. No extension numbers are necessary.

GENERAL

1. The bells and lights on the phones are powered by the 110 volt current in each room. In some of the newer rooms in the Hotel Pierre all the current in the room is controlled by a single wall switch. It is possible that on bright days you might not be using electric lights and possibly might have the electricity turned off. If this happens your phone will not ring.

2. To report a line out of order, advise the WHCA operator. He will request repair service for either the WHCA or business lines.
MEMORANDUM

November 27, 1968

TO: BRYCE HARLOW
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE from Vol. CLXXII, No. 103, entitled "Locking Nixon In"

RN feels that copies of the attached article from the Wall Street Journal should be sent to all of our Congressional leaders, and that you should be fully aware of the problems covered therein.
Locking Nixon In
Great Society Planners Plotting to Force GOP To Continue Programs

They Set Commitments Now, Get Legislative Backers; But Success Is in Doubt

'Booby Trap' and Other Ploys

BY MONTGOMERY W. KARMAN
First Edition of This Wire Service Journal
WASHINGTON—As twilight descends on the Johnson era, LBJ’s men are getting ready for the last big push. Their objective: To save as much as possible of their domestic welfare programs from the Nixon knife.

The poverty-fighting Office of Economic Opportunity, notwithstanding expectations of some cutback or revamping at the hands of Mr. Nixon, is plotting a sharp thrust for its neighborhood health centers and anti-poverty efforts. A doubling of the $29 million health budget is talked of to achieve what Dr. Gary Landon, cognizant of Republican cost-containment, describes as “an efficient delivery system” of health services to the poor.

Another seemingly favorite tactic among the Johnsonites might be described as “round-the-flap.” This is designed to place on the public record expanded horizons for the Great Society so that, after the LBJ crew leaves, friendly Congressional Democrats and special-interest lobby groups will be able to use these stated goals as weapons for legislative battles with the GOP. Whether this play will be more or less successful than the “momentum” play is not known, however.

Promoting Integration
If Secretary Wilbur Cohen of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and Mr. Nixon, the President, shoulder the heavy budget burden, and other messages will propose a variety of new social-welfare threats. One possibility aims at promoting school integration with a new Federal-aid program to encourage the construction of public schools at sites between white and black neighborhoods. Another: Expanding Medicare to cover the cost of drugs and making the program available to disabled persons and infants as well as old folks.

Mr. Cohen hopes to keep his new ideas alive until the time is right for the Cohen concept to be “in” or else until Mr. Nixon is out. Though he’ll formally join the University of Michigan faculty upon his departure from HEW, Mr. Cohen expects to spend a good deal of his time helping Congressional Democrats continue the fight for the Great Society.

Looking to Capitol Hill, too, are Mr. Johnson’s tax strategists. The President, before year-end, will send Congress his proposals for reforming the tax laws, probably including recommendations to ease the tax burden on the poor. Those at work on the tax package seem less concerned with pleasing Mr. Nixon than with satisfying Democratic reformers in Congress, who might push ahead with or without help from the new regime. “Next year more than usual,” predicts one, “tax policy will be made on Capitol Hill” instead of at the Treasury.

Pentagon Efforts
Even the Pentagon is joining the effort to bring pressure on the next Administration. Not long ago Defense Secretary Clark Clifford proclaimed his desire to enlist the military establishment in helping meet social needs, including lower-cost housing construction and added job opportunities for slum-dwellers. Before he leaves office, Mr. Clifford expects to offer at least 10 specific recommendations for his successor on how to proceed. These matching orders are sure to find support among Congressional liberals.

HUD’s Mr. Weaver knows that he, too, must rely on Democratic legislators to take up the urban aid cause after he leaves. As a yardstick for possible Congressional action, HUD planners are calculating what they think it will take just to keep pace with rising urban needs in the years ahead. Their conclusion: Total

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Glonal investment (Federal, state, local and private) must rise to an annual spending rate of nearly $532 billion in 1968, compared with $360 billion in 1966.

Some Johnson teammates display a preference for a "glum and doom" approach. The idea here is to spread the idea that certain perils are so pressing that the new President simply has no recourse except to do as the Johnson Administration wants him to do.

An example is the talk emanating from LBJ's economic advisers. On the one hand, they warn that if Mr. Nixon keeps his pledge to let the 10% surtax lapse on June 30, he'll ruin the rest of a heated-up inflationary boom that remains the only sign of a stable economy. On the other hand, they warn that unless Mr. Nixon stays up Federal spending early in his reign, the economy could spin into a recession.

A variation is the "booby trap" strategy, calculated to pressure the new President into a course of action by leaving him little real choice politically.

Labor Department backers of the Concentrated Employment Program to bring jobs to urban ghettos are engaging in this sort of plotting. About 20 CEP contracts are now up for renewal, and the department is renewing them at past-year spending levels. The booby trap: Because of earlier budget trimming, the new CEP money will run dry in April of next year. Thus, next spring the Nixon team will face the decision of whether to let an important ghetto job program wither or to find money elsewhere to keep it going. The CEP fans are betting new money will be found.

"Sacrificial Lambs"

A different element in the defense strategy is the offering-up of "sacrificial lambs" to the incoming Administration. The hope is that by proposing certain policies that might help Mr. Nixon validate his campaign promises of economical and streamlined Government, the departing Johnsonites might be able to save other cherished programs.

One concession to Nixon aims might come from HUD officials. They are prepared to suggest to the new Administration that it might want to gather up the manifold programs for housing low-income and moderate-income families into a tidier organizational package; in the campaign, Mr. Nixon accused the department of operating in a state of chaos. HUD officials also seem prepared to give up the idea of a third round of "model cities" grants, hoping Mr. Nixon might then be more willing to OK pay for the 150 cities to be involved in the first two rounds. "We won't push too hard for the third round," confides a HUD policy-maker.

The "Save the Great Society" participants also are beginning to think Republican, hoping Mr. Nixon may spare certain Democratic programs if they can be shown to fit his philosophy.

Opportunity are hopeful that a new hybrid agency, called The Community Corporation, will gain enthusiasm from the Republicans. These corporations, just now coming into being, are semi-independent from local anti-poverty programs, electing their own boards of directors and managing their own community-improvement funds. OEO officials believe the concept dovetails with Nixon emphasis on local control, self-determination and black capitalism, and they plan to point this out to the new Administration.

HUD Secretary Weaver already is talking to Republicans, especially about programs such as public housing that seem especially vulnerable to the Nixon knife. He claims that through the "turnkey" approach providing for private planning and construction of public housing, as well as through experiments with private management of public housing, the New Democrats program to house the poor has taken on private-enterprise aspects.

In fact, Mr. Weaver proclaims, "This Administration has been more concerned with the involvement of private enterprise than any Administration to date. We've not only been concerned, we've done something about it."

An Ancient Axiom

The not-so-secret weapon in the fight to preserve the Great Society is the ancient but still-accurate axiom of politics that says if there are two important votes to be gained by pursuing a course of action, a President is likely to pursue that course.

This is most applicable to programs such as Model Cities, which has been promoted by the Johnson Administration to the point where it stands as a symbol of potential help to many slum-dwellers.

Though delays have upset the program's timetable, the political promise of Model Cities remains alive for Mr. Nixon. By 1972, when he presumably will be up for reelection, there may be a lot of visible change in the ghettos, a lot of projects for a President to cut ribbons at and a lot of political credit to be collected—or so the Model Cities enthusiasts suggest.

They also suggest that Mr. Nixon could use some political help in the heavily Democratic cities and with the heavily Democratic black population in these cities. "Nixon's a 45% President," one urbanologist muses, "and he can be more than that only if he gets help from the cities and the black people."
Memorandum

TO: Nixon Staff

FROM: SAIC Duncan - Nixon Protective Detail

SUBJECT: New Lapel Identification

Effective November 27, 1968, the lapel pins issued for the Campaign Tour are no longer valid.

Attached to this note is your new lapel identification. This lapel pin should be worn anytime you are in the vicinity of Mr. Nixon, his family, his residence, the Nixon Office, or any trip on which you accompany Mr. Nixon.

If lost or misplaced, notify the nearest U. S. Secret Service Agent.

William L. Duncan
Special Agent in Charge
MEMORANDUM

November 25, 1968

TO: TOM EVANS
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: LEGAL AID SOCIETY

After careful consideration RN has made the firm decision that he will not serve as Honorary Chairman or in any other such role with any organization during the term of his Presidency.

Obviously as times go on exceptions will have to be made to this rule, but he is anxious that they be as few as possible.

With this in mind, what is your feeling as to the position he ought to take on the Legal Aid Society. It would be mine that he should not serve as Honorary Vice-President in spite of the tradition. If he does take this post it is going to make it more difficult to turn down the others as a matter of policy.

Will appreciate your recommendation.
MEMORANDUM

November 25, 1968

TO: DICK ALLEN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: PERSONNEL RECOMMENDATIONS

Thanks for your excellent list of personnel recommendations.

Special thanks for the careful manner in which they were prepared and presented. I would hope that you would counsel with all of your associates in the R&W area and guide them in the method of preparing and presenting personnel recommendations.

The way you have done it is especially helpful because you have pinned down specific assignments for each individual along with alternatives, and have cited only the pertinent background in each case.

Keep them coming.
MEMORANDUM

November 25, 1968

TO: PAT BUCHANAN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: PERSONNEL: BLAKE

RN would like you to check out a fellow by the name of Blake whose father is from Whittier. He says you will know who it is. The question is whether he would be useful at the Assistant-Secretary level, and if so, where.
MEMORANDUM

November 25, 1968

TO: DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
RE: PERSONNEL: H. TASCA and J. BEAM

RN talked with Robert Murphy regarding Henry Tasca and Jacob Beam. Murphy explained the problem in bringing them back and it was agreed that we would hold up on this for the time being. He did ask Murphy to check to see if there was any chance of Tasca coming home for Christmas or around that time.

It was left that Murphy will try to set up meetings as soon as it is possible.
November 25, 1968

TO: RAY PRICE

FROM: BOB HALDEMAN

RE: PERSONNEL RECOMMENDATIONS

RN especially anxious to get from you any thoughts you have on people in the State Department and Foreign Service with whom you were particularly impressed, and your thoughts as to what roles they might fill in the administration.