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A Preliminary Outline of Problems and Issues

Caveat

Even to take up the idea of improving the Office of the President raises the question: Is there such a thing as an "Office of the President" apart from the President who occupies it? Is there "a right way" to be President? A study of the Presidency should recognize that the answer may be "no" and in any case will be contested. Nonetheless, as its minimum assignment, such a study could and should

a) show what has been happening -- throughout 180 and especially the last 36 years -- to the concept and functioning of that Office;
b) discuss alternative approaches to the key issues today (e.g. the war power, coordination of domestic programs);
c) sum up certain lessons of administrative effectiveness, applicable at any level; and
d) end up by displaying before future Presidents and the nation the choices available and the consequences of choosing.

Bradley H. Patterson, Jr.
I. SOME ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE AS CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR

A. The key dilemma: A singular President and a Plural Executive Branch

Article II Section I begins "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." This one man, with one body and one brain, is thus in the eyes of the Constitution, alone responsible for carrying out tens of thousands of public statutes and for directing the work of 6 million employees. Both statutes and employees are increasing yearly.

Early or late in the study, two questions must be faced:

1. Is there any limit at all on the number of statutes, programs and employees which a President can direct with enough effectiveness to make elections meaningful?

2. Should the Presidency be multiple?

The answer to both questions is probably "no" but this then forces examination of all the modes of a President's Administrator Role.

As preliminary research:

--Graph the number of public laws in effect at the start of each President's term, beginning in 1789;
-- Graph the number of civil and military employees in the same manner;
-- Graph the federal budget likewise;

B. With respect to some of the Statutes: The laws assign specific duties to the President.
1. How many are there of these specific assignments? Make a catalogue.
2. How many have been delegated and to whom?
3. How many are still undelegated?
4. Of the undelegated assignments, how many others could or should be delegated?

C. For All of the Statutes: There is the President's obligation to "Take Care That the Laws be faithfully executed."
1. To do this the President needs information on how programs are being administered, especially advance information on problems being encountered.
   a. From recent history, what are some notable examples of this need?
   b. What information mechanisms for producing advance information have been tried? Which have the greatest promise of effectiveness?
c. Is the President used too often as Ombudsman for the Congress, Governors, Mayors and the rest? What is the irreducible minimum for this role?

2. An unavoidable part of the "Take Care" Role is the President's ultimate obligation to be Chief Coordinator in program administration. With special reference to the domestic sphere:

   a. Describe this obligation, with examples.

   b. What can be learned, useful to domestic program coordination, from the accomplishments in forging a national security community over the past quarter century? What essential differences?

   c. Evaluate (linked with "b" above) the program coordination role of:

      -- Committees (e.g. Cabinet, NSC, EOC and on down to regional and local levels e.g. Federal Executive Boards).

      -- Executive Office troubleshooting task forces (e.g. on Neighborhood Centers).
The Bureau of the Budget, OST, OEP.
A new unit in the Executive Office.
Special White House Assistants and Staffs (Califano, Bundy/Rostow & Companies).
Interagency information exchanges (the Vance-Ball Agreement, CHECKPOINT procedures).
Special Agency Centers (NMCC, Operations Centers, Chart Rooms, Situation Room).
Interchange of agency personnel (e.g. State/Defense/JCS).
The Metropolitan Expediter experiment.
The reforms proposed in the Intergovernmental Relations Act.
Consolidated Departmental regional boundaries and offices.
Regional Presidential coordinators.
Training programs for the bureaucracy (Executive Seminar Centers, Career Executive Institute, War Colleges).

Another way of looking at it: could the problem of federal program coordination be lessened by delegating the operation of certain federal programs out of the federal bureaucracy to geographically
based units at other levels of our federal system: e.g.: Neighborhood Corporations, Cities, Multi-County Units, Regional Governmental Organizations, States?
Pros and cons of this approach.

D. For Statutes yet to come: a President may need new flexibility.

1. To vary tax rates within a given range: give the arguments pro and con.
2. To vary interest rates within a given range: give the arguments pro and con.
3. To transfer funds among appropriation titles or programs: give the arguments pro and con.

E. The President's Control: Is the Executive Branch being insulated from him?

The Congress frequently attempts to drive wedges between the President and his subordinates, vesting statutory power in the hands of independent bodies or of long-term officers. Does the nation benefit or suffer from this?

1. Review this problem with respect to Departments and Agencies (e.g. the REA issue of 1959, the Small Business Administration, terms of office for FBI, JCS).
2. Review this problem with respect to the Regulatory Commissions: do they improperly circumscribe the President's ability to meet his responsibilities?
II. SOME ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Article II, Section 2:

"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States;"

The dilemma:* The same singular President, one body and one brain, also responsible for the actions of 3-1/2 million persons in the Armed Forces -- in their use of bayonets or megatons -- with shorter and shorter warning times and with the constant danger of small, far-off crises escalating into major confrontations.

The basic question: With new gadgetry making Washington-to-front-line communications easier and easier, what principles of delegation should a President follow?

As preliminary research:

-- Discuss and if possible graph or otherwise portray the stages through which Presidential military communications have come: from the packet of letters on board a sailing ship through telegraph and telephone to today's facilities.

-- Forecast them ten years ahead.

-- Graph the size of the Armed Forces beginning in 1789.

*For a discussion of the War Power in the sense of making and keeping commitments, see Section III.
-- Graph the size of the Armed Forces Budget beginning in 1789.

A. **Strategic Crises**

1. What are the best estimates as to the warning time Presidents in the near future will have with respect to strategic threats?

2. What do present and future strategic weapons developments portend for the variety of Presidential options, the length of time he may have to choose and his ability to delay, redirect or recall weapons once chosen?

3. What new facilities and procedures, if any, need to be initiated to equip a President to survive and to command in a strategic crisis?

B. **Tactical Crises**

1. What are the factors which tend to force Presidents to play a personal hand in tactical national security crises? (There are at least ten.) Give examples from recent history.
2. What are the risks a President runs who feels impelled to play such a personal hand?

3. What principles should govern the balance to be struck?

4. What aids and helps should be developed or enlarged for the President to make this balance more tolerable?
III. SOME ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE AS CHIEF DIPLOMAT

Article II, Section 2:

"He shall have the power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, providing two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,..."

Article II, Section 3:

"... he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers;"

"The Congress shall have Power ... To declare War," "... To make rules for the Government and Regulations of the land and naval Forces."

The dilemma:

Chairman Fulbright: "You think it is outmoded to declare war?"

Under Secretary Katzenbach: "In this kind of context I think the expression of declaring a war is one that has become outmoded in the international arena." (S Res. 151 Hearings, August, 1967, page 81)

Chairman Fulbright: "Would the President, if there were no [Tonkin] resolution, be with or without constitutional authority to send U.S. soldiers to South Vietnam in the numbers that are there today?"

Under Secretary Katzenbach: "It would be my view, as I indicated, Mr. Chairman, that he does have that authority. I think there would be others both inside and outside of the Government who would not agree with that...yes, I think it includes the authority to bomb North Vietnam." (S Res. 151 Hearings, August, 1967, page 141).
A. The President's Power to Make and Keep Commitments.

1. The Secretary of State should be asked to prepare a list of all the nations with which we have diplomatic relations and for each one set forth what it (not we) believes are either formal (e.g. NATO) or informal (e.g. Israel) U.S. commitments to it which could involve the use of US armed forces.

2. What are the prospects over the next eight years that under any of these believed commitments U.S. armed forces help will be requested?

3. What are the prospects over the next eight years that any of these requests could be met by peace-keeping forces other than of the U.S. (e.g. UN, Regional?)

4. Should the new President endorse and abide by S. Res. 187?* Give a full analysis of the arguments pro and con. If not, what principles should guide future Presidents' relationships with Congress with regard to the use of U.S. Armed Forces in meeting foreign requests for assistance?

*Text appended
B. The President as Negotiator

1. Graph, in terms of hours if possible, the international bilateral and multilateral conferences (in the U.S. or abroad) in which the President has personally participated as a substantive negotiator, from President Roosevelt through President Johnson. What trend here does the Secretary of State forecast for the future?

2. Analyze the procedures now used in preparing for, in "advancing" and in conducting every aspect of a Presidential conference at home or abroad with another Head of Government with a view to recommending steps to save Presidential time and energy without degrading his ability to conduct negotiations effectively.

C. The President as Manager of the National Security Community

1. Review the arrangements in the national security community for keeping the President informed -- the respective roles of the White House Staff, the Situation Room, the Departmental Command/Operations Centers. Examine the possibilities (and pros and cons) of increased automation, faster data storage and retrieval, improved communications (especially to Ambassadors), secure conference television.
2. How effectively are Ambassadors acting as Presidential agents in knitting together the Country Teams abroad? What further improvements if any are needed here in the interests of the Presidency?

3. Make an analytic comparison of the national security policy machinery used by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson in such a way that present options and choices for the new President are clearly set forth.

4. Include in the above a critical review of the current and future abilities and procedures in the national security community to anticipate crises in foreign affairs and to form contingency plans both interdepartmental and intergovernmental.
IV. ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE AS CHIEF RECOMMENDER

Article II, Section 3

"He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient;"

A. The Increasing Role

1. Graph (in terms of numbers of Messages, or perhaps of words) the growth of formal proposals Presidents have made to Congress from Washington's term on.

2. Describe the changes in technique: from the written note to the evening, televised address to a Joint Session.

3. Compare comments on this practice by Presidents, Senators and Congressmen and others. The future: more of same undiminished or even increasing?

B. Information for Policy Formulation

1. Make a thorough analysis of OEO's Information Center function -- what it has done already (County-by-County Poverty Indicators, a catalogue of assistance programs, County-by-County Federal expenditure analysis), and what it foresees being able to do in the future
(construction of models, testing of alternative hypotheses).

2. Do the same for OEP's PARM system and the facilities this represents.

3. Review the economic information function of the Council of Economic Advisers—what it can contribute.

4. Distill from these analyses and any other systems being inaugurated in progressive Departments, alternative proposals for constructing a Presidential information system for policy formulation (fitting same hand-in-glove with the information systems for program coordination—being discussed under Section 1-B above).

C. Unresponsible Advice for Policy Formulation

1. Total (in numbers) the Citizens Commissions and Councils (those made public and those not made public) advisory to the President from Roosevelt's time on.

2. Describe and show the plusses and minuses for the President of the various roles Advisory Commissions play vis-a-vis the Presidency (e.g. researchers, balloon-floaters, crises-calmer, stallers, wakers-up of somnolent Departments, policy
reviewers and innovative proposers, lobbiers-in-Congress, talent pools, keep-Congress-happy groups, patronage outlets, even needleers of the President himself, etc) and name an example or two of each of these types.

3. Name the whole total in being as of January 1, 1968 which were advisory to the President. Analyze the problems of overlap, vague terms of reference, poor attendance.

4. Analyze the rocky road every President must in the end travel from unresponsible to responsible advice -- from the blue-sky proposals of Commissions to feasible legislative recommendations.

5. From all the above, what guidelines can be proposed for the President's use of public advisory groups -- perhaps to make that final stretch less rocky for him?

6. Explore the idea of a common secretariat and common facilities for public advisory groups to the President.

D. Responsible Advice for Policy Formulation

1. How open are the channels between the President and the senior career
bureaucracy? How open should they be?

-- White House social receptions from time to time?
-- Should the President visit more Federal field installations?
-- Should the President oftener visit the Departments for closed-door Q and A sessions with assembled career officers?
-- Should the President, should the White House Staff, directly seek the advice of career officers? Analyze the benefits and risks in view of the pressures on the President from program-loyal bureaucracies.
-- What other ways, if any, to bring the President closer to his career helpers?
2. The role of Cabinet Members and the other political executives -- the razor-edges they walk:

a. Between the bureaucracies and the President;
b. Between Congress and its Committees and the President;
c. Between outside pressure groups and the President.
d. What additional measures, if any, are needed to ensure that the President gets Cabinet Members' unvarnished advice?

3. The Bureau of the Budget features its Legislative and Budget Reviews as machinery for policy formulation: Any improvements possible?
4. The role of Committees:
   a. Cabinet Committees: Make an analysis of their strengths and weaknesses. e.g. the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments probably has been quite effective; the Economic Opportunity Council probably has not. What makes for success— in terms of helping the President? How can the sense of Presidential or inter-departmental perspective come to flower on the part of senior career and Sub-Cabinet/Cabinet officers?
   b. The Cabinet as a collective body. How have different Presidents used it? Accomplishments and limitations; lessons earned from the Eisenhower experience; role of a Cabinet Secretariat; options for a new President.
   c. Committee management: how can good techniques help a President? What about a common secretariat located in or near the White House for the senior-most Cabinet Committees? What could its role be in policing the adequacy of distribution of papers, flagging
the key decisions and knottiest problems for the President, supplying common facilities?

5. The role of the Executive Office:
   It's in six pieces (BOB, CEA, OEP, NSC, OST, OEO) with more continually proposed. Does it make sense to have such a subdivided staff, fractioned by statute, in the Executive Office of the President? Do the President's problems fit into such packages? Is some consolidation in order in the President's own environs?

E. Other Possible Issues Surrounding the President's Policy-Formulating Relationship with Congress
   1. Evaluate the consultative arrangements - at White House and at Cabinet level.
   2. Review the doctrine of Executive Privilege.
V. ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE AS CHIEF PARTISAN

The dilemma is between the President who knows that both foreign and domestic issues are complicated, full of gray areas, with key supporters for his positions on both sides of the political aisles vs the same President who must rise before his partisans every 2 or 4 years and state the issues as being the "good guys against the bad guys".

This dilemma is probably not ameliorable.

A. The Decline of Patronage

Analyze the effect of the decreasing number of non-merit positions (e.g. IRS, Customs, Post Office) on the President's ability to use patronage as a lever of persuasion and influence.

B. The President's Relationships to the Party -

What are the Proprieties?

1. In Fund-raising?
2. For his personal role in campaigning?
3. In building the party for the future?
VI. ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE AS CHIEF OF STATE

A. Answering his mail

1. Graph the numerical increase in mail to the President since 1932.
2. Graph the numerical increase in gifts sent in to the President since 1932.
3. Graph the increase in private requests for Presidential statements and messages since 1932.
4. After considering both precedent and prognosis, what would be some useful guidelines for the future in what has been called the Pastoral Role of the President?

B. Communicating with the American Public

The country looks to the President to provide unifying leadership particularly amid the disorder and dissension of these times. What new or refurbished modes of communication should the President consider?

-- "walks in the ghetto" a la Lindsay
-- some kind of local Presidential presence, e.g. at regional level...
-- Fireside chats a la Roosevelt.
-- Giving the thousands of White House tourists more information about the Presidency.

What others?
VII. OTHER AREAS OF INQUIRY

A. Assistance from the Vice President

At least in the public mind, the question almost always arises: "What can the Vice President do to help with the burden on the President?" Being fully aware of the extreme sensitivity of President-Vice President relationships, a proper study could and should discuss the possibilities and the limits of Vice Presidential assistance in the form of:

1. Trips and Conferences abroad
2. The "Staff officer" function on specific problems (e.g. as Vice President Johnson did on the supersonic transport.)
3. Chairmanship of Cabinet committees
4. Liaison with special groups (e.g. Vice President Humphrey with Mayors)
5. Political duties.

B. Structure of the White House Staff

Here particularly the caveat at the beginning of this outline comes into play: there is no "right" structure. Yet since the Brownlow-Merriam Report of 1937, there is experience with various forms. What light does this experience shed on the alternatives open to a new President?

1. A staff of specialists or generalists?
2. A structure of hierarchy or equality?

3. The need for internal communication devices.

4. Cooperation with special staffs (e.g. national security) and with coordinating units in the Executive Office.

5. Idea of a Conference Secretary and what he could do (e.g. decision records, rapid, limited distribution systems).

6. Desirable and undesirable methods of liaison and quick communication between White House Staff and key parts of the bureaucracy.

7. The extension of White House staff: secretariats, duty centers in the Departments.

C. The Presidential Role with the Press

1. What are the proprieties if any? New rules needed? The choices facing each President.

D. Presidential Facilities

The White House Residence was rebuilt 18 years ago. But the White House office facilities, and some of the procedures in it are not far removed from horse-and-buggy days:
1. The Chief Physical Needs
   a. Space for offices
   b. Conference facilities; a Cabinet Room with visual display capability
   c. An auditorium
   d. Reception facilities
   e. Ceremonial facilities
   f. Press facilities

2. Communications Procedures
   a. Messengers getting in and out of cars and driving them around town; electronics surely have moved us beyond this.
   b. Explore a tube delivery system; secure multiple LDX; secure conference television

E. Should there be more of a Role for Ex-Presidents?

1. In the Congress or in the Executive Branch?

2. Constitutional or statutory? -- or stick with informal arrangements?
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 30, 1967

Mr. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported the following resolution; which was ordered to be placed on the calendar

RESOLUTION

Whereas the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government have joint responsibility and authority to formulate the foreign policy of the United States; and

Whereas the authority to initiate war is vested in Congress by the Constitution: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That a commitment for purposes of this resolution means the use of, or promise to a foreign state or people to use, the Armed Forces of the United States either immediately or upon the happening of certain events, and

That it is the sense of the Senate that, under any circumstances which may arise in the future pertaining to situations in which the United States is not already involved,
the commitment of the Armed Forces of the United States
to hostilities on foreign territory for any purpose other than
to repel an attack on the United States or to protect United
States citizens or property properly will result from a de­
cision made in accordance with constitutional processes,
which, in addition to appropriate executive action, require
affirmative action by Congress specifically intended to give
rise to such commitment.
The Secretariat Function in the White House

In Jackson's time it was like this:

"The general says he likes things simple as a mouse trap .... There is enuff of us to do all that's wanted. Every day, jest after breakfast, the (President) lights his pipe, and begins to think pretty hard .... I and Major Donaldson begin to open letters for him; and there is more than three bushels every day, and all the while coming. We don't git through more than a bushel a day; and never trouble long ones, unless they come from Mr. Van Buren, or Mr. Kindle, [Amos Kendall] or some other of our great folks. Then we sort 'em out jest like Zekil Bigelow does the mackerel at his packin' yard.... We only make three sorts and keep three big baskets, one marked 'not red', another 'red, and worth nothin', and another 'red, and to be answered'. And then all the (President) has to do is to say, 'Major, I reckon we best say so and so to that,' and I say 'Jest so', or not, jest as the notion takes me -- and then we go at it.

"We keep all the Secretaries and the Vice President, and some District Attorneys, and a good many of our folks, and Amos Kindle moving about; and they tell us jest how the cat jumps.

"As I said afore, if it warnt for Congress meetin' once a year, we'd put the government in a onehorse wagon, and go jest where we liked."*

Today the problem is somewhat tougher. In particular, how can the President be sure that each decision he makes is:

First of all: remembered -- written down and kept track of?

Second: communicated -- to the tiny or broad circle of men who need to know about it to act?

Third: followed up in the future days or weeks?

Fourth: recalled -- when a new, related decision is pending?

*Extract from letter from Major Jack Downing, dated August 17, 1833 (Major Downing was an assistant to President Andrew Jackson)
here are three ways.

A. He can try to do these things himself: personally write down, personally transmit, personally follow up, personally remember.

This puts an entirely needless burden on the President.

B. He can ask each White House or Executive Office or Cabinet Officer to whom he talks on a given matter to do these four tasks on each resulting decision.

This might work, but then there would be perhaps fifty separate and individual centers of record, transmittal, follow-up and recall. A few might perform well, but most of them would let their specialized action tasks take priority over the more prosaic staff function. Moreover there would be no one place where the whole is pulled together.

C. The President can designate a Secretariat Officer -- who is to be czar of nothing but a communicator to all. He can mandate to this officer the primary task of being Recorder, Transmitter, Reminder and Memory.

It is proposed that in the new White House, such an officer be designated, perhaps be called the Conference Secretary, and have the following functions, allowing for any exceptions or special emphases the President would wish to invoke:

1. Record each Presidential decision touching official business.

The modes of doing this would vary:

a) sitting in on Presidential conferences;

b) contacting key White House or Cabinet Officers immediately after a Presidential conference, to ascertain the
substance of decisions reached;
c) attending Cabinet and NSC meetings.

The records of decisions could be cross-filed by Department, by subject, by White House Officer concerned. At the end of each day or week or month, the President could be presented with a capsule summary, if he wished, to review. As the weeks, months, and years went by, this record collection would be an absolutely invaluable asset to the President himself and his senior staff.

Result: the President will never be plagued with the question: "Did anybody remember what I said on that subject?"

2. Transmit each decision or commitment to just those who have to know of it in order to act on it. Recipients of this service would typically be: the appropriate Officers on the White House Staff, in the Executive Office, in the Departments, often the Vice President. Telegraphic or remote Xerox facilities could be used for speed as needed; the oral mode would be eschewed.

Each recipient would know who the other recipients were; doubtful or highly sensitive instances would be checked with the President if necessary.

Result: The President and his Cabinet or White House action officers could concentrate on the substance of action, and not be plagued with the question: "Did we inform the right people of our decision?"
3. The Conference Secretary would ensure that each decision or commitment was followed up at the appropriate time, using a proper measure of judgment as to what that time would be: within hours, days or weeks. He need not be the personal "needler" -- the White House staff or the Executive Office might be doing the actual "riding herd" but he would make sure, for himself and the President, that the reminding continued until the commitment was fulfilled.

If the President wished, the Conference Secretary would periodically prepare a status report of the outstanding decisions which needed especially thorough follow-up - so the President or senior White House Staff could glance down the list...

Result: The President need not fear that the decisions he makes will evaporate in execution.

4. Since the Conference Secretary could be expected to know when related decisions are pending, he would automatically supply to the President and White House Staff the records of earlier decisions, as points of reference.

5. The Conference Secretary, with the President's permission, could and ought to serve the senior White House Staff Officers in the same four-fold staff capacity in which he would help the President. Their decisions are White House decisions, and thereby would have some of the force of the Presidency; they deserve the same services.

The Conference Secretary would be particularly
valuable to his White House staff colleagues in that he would guarantee to them that however staccato they are working, they would be automatically keyed into any Presidential decisions which affect them.

6. The Conference Secretary can and should be expected to ensure that preparations for any Presidential or senior White House conference are taken care of: that the list of attendees is known (and OK'd) by the Convenor of the meeting, that papers (if any) are in the hands of the attendees in advance; that conference facilities have been arranged for.

In addition to these central staff functions, the Conference Secretary is the most logical officer to ask to perform three other basic secretariat tasks:

7. Preparing for Cabinet meetings. This would bring the advantage of not having a separate Cabinet Secretariat sitting by itself as in the White House of 1953-61, but tying this service directly into all the other staff functions to which it is closely related. This relationship would strengthen the President's assurance that the right matters were being brought into Cabinet at the right time, and not extraneous issues dredged up for the occasion.

Naturally the Conference Secretary's office would render its services to Cabinet Committees, if any were established to make special reports. (President Eisenhower set up five
in 1954.) If the President wished, it could extend these conference services also to Presidential Task Forces of private citizens. (President Johnson was using perhaps two dozen of these at once.) The advantage here is not only one of economy in staff (one secretariat instead of dozens of outlying ones) but in the intelligence system which is thereby created for the President and his senior White House officers: they will know what is going on in many policy forums...

8. Riding herd on an Advance Information System for the President. The scarcest commodity around the White House is information from the Executive Branch about problems which are "around the corner". On accomplishments there is a glut; on the crises which finally confront the President there is preoccupation. But the President needs a warning system: to shake out from the reluctant Departments the first indications of crises before they occur, to be told of smoke before it becomes fire. President Eisenhower initiated such a system which, in varying forms, has continued. From 1956-61 it was daily, was called "Staff Notes" and the Departmental raw material was edited by an officer in the White House. Vice President Nixon received a daily copy. In 1961 President Kennedy changed it to a weekly (Tuesdays) collection of two-page memoranda, unedited. President Johnson has similar systems, including one wholly for legislative developments.
The new President needs an Advance Information System (which is for information only, never for action items) but it will require energetic White House reminding to traditionally uncooperative Departments.

9. Reviewing memoranda and correspondence submitted for Presidential (and possibly senior White House Staff) action.

It is of course a matter of Presidential style whether he would wish a central point of secretariat review of action proposals, in addition to the substantive review naturally given to them by White House staff officers. General Goodpaster performed this function for President Eisenhower, asking of each action paper:

- Is it necessary?
- Is it responsive?
- Is it ready for the President's action?
- Is it timely?
- Is it coordinated?
- How will it be followed up?

If this review function is desired, the Conference Secretary's office could provide it.

The Conference Secretary would be a facilitative, not a substantive staff officer. He would have to personify those original White House virtues so well described in 1936:
"...would have no power to make decisions or issue instructions in [his] own right...would not be interposed between the President and the heads of his Departments...would not be assistant President in any sense...would remain in the background, issue no orders, make no decisions, emit no public statements...should be possessed of a high competence, great physical vigor and a passion for anonymity."

The Conference Secretary would have no "empire". With a senior assistant or two (e.g. for Cabinet) his office could be staffed by young men whom the President wanted to bring into government, by White House Fellows, by outstanding young Civil Service interns.

This office could be expected to investigate the use of automatic equipment to store, send and retrieve information; in this area the White House has been a laggard among agencies.

The Conference Secretariat would be only as modest or as elaborate as the President wished; it would build on the many administrative achievements made on the White House staff since 1953 and it could help the President make his own unique contribution to the art of public administration at the apex of government.

Bradley H. Patterson, Jr.
November 18, 1968

Dear Congressman Meader:

Thank you so much for your gracious letter of good wishes.

I am sure the material you enclosed will be most helpful to those who are working with Mr. Nixon on the transition, and I am forwarding it to them for their use.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Rose Mary Woods
Personal Secretary to the President-Elect

The Honorable George Meader
3360 Tennyson Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20015
Dear Rosemary,

Congratulations!

I would appreciate your giving the enclosed sufficient study to see that it is either brought to the attention of Mr. Dixon or referred to someone in his organization who can make use of it.

Best wishes!

Sincerely,

George Meader

Nov. 13, 1968
November 13, 1968

HON. Richard M. Nixon, President-Elect,
United States of America
New York, New York

Dear Dick,

Like Abraham Lincoln (and George Meader) you lost a few. But you won the big one. Congratulations!

Your telegram of November 2, 1968, thanking me for my participation as panelist on "Speak to Nixon-Agnew Program" was appreciated.

In 1952, after Ike won, in my first term, two gentlemen came to see me in my Congressional office. One was Fred Telford, an old civil service buff. The other was Bill Brownrigg, first Civil Service Director of the State of Michigan (formerly Civil Service Director of California). I met Bill when I was Counsel for the Michigan Merit System Association in the late 1930's.

They left a document with me which they had prepared—blue-printing the take-over of the executive branch after 20 years of the New Deal and Fair Deal—without violating civil service laws or merit principles.

This document and their discussion sufficiently impressed me that I brought it to the attention of Al Cole of Kansas who had been defeated for Congress while he was helping others get elected, and was, at the time, deputy to Mr. Roberts of Kansas, National Committee Chairman.

Al told me that he thought the document excellent and that he had given it to Roberts and had urged him to study it. Unfortunately, some scandal about Roberts' lobbying the Kansas legislature brought a sudden end to his service as National Committee Chairman—and that was that!

Meanwhile, immediately after Ike's election, Art Fleming, Nelson Rockefeller, and Milton Eisenhower were somehow constituted the President's Reorganization Committee. Each of them had held important posts in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Apparently, they were in charge of the take-over.
When your election appeared imminent, I tried to resurrect the 1952 civil service document. I contacted both Brownrigg and Telford and also Ab Hermann at the National Committee. Finally I obtained a copy of a subsequent version of this document from Bill Reed who had received it from Bill Brownrigg, III, in 1953.

The Telford document is entitled "A Suggested Patronage Program for the Incoming Republican Administration." It is dated January 12, 1953. A copy is enclosed.

Bill Reed, who was Deputy Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate in the 83rd Congress, also gave me a document dated November 24, 1953, entitled "Federal Personnel Problem," a copy of which is enclosed. This document is sketchy but confirms many of the criticisms of the Telford document and recounts techniques employed—and some specific examples—to obstruct effective take-over of the bureaucracy by the Eisenhower Administration.

I have re-read the Telford document and it seems sound and as applicable today as it was in 1952.

Last week I obtained a copy of "Policy and Supporting Positions" from the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, compiled by the Civil Service Commission pursuant to a request for a list of "excepted positions" by the chairman and ranking minority member of the committee. A cursory examination of this document (a re-run of the 1964 Blue Book) satisfies me that if you replaced all of the incumbents in these positions, which are presently replaceable, your administration would be no different in any substantial way from the Johnson and prior administrations, to the extent that the entrenched bureaucracy could influence it.

Your first and most crucial job is to achieve control of the bureaucracy—without being successfully attacked for reverting to the "spoils system."

You can be sure that the bureaucracy has missed few bets on locking itself in. The task of a meaningful take-over will not be easy. Legislation may be needed. A new "Hoover" Reorganization Commission may be necessary or extensive use of the reorganization power of the President. All will, of course, be difficult to achieve in view of Democratic control of both Houses of Congress and obviously would require time.

More urgent is the requirement to assemble quickly high-powered and reliable skills in the field of civil service, with the capacity to effectuate change under existing laws and regulations.
One good source would be the civil service systems of state and local governments or the personnel departments of private business.

You may be sure you have my best wishes for success in the formidable task you have undertaken.

Sincerely,

George Meader

3360 Tennyson St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20015
Tel. 26-6915

Enclosures
A SUGGESTED PATRONAGE PROGRAM FOR THE INCOMING
REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION

Prepared by Fred Telford

January 12, 1953
A SUGGESTED PATRONAGE PROGRAM FOR THE INCOMING
REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION

Prepared by Fred Telford
Director of the Bureau of Public Personnel Administration
Ednor, Maryland (telephone Fulton 8 - 5707)

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January 12, 1953
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The following statement, entitled "A Suggested Patronage Program for the Incoming Republican Administration," has been prepared by Fred Telford after consultations with a number of persons active in political matters and in technical personnel operations. All of those consulted are in agreement as to the procedures suggested but the manner of presentation is Mr. Telford's only.

For thirty years Mr. Telford has been engaged principally in various types of personnel work and in doing related budget, taxation, and organization work for large and small business and government organizations. He has done administrative, consulting, and technical work for the national governments of the United States and Canada, for a dozen state governments, and for nearly a hundred local governments. He has also aided a number of political organizations; in particular he has aided them in developing and executing programs designed to make it possible for them to appoint the largest possible number of party adherents to suitable positions without violating the personnel laws and without incurring avoidable public and voter opposition and resentment.
A - PATRONAGE POSSIBILITIES

All told there are now somewhat more than two and a half million civilian positions in the executive branch of the national government. In addition, about half a million positions now labeled and treated as military are really civilian in nature; these should be moved to the civilian category and treated in the same manner as other civilian positions.

Something more than two hundred thousand of these positions are not subject to the civil service laws and are usually regarded as in the "patronage" category. About 170,000 of these are located in what is called the continental United States. The remainder are located in foreign countries, in Alaska, in Puerto Rico, and in some other "possessions" of the United States. Actually, however, it would be difficult to use approximately half of these positions for patronage purposes; examples are those in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and several other agencies. For still other positions there are legal prescriptions as to qualifications and firmly established methods of recruiting. Nevertheless at least a hundred thousand of these positions are available for patronage purposes.

Somewhat more than half of the two and a half million positions now labeled as civilian are filled by officers and employees having what is called permanent status. These are popularly supposed to be sacrosanct as far
as patronage is concerned. Such, however, is far from the case. In any
given year approximately a quarter of a million officers and employees
having permanent status leave their positions, which then have to be filled.
In addition, both the classification of these positions and the recruiting for
them have been so carelessly done that, if the positions were reclassified
in the manner prescribed by law, a large fraction of the present incumbents
would have no legal or moral right to their positions as reclassified.

About a million of the two and a half million positions now labeled as
civilian are filled by officers and employees who have what is called in­
definite status or temporary status. They have been recruited in various
ways; a goodly proportion of them are protegees of bureaucrats who, in
recent years, have been building up their own personal machines. In any
case they are serving at the pleasure of their respective appointing au­
thorities, though the Civil Service Commission is trying to get for them
what it proposes to call "reserve" status. A large number of these in­
definite and temporary employees are very well qualified for the posts
they hold but about as many, because of careless and inadequate recruit­
ing methods, are not. It would be a technical personnel crime of the
first order to give them permanent status. Probably half of them, on
the basis of their qualifications - or lack of qualifications - should be
displaced. A good many of these, however, are veterans whom it might
not be expedient politically to separate from their present positions. It
seems safe to state, however, that the more quickly three or four hundred thousand, and possibly half a million, of these indefinite and temporary employees are gotten out of the service, the better it will be for the country and the Republican party.

If the half million or so positions now labeled as military but which are civilian in nature were moved to the civilian category and treated accordingly, just that many positions would become available for the appointment of civilians. The present incumbents, being in the main trained in military science, would be assigned to military duties. Of necessity most of the new incumbents would at the outset have to be given indefinite or temporary appointments; this means that the appointing authorities, while observing meticulously every legal and other restriction, would have a relatively free hand in selecting their appointees.

In a word, the incoming Republican administration has at its disposal well over a million appointments and, if it wishes to make effective use of all the legitimate legal devices, well toward two millions. In addition, the labor turnover is so large as to make available additionally at least half a million more appointments each year.
B - THE CIVIL SERVICE MYTH

Civil service systems are a perennial mystery to those who organize and operate political organizations - and particularly to those who undertake to dispense patronage. This applies in state and local governments and reaches its peak in the case of the national government. Almost without exception, as to the national government, the party leaders make one of two major patronage errors. The first is to accept the myth that, as far as the positions included in the civil service system are concerned, they are sacrosanct and therefore cannot be used for patronage purposes. The second is to disregard inconvenient provisions of the civil service laws and to make appointments by the use of methods which are illegal, which outrage public sentiment, which bring the party into disrepute, and which drive sizable segments of the voters into the opposition party. Never in this century have the party organizations used the civil service machinery on a large scale to achieve their party ends in a legal and ethical manner through the appointment of large numbers of party followers.

The civil service myth is particularly strong and wide-spread in the case of the national government where the basis for the commonly held civil service beliefs is weak and sketchy. As a matter of fact, those responsible for the administration of the civil service laws - that is, the Civil Service Commission, the agency personnel units, and the several
appointing authorities - honor them much more frequently in the breach than in the observance. A few examples show this flagrant disregard of legal requirements and of sound personnel principles. The law properly requires that positions, on the basis of their duties and responsibilities, are to be grouped into homogeneous classes for use in carrying on pay, recruiting, and other personnel operations; the grouping is incomplete and poorly done and the classes as such are seldom used for either pay, recruiting, or other purposes. Instead the vain attempt is made to treat each position as an entity and to disregard the class. In some cases, to be sure, the recruiting is for a true class; examples are Railway Mail Clerk and Messenger. Much more frequently, however, such examinations as are given (the number is only a fraction of those needed) are intended for broad groups of positions only loosely related and the resulting "registers" are used in hit and miss fashion. In one case, for example, when the operating officers asked that qualified persons be certified for appointment as Naturalization Examiner, they were practically forced to use a "register" resulting from an examination dealing in the main with broad legal problems and containing the names of those who, almost entirely, had tried practicing law and who had failed therein. The law requires that, with some exceptions, promotions be made only as the result of examinations; yet, since 1883, when the law was enacted, not a score of promotion examinations have ever been held. The law also requires
that appointments to positions in the departmental service - roughly, though not accurately, those in Washington - be apportioned among the several states according to their population; regularly the Civil Service Commission publishes lists showing this is not being done. Example after example of this kind could be given. In the main those who have to make personnel decisions do much as they please with scant regard for civil service laws and rules; in their own words, they decide each case "on its merits."

Bureaucrats by the dozen use the appointing power to put into office their favorites and proteges and to build up powerful personal machines to be used for their own advantage with slight regard for the administration in office or for the political party in nominal control at the moment. Some have become so strong in their own right that they have defied Presidents, Congressional committees, and party organizations.

Though this system has produced, in the main, a distinctly high grade personnel, there have been many large scale failures, particularly in recent years and in the newer agencies. But the long established units have not been free from embarrassing personnel happenings; well known examples are the infiltration of subversives into the State Department and other units and the corruption among the Collectors of Internal Revenue. It is clear that the orderly personnel procedures prescribed by law should be substituted for the methods now in use. This would mean not only public
acclaim but also, if proper methods are used, the substitution, while the change is being made, of party patronage for personal patronage. The existing personnel machinery and staffs would have to be revamped; some of the actions needed are outlined in section J following.
C - PATRONAGE PITFALLS

So nearly universal is the failure to realize the patronage possibilities, particularly in large services, that it seems worth while to list and explain some of the commoner and more significant patronage pitfalls.

First in order is the failure of the party leaders and also of organization members on the lower levels to realize the magnitude of the patronage problems. Where two and a half or three million positions are involved, and probably two or three times that number of job seekers, the political, technical, and clerical requirements are tremendous. In the case of the national government the difficulties are increased by the diversified nature and geographical scattering of the positions and by the varying needs, desires, and qualifications of the job seekers. No political organization has ever built up the technical and clerical staffs needed to cope with patronage problems of this scope and none has ever availed itself, except to a very limited extent, of the legal and ethical use of the existing personnel machinery of the national government.

When the party leaders fail to realize the magnitude of the patronage problem, it follows as the day follows the night that they have no carefully thought out patronage program. More often than not they fondly conclude that, in some mysterious and unspecified fashion, the thing will work itself out satisfactorily. But in large services it never does. The
higher ups, at best, can give personal attention to only a few thousand positions - and in so doing they run the risk of neglecting other matters of vital importance. The national party organization, with its limited staff, can attend to some additional thousands. The state and local organizations can assist materially, though the problems of coordination become difficult at these levels. Few of the job seekers have any except vague information as to the positions available; they typically ask for something "big," make much noise, exert pressure, and demand quick action. In the end large numbers of party followers are appointed to positions which may or may not be suitable in view of their qualifications. But double, triple, or quadruple the number of actual appointments which are made might be made if the needed party and other machinery were available.

The third pitfall is the delay in handling patronage matters. Time after time those seeking appointments which would be to the party advantage are told they must wait a little longer. At best, when a new administration takes over the national government, some months must elapse before a million appointments of party followers can be made in such a manner as to serve the needs of the country and the party and to meet the requirements of the job seekers. When the days, weeks, and months go by with only limited patronage action, two things occur. The first is that individuals within the party and bureaucrats within the service increasingly
take or force action which in many cases has unfortunate repercussions. The second is that many of those who think they are entitled to appointments but who fail to get them become vociferous and belligerent. In the end there are a good many appointments which, if they had been made promptly, would have been a distinct party asset but which, when made after annoying delays, are regarded as grudging and belated recognition calling for doubt and hostility rather than gratitude.

The fourth major patronage pitfall also comes about, in considerable part, from the failure to recognize the magnitude of the patronage problems and to set up the organization needed to handle patronage matters. With two and a half million positions in the service, half of which or more are available for patronage purposes, and with three, four, or five million party followers actively seeking appointments to which they think they are entitled, the task of matching men and jobs takes on large proportions. Sometimes the failure to do the matching well means nothing more than a poorly manned service about which the voters are only dimly aware. Typically, however, when the matching is poorly done, there is a stench which the voters cannot miss, which they resent, and which they punish at the next election. This happens particularly when the misfits are given positions where they are in the public eye, or when they have corrupt or subversive tendencies, or when those lacking basic qualifications are given positions in which they have to make administrative or technical decisions that are far reaching.
There are other patronage pitfalls which might be discussed. It seems more to the point, however, to point out how, from 1933 to 1952, the Democrats came to grief because of their failure to envision and guard against avoidable patronage mistakes of the kind that the Republicans can, if they will, avoid:

1. When a comprehensive plan of dispensing patronage was presented to him early in 1933, Mr. Farley decisively refused to face large scale patronage realities. He insisted that it would be readily possible, with the existing party machinery, to discover the deserving Democrats who should be appointed to federal positions, to locate the available positions, and to match men and jobs. The tasks, in reality, were not so formidable as they now are because then the federal service was only a fifth as large as it is at present and the positions were much less diversified. Yet, after about three months, Mr. Farley found it expedient to make a nation-wide radio address in which he tried, not very successfully, to explain why relatively few appointments had been made and in which he pleaded with the faithful party followers to be patient for a few more months while the necessary arrangements were being made.

2. For years and years during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations the only active member of the Civil Service Commission was the minority Republican member. First Leonard D. White, then Samuel Ordway, and after him Arthur S. Flemming interested himself in the
policies, programs, procedures, and activities of the Commission while their Democratic colleagues remained largely inactive. This anomaly was discussed in more than one cabinet meeting; Secretary Ickes in particular asked that something be done. But no remedial action was taken.

3. In the absence of any expressed and consistent party interest or action, one bureaucrat after another took advantage of the situation to build up his own personal machine. To give a single example, Ismar Baruch, head of the classification unit of the Civil Service Commission, took pains from 1933 on to become so powerful that he was able successfully to disregard the express instructions of his superiors in the Commission, President Roosevelt, and powerful Congressional leaders.

4. Insufficient attention was frequently paid to certain basic qualifications, such as integrity and loyalty to the United States and its institutions, in making appointments to many key posts. As a result, the Republicans were able, in the 1952 campaign, to make effective issues of the corruption and subversion situations; inept handling of patronage, in fact, led to no inconsiderable part of the "Washington mess."

5. Most striking of all, perhaps, large scale patronage matters were handled so ineptly that large numbers of those given appointments - possibly a majority - were not even Democrats. This is indicated rather conclusively by certain results in the 1952 election. Arlington, Fairfax County, Alexandria, Montgomery County, and Prince Georges County, suburban
areas near Washington in which the federal employees are so numerous as almost to dominate the voting, all turned in sizable Republican majorities.

These and other things which might be cited did not just happen. They came about because sufficient attention was not given to patronage problems. They may be expected to recur under a Republican administration, in the main, unless active steps are taken to produce a different kind of result.
D - THE SUGGESTED METHOD OF HANDLING PATRONAGE

There are two compelling reasons why the orderly handling of patronage cannot be accomplished by means of the party machinery only. The first is the prohibitive money costs which would be entailed in building up and maintaining the large technical and clerical staffs necessary. The second, which would be governing even if the first did not operate, is that the proper matching of men and jobs cannot be done without detailed information as to positions which the party does not now possess and which it cannot obtain without delays running into the years.

These very stubborn facts show clearly that there are only two possible courses of action. The first is to proceed much as the Democrats did, relying upon methods improvised from time to time and then making a limited number of appointments without having at hand much of the needed information as to men and positions. This course is, or should be, unthinkable.

The second possible course is to use both the party machinery and the existing personnel machinery of the national government, making such changes and improvements in both as are necessary. The following paragraphs indicate, in barest outline, how this second course can be followed, legally and ethically and practically, to achieve the desired patronage goals. The later sections give some of the details.

The first step is to obtain the needed information about themselves from party adherents seeking appointments. The party machinery should
be used for this purpose. The national, state, and party organizations should also supply information as to the propriety of the requests of the job seekers and decide upon the priorities to be observed in making appointments. The specific procedures are outlined in greater detail in section E following.

The needed information as to positions should be supplied by the Civil Service Commission. This includes not only a listing of the positions to which new appointments may be made but also rather detailed information as to their geographical location, their duties and responsibilities, the status of the present incumbents, and, as a matter of course, the rate of pay. The Commission should have on hand in usable form all needed information as to positions subject to the civil service laws. Unfortunately, however, there are now many gaps and much of the alleged information has little relation to realities. The suggested procedures are given in some detail in section F following.

As a third step, the top level Republicans should determine with some definiteness those positions in both the unclassified service and the classified service for which they will personally handle appointment matters. Both the party organizations and the Civil Service Commission should supply them with any information they need and desire in making their decisions but need not concern themselves further with the designated positions.
With adequate information as to job seekers and positions available, the fourth step is in order. This is the matching of men and jobs. The technical staff of the Civil Service Commission should do the original work, which is highly technical in nature. Normally as many as a dozen or even a score of suitable job openings should be listed, though in a relatively few cases not even one will be found. Then the listings should be submitted to the appropriate party organization, national, state, or local (normally for the state and local organizations through the national organization), for definite decisions as to appointments. The procedures are outlined more fully in section G following.

The fifth step is to make the appointment of the selected party follower to the selected position, giving him, with a few exceptions, indefinite or temporary status in positions in the classified service. The appropriate party organization should inform the appointing officer of the proposal (normally he should collaberate in working it out), who should then make the appointment (in some cases pressure has to be exerted from above to get the appointing officer to act). The procedures are described more fully in section H following.

In the course of two or three years - earlier if the pressure of the work load permits - the sixth step is in order. That is, for most of the indefinite and temporary appointees, to do the things necessary to give them permanent status. The necessary procedures are outlined in section I following.
The normal labor turnover will inevitably make necessary the repetition of the selection and appointment procedures for hundreds of thousands of positions each year. After the initial work, it will almost surely be found to be desirable to establish in advance lists of qualified persons who take examinations and can be given first probationary and then permanent status without the intervening steps. If the examining work is handled competently, with the party organizations using proper efforts to get qualified party adherents to take the examinations, and if the appointing officers whenever possible select a party follower from the three from whom a choice may be made, a very large proportion of the probationary and permanent appointments will be of party adherents approved by the party organizations.

It is apparent that, to handle large scale patronage matters effectively, there must be some expansion of the staff of the national party organization and some changes in existing procedures. And, at the outset, the whole personnel set up of the national government must be overhauled. The necessary changes include three carefully selected new members of the Civil Service Commission; the writing and adoption of new and realistic civil service rules prescribing workable procedures; the overhauling and reorganization of the Commission's technical and clerical staffs, both at Washington and in the field; and getting out of the personnel picture the expensive, time consuming, and useless agency personnel units. The suggested steps are outlined in section J following.
E - LISTING AND CLASSIFYING THE JOB SEEKERS

It may be expected that the number of party adherents desiring appointment to civilian positions will run into the millions. Few will know a great deal about the types of positions to which appointments may be made or the requirements therefor. Most will prefer to remain at or near their present places of abode but some will wish to go to Washington, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, or even abroad, or to places where they have relatives or friends. Most are likely to have somewhat exalted ideas as to their own capabilities, versatility, and worth. And, all experience shows, a sizable fraction are averse to doing much work, to keeping regular hours, or to meeting other obligations involved in performing assigned tasks in such a manner as to reflect credit on themselves and their party.

Obviously it is necessary to obtain from each job seeker, with a relatively few exceptions, the salient information in written form. This information includes the name, age, sex, address, and telephone number of the job seeker; brief statements of his formal education and occupational experience; information as to the type or types of work for which he considers himself fitted and which he would like to do; the place or places he desires or is willing to work; the lowest rate of pay he is willing to accept and the amount he would like to be paid; the approximate date he will be available for federal appointment; and a succinct statement of the party
services which he considers should be taken into account in deciding upon appointments.

Clearly this information can be obtained most certainly by the use of a carefully designed form. If any party follower regards the filling out of such a form as beneath his dignity, or if he is illiterate, then it can be filled out for him by the appropriate party organization. Obviously the form should be supplied by and addressed to the party organization, national, state, or local.

The form should contain a space for the appropriate party leaders to record their desires as to the appointment of the person who fills it out and submits it. Probably some such classification as this is most useful:

A - Early appointment urgently desired.
B - Appointment urgently desired but time not of the essence.
C - Appointment highly desirable.
D - Appointment approved if a suitable opening becomes available.
E - Appointment of little party significance but going through the motions seems expedient.

In a separate space on the form the appropriate party leaders should also record their own conclusions as to the type or types of federal work for which the person filling out the form is qualified, the place or places he might work, and the pay he should receive. It is not to be expected that in routine cases they will have all the information needed to make a final decision on
these points but they are likely to be better informed and more realistic than the job seeker.

It need hardly be added that the forms should be made available for the use of those who have the task of matching men and jobs.
F - OBTAINING NEEDED INFORMATION ABOUT POSITIONS

As to most positions subject to the civil service laws, the Civil Service Commission has a good deal of information. This includes the position title, more or less information as to the duties, responsibilities, and organization relationships of significance, geographical and department location, the name and status of the incumbent, and the established rate of pay. Much of the information, however, and particularly that as to duties, responsibilities, and organization relationships, is neither reliable, complete, nor current. The positions, moreover, are not uniformly grouped into classes having titles supposed to be descriptive; the classification work has been carelessly done.

Three significant conclusions may safely be drawn:

1. Enough position information of a usable type is currently available to make possible a quick start on the large scale matching of men and jobs.

2. It will be necessary to collect and record current, reliable, and complete information as to individual positions and, on the basis of this information, to group the positions into true classes before the initial patronage work is rounded out and before much of the later work involved in giving permanent status to the initial appointees can be competently and legally done. This is a task which will take the major fraction of a year after the staff of the Civil Service Commission is reorganized and revamped but the work can be so done as to speed rather than delay the early appointment of indefinite and temporary employees.
3. The position classification work is highly technical and need not be described here. The techniques are well known and of proved worth. The fact that the classification work has been toyed with rather than attacked vigorously since it was first authorized and directed in 1923 should not be interpreted to mean that it cannot be quickly and well done when and if it is attacked in earnest. It should be emphasized, moreover, that ascertaining and recording the significant position information and grouping the positions into true classes which may be used for pay and recruiting purposes is a basic requirement in handling large scale patronage operations.
With the significant information as to job seekers and as to positions at hand, the personnel technicians on the staff of the Civil Service Commission and the party leaders concerned can proceed apace with the task of matching men and jobs. The work naturally divides itself into two parts:

1. The tentative matching, a technical operation to be handled in the main by the personnel technicians.

2. The review by the appropriate party leaders of the proposals worked out by the personnel technicians to make sure that the political as well as the technical requirements are met as fully as possible.

While it seems unnecessary to explain the matching procedures in detail, some examples make clear the nature and the magnitude of the tasks to be done. If, for instance, a party adherent given high political priority lives in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, is fifty years of age, wants to work only in his home city, expects pay of $3500 a year, and has a varied semi-skilled mechanical background, the choice of positions to which he may be appointed is very limited indeed. But when the wider possibilities at another place a hundred miles away are pointed out to him by the appropriate party leaders (such information would normally be supplied them by the personnel technicians), he may change his mind about the place of work. Or if an available position in Cedar Rapids for which the pay is $3200 a year is called to his attention, he may lower his pay sights. Matters of this type come up by the thousand
in carrying on large scale matching operations; there is no escaping the "cut and try" procedures which involve the understanding collaboration of the personnel technicians and the party leaders.

Exactly the same type of thing occurs when the problem is approached from the other angle - that is, finding the qualified party follower to be offered appointment to an available position. If, for example, there is to be organized a survey party to operate in the mountains near Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, from June 1 to September 30, 1953, and there are needed three additional chainmen and an instrument man, then a search may be made among the job seekers for those able and willing to do the necessary tasks under the conditions entailed. Here the difficulty is likely to be the temporary nature of the work - for four summer months only. Yet this is just the type of employment many who are attending engineering schools desire. It may well turn out, however, that as to the three chainman positions party adherents who would like all the year work will be willing to accept the summer jobs. Again the personnel technicians and the party leaders concerned must collaborate to assure the attainment of both technical and party ends.

In case the personnel technicians and the party leaders are not in accord as to the fitness of a specific party adherent for a specific available position, the view of the party leaders should, with very rare exceptions, be governing. The personnel technicians should not be expected or asked to base their professional conclusions upon political considerations; their sole task
is to discover one or more available positions which, as far as they can determine from the information available, the job seeker is qualified to fill. The party leaders, however, should rather meticulously refrain from frequently riding rough shod over the findings of the personnel technicians. It is doubtful whether, in either the long run or the short run, there is any party advantage in appointing a party adherent to a position which he is only poorly qualified to fill. At the outset the appointing authority is likely to be displeased; after all, he needs competent workers in getting the work of his unit done. Then, too, public and voter disapproval almost surely comes sooner or later. Finally, real trouble develops when the time comes to consider giving permanent status to the indefinite or temporary appointee; then the conclusion of the personnel technicians must prevail and they cannot be expected to compromise their professional integrity however fallible their findings may seem to others.
H - MAKING INDEFINITE, TEMPORARY, AND OTHER TYPES OF APPOINTMENTS NOT GIVING PERMANENT STATUS

When the selection of the specific party adherent to be appointed to a specific position has been made, the appropriate party leader should inform the appointing authority, through the appropriate channels, of the decision and request that he proceed to make the indefinite, temporary, or other type of appointment not giving permanent status. Normally the appointing authority is consulted and aids in the course of the matching work; therefore he is normally ready to take the next step. In any case, the time has come for him to act. If he balks, it may be advisable to make modifications in the proposed action. But if he persists in being refractory without good cause, as sometimes happens, then pressure from on high may be necessary. In any case, the appointing authority should be allowed reasonable leeway, in view of the work load, the budget situation, and other pertinent factors, in choosing the time the appointment becomes effective.

Sooner or later the indefinite, temporary, or other appointment not giving permanent status must be formally reviewed and approved (or disapproved) by the Civil Service Commission. When its own technicians have participated in the matching process and have concluded that the appointee has the needed qualifications, Commission approval is likely to be quick and essentially perfunctory.
MAKING PERMANENT APPOINTMENTS

During the first months of the incoming administration, practically all the appointments must of necessity be indefinite or temporary. This is due to three sets of facts. The first is that with the present set up of the Civil Service Commission, not a tenth as many examinations are being held as are necessary and most of these are too general to be of great value or to comply with legal and technical requirements; it will take some months to build up the needed staff. Then the examining procedures must be drastically revised. Finally, much reclassification work must precede good examining work.

By the beginning of the second year of the new administration, if the reorganization, procedural, and reclassification operations are properly handled, it will be possible to put into effect the examining procedures necessary under the law to give first probationary and then permanent status to those having indefinite and temporary appointments, to those brought in directly from the outside, and to those promoted, with tests each month for some two hundred classes of positions. Holding such examinations, it should be noted, is a continuous process once it has been started and should continue year after year to eliminate, as far as possible, indefinite and temporary appointments. This is advantageous from the party standpoint, from the legal standpoint, and from the standpoint of public and voter approval. In particular, following this course does not leave a million or
more appointees at the mercy of the incoming administration when the next change occurs.

When proper examinations are held, not all those given indefinite and temporary appointments will win. Nevertheless they have a tremendous advantage due to the training they have been given while serving as indefinite and temporary appointees. In addition, the Civil Service Commission certifies three names from the lists it establishes and the appointing authority can choose any of the three certified (there are exceptions in the case of veterans versus non-veterans). By selecting reasonably qualified indefinite and temporary employees in the first place, by giving them training on the job, by holding examinations which properly put a premium on job knowledge, and by using the choice of the three certified, the mortality can be held to small proportions.

In holding the examinations which lead to probationary and then permanent appointments, the salient procedures are in part as follows:

1. When an examination for any class of positions is to be held, the Civil Service Commission prepares an announcement giving the title of the class, the duties, the pay, the places of work, the requirements, the manner of obtaining and filing applications, the time and places the examinations are held, and other significant information.

2. The Civil Service Commission distributes widely copies of the examination notice. Each indefinite and temporary appointee holding a
position allocated to the class is supplied a copy. In addition, enough copies are supplied to each county chairman in the areas where there are or will be positions to be filled that he can provide each district or precinct chairman with at least three copies.

3. The national and state party organizations exert whatever pressure is necessary to make sure that the county, district, and precinct chairmen call the announcement to the attention of qualified party adherents and stimulate them to obtain, fill out, and submit applications. Such pressure, all experience shows, is necessary because the appointments are not to be made tomorrow or next week and many of the local party leaders persistently fail to look ahead.

4. The Civil Service Commission holds the examination and establishes an employment list containing the names of those found qualified. It should be repeated that the indefinite and temporary employees have a tremendous advantage.

5. The Civil Service Commission certifies to the appointing authority three names - those highest on the list.

6. The appointing authority makes his selection from the three certified and gives him a probationary appointment. At this point the appropriate party organization needs to be on the alert to see that the appointing authority selects from those certified the one having political priority.

7. At the end of the probationary period the appointee, if his services have been satisfactory, is given permanent status.
In a large service containing millions of positions, widespread personnel confusion comes about unless there are a comprehensive personnel program, orderly personnel procedures, and adequate personnel machinery. The program, the procedures, and the machinery are needed not primarily or principally for patronage purposes but in order to carry on effectively and economically the activities undertaken. Lacking the personnel essentials, however, even patronage matters must be handled in a fashion which is at best uncertain and which at times becomes bungling. The reason for including this section in this discussion of patronage matters is that even if more compelling reasons for corrective action did not exist, patronage reasons alone call insistently for early improvements.

The personnel program prescribed at different times by the Congress is quite comprehensive and as to most essentials sound. First things are put first - position classification, pay, recruiting, employee ratings, leaves, and separations. But, since its creation seventy years ago in 1883, the Civil Service Commission has failed or refused to accept most of the Congressional personnel program and has persisted in substituting another of its own. It pays lip service to position classification requirements but, with negligible exceptions, does not use its own classes for pay, recruiting, and other purposes. It merely toys with recruiting problems. Its
shortcomings in this field are graphically represented by its failure to hold promotion examinations and by the fact that, at this moment, there are nearly a million employees who have only indefinite and temporary status though many have been in their positions for years. The pay of federal officers and employees is not closely and consistently related to the kind, the quantity, and the quality of the work they are doing; personal factors are governing with distressing frequency and classifications are moved upward in large numbers to bring about higher pay rates for favorites. Employee rating problems, despite a Congressional mandate dating back to 1923, are mostly untouched. The handling of separations depends largely - not entirely - upon the varying needs, whims, and desires of thousands of administrative and supervisory officers. The Commission has developed into a fine art the practice of running away from major technical problems. When these became unduly pressing in 1939, Commissioner Ordway persuaded President Roosevelt to set up the agency personnel units and give them directions to do personnel tasks vested by law in the Commission; these agency units, in turn, with a few exceptions have passed the responsibilities given them to the operating officers. From time to time the Commission, while refusing to tackle seriously major personnel matters, has given considerable attention to personnel refinements such as employee training, safety, employee suggestions, and scholarships of varied kinds. There are two notably bright areas in this dismal picture; the Commission has accepted the Congressional mandates as to leaves and retirements and has set up fairly adequate
even though cumbersome leave and retirement procedures.

As usually happens when major personnel problems are systematically evaded over a period of years, the personnel procedures have become complex, uncertain, time consuming, and ineffective. In the actual handling of the personnel transactions they are disregarded about as often as not, with the responsible officer, whenever it pleases him to do so, deciding each action "on its merits" - which is a euphemistic way of saying he does about as he pleases. Two examples will show the basic nature of the existing situation. The personnel manual, supposed to be governing, now contains almost a thousand large printed pages and is still growing; it is supplemented by even more voluminous circulars, supplements, directives, interpretations, rulings, letters, and other prescriptions. Even the "experts" in this field are often hard put to it to know what the governing prescriptions are and the officers who handle personnel matters do not, with some exceptions, even attempt to master this maze of material. The slowness is illustrated by the sorry experience of an administrative officer who asked for the certification of three eligibles from a list for which there was a "register." Several weeks passed before he was able to obtain any action; when he took pains to find the cause of the delay, he found that this routine transaction had to be cleared by twenty-four separate and distinct persons of various types and levels before the certification could be made. In a word, the governing personnel prescriptions are mostly incomprehensible and are so administered as practically to stop personnel operations except as the operating officers
take matters into their own hands.

These conditions have led, too, to the creation and clumsy operation of unbelievably complex personnel machinery. The Civil Service Commission has established fourteen district offices, which is less than a quarter of the number needed to enable the supervisory operating officers and the personnel technicians to get together consistently when personnel problems have to be worked out. To aggravate this situation, the staffs of these district units concern themselves largely - almost wholly, in fact - with paper work and what they call "policing" instead of going into the field to advise and assist the operating officers. It was partly because of these deficiencies that the agency personnel units were set up. But these, with some exceptions, simply make up another layer of personnel officers and clerks who make sizable indentations in the taxpayer's dollar, interpose more delays, and contribute little or nothing to good personnel management. There has also been much talk of "decentralization" but this boat too has been missed. The need is for geographical, not departmental, decentralization - but the agency personnel units, again with some exceptions, operate from Washington even to a greater degree than the Civil Service Commission. The operating officer in Kansas City or Houston or Elmira or Butte or Providence who has a troublesome personnel matter hanging over his head has very slight chance indeed to get first or other aid from the personnel technician who should but does not call upon him to help arrive at a legal, sound, and prompt decision.
Such personnel conditions call insistently for correction. Remedial action is needed not merely to make possible the effective handling of patronage matters but much more importantly to contribute to the effective and economical operation of the executive branch of the national government. Fortunately there is no basic conflict in general and patronage objectives; in fact, if the procedures set forth herein are accepted, each for the time being at least, ties in with the other. Therefore in the following paragraphs the rather obvious corrective measures are briefly outlined.

The first need is for a properly manned Civil Service Commission. Without that little improvement can be expected. The new members should be carefully selected. At least two of the three should have comprehensive personnel know how. Good intentions, industry, high public standing, political availability, a high order of eloquence, civic consciousness, accomplishments in other fields, and the like, while highly desirable, cannot suffice to clean up the personnel mess. The first requisite is proved ability to organize, direct, and participate in the actual operation of large scale personnel operations as they are carried on through a central personnel agency. Closely allied is proved ability to work harmoniously with high placed persons of diverse types; these include the President, the Congressional leaders, the Heads of the several agencies, and the officers of business, civic, and employee groups. The limited personnel accomplishments of eminent and admirable citizens like Harry Mitchell, Leonard D. White, Samuel Ordway, Arthur S. Flemming,
Frances Perkins, and Robert Ramspeck, to mention only a few, shows quite conclusively that the civil service commissioner without personnel know how gets exactly nowhere when confronted with large scale personnel disorder, confusion, mismanagement, and ineptitude. Of such far reaching importance is the make up of the Civil Service Commission that it seems worth while to indicate at least one possible course of action.

For Chairman of the Commission, some such man as Robert C. Smith, a Virginia Republican, is essential. Mr. Smith, as Personnel Director for the Department of Labor, developed for that Department a sound personnel program despite the opposition and sniping of the Civil Service Commission's staff and won the support and understanding of the southern leaders in the Congress. Mr. Smith left the Department of Labor in 1946 and is now Director of Industrial Relations for the Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Company, where he is doing notable personnel work in the business field.

Mr. Smith, if appointed Chairman, would need the help of Charles P. Messick, a New Jersey Republican. During a period covering thirty years Mr. Messick was the principal figure in building up and maintaining a personnel system for the New Jersey state government and for numerous local governments which grew to have a total of sixty thousand positions. He gave major attention at all times to the personnel fundamentals - position classification, pay, recruiting, ratings, leaves, and separations - but did not neglect the personnel refinements when the personnel stage was properly set for them.
He enlisted the understanding collaboration of Governors, legislative groups, operating officers, civic organizations, and employee groups. He has high professional and political standing. More important, he, more than any other living person in the United States, has been successful in building, operating, and maintaining a comprehensive and sound personnel system on a large scale.

The third member to work with Mr. Smith and Mr. Messick should probably be a woman from the middle west or the far west. She would not need to be a personnel technician but should be well and favorably known among those active in the women's organizations and should be able to explain the personnel program to them, including the patronage angles, and win their understanding support.

The second need is that the Civil Service Commission and all its agents accept the personnel program prescribed by the Congress and abandon that of its own devising. Such acceptance should be one of the conditions of appointment to the Commission. The Congressional program, moreover, must be given practical effect, not regarded with a jaundiced eye. It may seem far fetched to insist on this point. But seventy years of rather consistent flouting of the Congressional mandates shows that acceptance of the Congressional personnel program is of first importance.

The third need is for proper civil service rules to take the place of the present jumble of rules, manuals, circulars, directives, interpretations, rulings, and other prescriptions. The new rules should be so worded as to
be clear and understandable, so comprehensive as to cover the several types of personnel transactions, and so explicit as to indicate unmistakably the responsibilities, in originating and passing upon personnel transactions, of the administrative and supervisory officers, the employees, and the personnel technicians. The civil service rules are promulgated by the President but the Civil Service Commission and its staff normally assist him in their drafting.

The fourth need is the proper organization and manning of the Commission's staff. There is no need, in this discussion, to go into the details of this matter. But attention may well be called to a few essentials. The headquarters staff in Washington should be so organized and operated as to provide the basic personnel tools and procedures. These include the working out of the details of the personnel program as needed to effectuate the Congressional mandates; the development of the detailed operating procedures; providing quarters and facilities for the district organizations; the development (not the administration) of the classification and pay plans; the construction (not the giving) of tests; and the development of the employee rating system. The administration of the personnel program should be handled through the district organizations. About seventy-five districts are needed to make it possible for the personnel technicians to visit and work with the operating officers who have a part in the handling of classification, pay, recruiting, rating, leave, separation, and other personnel operations. They should also make sure, in the course of their visits, that the prescriptions contained in the law and the rules are under-
stood and observed.

The fifth need is for the building up of competent technical and clerical staffs. This means practically a clean sweep of the present incumbents in the top three or four technical levels; they have shown conclusively year in and year out that they have neither the will nor the capacity to cope with the complex organization and operating problems. A sizable fraction of those in the lower technical levels can probably be salvaged despite their training in false and unsound conceptions and practices. In the main, however, a new technical staff would undoubtedly have to be built up by bringing in from the outside those who have shown competence in the operation of sound state and local personnel systems and by finding others with the basic traits needed and giving them the proper technical training. The present clerical staff is capable and almost surely could handle the paper work well when the unnecessary and time consuming operations are eliminated. The new technical and clerical staffs at headquarters and in the district offices would almost surely be smaller than the present staffs if account is taken of the numerous agency employees now assigned to the Civil Service Commission (principally from the Post Office Department).

As to the agency personnel units, they cost millions of dollars to operate, slow up personnel operations, interpose one more personnel layer, and contribute little to effective personnel management. With the staff of the Civil Service Commission properly organized and manned, they would
become a useless fifth wheel on the personnel wagon. They should be eliminated in their entirety. Since they were created by executive order, they can be discontinued in the same way.

With the Civil Service Commission organized, manned, and operated in the manner outlined in this section, large and small personnel matters could be dealt with effectively and fruitfully - including the handling of patronage.
K - SUPPLEMENTAL OBSERVATIONS

No attempt has been made in the preceding sections to set forth every detail of the suggested patronage program. Many of the implications have been passed over lightly or not even mentioned. It seems desirable in this final section to discuss briefly several significant matters.

First of all, it must be fairly obvious that the patronage situation is in a constant state of flux. As some party followers are given appointments, the number of openings available for others decrease accordingly. But the constant labor turnover works in the opposite direction. At the present time there are few lists of eligibles and those have been made up without calling the openings generally and specifically to the attention of party adherents. With good personnel and political management the number of lists will increase markedly after a few months and on them the names of party adherents will predominate. Even the reclassification of existing positions, which should be done early and on a large scale, leads to many changes in the incumbents of the positions reclassified. In brief, the personnel situation does not become and remain static.

In the second place, the top level Republicans, in making their selections of those to be appointed to the higher posts, or of any others in whom they have a personal interest, are likely to need a good deal of information, both specific and reliable, about the duties of positions, legal requirements, customs, and work conditions. It is therefore suggested that a request be made for the im-
mediate detail, possibly in a part time capacity, of three or four trustworthy personnel technicians who know their way about in the existing personnel maze and who cannot only collect factual information but who can also translate the prevailing personnel and position gobbledygook often resorted to into understandable English. Almost every agency, when a request for information comes to it, will almost surely go through the motions of supplying whatever is requested. But it does not follow that in every case such information will be understandable, complete, and reliable.

Thirdly, it would be a patronage mistake of the first order not to enlist the collaboration of some or most of the Republican members of the Congress in handling patronage matters. In any case many of them will be in the picture. They can be very helpful indeed in obtaining and appraising information about job seekers, in conveying reliable information to them, in convincing them that they must accept the most suitable available position, and in many other ways. Failure in the preceding sections to make specific mention of Congressional collaboration should not lead to the conclusion that it is looked upon as unnecessary or unimportant. Just the opposite is the case.

Closely related is the matter of building up Republican party organizations in the southern states. Such action can be vastly facilitated by the use of patronage or retarded by withholding patronage. There is no legal, technical, or political reason why those engaged in building up these local Republican organizations should be regarded as outcasts when federal civilian positions
in their respective areas are to be filled. On the other hand, there is every reason why they should be encouraged to make known their desires as to the appointment of qualified persons to available positions.

Finally, if some such patronage program as that outlined herein is adopted, the matter of centralization and decentralization among and within the national, state, and local party organizations will frequently arise. There is no known formula which indicates unmistakably what course is best in any given situation. It may be rather confidently concluded, however, that the national organization should consciously, after proper consultation with those concerned, including the state and local groups, decide upon the patronage program and the broad procedures to put it into effect; that every task which the state and local organizations are organized and manned to do well should be left to them; and that the national organization will find it necessary, if the patronage ball is to be kept rolling, to supply a good deal of stimulation and guidance. It need hardly be added that most of the arrangements for appointments to positions in Washington and abroad should be handled by the national organization.
LIST OF NEW YORK POSITIONS

November 22, 1968

Note: In addition, Ambassadors and all Chairmen and Members (as opposed to Staff) of Independent Agencies are deemed included in the New York category whether or not listed herein.
I. Bureau of the Budget
1. Director
2. Deputy Director
3. Assistant Director
4. Assistant Director
5. Assistant Director

II. Council of Economic Advisers
6. Chairman
7. Member
8. Member
9. Executive Director, Cabinet Commission on Price Stability

III. National Security Council
10. Executive Secretary

IV. National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development
11. Executive Secretary

V. National Aeronautics and Space Council
12. Executive Secretary

VI. Office of Economic Opportunity
13. Director
14. Deputy Director
15. Community Action Program, Assistant Director
16. Job Corps, Assistant Director
17. VISTA, Assistant Director
18. Office for the Aged, Assistant Director
19. Office of Rural Affairs, Assistant Director
20. Office of Research, Plans, Program, and Evaluations, Assistant Director

VII. Office of Emergency Planning
21. Director
22. Deputy Director
23. Assistant Director—Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications Management
24. Assistant Director
25. Assistant Director
26. General Counsel
27. Director, Liaison Office
28. Director, Office of Information

VIII. Office of Science and Technology
29. Special Assistant to the President, Director
30. Deputy Director
IX. Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

31. Special Representative
32. Deputy Special Representative

X. President's Committee on Consumer Interests

33. Director for Public Affairs

XI. President's Council on Youth Opportunity

34. Executive Director

XII. Department of State

35. Secretary of State
36. Under Secretary of State
37. Ambassador-at-Large
38. Ambassador-at-Large
39. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
40. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
41. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

42. Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
43. " " " " African Affairs
44. " " " " Inter-American Affairs
45. " " " " European Affairs
46. " " " " East Asian and Pacific Affairs
47. " " " " Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
48. " " " " Economic Affairs
49. " " " " Educational and Cultural Affairs
50. " " " " International Organization Affairs
51. " " " " Public Affairs
52. " " " " Administration

53. Counselor of the Department
54. Legal Adviser
55. Administrator, SCA
56. Inspector General - Foreign Assistance
57. Deputy Inspector General - Foreign Assistance
58. Chief of Protocol (International Organizations)
59. Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INInternational Org's)
60. U. S. Representative to the U. N.
61. Deputy Representative to the U. N. and Deputy Representative in Security Council
62. Deputy Representative in Security Council of the U. N. with personal rank of Ambassador
63. Administrator, Agency for International Development
64. Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development
65. Assistant Administrator, Office of Private Resources (AID)
66. Assistant Administrator, Office of Program and Policy Coordination (AID)
67. Assistant Administrator, War on Hunger (AID)
68. Assistant Administrator, Bureau for East Asia (AID)
69. Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Viet Nam (AID)
70. Assistant Administrator for Administration (AID)
71. Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa (AID)
72. Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Near East and East Asia (AID)
73. Director, Information Staff (AID)
74. Controller (AID)
75. Deputy Director, Office of Personnel and Manpower (AID)
76. Congressional Liaison Officer (AID)
77. General Counsel (AID)
78. Director, Peace Corps
79. Director, Peace Corps

(Ambassadors on separate list)

XIII. Department of the Treasury

80. Secretary of the Treasury
81. Under Secretary
82. Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs
83. Assistant Secretary
84. " "
85. " 
86. " 
87. General Counsel
88. Comptroller of the Currency
89. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
90. Assistant General Counsel (Chief Counsel, IRS)
91. Treasurer of the United States
92. Deputy Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs
93. Special Assistant to the Secretary (for Enforcement)
94. Commissioner of Customs

XIV. Department of Defense

95. Secretary of Defense
96. Deputy Secretary of Defense
97. Director of Defense Research and Engineering
98. Principal Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering
99. Director of Advanced Research Projects Agency
100. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)
101. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
102. Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
103. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
104. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
105. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
106. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
107. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis)
108. General Counsel

(Department of the Army)

109. Secretary of the Army
110. Under Secretary of the Army
111. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management)
112. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics)
113. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
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<td>Special Assistant for Public Relations</td>
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<td>Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>149.</td>
<td>Assistant Postmaster General, Facilities</td>
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<td>150.</td>
<td>Assistant Postmaster General, Transportation</td>
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<td>151.</td>
<td>Assistant Postmaster General, Research and Engineering</td>
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<td>152.</td>
<td>General Counsel</td>
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<td>153.</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Postmaster General (Public Information)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Department of the Interior)</td>
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<td>154.</td>
<td>Secretary of the Interior</td>
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<td>155.</td>
<td>Under Secretary of the Interior</td>
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</table>
156. Assistant Secretary (Public Land Management)
157. " " (Water and Power Development)
158. " " (Water Pollution Control)
159. " " (Mineral Resources)
160. " " (Fish and Wildlife)
161. Solicitor
162. Commissioner, Fish and Wildlife Service and Deputy Assistant Secretary, Fish and Wildlife
163. Commissioner, Bureau of Indian Affairs
164. Director, Bureau of Mines
165. Director, Geological Survey
166. Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamations
167. Assistant to the Secretary and Director of Information
168. Assistant to the Secretary, Congressional Liaison
169. Director, National Park Service
170. Commissioner, Federal Water Pollution Control Administration

XVIII. Department of Agriculture

171. Secretary of Agriculture
172. Under Secretary
173. Assistant Secretary
174. " "
175. " "
176. General Counsel

XIX. Department of Commerce

177. Secretary of Commerce
178. Under Secretary
179. General Counsel
180. Assistant Secretary for Economic Development
181. " " Domestic and International Business
182. " " Economic Affairs
183. " " Science and Technology
184. " " Administration
185. Maritime Administrator
186. Director, Bureau of Census
187. Director, National Bureau of Standards
188. Commissioner, Patent Office
189. Federal Co-Chairman, Ozarks Regional Commission
190. " " Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission
191. " " New England Regional Commission
192. " " Coastal Plains Regional Commission
193. " " Four Corners Regional Commission
194. Special Assistant for Congressional Relations
195. Assistant for Public Affairs
196. Director, Office of Foreign Direct Investments

XX. Department of Labor

197. Secretary of Labor
198. Under Secretary
199. Assistant Secretary
200. " "

201. Assistant Secretary
202. " 
203. Solicitor of Labor
204. Administrator of Wage and Hour Divisions
205. Commissioner of Labor Statistics
206. Special Assistant to the Secretary (Office of Legislative Liaison)

XXI. Department of Health, Education and Welfare

207. Secretary
208. Under Secretary
209. Assistant Secretary (Legislation)
210. " " (Education)
211. " " (Health and Scientific Affairs)
212. " " (Planning and Evaluation)
213. " " for Commissioner and Field Service
214. General Counsel
215. Commissioner on Aging (Social and Rehabilitation Service)
216. Chief, Children's Bureau " " "
217. Commissioner, Office of Education
218. " Social Security Administration
219. Department Assistant Secretary (Legislation)
220. Director, Public Information
221. Administrator, SRS

XXII. Department of Housing and Urban Development

222. Secretary
223. Under Secretary
224. General Counsel
225. Assistant Secretary for Mortgage Credit and Federal Housing Commissioner
226. Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing Assistance
227. " " Model Cities and Governmental Relations
228. " " Metropolitan Development
229. " " Equal Opportunity
230. " " Urban Technology and Research
231. " " Congressional Services
232. Director of Public Affairs
233. Federal Insurance Administrator
234. President, Federal National Mortgage Association
235. Director, Model Cities Administrator

XXIII. Department of Transportation

236. Secretary
237. Under Secretary
238. General Counsel
239. Assistant Secretary for Policy Development
240. " " International Affairs and Special Programs
241. " " Research and Technology
242. " " Public Affairs
(Federal Aviation Administration)

243. Administrator
244. Deputy Administrator
245. Assistant Administrator for Congressional Liaison
246. Federal Highway Administrator
247. Director, Bureau of Public Roads
248. Deputy Federal Highway Administrator
249. Administrator, Urban Mass Transportation Administration
250. Administrator, St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation
251. Federal Rail Administrator

Independent Agencies

I. Appalachian Regional Commission
252. Co-Chairman

II. Atomic Energy Commission
253. Commissioner

III. Civil Aeronautics Board
254. General Counsel

IV. District of Columbia Government
255. Commissioner of the District of Columbia

V. Export-Import Bank of the U. S.
256. President and Chairman
257. First Vice President and Vice Chairman
258. Director
259. "
260. "
261. Executive Vice President
262. General Counsel

VI. Farm Credit Administration
263. Governor
264. General Counsel

VII. Federal Communications Commission
265. Member (Chairman)
266. General Counsel

VIII. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
267. General Counsel
268. Executive Assistant and Controller
IX. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
269. General Counsel
X. Federal Maritime Commission
270. General Counsel
XI. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
271. Director
272. General Counsel
XII. Federal Power Commission
273. General Counsel
XIII. Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors
274. Chairman
275. General Counsel
XIV. Federal Trade Commission
276. General Counsel
XV. General Services Administration
277. Administrator
278. Deputy Administrator
XVI. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
279. General Counsel
XVII. Indian Claims Commission
280. Chief Counsel
XVIII. Interstate Commerce Commission
281. Chairman
282. Congressional Liaison Officer
XIX. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
283. Administrator
284. Deputy Administrator
285. Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs
286. " " Legislative Affairs
287. Associate Administrator, NASA Headquarters
288. General Counsel, NASA Headquarters
XX. National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities
289. Chairman

XXI. National Labor Relations Board
290. Board Member

XXII. National Science Foundation
291. Director
292. Comptroller
293. General Counsel
294. Head, Congressional and Public Affairs

XXIII. Securities and Exchange Commission
295. Commissioner
296. Chief Accountant
297. General Counsel

XXIV. Selective Service System
298. Director

XXV. Small Business Administration
298. Administrator
299. Assistant Administrator (Congressional and Public Affairs)
300. Deputy Administrator

XXVI. Subversive Activities Control Board
301. Member
302. Member

XXVII. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
303. Director
304. Deputy Director

XXVIII. Tennessee Valley Authority
305. Chairman

XXIX. U. S. Civil Service Commission
306. Commissioner

XXX. U. S. Information Agency
307. Director
308. Deputy Director
309. Member
310. Liaison Officer (Congressional) Office of the General Counsel

XXXI. U. S. Tariff Commission
311. Commissioner
312. "

XXXII. Veteran's Administration
313. Administrator of Veterans' Affairs
314. Deputy Administrator
315. General Counsel

XXXIII. Commission on Civil Rights
316. Staff Director
317. Deputy Staff Director
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