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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NIXON

PREPARING FOR THE POST-ELECTION TRANSITION

Until November, you will be preoccupied with winning the election. A few steps taken now, however, can give you a headstart on meeting the wholly different, and almost impossible, demands that face a President-elect.

There are only ten-plus weeks between election and Inauguration. Within that period, and in many cases within the first few weeks of it, you will face some of your most crucial decisions.

First, you will have to make a few dozen top appointments. You will entrust the nation's fate and your own place in history to men you may not know, after a selection process necessarily less thorough than that of any professional firm, business organization, or university.

Second, you must initiate the alterations in government organization most critical for your objectives.

Third, you must formulate the substantive positions necessary to make best use of the "honeymoon period," to engage the enthusiasms of a divided nation, and to deal with early crises.
The quality of your administration may be determined in the ten weeks before you take office.

Advance preparations are therefore imperative. But there are two problems. First, you and your immediate staff must give top priority to the campaign. Second, advance preparations might be misunderstood as overconfidence of victory. (There would be little risk of such misunderstanding if it were known that both major candidates were undertaking advance preparations.) Both problems can be overcome if you entrust these preparations to discreet and trusted personal advisers not immersed in the campaign.

The four areas requiring advance work are personnel, substantive program, government organization, and transitional arrangements.

I recommend that you now ask at least one person to begin identifying possible appointees for specific key positions. If his activities are to be of real use to you, a personnel adviser must enjoy your complete trust. He should have a wide circle of acquaintances and possess good judgment about people and about the qualities needed for effective government service. In addition, he must understand the particular qualities demanded by particular positions. He must be known to be a man of great integrity with no tendency to "play favorites." Hopefully, he would be intimate enough so that you and he could discuss specific individuals in candid detail. He ought also to enjoy the full confidence of your staff.

It should be understood by the adviser and by any others who might learn of his activities that he does not select, but only gathers names
and information for you. This adviser might or might not be useful in the post-election period when you may wish to entrust larger scale recruitment to a different person, possibly one not more actively engaged in your campaign. Two or three pre-election advisers, acting separately, might be equally or even more useful. We describe in a later section those key appointments which require decisions almost immediately after the election. If you undertake this preliminary effort, you will be much better prepared for that ordeal.

II We recommend that you request substantive studies on issues which may be in crisis during the first three to six months of 1969, issues likely to demand some early response from your administration, and issues otherwise likely to be important in your first year program, particularly those to be stressed in your Inaugural Address and other early messages. To some extent, the campaign apparatus is now doing this, but additional steps outside the campaign effort may be vital for three reasons: First, there are issues which may be important to you as President, but which are not important campaign issues. Second, campaign priorities usually preclude the pursuit of issues in sufficient depth or concreteness to provide for specific executive actions or legislative proposals. Third, such an effort might enlist participants or consultants who would not be available for the campaign itself. It is difficult to identify the issues worthy of special pre-election inquiry, but we offer some suggestions in a later section.

III We recommend that you conduct selected studies on government organization. The success of your administration in carrying out your
policies will depend primarily on the quality of people selected. The division of responsibilities among executive departments and between the departments and the White House Staff could, however, influence your choices for particular posts. You may need to determine how you expect to handle national security policy or welfare-urban-labor-transportation problems even before you make your major Cabinet and Staff appointments. Your personal preferences and working habits will determine the kind of White House Staff that would best serve you and would bear strongly on the other questions as well. You will have little time to pursue or even discuss these questions before the election, but prior staff work in these three areas at least (national security, urban problems, White House Staff) should facilitate the actions you must take immediately after November 5. You might, for example, wish to ask a man experienced in each area to recommend sensible approaches that could be implemented within existing statutory authority and thus be of immediate relevance to you. We offer further observations later.

IV We recommend that prior to the election you prepare administrative arrangements for the transition period. You will need someone to deal with the old administration after the election, or, if President Johnson suggests it, earlier. You and your appointees will also need advice on useful past transition experiences and on methods of moving smoothly and efficiently into power. These are clearly temporary functions. More generally, you will need staff services other than those required during the campaign and similar to those you will soon need in the White House. We would be prepared to offer suggestions in a later memorandum.
I

APPOINTMENTS

1. An impossible task. In the brief period between election and inauguration, you will have to select most of the several hundred top-level appointees upon whom the fate of your administration will largely depend. No President-elect can know beforehand more than a handful of men qualified for these posts. Many of those he chooses will be strangers. The number of appointments to be made, coupled with the shortness of time, impairs the selection process. Further complicating the President-elect's almost impossible task is pressure to reward faithful service to campaign or party. The authors—who have never felt the heat—believe that the dissatisfaction of disappointed office-seekers and their supporters are transient and minor compared to the harm to the country, and to the President, resulting from appointees of modest competence or mere acceptability. The next President's responsibilities are too grave to be entrusted either to the bureaucracy or to the merely competent.

A. Large Scale Talent Hunt

2. You will need a large-scale talent hunt primarily for the several hundred sub-Cabinet posts you must fill. For your Cabinet, you will probably draw on your intimate advisers and other major political figures. These sources in turn may suggest to you people whom you will want to use, but whom you may know casually, if at all. It may be instructive to
recall that the original Cabinets of your predecessors included men not
at all well-known to the President-elect. (Nash, McNamara, and Bay
fall into this category among Kennedy's 1960 appointees, George Humphrey
is the obvious example in Johnson's 1962 Cabinet.)

A well-conducted pre-and post-election talent hunt could turn up
prospects for Cabinet as well as sub-Cabinet posts. Its major targets,
have, would be potential sub-Cabinet Presidential appointees. In ad-
dition, your Cabinet and Agency heads might find the results of this
research of use to them in making their own important personnel selections.

3. A committee. Unless you have available an ideal recruitment

chief, you might proceed by appointing a small screening committee. This

method offers the advantages of multiple sources and multiple evaluations.

You might think in terms of three to five men of roughly equal

stature. Elder statesmen beyond personal ambition would be useful, but
may be somewhat out of touch with younger generations. But also suffi-
ciently beyond ambition for these purposes are many persons established
in secure and relatively prestigious positions (such as a substantial
industrialist or financier; senior professor, or leading partner in a major
law firm). Your adviser or advisers—whether or not a committee is used—
need a wide personal acquaintance in industry, finance, the professions,
government, universities, etc.

You may wish to instruct your personnel advisers to consider not
only registered Republicans but also qualified independents and even
Democrats. (It is particularly important not to insist unduly on political
credentials for younger persons, lest the opportunity be lost—as in 1953-1956—to draw new vitality into the party.) They should seek not only the more senior people who would be appropriate Presidential appointees but the younger men who might be their deputies and assistants, or who might be useful later in the administration.

The places to look are many. Among the more obvious sources are (1) foundations, (2) boards of directors of national companies (and especially of the insurance companies that often expend considerable effort to secure broadly qualified and public spirited national representation), (3) metropolitan law firms, (4) major investment banking firms and other financial institutions, (5) universities, and (6) such business organizations as the Committee for Economic Development. The latter may be of particular aid in identifying able middle-level corporate executives.

B. Seminars with Prospective Appointees

4. The traditional method by which Presidents-elect have selected appointees has been the private interview. In some instances, your interests could also be served by arranging for a few seminars to be conducted by small groups, including some possible appointees.

The format of such seminars should not be uniform. To one on domestic and international financial matters, three to six men might be invited; most would be "experts" in the sense of having qualifications for appointment to the Treasury, Commerce, or the Council of Economic Advisers. They could receive invitations and be given an agenda a week or so in advance. In an hour or two with such a group, you could inform yourself on complex,
technical subjects, and at the same time obtain impressions of how these
men might perform as members of your administration.

In a less technical area, you might alternatively invite a few
possible appointees to join you in a briefing session conducted by repre-
sentatives of the departing administration. You could find it profitable
to see how these men interact with experts and with each other. This
device is available before the election as well as later, and it could
both extend the range of your knowledge and spare you some fruitless
private interviews.

C. Appointment Priorities

5. Earlier the better. To be ready to operate the government upon
its inauguration, the new administration must be formed as much before
January 20 as possible. The new appointees need time to familiarize
themselves with the fundamentals of their offices before assuming actual
responsibilities, to get to know one another, to extricate themselves from
their previous occupations, and to make the necessary personal moves. Al-
though it was once customary to announce the Cabinet on Inauguration Day,
major appointments should now be made as soon as possible after the election.

We have already appointed into "honor" and "non-enforcement" cate-
gories and arbitrarily placed the dividing line at fifteen days after the
election. All major appointments should be completed by mid-December.

6. Superior positions first. It is generally preferable to name a
department's Secretary before naming the Assistant Secretaries. This
might seem obvious, but President Kennedy used the opposite in order to
"plant his own men" in the departments and thus provide alternative
channels to the departments. The Kennedy effort did not accomplish
that purpose but tended to impair effective working relationships within
the departments; the Secretary's position was made ambiguous both with
respect to his nominal subordinates and with respect to the White House.
That is not the way to make the departments effective entities (and es-
pecially not in State with its chronic organizational difficulties). The
President-elect should, of course, participate in selecting major depart-
mental appointees—especially the Deputy or Undersecretary. But we
believe he will achieve a more effective administration if he accords
the Secretary-designate some role in this process.

7. Criteria for immediate appointees. Before naming the positions
that should be filled immediately—a list that is meant to be suggestive
rather than definitive—we enumerate some relevant criteria. Prompt ap-
pointment seems required for positions with one or more of the following
characteristics:

(1) The agency is concerned with matters in which decisions are
required and in which wrong decisions may have disastrous consequences.
Here the appointee must be given the utmost time to prepare. (State,
Defense, and perhaps Justice)

(2) The agency is so complex, so ill-organized, or so poorly
staffed—or all of these—that successful mastery by the new administration
requires the longest possible preparation. (State, Defense, and, depending
on your plans, DED, EDB, or Transportation)

(3) For these or other reasons, early preparation time is under-
taken by second- and third level positions; appointees must be appointed


requires some attention from a Secretary-designate.

(4) The agency is likely to be confronted by early urgent demands for executive action or legislative recommendations such that concrete agency preparations must begin at once. (Treasury and others)

(5) The position is so prestigious or of such controversial policy importance that the leading political figures in the party are regarded as contenders. Until such positions are assigned, the President-elect will have difficulty obtaining impartial advice regarding the many other posts he must fill.

(6) The position requires early appointment for psychological or symbolic reasons. (UN Ambassador)

6. Early staff appointments. Your own staff needs for the transition period must be attended to. Summarizing matters of great complexity, we would suggest that you will need one assistant or more for each of nine functions. Since you will require permanent White House Staff to handle all but two of these functions, you might appoint to your transition staff men whom you are considering using in the same roles after January 20. The transition period can then give you an opportunity to find out in advance whether they have the special capacities needed to help you carry your post-Inauguration responsibilities. The functions to be performed for you both during the transition and later are:

a) Management of your calendar and of administrative arrangements for yourself and your staff. This could be your permanent Appointments Secretary.

b) Contact with the press and advice on public relations. One
...man usually performs both functions and he could become your permanent Press Secretary.

d) National security liaison and advice— a role similar to that performed by kissel for Johnson, Bundy for Kennedy, and Gray and Goodpastor for Eisenhower.

d) Liaison for and "translation" of military and intelligence documents.

e) Personnel advice. There might be need for two persons: one concerned with the general talent hunt and the other handling patronage recommendations.

f) Oversight of task forces and similar substantive work. This might be done by a general aide for policy and programs— by a man with the breadth of jurisdiction (though not necessarily the powers) of a Sherman Adams or Theodore Sorensen. This function could be divided among several men who would also collect ideas and prepare initial drafts of your Inaugural Address and later public messages. Actual assignments depend, of course, on many factors including the distribution of literary talent.

The following functions need to be performed only during the transition and for a short time thereafter. You might assign them to men whose wisdom you want but who, because of business commitments, age, health or love other person, will not accept live-in position.

h) Advice on organization and implementation.
1) Advice on transition questions and transition contact with the old administration.

Among decisions which you will have to work out before or during the transition period will be some regarding organization of your White House Staff. You will have to determine how much access each assistant is to have and, for example, whether there is to be a staff coordinator like Adams. You will have to decide whether your best interests will be served by giving each assistant a strict functional assignment or by using them to some extent interchangeably. Since the purpose of the White House Staff is to give the President the extra eyes, ears, and hands he needs for his incredibly difficult task, your decisions on these questions and others related to them could have profound effects on your presidency. We hope to describe the issues in greater detail in a subsequent memorandum.

9. Early appointments in the national security area. Most of the following positions meet several criteria for early appointment: *

a) Secretary of State and two Undersecretaries. The qualities you seek will depend in part on your conception of his office. See Par. 21 below. **

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* Lest we presumptuously state the obvious, we relegate to the footnotes our limited observations on the qualities needed for certain offices.

** Also, we believe it important that the top team in State have the capacity to advise the President, to guide the department, to deal with friends and critics in Congress, and generally to explain administration policies in ways that will maximize public understanding and support. Calif. Carter, and Fewell often possess none of these qualities, but the lack of confidence, communication, and team spirit at the top level of the New Administration State Department is not a happy prospect.
b) Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary. And

c) Central Intelligence Agency Director. If you intend to appoint a new Director during your first few months, he should be appointed early. You might wish to continue Mr. Helms, who is a CIA official with, we understand, an excellent reputation. That course requires no immediate action; you would simply have to ask him sometime before Christmas to stay on and to announce that fact. (Either an indefinite reappointment or a commitment of six months or so would seem courteous in such a case.)

d) Ambassador to the United Nations. If you wish to continue the symbolic importance of this position and to fill it with a prominent figure, then the appointee will have to be named about the same time as the other high national security officials.

e) The JCS. The terms of both General Wheeler, the Chairman, and General McConnell, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, will expire in 1969. Following the precedent set by President Eisenhower, you could indicate before Inauguration, or even in November, your choices for these posts, or you could defer action. Your decisions both on individuals and on timing will require careful consideration. These decisions will be taken as indicative of many of your policies. They will also be read as suggestive of your basic attitude toward the military establishment and can influence the amount of cooperation you and your appointees

*** The press position is easy to thrust, judgment and wisdom plus Clifford's reputed ability. The need for an individual with a recognized, well-respected individual ability.
obtain from the inner reaches of the Pentagon. Many complex issues are involved, especially if, as a result of your decisions on Vietnam, or for other reasons, you were to contemplate asking the other two chiefs to step down or to take other posts. (Admiral Moorer's term as Chief of Naval Operations runs to 1971; General Westmoreland's as Chief of Staff of the Army to 1972.) We are prepared to submit an additional memorandum on this subject.

f) The field commander in Vietnam? We raise the question because reconfirmation or replacement might have significant effects in Saigon or Paris and on your concepts for the conduct of the war within Vietnam.

10. Early appointments in foreign missions.

a) The Ambassador to Moscow is an important bridge between the two governments. Not only are his functions important, but he may also be a symbol to the Russians of your administration's prospective attitudes. Moscow is no place for an inexperienced academic or other amateur. Unless early inquiries persuade you otherwise, you will want to consider reconfirming the present ambassador as a symbol of continuity. If there is to be a change, the new appointee must be highly qualified. In any event, an early announcement would be desirable to permit the new appointee to consult fully with his predecessor.

b) Ambassador to Saigon. This post will remain important for the foreseeable future. If you intend to continue the incumbent, it could be wise to announce it early to preserve his effectiveness in Saigon. If you make a change—perhaps necessary as a symbol of the popular mandate
c) Paris negotiating team with North Vietnam. Your actions here will appear to signal the direction of your policies toward the negotiations and the war. You will want to consider with your Vietnam experts the appropriateness or manner of changing the Paris team. If you continue them for the near future as a symbol of a continued "tough" negotiating position (if that would be its meaning), it would be advisable to announce your decision quickly.

d) Ambassador to Paris. The country is important to us, but its government is so highly sensitive and difficult to deal with that an early appointment is advisable.

e) Ambassadors at large. These positions, as such, do not require immediate attention unless you have particular functions in mind.

f) Most other ambassadorships can probably be deferred until after Inauguration in favor of more pressing work. A few caveats are, however, in order: (1) The State Department's views on the relative urgency of other positions should be considered. Bonn and Tokyo, for example, might be thought to require early attention, as might London, Prague, Warsaw, Rio, or the special ambassadors to NATO and the OAS. (2) The governments not receiving immediate attention may feel slighted and undervalued by the United States. To preserve feelings, you might dispatch special envoys to explain the delay and give assurance of our interest. (3) Most ambassadors would be asked to continue (1) indefinitely,
(4) for a few months, or (iii) briefly. This will present few problems for career officials who would stay or for political hacks who won't be missed. Others may require gentle treatment if you wish them to remain. The longer such posts remain unfilled, the greater will be the pressure for political appointments. Your Secretary of State-designate could form an advisory committee to identify the ambassadors who should be dropped quickly (former political appointees of modest quality), those who should be retained (the best career people and those non-career ambassadors who have served with unusual distinction), and to screen names proposed for vacant posts.

11. Early "de-arric" appointments.

b) Budget Director. This agency's name does not connote the breadth of qualities required by the office. The Budget Bureau and the White House Staff provide the President's principal protection against departmental and congressional special pleading. Only with their help can he make the executive apparatus serve his purposes. The Budget Director should be the one man in government with an outlook virtually as broad as that of the President, and he must be able to judge not only the office as a ran of wisdom and vision with understanding of many policy issues. Though no particular professional background is vital, all testimony we have taken suggests that economists have proved unusually effective in this post. An early appointment is crucial to master the current budget and to gain early use of the invaluable resources of the Budget Bureau.
b) Secretary of the Treasury. It is likely that the problems of balance of payments, taxation, and the general state of the economy will argue for a November appointment. If the economic front is quiet, however, it may be possible to delay this appointment until December.

c) Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. This post should be filled early if the Treasury is. The Department is a powerful agency and its Secretary has tended to consider himself the President's primary economic adviser. In any case, it may be useful to have the Chairman of the CEA at hand from the beginning.

d) Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and/or Secretary of Housing and Urban Affairs. The new administration has two problems in this area: it will encounter strong demands for action and legislative recommendations to deal with the "urban crisis." Because it is important

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*A Republican administration enjoys the presumptive confidence of the financial community. Thus, your appointment need not be specially directed to assuring them. But a different audience may need reassurance: your appointee should not only understand compensatory fiscal policy; he should be able to speak the language and perhaps even appeal to the economists and economic critics who do most of the popular and serious writing in this area and who thus tend to shape the general reception of an administration's economic program—often in the long-run as well as the short. This "criterion" is almost certain to be satisfied by your CEA Chairman.

**These are critical agencies for the new administration. This is the area of key and explosive domestic challenges with the least assurance of "solution" in principle or legislation in practice. Innovations are necessary, but innovations (e.g., the "negative income tax") may be costly and irreversable even though experience or later analysis may prove them unwise. Yet, the pressure for action from politics and "the streets" will be enormous. And it is a Republican administration in particular that needs to win acceptance, in a, or at least in the minds of those particular groups or at least as much attention and have its people customarily assigned to the State...
to respond and because a failure to push affirmative proposals will force it into an unhappy defensive posture, the new administration must be ready to move. Secondly, a Republican President has a strong need to demonstrate concern with poverty, urban decay, and associated problems. An early appointment could dramatize your concern. Certain outstanding appointments could induce opposition critics to "wait and see" and to give the administration a chance "to prove itself." And the earlier the appointments are made, the sooner you can begin to ask your administration for results.

e) Secretary of Agriculture. There seems to have been a sweeping partisan turnover of Agriculture personnel in 1951. If similar turnover is to occur in 1969, the Secretary should be appointed early to allow time for departmental recruiting and orientation.

12. Other appointments.

e) Attorney General.* He is involved in matters that are intrinsically and politically of great importance: civil rights, criminal and defense appointments—and even more because the qualities required are even rarer. It will be difficult to find the man who can manage the departments, who can delegate but not too much, who can both reign and rule, who can react and appraise but who can also innovate and generate enthusiasm, who can refrain from bucking every demand up to the White House, who have sufficient dedication and clarity of purpose to demonstrate "concern" and "commitment" and indeed to push for improvement but who are also sufficient team players to accept administration "defeat" without leaking all or resigning in a huff. Whether such persons exist outside of heaven, we cannot say.

* The Attorney General can be a much more important asset to an administration than is often realized. If a President behavior of their appointees is often accepted and even encouraged, the President...
procedure, riot control, organized crime, the FBI. The course of the campaign, in particular, may require an early appointment for symbolic purposes. Nevertheless, the Attorney General has relatively less need than, for example, the Secretary of Defense to master the technicalities of ongoing problems, or to prepare for early crises (at least if riots remain infrequent during the winter).

b) Secretary of Labor.* Appointment before Thanksgiving would

source of their problem: they relied for advice on an Attorney General who did not learn or appreciate the significance of an appointee's judicial philosophy but who relied instead on others' conclusionary apprehension of quality and political opinion. A President may have his most lasting impact through his judicial appointments (including the lower courts); the Attorney General will have a role in that process. It is important to have an Attorney General who will do you and the nation credit in that role. To do so with appropriate attention to Santorini and other patronage requests requires great judgment and finesse. (2) The Solicitor General's office traditionally attracts brilliant talent from law firms and law schools. With appropriate leadership from the Attorney General, the Department can do the same both at the level of Presidential appointees and below. This resulting reservoir of high-powered talent can multiply the Department's effectiveness and also serve, by loan or otherwise, other departments and the White House. (3) The Attorney General's rectitude, vigilance, and readiness to inquire can give you an important defense against corruption within the government.

*This position has commonly been viewed as "labor's voice in the Cabinet." When important matters are at stake, however, union leaders want to deal with you and your representative. And, of course, neither management nor Congress will respect a mere union labor spokesman, whatever his title. To advise you, to serve as a buffer and (when appropriate) mediator on industrial relations matters, to supervise the mediation services, and to deal (as appropriate) with the National Labor Relations Board—your appointees must be tolerable to labor but probably not a union man. You might find the right man in industrial relations; among respected arbitrators, mediators, or umpires; or even in a Business School, Economics or Law faculty.
not been necessary unless (1) there is or might be pressure for federal involvement in important national strikes in progress or prospect before March, or (2) you intend to take a very early position on "wage-push" inflation.

c) Secretary of Transportation. Nothing inherent in this post requires that appointment be made in November rather than December.

There is a serious organizational problem on the domestic welfare front. As one interim approach, you might insist that the Secretaries of

*%

Housing, Labor, perhaps Transportation, and perhaps others form a sub-group of the Cabinet and work very closely together to formulate and implement policy. If that is to be done, it should be done from the beginning and calls for roughly simultaneous appointments. Thus, if one is appointed early, all should be. (Alternatively, if you intend to give one Secretary primary responsibility for the overlapping welfare functions of the several departments, he could be appointed early and the others late.)

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A trouble-avoiding holding operation may not be too difficult in this department. It will not be easy, however, to find a man who can promote innovation and cope with it in the effort to keep the country livable notwithstanding its expanding and increasingly-concentrated population. More common than creativity, but still rare enough to emphasize is the strength to stand up to the special interests, such as the "highway lobby" or the protagonists of the aerospace or supersonic transports. He will also have to consider the desirability of new steps to consolidate or coordinate executive branch operations with those of the "independent" Civil Aeronautics Board and Interstate Commerce Commission. Whether new steps would be both wise and politically practicable is not clear, but your appointee should be one who can both answer the question and carry out any necessary steps.
d) Postmaster General. Appointment before Thanksgiving is not required unless you must take a position in your first few months on the proposal of the recent Presidential Commission that the postal service be performed not by a regular government department but by a public corporation. If delay would impede reform, your appointee cannot begin soon enough to appraise the substantive merits and political possibilities of reform.

e) Secretary of Commerce. There is less need for appointment before December. The basic question is whether you can make something more of this post than it has been in recent decades. If you are considering merging the Labor and Commerce Departments, your appointees should be made aware of this at the time of appointment.

f) Secretary of the Interior.* Again, early action may not seem necessary.

g) White House Scientific Advisor. The "scientific community" attaches great importance to this post and became very restive about President-elect Kennedy's intentions until the post was filled in 1961. The same sensitivity can be expected today. A strong and relatively early, though not necessarily immediate, appointment can reassure this community of your respect for them and help gain their respect for your White House and thus facilitate the recruitment of top scientific talent in Defense and elsewhere.

* In addition to the usual functions, it's your duty to hire the man who can advance into the real, not the symbolic, secretarial space in the face of great pressure and great resistance in history—and in the future also as well if it does not come too much. And the man who can please public and private power parochial and keep the oil and mineral interests off the President's back will be doubly precious.
h) FBI Director. Unless you are persuaded that you want Mr. Hoover to continue, judicious silence about this post should give him ample opportunity (which he might welcome in view of his age) to indicate that he does not wish reappointment. If a new appointment is to be made, it must receive the greatest care, for you cannot later remove the Director without being charged with "political misuse" of an agency that should be "above politics." For an agency long subject to single control, there is reason to appoint an outsider who could look at the Bureau with a fresh eye. At least, there should be no automatic presumption that a present Bureau official would be better than a first-rate urban police chief, an effective administrator not now in police work, or an elder statesman who could serve for a short period, reassure the public and give you a breathing spell in which to assert your control over this important but currently semi-sovereign agency. Although your Attorney General should probably have a voice in the appointment, its importance requires your close attention.

1) White House liaison with the academic community. Your two predecessors had resident academics in the White House presumably in the hope of generating a sympathetic chronicle and a bridge to "intellectuals" at large. The first function is unsure (compare Schlesinger with Goldman) and the second silly. You reach "intellectuals" not by having a special communicator for that purpose, but by the actions and statements of your administration. By all means, do not neglect academics in your operating and staff appointments. And, of course, their role in pre-
and post-Inauguration task forces in both (1) an effective and easy way to impress "intellectuals" and (2) useful on the merits.

13. Immediate Action by New Appointees. Many of your appointees will need time—perhaps six to eight weeks—to extricate themselves from other affairs. Even so, all appointees should be asked to begin immediately, if only on a part-time basis, not only to familiarize themselves with their new jobs, but to confer with members of the outgoing administration, meet the civil servants who will work for them, and learn the routine of their agencies.

14. Political Criteria Generally; Holdover Personnel

a) Though judgeships need no special caveat since everyone understands their importance, regulatory agencies do. They are often viewed as convenient "dumping grounds" for persons of minimum qualifications, the assumption being that a commission of five or seven members can carry a few weak members. Often, however, most of the members turn out to be weak. Even when this is not the case, the weak appointees vote, and not always wisely. It has reached the point where well-qualified men frequently decline to serve on regulatory commissions. To correct that situation, the new President would need to construct his personal priorities in unequivocal
form and, in order to induce a good man to join an agency, he may have to give assurances that he will fill future vacancies with men of similar high quality.

b) There are positions—often wasteful and unnecessary—of some prestige that can be filled with persons of minimum quality without undue damage to you or to the nation. A thorough (and secret) pre- and post-election attempt to identify such positions would be useful to you.

15. Some personnel and patronage advisers have, in past administrations, appeared to insist on political credentials for every Presidential appointee and for every lower position at the disposal of such appointees. Such an approach will deprive your administration of valuable services and will miss the opportunity to win independents to the Republican cause. There is obviously reason to avoid highly partisan Democrats, but independents and even nominal Democrats should be welcomed with open arms even as Presidential appointees and especially at lower levels. And if academics who supported Democrats are excluded from task forces and from consultation, an important resource will be lost.


a) At least one Presidential appointee in each agency should be asked to remain for a few days after Inauguration in order to provide each department with an "Acting Secretary" to perform the formal departmental functions that cannot be performed by your appointees prior to their official Senate confirmation.
b) Some Presidential appointees in the outgoing administration are essentially career men of a quality you will wish to retain. (This is especially likely in such departmental positions as the Assistant Secretary for Administration—who will be useful for a few months at least.)

c) Some non-career officials of the outgoing administration might be of such outstanding quality that you would want them to stay. Your pre- and post-election personnel advisers should make the effort to identify any such persons.

d) The preceding considerations are applicable with even greater force to those non-Presidential appointees occupying positions that are at the disposal of the new administration.

II

SUBSTANTIVE POLICY PLANNING

17. We have refrained thus far from mentioning the Bay of Pigs, though that episode dramatizes the dangers facing an administration that takes office ill-prepared for the exercise of power. We refer to it now because it illustrates some problems almost certain to face you in your early months in office.

(1) Elements in the bureaucracy will refurbish and attempt to sell ideas studied and rejected by the previous administration or, as in the case of the Bay of Pigs plan, represent as beyond the point of no return program about which the previous administration had, in fact, been skeptical, reserved, or undecided.
(2) Your appointees will be less willing than later to go against what seems a consensus among departmental experts. As with the Bay of Pigs plan, they may feel hesitant to express doubts. In other instances, they may hesitate to question bureaucratic advice that something or the other cannot be done.

(3) Your appointees will be less prone than later to recommend courses of action involving risks of public or Congressional criticism. With each hoping for maximum accomplishments, each will be reluctant to see you incur political costs except in behalf of his program. After six months or so, your appointees will hopefully have become not only more realistic but more conscious of how their departmental interests fit into the whole program of the administration.

16. From mere mention of these problems, several obvious conclusions emerge:

(1) Your appointees should identify as quickly as possible the hobby horses of otherwise valuable and trustworthy men in the permanent government. They should also make every effort to learn from their predecessors the exact status of issues likely to arise between January and July, 1969.

(2) Your appointees will need to acquire as much advance knowledge as possible about higher-level personnel in their agencies and about the major issues which they are apt to face in the settling-in period.

(3) To cope with the third problem, your appointees will need better understanding than has been the case in the past of what the President expects—of what you expect.
This means that you will need to make a number of early
decisions about policy issues and to communicate these decisions as
clearly as possible to your prospective and actual appointees. These
decisions will concern not only policy positions, many of which will be
developed during the campaign, but also relative priorities, tactics to
be followed (i.e., a push for legislation, an effort first to stimulate
public pressure, or simple administrative action), and desired time-tables
(e.g., some symbolic action on cities before the summer even if high
priority measures have to come later).

19. With this as prologue, we suggest below some of the more obvious
issues on which you might want to initiate serious pre-election study, with
a view to helping you make the tough decisions on policy and tactics which
you will want to make as soon as possible after November 5:

(1) A first group of issues would be those which could be in
crisis in early 1969: Vietnam, Thailand, Berlin and East Europe, the Middle
East, urban "ghettos," federal-state-local welfare programs, monetary
policies, threats to wage-price stability, and the balance of payments.

(2) A second group consists of issues with continuing or long
range ramifications requiring early decisions. This category does not
admit easy definition and is perhaps better described by example. General
defense and space programs, NATO, AIM, manned bombers, relations with Cuba
and Red China, long-range anti-crime policies, and relations with regulatory
agencies all illustrate in several ways matters upon which you may have to
make early shceds that will...
28. A third group of issues would be in those areas in which you plan early legislative proposals. You, of course, know that these will be; any groundwork on our part would be irrelevant. A considerable body of experience exists with regard to task forces and how to get the most out of them. We would be happy to prepare a summary on this subject if it would be of use.

III

THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

20. In a number of key policy areas your ability as President to formulate, coordinate, and execute programs will depend on putting into particular posts men who can do what you want the occupants of these posts to do. Given the number of high level officials that must be named soon after the election, you might usefully have some pre-election attention given to the division of responsibilities most compatible with your purposes as President. The following paragraphs will identify two major issues bearing on your prospective appointments.

A. Responsibility for National Security

21. Prior to choosing your Secretary of State, you might well consider the extent to which you will want your Secretary to be your principal adviser on all foreign policy problems, including military, financial and economic policy. This decision will affect both the qualities you will seek in a Secretary, and the breadth of charter you will assign to the National Security Advisor on your own staff.
You face many alternatives, each involving complex considerations. We are prepared to develop a further memorandum on the subject.

b) Meanwhile, it is important to recognize that if you choose to give your Secretary of State a broader mandate, the consequence will be twofold: First, the Secretary-designate must be a man who wants this role and who understands what he has to do to perform it effectively. Second, the State Department would have to recruit a staff of men able to think of foreign policy not rarely in terms of diplomacy, but in much broader terms.

b) If State does not perform this role, such a staff must be part of the White House or National Security Council staff under the direction of a national security adviser. Thus, resolution of this issue affects not only the requirements for a Secretary of State, but also those for your national security adviser and their personal staffs.

22. In any event, there are perennial organizational problems within the State Department which in the past have prevented it from being as useful to the President as it might be. In particular, the relationships among foreign service and non-foreign service men, the regional desks and functional bureaus, and the foreign service on the one hand and program groups such as AID on the other, need to be rationalized. The Secretary-designate must understand that you care about the efficiency of State and that he must address this problem, or at least entrust it, to an Undersecretary with genuine delegated power. You will want to be sure that your top team in State has the authority and resources to grapple both the policy and the management tasks.
23. The ability of the federal government to respond to urban problems is reduced by the diffusion of responsibility and power in this area among many governmental departments and agencies. No matter how much responsibility is transferred to states or localities, the federal government will remain concerned with inter-urban transportation, assistance to local police, and other forms of grants-in-aid. Moreover, the transfer of other responsibilities will require considerable study and, at best, will take time. In short, the problem will continue.

24. The major issues here are whether and to what extent federal responsibility for dealing with urban affairs should be centralized, and if so, whether the centralization should occur within the existing departmental framework, within the White House or Executive Office staff, within some other agency, or within a super-department created by merging existing departments and agencies. Any such steps would, of course, affect your personal requirements for Justice, HUD, OEO, and White House assistant(s) primarily concerned with urban affairs.

25. If you contemplate reorganization requiring Congressional action, preliminary studies looking toward proposals for legislation might well be undertaken prior to election. And if, as you have indicated, you are to provide encouragement to the development of locally owned housing and business in black communities and to enlist private industry in efforts to rebuild the ghettos, then pre-election studies of how the White House could
January 9, 1969

Dear Virgil:

Judging from the success of your address before the Wilshire Rotary Club you should stay on the circuit and talk to as many Rotarians as possible.

You may be sure I appreciate your asking everyone to unite behind the administration and to pray for the success of our policies. In this connection, I want you to know how much I have appreciated your friendship and wise counsel through the years, and I hope as you travel around the country you will continue to pass along your suggestions and thoughts from time to time.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Mr. Virgil Pinkley
73155 Ironwood Drive
Palm Desert, California 92260
December 29, 1968

Dear Rose Mary:

Perhaps you will be kind enough to pass along the enclosed.

I am brushing up on my Spanish as I do each time I come to this colorful and fascinating city. The same applies to my trips to Italy.

Before long I hope to be in Washington and to have the pleasure of seeing you at that time.

Meanwhile, my most cordial regards.

Virgil Pinkley

Miss Rose Mary Woods
Administrative Assistant to
President - Elect
Richard M. Nixon
New York City, N. Y.
Dear Dick:

Before coming down here ten days ago, I addressed the Wilshire Rotaty Club.

I took the liberty of speaking on the Nixon Foreign Policy; its objectives and why.

At the conclusion there was a standing ovation and requests to speak to eight Rotary Clubs, including ones in Edmonton and Calgary, Canada, and Honolulu.

At the close I pleaded for everyone to unite behind you and your administration, to pray for the success of your domestic and foreign policies and your personal health and safety.

Also, hope that commentators and columnists would not pre-judge you, that they would recite the actual record correctly and would indeed be fair, balanced and objective!

My warmest personal regards and salutes from Mexico.

Abrazos Amigo

Virgil (Pinkley)

Mr. Richard M. Nixon
President-Elect of the United States
P. O. Box 1968
New York City, N. Y.
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Abrazos amigo

Mr. Richard M. Nixon
President - Elect of the United State
P.O. Box 1968
New York City, N.Y.
U.S.A.
December 4, 1968
Chairman of the day: RALPH O. WILCOX

VIRGIL M. PINKLEY

"U.S. AND THE WORLD TODAY"

This outstanding correspondent joined the United Press in London in 1929, becoming Chief Editor in 1937, General European Manager in 1943, and Vice President in 1944. He introduced United Press Services to many European and Middle East areas.

For years he was a radio personality and his personal friends and interview guests include Dwight Eisenhower, President Macapagal of the Philippines, and Mme. Chiang Kai-Shek. He has received many awards, including the Medal of Freedom, which is the highest award given by the United States Government to civilians. Dwight Eisenhower has written, "So far as I can now recall, the earliest serious suggestion that I might become a presidential candidate one day was made by Virgil Pinkley in 1943. Pinkley, then a newspaper correspondent in the North African theater of World War II, came to see me shortly after the Allies in the Mediterranean had succeeded, at long last, in sweeping North Africa clean of Axis Forces, overrunning Sicily, and landing in Italy."

"Mr. Pinkley, remarking on the magnitude of these operations, observed that in view of a practice that had all but become an American tradition, I would, as a wartime com-

(Turn to Page 2)
Introducing New Member:

LORRY SCHOTTKE

Welcome to Lorry Schottke who recently became a member of Wilshire Rotary, and sponsored by Fran Lore.

Lorry is a native Angelena, born in December 1914. After finishing his secondary education in East Los Angeles schools, Lorry attended the School of Business, studied Engineering and Business Administration at Pasadena City College and Alexander Hamilton Institute.

He attended the Senior National War College at Fort McNair, Washington, and now holds the rank of Captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve. He served in the Pacific Theatre during World War II as a fighter pilot. After the war he remained on active duty and flew the Berlin Airlift until 1950, thus establishing a flying record of over 11,000 hours.

In civilian life, which began in 1950, he has continuously served as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Sho-Fel Industries, Inc., manufacturers of aircraft, space and missile hardware and commercial assemblies.

His civic activities include Past Master of James A. Garfield Lodge #556 F. & A.M. 1966, Past Sawyer's Aviators Post-American Legion, Past Chairman of the Aeronautics Commission of the State of California, and Past Chairman of Boy's State in California.

Our new Rotarian Lorry resides in La Canada with his Rotary Ann "Betsy", and has three daughters and 31 grandchildren, if you understand what that ¼ means.

(Editor's note: Two other new members, Morton Rible and Robert K. Byerls will be introduced at a later date.)

DAYS TO REMEMBER

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 18: Annual Family Christmas Party.
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 25: No weekly meeting.
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 1, 1969: No weekly meeting.
FRIDAY, JANUARY 17: Wilshire Rotary Swingo Party.
JANUARY 19-25: Rotary International Magazine Week.
JANUARY 25-26: State Bowling Tournament.
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 29: L.A. Kings-Toronto Mapleleaves Hockey Game.
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4: Wilshire Rotary Club Assembly.
SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 23: Annual Family Christmas Party.
THURSDAY, MARCH 27: District Conference Golf Tournament.
MARCH 28-30: District Conference.
TUESDAY, JUNE 3: Rotary Day at Races.
FRIDAY, JUNE 6: District Golf Tournament.

WILSHIRE COMMUNITY SERVICE CITED

Congratulations to Don Hinkley and his Community Service Committee for being introduced in the Club News Column of the November issue of Governors Letter written by A. Ronald Burton, Governor of District 528. Projects on Campfire Girls, Pop Warner Football, Los Angeles High School and Project PICD were given recognition.

Virgil Pinkley . . .

(Continued from Page 1) mander of large and successful military groups, inevitably be considered as a strong presidential possibility. Virgil, I said, you've been standing out in the sun too long.

Mr. Pinkley now owns and is president of Ad Service Publications.
November 27, 1968

President-elect Nixon
New York City, New York

Dear Dick:

The entire mass media is delighted with your selection of Herbert Klein for this new and important job. He is the right man in the right place.

I know you will give him the authority and backing which is essential for a stand out performance. There has long been a need for such a job.

You are fully aware of what damage can be inflicted on you and your administration if any credibility gap should develop.

Sometime if you desire, I can present some ideas on this vital matter which effects everything you attempt to do at home or abroad.

It is great that you are spending Thanksgiving with the General. It will be one of the highlights for him—and all of you.

Everything about Julie’s forthcoming wedding reflects good taste and good judgement.

With warmest regards and highest esteem,

Cordially,

Virgil Pinkley
VP/nlg
November 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: RN
FROM: Ellsworth
RE: I. Background press briefings, London and Paris
    II. European interests in U.S. policy
    III. Opportunities to develop lines of communication

This is a brief summary of the accompanying memorandum.

I. Background press briefings, London and Paris: The elite of the international press of London and Paris have been briefed as to our "line" on the election strategy which resulted in a genuinely national and centrist victory for Nixon because of Nixon's wise, perceptive and strong campaign.

II. European interests in U.S. policy: Europeans, while seeing the need for a special relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., are deeply concerned to make sure that their interests are represented as the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship develops. They would appreciate it if Nixon could visit Europe before he visits Moscow; they very much appreciate Nixon's intention to insure thorough preparation before the U.S.-U.S.S.R. heads of state meeting.

NB: It might be a good idea to assign as Ambassador to NATO a figure who is thought to have clout with Nixon, such as Scranton, and give him the main job of making sure the Europeans feel in on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. developments.
III. Opportunities to develop lines of communication:
Not only some of the elite members of the press of London and Paris, but also the Institute for Strategic Studies can be used immediately to send messages. For example, I told the French press that Nixon is looking forward to establishing close relations with the De Gaulle government immediately.

I also indicated that Nixon would be skeptical of calling an international monetary conference until such time as there seemed to be a consensus on the direction such a conference should take and until there seemed to be a reasonable chance for such a conference to be successful.

I'm sure these messages will be passed on.
November 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: RN
FROM: Ellsworth
RE: I. Background press briefings, London and Paris
    II. European Interests in U.S. Policy
    III. Opportunities to develop lines of communication

Pursuing Safire's memo of November 20, I ate dinner in London Wednesday evening, November 27, with the top political or diplomatic or general editorial writers from: Sunday Times, Daily Mail, London Sun, The Economist, London Times, BBC, Sunday Telegraph and Daily Express.

The following day, Thursday, November 28, I ate lunch in Paris with similar figures from France-Soir, Europe I (a radio station), Le Figaro, L'Express, French TV News and Le Monde.

Killian of the Daily Express and Worsthorne of the Sunday Telegraph in London and Andre Fontaine of Le Monde in Paris all asked me to convey their personal congratulations and good wishes.

The thought behind Safire's memorandum was that we should establish a line on the election, its salient points, and its interpretation. This was done, and it was seemingly well received, although there was also naturally intense
interest in plans and thinking for the future.

Part I of this memo will cover the line that was set; Part II will cover the areas of greatest interest insofar as future plans and thinking are concerned; Part III will cover the need to exploit these types of journalists as communication channels (not in terms of what they print but in terms of their direct and indirect Government contacts) in the conduct of international politics.


The Nixon Presidential campaign of 1968, guided to success through the most complicated and turbulent political year in modern American history, showed Nixon to be a wise and strong political leader. The shape of the victory established Nixon as the winner of a truly national and centrist mandate.

(1) The Primaries. The decision to enter the primaries involved very high risks but the brilliant and substantial victories in all the primaries succeeded in effectively abolishing the "loser image", proved Nixon's popularity, and laid the groundwork for the handling of issues in the general campaign, both as to content and technique. Nixon won every primary he entered (and he entered all of them except those like D. C. and West Virginia, of no significance in the Republican Party, or those like California that had bona fide favorite son Governors), with 70 percent of the
vote or more. The two salient primary victories, however, were New Hampshire and Oregon. In New Hampshire, the Nixon appeal was so strong that the popular and energetic Romney, who had just been reelected by an overwhelming margin as Governor of Michigan, one of our major industrial states, and who had the total backing of the Eastern Establishment of the Republican Party, was forced to withdraw from the race before election day in order to minimize the size of the humiliation of his defeat.

In Oregon, where Dewey "stopped" Stassen in 1948 after Stassen had swept all the primaries, where Rockefeller had won his only Republican primary victory in 1964, and where both Rockefeller and Reagan in 1968 had truly full scale media and organizational campaigns conducted in their behalf, Nixon surprised everyone by winning with nearly 70 percent of the votes.

(2) The Convention. Nixon's success through the primaries assured him of more than enough convention delegates to win the nomination, and even to be able to afford some erosion in delegate strength. For this reason, and also to be able to ask for and receive genuine unity throughout the Party, Nixon adopted a Convention strategy of avoiding controversy. The fundamental strategy of Rockefeller and Reagan, on the other hand, had to be a strategy of seeking
to find controversial issues that would force delegates away from Nixon and into either the Rockefeller or the Reagan camp. Nixon's strategy of avoiding controversy at that point and seeking accommodation while suffering some erosion none-theless proved to be successful in that he did receive the nomination and was able to ask for and receive, immediately after the Convention, widespread Party unity.

(3) Agnew. The selection of Agnew seemed wise at the time of Miami and in retrospect appears to have been brilliant. A Tower or a Reagan would have lost, for the ticket, Ohio and Illinois and California -- or at least two of those. Their presence on the ticket might have won Texas, but that would not have been enough.

On the other side, a Lindsay or a Rockefeller on the ticket would have caused the loss of Tennessee, Kentucky, North Carolina, Virginia and South Carolina (the "border states" with 54 electoral votes) plus Florida with 14, as against the possibility of capturing Pennsylvania with 29. It would not have been enough.

NB: A fascinating observation on the difference between the French reaction and the British reaction to this particular analysis: the French understood perfectly and expressed admiration, whereas the British felt the personal
and political shortcomings of Agnew, as perceived by them, and as those shortcomings seemed to speak to his ability to be President, should have ruled him out. Of course, at this point I put on a hard sell for Agnew's intelligence, character and personality, but the British would have picked somebody else even though they recognize it would have endangered the election.

(4) The strategy of the Democrats, as foreseen by Nixon at the very beginning of the general election campaign. Nixon foresaw that the Democratic Party would come back together. He knew that Kennedy and O'Brien would be able to bring most of the East back; he knew that at some point in time, during the campaign, McCarthy would endorse Humphrey with something less than full enthusiasm but nonetheless substantial effect; and he knew that the leadership of organized labor would generate very great activity, and with very great effect, to recapture for the Democratic ticket those rank-and-file members whose sentiments were with Wallace in September. In fact, all these things did happen; but the fact that Nixon had foreseen them and designed his own basic campaign strategy to account for them, permitted him to win anyway.

(5) The effect of the bombing halt. The bombing halt had been foreseen; when it did come, its effect was massive.
In fact, Lou Harris has said since the election that he was convinced on the day before election day that Nixon had been beat by the bombing halt.

The Nixon camp, at the beginning of the campaign, had in mind McNamara's statements immediately before the 1966 Congressional election about reducing the draft and about troops being home by Christmas. Thus, a major peace move of some kind was to be foreseen, and a bombing halt would be the most likely. The Humphrey camp, it was known, anticipated the bombing halt announcement almost every day starting with Humphrey's Salt Lake City speech.

Nixon, of course, was able to appeal to the electorate on the war and peace issue by his call for negotiation (from strength) instead of confrontation, and also by his support for the bombing halt expressed in mid-October in the Johnstown, Pennsylvania speech and thereafter. In any case, Nixon steadfastly maintained his cool and in the final analysis the nation got both the bombing halt and a Nixon Presidency.

(6) Nixon's basic strategy. Nixon adopted a so-called "big states" strategy designed to concentrate most of his time and the funds of the campaign, and the Surrogate Candidate activity in the big electoral vote count states: California, Texas, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania,
and New Jersey. Of these, he won four: New Jersey, Illinois, Ohio, and California -- and he won all of those by very substantial margins of 40,000 or more, not by miniscule margins of under 10,000 as had been the case with the key Kennedy states in 1960.

A secondary part of the Nixon strategy was aimed at the border states which he won. A third part of his strategy was to campaign to the Negroes in the country by means of continuous references to his Black Capitalism program and by continuous references to justice whenever law and order were mentioned. Nixon never thought he would get a substantial percentage of the Negro vote, but he wanted to be in a position to be able to communicate with them as President.

The result of the Nixon strategy now is that Nixon has won a truly national election -- unlike Wilson's election when he carried only New Hampshire in the East, and unlike the election Humphrey was trying to win, i.e., without any support in the South or the West.

Conclusion: Thus, Nixon has won a truly national and centrist victory. As Joseph Kraft and others have pointed out, he is now in a position to govern effectively.
Part II: The Areas of Greatest Interest Insofar as Future Plans and Thinking are Concerned.

This section reflects areas of strong interest and conveys the substantive views not only of the elite of the London and Paris press, but also of the staff at the Institute for Strategic Studies, Mr. Minos Zombanakis (a Greek citizen who represents the Manufacturers Hanover bank in London, continental Europe and the Middle East. He sends his personal congratulations and good wishes to RN. RN will remember meeting him in Rome the spring of 1967), as well as at least a portion of the Harriman/Vance staff in Paris.

(1) The Europeans (and the British regard themselves as Europeans in this context) recognize that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have special responsibilities and therefore need to have a special relationship. They hope that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. pursue the Nixon formula for detailed negotiations: first at the Ambassadorial level, then at the Foreign Minister level, and finally, when appropriate at the highest level -- covering Vietnam, the Middle East, and strategic weapons.

However, the Europeans feel that they have interests that require consideration as these matters develop between the two super powers, and they should be kept au courant and even, to the extent possible, should be involved and represented,
in some way, in the new developments.

For example, while the Russians hope and expect Nixon's first trip abroad to be very soon after his inauguration, and to Moscow, such a trip would be inconsistent with Nixon's emphasis on preparatory talks at lower levels; it seems to me that the best opportunity for an early Nixon trip abroad would be if the Paris peace talks should reach a stage that would make it appropriate for a Presidential visit.

In any case, Europe is on the way to Moscow, so to speak, both geographically and politically. A visit to Europe before a visit to Moscow would be one way to symbolize the Nixon concern for the interests of the nations of Europe.

Another way would be to send as Ambassador to NATO a prestigious figure who was also known to be close to Nixon. Such an individual could authoritatively and continuously keep the nations of Europe fully informed and their interests adequately represented, in connection with the development of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.

In fact, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow (e.g. Thompson, Beam, Alexis Johnson or whatever top professional RN sends there), together with the Ambassador to NATO (e.g. Scranton), and RN, should think of themselves as a three-way system in this context, with a need for close communication between the NATO man and the Moscow man, and the need for the NATO man to understand his particular responsibility in handling the Europeans being of particular importance.
The Middle East. The two salient facts with regard to the Middle East today are, first, the high level of Soviet activity in the Middle East, and second, the serious instability that is afflicting the Arab world.

The Soviet activity is thought to be motivated by three impulses: (1) the traditional desire for Russian access through the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean, (2) as a reaction to a recent McNamara speech in Athens where he announced the intention to increase NATO activity in the eastern Mediterranean, and (3) penetration of the petroleum zones in northern Africa, Arabia and Iran.

The Soviets of course are very large in Egypt and the Yemen; Nasser is regarded as having very little ability to control Egypt but for the presence of Soviet help -- student riots, etc.

Without getting into the subtleties of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there is strong and widespread hope in Europe that RN will not feel that he has to be too hasty in fulfilling his campaign promise to provide the Israelis with phantom jets. It is specifically felt that to send them in before the Israelis need them would only provoke the Russians into accelerating their build up in that area. In any case, it is doubted that the Arabs and the Israelis will agree to a settlement of their disputes at any time in the foreseeable future. If a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict comes
about, it will have to be on the basis of a give-up by the Israelis of the occupied territory in exchange for a permanent recognition by Egypt (others will follow) of the right of Israel to exist as a state, but this will probably have to be imposed from the outside on the respective states by the United States and the U.S.S.R.

(3) The Monetary Crisis. There is a great deal of talk in Europe, in the press and elsewhere, about the need for a world monetary conference, a latter day Bretton Woods. No one, however, claims that there is any agreement or consensus about what direction the conference should move in. Burns, on his recent trip, created some misunderstanding when he said that most academics in the United States would favor flexible exchange rates. It had to be clarified later that he himself did not favor flexible exchange rates.

Government-imposed austerity in Britain is causing severe political backlash, and the French feel that they are in for a year of great difficulty, what with inflation and trade union demands.

With regard to these matters, insofar as Nixon's moves in the next few weeks are concerned, it would be well to keep in mind that Burns is very highly regarded in Europe as a sensible pragmatist. Nixon is said to be receiving advice from others in this area who are not so sensible. There is very high regard for Charles Coombs of the New York Federal
Reserve and considerable sentiment would support his appointment as Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs since he is already the de facto leader of U.S. policy and operations in this field and to put him in the strong public position of de jure leadership would strengthen respect for United States leadership in this critical area all over the world. The present Treasury team is regarded with contempt.

(4) Vietnam. Two salient facts should be known with regard to the Harriman/Vance mission in Paris. One, the mission has received no guidance on the President-elect's wishes. Absolutely none. Second, the South Vietnamese deeply fear that they are going to be sold out. They are still stalling in sending personnel to Paris. For example, secret bilaterals were to have begun today, Saturday, November 30, between the U.S. and Hanoi with regard to physical and procedural arrangements for the initial procedural four-way conversations. South Vietnam personnel were supposed to be in Paris by now so that they could be kept informed, but they had not shown up as of Friday.

The fact that Nixon had seen Kissinger three times in the past week had been noted by the members of the Harriman/Vance mission. Kissinger is said to be one who really knows what's going on.
The Soviets, by the way, played a major catalytic role in working out the bombing halt understanding.

Also, when the record is made available to the new administration and is examined with care, it will be clear that the bombing halt agreements could have been made much earlier than they actually were. This is something to be kept in mind for February and March, on the political side.

(NB: Holbrook said he assumed Nixon's objective would be to settle the Vietnam conflict by means of negotiations as distinguished from settling it by means of military escalation, but the settlement would have to be on an honorable basis -- i.e., on a basis that would not make it appear that Nixon had sold out what his predecessor had fought for. I told Holbrook that was extremely well put. Holbrook suggested that such a formulation might end up with a statement by us that, since our presence in South Vietnam was designed to protect the South Vietnamese from the foreign invasion, we would withdraw our troops from South Vietnam if, as, and when they withdraw their troops from South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This will cause very substantial problems with the Saigon regime, but the feeling is we are going to have to force the Saigon regime in various ways to accept more of the responsibility for their own fate.)
(Thoughts on the selection of the Ambassador to Saigon: He should be young and strong. His job will be far more debilitating than any Cabinet job. He should be someone who is particularly close to the President's thinking, knows what the President wants. He should be one who is profoundly skeptical. Bunker, for example, has been too easily hoodwinked by the lying, cheating, coniving leaders of the South Vietnamese Government. He need not be a person who has had great diplomatic experience or who has credentials as an expert on Southeast Asia or South Vietnam. (There do not seem to be any genuine experts on Southeast Asia or South Vietnam.) Mitchell?)

Part III: Use of Journalists as Communication Channels.

The London Institute for Strategic Studies, because of its unique structure and mode of operation can serve as an extraordinarily effective channel of international communication, when one is needed outside of regular government channels. The same thing can now be said of the elite of the international press in London and Paris.

First, with regard to the press: obviously they are not set up on a structured basis as is the ISS, but there is now in existence a certain good feeling, a feeling of confidence and reliability that exists among and between the
following particular individuals, out of the groups I met with in London and Paris: Roy Lewis of the London Times, Nancy Balfour of The Economist, Henry Branden of the Sunday Times, Bruce Rothwell of the Daily Mail, Andre Fontaine of Le Monde (now editor, formerly foreign editor), Jean-Jacques Faust, Assistant Editor of L'Express, and Andre Rabache, Editor of France Soir (formerly foreign editor). These people can be used, not so much with regard to what they write, as for their channels of communication to officials of their own governments as well as elite journalists and officials of foreign governments.

The Institute, however, is much more readily structured to serve these purposes immediately. Their financing is all non-government and is truly international, flowing mostly from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in this country, the Wolfson Foundation and the Nuffield and Leverhulme Trusts in the U.K. and the Volkswagen Foundation in Germany. In addition, their staff is international, including British, Americans, Germans, Japanese and Australians. Their membership is international, including government officials, politicians, corporations, and members of the press. All their work is unclassified and all their sources are supposedly unclassified. In any case they operate on that basis. But
they have marvelous access on a global basis. For example, the morning I was there they had had a staff consultation with a general from the Israeli general staff. The Associate Director, Kenneth Hunt, had just returned from Vietnam where he had been out in the field fighting with the marines. This is against the law but his contacts are such that it had been no problem for him to get into that position. Also, they move in the circle of academic, quasi-academic and government think tanks everywhere, including RAND, IDA, Princeton, Harvard, MIT in the U.S.; Chatham House in England, the government-sponsored institutes in France, Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia and the privately financed institutes in Germany, Japan and Australia.

Thus, quite apart from the possibility of modeling an in-house White House institute on similar lines, which will be the subject of a separate memorandum, this institute can be exploited immediately, even in the transition period as a fast and respectable means of communication about intentions, etc., with regard to international strategic matters.

Kissinger, by the way, can be immediately useful in this as he is most highly regarded by the London Institute staff and apparently moves widely among all of the similar institutes listed above.
November 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: RN
FROM: Ellsworth
RE: The London Institute for Strategic Studies

Summary

I. This is an organization which is unique in the field of think tank type of operations.

   It is international; it is small; it has no relationship with any government, and it is conveniently located, geographically, in the sense that London is a convenient and regular jet transfer point between continental Europe (including Russia) and North America.

II. In a general way, the Institute suggests itself as a model for a White House executive office institution, although such an in-house institution would have to be radically different in basic ways from the London Institute.

III. The facilities and personnel of the London Institute can be exploited much more heavily than they have been.
The London Institute for Strategic Studies

I. The ISS is unique.

The London Institute is unique in a number of ways. First or all, it is truly international. It is international in its financing. Following is a table of its sources of funds for 1967-68:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>1967-68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(in pounds)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A - Basic Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ford Foundation (U.S.)</td>
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<td>Rockefeller Foundation (U.S.)</td>
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<td>Wolfson Foundation (U.K.)</td>
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<td>B - Specific Grants</td>
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</table>
Its staff is also international, including members from the U.K., the U.S., Germany, Japan and Australia.

Its "membership" is international, including corporations as well as individual members, newspapermen, governments, etc., from over 40 different nations.

"Members" pay a small annual dues of under $200. This entitles them to come to "meetings" at which papers are presented, to use the library, to consult the staff on a limited basis, and to receive publications -- books, papers, etc.

And, of course, the distribution of the Institute's material is international.

None of the other think tanks in the world are as truly international. Some of the other institutes are actually supported by their governments; others, such as some of the academic institutes in this country, are supported entirely by funds which flow from or relate to the interests of one particular nation.

That the Institute is centrally located from the standpoint of jet travel these days back and forth between Europe and North America is self-evident.

The Institute is not tied to any government, whereas our Rand and IDA in this country and other institutes in other countries are. Also note the London Institute does no contract work.
And, finally, the London Institute is unique in that it has a very small staff: four permanent staff and eight visiting staff, for a total of twelve. Obviously, with such a small staff, every staff member must possess extraordinary ability; the projects undertaken must be so unique in concept that they are non-competitive with projects being undertaken by other, larger, think tanks; and yet the output must be relevant enough to policy makers to keep the Institute's output in demand; and all the staff must be good enough not to make any mistakes (certainly not very many) since a bad project for the year by one staff member would mean an eight and one-half percent error in the Institute's work for the year.

II. The Institute as a model.

Obviously, this kind of institute could not function in the White House, or anywhere else within a government. At the same time, our government already has the Rand Corporation and IDA doing this kind of work on a very large scale, and with access to classified information, and all done from the standpoint of the best interests of the United States. Moreover, we have the gigantic Brookings Institution located in Washington and designed to provide high government officials with the best in thought on economic and social issues, research on such matters, etc.
However, in a way roughly similar to the way which the top management of many top corporations have provided themselves with small groups of "wild birds", so also the President might provide himself with a small staff of no more than three or four men whose assignment would be to (a) keep in touch with the ten or twelve top men in this field on a worldwide basis (Kissinger, Bucham, Sjnederek, etc.), and (b) develop material based on their own intuition and research.

III. Greater Use of the Institute.

Immediately, through the United States "membership" in the London Institute (two officers of our embassy in London have been provided with "memberships" by our government) the Institute could be asked for a consultation or a short paper on some aspect of policy that is going to require some immediate action. For example, the Institute could be asked to prepare a quick paper, from a totally unbiased point of view, and without reference to the interests of any one country, on the subject of the adequacy of the inspection provisions of the Non-proliferation Treaty, not only in terms of the possibility of nations evading inspection but also in terms of their effect on the international politics involved in getting further ratifications. Also, the question
of inspection is obviously going to loom very large in any talks with the U.S.S.R. with regard to strategic weapons. The Institute might be asked to suggest guidelines on this point. (None of these items was either suggested by or discussed with the Institute or anyone else. This is strictly my own idea. In fact, as I reflect on it, it would probably be better to have such a request not come from our London embassy "members" but from some corporate or individual "member".)

Also, the Institute, through its widespread press and academic contacts, can be exploited to send signals and messages on a pretty far-ranging basis and into powerful and influential circles.