

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
6	2	10/29/1968	Memo	Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman RE: apparent reply to a previous memo from Haldeman. 1pg.
6	2	10/23/1968	Letter	Letter (author unk RN?) to Philip Habib thanking him for previously submitted report. 1pg.
6	2	10/14/1968	Letter	Letter form Philip Habib to RN informing RN of enclosed report titled "Toward a Modern Diplomacy". 1pg.
6	2	n.d.	Memo	Memo (author unk) to RN RE: dealing with the old administration. 18pgs.
6	2	10/04/1968	Letter	Letter from RN to President Johnson RE: presidential transition. 1pg.
6	2	10/04/1968	Letter	Letter from RN to Robert C. Hill extending appreciation for advice on the situation in Mexico. 1pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
6	2	09/28/1968	Report	Report (author and recipient unk) RE: American policy toward Germany in the light of the (Soviet) invasion of Czechoslovakia. 3pgs.
6	2	12/09/1968	Letter	Typed letter from Jacqueline Bouvier Onassis to RN wishing him well. 1pg.
6	2	n.d.	Letter	Handwritten letter from Jacqueline Bouvier Onassis to RN wishing him well. 1pg.
6	2	n.d.	Memo	Memo/note (author, recipient unk) noting exchange of messages between RN and Pogorny of the Soviet Embassy. 1pg.
6	2	n.d.	Letter	Letter from Pogorny of the Soviet Embassy to RN congratulating him on his election victory. 1pg.
6	2	11/13/1968	Letter	Letter from RN to Pogorny thanking him for his note of congratulations. 1pg.
6	2	12/10/1968	Other Document	Western Union telegrams (2ea) from Thomas Upsher and Mr. & Mrs. JE Sorrells to RN expressing displeasure over the appointment of Seargent Shriver to an ambassadorship. 1pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
6	2	n.d.	Memo	Memo from Chotiner to Rose (Mary Woods) stating that "RN will probably want to handle this himself".. 1pg.
6	2	11/07/1968	Letter	Letter from RN's ex-lawfirm congratulating him on his electio victory. 1pg.
6	2	12/04/1968	Letter	Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to RN acknowledging Bob Woodruff and General Heaton's importance. 2pgs.
6	2	12/13/1968	Letter	Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to RN expressing a wish to meet various cabinet appointees along with a suggestion to appoint Herb Brownell for Chief Justice. 3pgs.
6	2	n.d.	Other Document	Envelope that contained correspondence from DD Eisenhower to RN. 1pg.
6	2	11/27/1968	Letter	Letter from Rita Hauser to RN congratulating him on his election victory. 1pg.
6	2	n.d.	Letter	Typed letter from Harold Lee to RN claiming election victory is assured along with good luck wishes. 1pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
6	2	10/19/1968	Letter	Handwritten letter from Harold Lee to RN claiming election victory is assured along with good luck wishes. 1pg.
6	2	10/19/1968	Other Document	Envelope that contained letter from H. Lee to RN. 1pg.
6	2	12/05/1968	Letter	Letter from John McCone to RN encouraging the employment of Gilbert Fitzhugh. 1pg.
6	2	n.d.	Report	Biographical and background information for Gilbert Fitzhugh.
6	2	11/27/1968	Brochure	Brochure authored by Gilbert Fitzhugh titled "Facing Up to our Urban Problems." 1pg.
6	2	n.d.	Form	NARA withdrawl sheet.
6	2	n.d.	Other Document	Birthday card from the Yorba Linda 4-H Club to RN with signatures. 2pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
6	2	n.d.	Memo	Notes (author/recipient unk) regarding flight information. 1pg.
6	2	10/09/1968	Letter	Letter from Robert Menzies to RN congratulating him on his speculative electoral victory. 1pg.
6	2	n.d.	Other Document	Envelope that contained letter from R. Menzies to RN. 1pg.

Rose Mary Woods

Staff of Richard M. Nixon
450 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
(212) 661-6400

(L to Rose)
gone



Executive Secretary

10/29/68

Memo:

Bob H. Rose

I have no idea
whether anyone else
has seen the letter
or the report. I
think you should
be sure to know
where all the reports
are. Rose

But I do H

October 23, 1968

Dear Mr. Habib:

Thank you for your thoughtful report and letter which Dr. Olds has delivered to me through Ambassador Martin. You will know from my recent remarks how interested I am in the reappraisal of our State Department.

At present, I am preoccupied with the campaign but I will read the report with the care it deserves when time permits.

Meantime, of course, I hope events of the next two weeks may permit using your study in the new year.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Mr. Philip C. Habib, President
American Foreign Service Association
2101 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20037

Traxator
Sp

copy

AMERICAN
FOREIGN SERVICE
ASSOCIATION

2101 E Street, Northwest



Washington, D. C. 20037 • 338-4041

October 14, 1968

Mr. Richard M. Nixon
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Mr. Nixon:

In behalf of the American Foreign Service Association I have the pleasure to enclose a copy of the report "Toward a Modern Diplomacy." Commissioned by the Association's Board of Directors, the report represents the efforts of a large number of professionals working in their spare time over the past 18 months. It has benefitted by their insights and experience. It contains their recommendations for reform of the organizations with which this country conducts its foreign affairs.

We believe the report to be an important document. So far as we are aware, it represents the first effort by any group of employees of the Federal Government to make systematic and constructive suggestions for improvements in the activities for which they are responsible. We hope that you will find the report valuable and we look forward to the excitement of serving the next Administration.

Sincerely,

Philip C. Habib
President

Enclosure:

Report

Rose
I guess the letter
is OK - has
anyone
but Ads seen
it?
H

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. NIXON

DEALING WITH THE OLD ADMINISTRATIONIntroduction and Summary

Relations between Presidents and Presidents-Elect of different parties have always been delicate and often strained. Frequently the President's natural disappointment at his party's defeat has been tinged with personal bitterness because his administration and policies have borne the brunt of his successor's campaign salvos. Nor has graciousness been an inevitable characteristic of Presidents-Elect. Even the most sympathetic historians of the New Deal find little to applaud in F.D.R.'s cavalier treatment of Hoover in 1932.

Yet cooperation is essential for several reasons. At least part of the public will be offended if either fails to show courtesy and consideration. National unity is hardly served by permitting a hard-fought campaign to merge into post election feuding. And, of course, much of the machinery for preparing a new President for the transfer of power can be utilized only with the concert of his predecessor. Thus it is in your interest that the interregnum be a time when old hatchets are buried and the grinding of new axes postponed.

Both because he has more to gain and because the task is easier for him, the burden of maintaining good will between Administrators falls to the President-Elect. The outgoing Administration has valuable information, experience, and

advice that you and your team will want to tap. To make cordial advances, to overlook minor irritants, to soothe the President's wounded pride -- all these are small prices to pay for such resources.

Pre-election Period. In order to exploit fully the opportunities for an effective transfer of responsibility allowed by cooperation between the two Administrations, you should consider the following actions:

- Appoint a counterpart to President Johnson's designee, Charles Murphy, experienced in the operations of the Executive Branch and able to bargain with Murphy on equal terms.

- Ask your designee to decide upon the requests to be made of the incumbent Administration.

- Initiate planning for transition matters not directly related to relations with the old Administration.

Post-election Period. Post-election customs are clear. President Johnson will doubtless suggest an early meeting to set the tone of transitional cooperation and lay the broad outlines of the actions you will take together. In summary -- to be elaborated later -- you will want to touch the following points:

- Security clearances: You should make arrangements for expediting security clearances for your appointees.

- Current and background information: You should seek access to such Administration information as daily intelligence reports, briefings and memoranda on current problems, and appropriate "cable traffic." You should also request other information, to be described below, that may be difficult to obtain later or less valuable unless studied in advance and acted upon early.

- National security and budget cooperation: You should plan for early and close cooperation on national security affairs and the budget process.

- Orientation of appointees: You should arrange for the general orientation of your appointees: briefing of new officials by the predecessors, access to career staff and files, clerical and professional assistance, and perhaps ground-rules to be established for an "open office" policy.

I. Pre-election contacts

1. It will be very much to your advantage to accept President Johnson's invitation to begin discussions now about the transition. After Election Day you will want as much cooperation as you can get from the outgoing Administration. The more you get, the more effectively you and your appointees can govern after January 20.

You cannot ask much prior to November 5. Whomever you designate to negotiate with the Administration can, however, lay the groundwork for fulfilling your many post-election requirements.

You must first therefore choose an individual to act for you in these negotiations. President Johnson's appointee, Charles Murphy, is an affable but very tough Southerner, long experienced in Washington. He acted for Truman in the 1952-53 transition, served in Agriculture and on the C. A. B. under Kennedy and Johnson, returned to the White House recently as a Special Assistant, and reportedly represented Johnson in Chicago during the democratic Convention. Your designee must be able to deal with Murphy on equal terms. It seems essential that he possess not only personal shrewdness and bargaining abilities, but experience in the total operations of the Executive Branch, preferably in the Executive Office.

2. You should develop with your designee a catalogue of your transitional needs. For both political and administrative reasons, these will fall into three general categories: (a) services that can be performed, at least in part, by the outgoing Administration prior to November 5; (b) post-election cooperation that can be plotted and arranged prior to the election; (c) post-election services that need not, or should not, be discussed with the incumbent Administration until after the election. In subsequent sections of this memorandum, we suggest several cooperative efforts and services you may want to request and, where important, try to indicate the time when action is most usefully initiated.

3. Although not directly related to dealings with the old Administration, certain other transitional matters bear a short comment. In order to coordinate later cooperation with the Administration and to make maximum use of interregnum preparation, you should begin thinking about designees to perform two functions. First, you will need some person(s) to direct and organize your transition activities in general. This man would conceivably play much the same role as Henry Cabot Lodge did for Eisenhower in 1952-1953. Second, you may want to select a transition planner, whose task will be to perform "think work" about the transition. The services of Richard Neustadt for Kennedy in 1960-61 suggest the nature of his responsibilities.

II. The Immediate Post-Election Period

A. Meeting with the President.

4. The President will probably contact you shortly after November 5 and suggest an early meeting. In order to gain maximum lead time for the transition,

you should accept the earliest possible date. Preliminary negotiating at the staff level can settle many details of agenda and format, which then need not occupy the time of the principals. *

5. You and the President may wish to issue a joint statement after your meeting. The ideal statement would leave everything open and yet obviate any appearance of friction which might result if the President later feels compelled to emphasize that his power continues unimpaired until January 20 or if you later wish to disclaim responsibility for interregnum Executive actions. A suggestion follows:

The President and President-Elect had a full, friendly and useful discussion. They and their associates will cooperate in every appropriate way in order to insure a smooth and effective transfer of responsibility on January 20. They will continue to consult as they think desirable and are confident that such cooperation can be achieved without impairing the orderly functioning of the Executive Branch in carrying out the President's Constitutional responsibilities.

B. Principals tone shapes transition.

6. You and the President will have to take strong and positive action to surmount the impediments to effective cooperation that have traditionally characterized transitions. Many in Government will feel that they and their policies were treated unjustly during the campaign. Some new people will act as if they

* For bargaining purposes, you will want these "White House negotiators" to be aware not only of your various needs for the transition, but of their relative priority. In addition, you will want to think about the general format of the meeting. You may wish, for example, to request the presence of key members of both Presidential staffs, either for purposes of coordination or in the hope of exposing subordinates to the spirit of cooperation shown by the principals.

were already in office. New appointees have been known to assume that their predecessors were fools or scoundrels or both and to show no regard for past decisions, present reasons, or future insights. Some incumbents may attempt to "sell" their policies to the new people. And the new people may feel that they are being asked to commit themselves prematurely.

By frankly anticipating these characteristic attitudes, you can try to offset them. Hopefully, so will the retiring President who must set the example of neither preempting his successor unnecessarily nor deferring all action in critical areas. And if he, who has suffered campaign criticism, is willing to act responsibly and constructively, his subordinates can be encouraged to do the same.

You, in turn, cannot be too emphatic in urging your appointees to take advantage of their predecessors' valuable experience in coping with their departments, their constituencies, and their particular Congressional committees. In the past, incoming officials have forfeited much of the advantage to be gained in tapping this source of information and advice. In 1952, for example, Charles Wilson neglected entirely to profit from the experience of Robert Lovett. Eight years later, the Kennedy Administration retained General Andrew Goodpaster through the transition period but made little effort to draw upon his experience. Those of your appointees who served in the Eisenhower Administration would do well to recall how little their own readiness to assist their successors was appreciated. If you can convince your appointees that the advice of former officeholders is a valuable resource not to be wasted, you will have taken a major step toward an effective and efficient transition.

III. Clearance of New Appointees

7. Arrangements must be made for investigating the personal background of your appointees for two reasons. First, some of your appointees will need the immediate security clearances necessary for direct access to classified information of the Johnson Administration. Nor will you yourself wish to entrust classified materials to your people, either before or after the inauguration, without the assurance of at least preliminary clearance. Second, you will probably want to continue the practice of investigating all potential Presidential appointees -- regardless of their need for classified data -- in order to assure yourself of their personal suitability for high government office.

8. The timing problem: Investigations not begun before the election require attention. Obviously, the process should be initiated as early as possible to avoid the delays incident to overloading the investigative agencies.

9. General procedure: (a) The reports on those needing pre-inaugural access to classified information must first be examined by the Administration -- perhaps the White House itself -- which can then relay both its decisions and the reports to you. Exposing such reports to the Administration may be politically undesirable but is probably unavoidable. It seems unlikely that the information thus revealed would be misused by the clearing officials. (b) Unless you receive direct access to the investigative agencies, reports on persons not in the preceding category must also be channeled through the Administration. Here, however, the Administration is merely a conduit to you; it has no need to examine the content of the report. You should arrange for the Administration, therefore, to transmit to you the unopened reports on persons not requiring pre-inauguration security clearances.

10. In both the pre-election and post-inauguration periods, the problem can be mitigated through the use of temporary clearances. You will have to determine the availability, limits, and conditions for such clearances.

IV. Information for the President-Elect and his designees.

A. Current information.

11. You should request the kind of military, diplomatic, and foreign intelligence provided routinely for the President. Such information will give you background for decisions you will have to make after January 20th. Also it should help you to establish early guidelines for distinguishing presidential from departmental "business." And it may permit you to judge the form and adequacy of such information for your needs.

12. You will, of course, need a staff to sit astride this information flow, direct your attention to the matters most relevant for you, and otherwise absorb and use this flow.* Let us emphasize that your most useful and significant information may come not via formal transmissions from the old administration but via your own people working closely with incumbent counterparts -- as discussed later in this memorandum.

13. You should request a channel for obtaining appropriate briefings and memoranda on current problems for yourself and your people. The Administration would probably offer some on its own initiative but you should clear the way for making your own specific requests for information and analysis on both substantive matters and on transitional and organizational topics.**

* Your basic needs for a transition staff were noted in our August 15 memorandum; a later memorandum will address itself to White House organization.

** Whether you should seek authority to request data directly from the departments or from departmental staff is discussed in a later section.

Details are not crucial in your initial dealings with the Administration; they can be worked out later. What you must establish at the outset is the basic proposition that the President-Elect is entitled to full access and that government information should move freely to you and your designees. Whatever you can do to create an atmosphere of willing cooperation and respect for the President's own responsibilities will facilitate the flow of information.

14. One of your most difficult and critical problems during the transition will be the gaining of mastery (insofar as mastery is possible) over national security affairs. You may want to request President Johnson to assign you one or more career officials qualified to brief you during the transition period on military, intelligence, diplomatic and related matters. The person(s) selected would be appropriately cleared, sufficiently knowledgeable to interpret and amplify information received about substantive and agency problems, and sufficiently experienced and senior to be respected by both sides for intelligence and discretion. Such a person would know when it is appropriate to seek further information from the staffs with which he is familiar and when not to do so.

15. You might want to request access to some "cable traffic" into the White House as a preliminary exposure to later responsibilities. Your personal staff for national security matters, to take one example, could serve as an effective recipient of this information to promote their own education and as a conduit to you.

B. Other information, especially from the White House and Executive Office.

16. You should ask President Johnson to arrange some way of giving access (controlled by him) to national security materials that might be available, or readily available, only in White House files which leave with the retiring President.

a) One aspect of this request is easily presented and justified:

Eisenhower-Khrushchev conversations were covered completely only in the White House files which left with President Eisenhower. President Johnson would doubtless agree that a new President must know what the preceding President said to foreign officials.

b) Your request should, if possible, embrace a second and more elusive matter: There might be "limited distribution" or other closely held documents or memoranda that are conveniently assembled only in White House files.*

c) Perhaps you can do no more than to (1) raise the problem, (2) express confidence that President Johnson will do everything he properly can to make sure that his successor is fully informed on significant national security matters, and (3) leave the details to be worked out by your national security adviser(s) and their incumbent counterparts. This reinforces another point: Unlike President Kennedy's adviser, McGeorge Bundy, who did not begin work until January or assemble his staff until later, your national security staff should be appointed early and begin performance as soon as possible.

* It is conceivable, for example, that complete details of various contacts with foreign officials on Vietnam matters may be so sensitive and restricted that full information vital to the new President might not be readily known to carry-over personnel or readily revealed by surviving files. In other cases, important material might be contained in permanent departmental files but yet not readily accessible because dispersed among voluminous other materials.

17. You should ask to see Task Force reports prepared for the President and not yet released to the public. You could point out that work by thoughtful people should not be wasted. You should, however, state your willingness to accept any limitations imposed by President Johnson as to acknowledgment, attribution, or quotation, and defer to his wishes regarding any reports which he might issue publicly himself or use in late messages and speeches.

18. You should ask for reorganization studies completed or underway in the Budget Bureau or in the Departments.

19. You will want to specify certain useful personnel information that could easily be assembled by the Bureau of the Budget: available Presidential and Departmental appointments (to the extent not published elsewhere), expiring term appointments, Presidential powers with respect to various classes of appointees, personnel policy decisions that need to be made within the first three months, etc.

20. You should request the preparation of a memorandum on technical operations of the White House, office and mansion -- budget, accounting, permanent personnel, customs, etc. This should be supplemented by personal consultation between incoming and outgoing officials. In addition, William Hopkins, the Executive Clerk, is a great storehouse of information on these matters.

21. The preceding enumeration of reports must not disguise the important truth that your best source of information lies not on paper but in people. Present (and former) members of the White House Staff are perhaps the most valuable resource of all for a new Administration. The unique experience and responsibility of Presidents seem to forge a common bond among them notwithstanding differences

of party or policy. Presidential staffs should find a similar bond arising from the special institution they serve. The insights, experience, and occasionally the negative example of incumbent and former staff members can be extremely illuminating for new people. And a common loyalty to the Presidency should be enough to encourage the future staff to seek and the present staff to offer candid discussion of the Office and its problems.

V. Orientation of New Appointees.

A. National Security and Budget observers.

22. Since you will need to master, at the earliest possible moment, the massive flow of communications and advice relating to national security policy, you should give high priority to obtaining from the outgoing administration permission for your prospective Special Assistant(s) for national security affairs to work with their incumbent counterpart(s), and, if possible, immediately nearby, hopefully in adjoining offices. If such an arrangement is not offered by President Johnson, you should request it. The terms of your understanding with the outgoing President should not preclude your designating more than one person for this function. Even if you choose to centralize responsibility on your own staff, your designee will want assistance to help in learning procedures, in mastering substantive issues, and perhaps in examining files soon to be removed.

23. In addition, your Administration must become familiar -- promptly and in depth -- with the Budget Bureau and its current work on the 1970 budget. Apart from intimate intra-Administration considerations of peculiarly partisan matters,

It would be helpful for your Director (or other designee) and a few key staff to observe as much of the budget preparation process as they can absorb. In this way, your appointees can understand the nature of current issues, can help you make preliminary judgments about the issues you want to re-examine after Inauguration, and can better handle the new or repeated departmental requests confronting them in early 1969. Close cooperation during the transition period has become traditional in Budget, and it is a salutary tradition. In the unlikely event that the Administration fails to offer cooperation in this area, you should request it.

B. General orientation of appointees.

24. To reiterate a key point, you will find no greater resource in the outgoing Administration than the expertise and experience of its staff and appointees. In the past, incoming officials have generally suffered to learn the same lessons time and again because they have not profited from their predecessors' experience. On the whole, this seems attributable more to mistrust of the predecessors rather than to any unwillingness of the latter to be helpful. Of course, not everyone can be equally helpful. Of course, much that is said will have to be discounted by different interests and circumstances. But the fact is: outgoing officials are a valuable resource that should be utilized by the incoming officials during the transition period.

25. You should press the old Administration to encourage Secretaries, Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Administrators, and other Presidential appointees to receive their counterparts and to acquaint them with the administrative practices and substantive issues of their agencies.

a) You can expect the office of each Presidential appointee to have prepared an appropriate 'briefing book' on administrative and substantive matters. Even excessively voluminous and routinely bureaucratic products can be useful to the appointee (or his special assistant). Even the routine product can identify such basic information (often unknown to new appointees) as both the 'hot' and recurring issues facing the agency, the identity and arguments of important interest groups concerned with each issue, and the relevant Congressional considerations.

b) On such topics, you should advise your appointees to seek the views of the incumbents. The direct exchange can be more sharply focused and more candid.

c) Furthermore, you should recommend that your appointees ask outgoing officials (on a discreet and informal basis) for their views on the agencies' career people. (We would hope that some information of this type would have been gathered in the pre-election period.) The new official with a different policy outlook may react differently, but incoming and outgoing officials will often have a common reaction -- independent of policy -- to a subordinate's qualities. In time, the new people may learn, as did their predecessors, that a subordinate is analytical, concerned, diligent, articulate, concise, skeptical, discreet, or the opposites. While the new official will not want to be bound by the predecessor's opinions, the latter's views can accelerate the process of testing and appraising. And, of course, subordinates are most useful to one who knows what discounts and premiums to apply to their work.

26. Some incumbent officials may value their successors or their agencies sufficiently to open their offices to their successors, letting them read much of the paper traffic and to observe conferences and meetings with subordinates and

outsiders. Whether any particular official makes such an offer will depend upon his work and working habits and the mesh of personalities. This assumes that the "open office" approach occurs to him both as a possibility and as one to which the President would not object. It follows, therefore, that if the President makes no mention of the subject to you, you should diplomatically suggest its usefulness. You should urge him, if agreeable, to authorize such cooperation perhaps by mentioning it in a Cabinet discussion of transitional arrangements. Some such approach as this is almost imperative in the State and Defense and perhaps elsewhere, depending on your plans.

27. These approaches are not without this danger: such one to one interaction between incumbents and new appointees may unconsciously and uncritically tend to freeze existing patterns of organization, allocations of responsibility, or ways of seeing problems. We see two possible countermeasures: First, you can make your appointees conscious of the issue, demand critical thinking about it, and warn that organizational arrangements are subject to review and revision. Second, it may be possible to postpone the appointment of some Assistant Secretaries in those departments which can be efficiently managed at the outset without the full complement of Assistant Secretaries. If so, your primary appointees would have more time for a thorough personnel search and for a careful review of effective organizational possibilities within the department.

28. Pre-inauguration access of appointees to the departmental staffs will probably be opposed by the old Administration which might fear a premature transfer of staff loyalty. Because no categorical rule can cope entirely with

individual and departmental variations, such contacts are best left to be worked out agency by agency. At the Presidential level, you should limit yourself to two requests:

a) Your study groups and task forces may feel particular need for access to relevant departmental files and experts. Fully knowledgeable outside experts are, to be sure, often available. But where this is not the case, the government experts may be essential for thorough appreciation of the data and correct analysis. You should specify these situations as clearly as you can and request access relevant to them. (They will be relatively few in number.)

b) You should seek agreement in principle that agencies lend a suitable "expert or two" to the new officials or task forces when they request them and when such aid can be provided without disrupting the current work of the agency.

29. General pre-inauguration access to files (as distinct from staff) might be rejected altogether if sought at the Presidential level. Since permanent departmental files will be available later, the Administration may hesitate to grant early access. You should ask no more than authority to make arrangements on a case-by-case basis with each department. In light of your hopes to include younger men in the intimate workings of Government, you might seek permission to designate relatively junior persons -- prospective special assistants to high officials -- to study relevant files and other background information which they can later bring to bear in giving post-inauguration assistance to their chiefs. In other situations, such work might make it possible to delay the appointment of some Assistant Secretaries, as discussed earlier. This technique could prove extremely valuable

in selected offices where orientation of new appointees is difficult. Possible examples are the Secretariat and a few other offices in the State Department as well as I. S. A. and Systems Analysis in Defense.

30. You should arrange quite early to have at least one incumbent official remain as Acting Secretary in each Department. He will exercise formal statutory power until the new Secretary and his team are confirmed (which might not occur on Inauguration day or the next).

31. There are certain technical areas where you may expect a briefing from the Administration. If one is not offered, you should request the following information:

a) To what extent will departmental office space be available? In 1960-61, ten new officials were housed in State and two in each of the other Departments. To accommodate any larger number might well prove disruptive but if an "open office" policy is in effect, new officials would have to be housed nearby. In other situations location may not be crucial if adequate information is available.

b) What funds are available to the President-Elect under the Transition Act for personnel, supplies, consultants, travel, and office space?

c) To what extent can the various departments help to absorb the expenses of transition by lending office space and clerical and professional assistance?

VI. The Handling of Crises

32. If a crisis arises during the transition and the response of the President will have major continuing consequences (e. g., American response to a Chinese invasion of Vietnam), the President will doubtless want to consult you since yours will be the longer burden.

You probably have little choice but to assume that the President acts in good faith when he calls upon you. The public would expect you to consult with the President in a time of national emergency. You will have been receiving and digesting information before and after the election; your confidence in the data will be proportional to the variety of your sources. Nevertheless, you may hesitate to share the responsibility, even symbolically, without clearly adequate information or time for deliberation, without decision-making authority, and without the inescapable mandate of office.

No one can tell either principal his duty. This much is clear: the President can see that you are kept fully informed and invite you to express your views. You may wish to decline and in most cases this is a real option. However, there may be a crisis of such proportions that silence or the standard formulations of concern are inadequate responses. Then if you have a clear policy view, there is every reason to state it. Beyond this we do not venture.

J-x
Johnson SPL
Transition SPL

RICHARD M. NIXON
P O. BOX 1968
TIMES SQUARE STATION
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10036

October 4, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

In response to your suggestion,
I have designated Mr. Frank Lincoln as my
representative to meet with Mr. Charles
Murphy on matters relating to the transition.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D. C.

bcc: Frank Lincoln

H-x

Bob Hill --SPL
(Transition - SPL)

RICHARD M. NIXON
P. O. BOX 1968
TIMES SQUARE STATION
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10036

October 4, 1968

Dear Bob:

Rose told me of her telephone conversation with you during our brief stop at Key Biscayne and I want you to know how much I appreciate having your advice on the situation in Mexico.

Also, I want to thank you for your suggestion with regard to working up a team to look carefully at State, Defense, and CIA top personnel. Others have been giving some thought to these problems and I appreciate your doing so as well. I am going to devote all of my energies and thoughts to winning the election between now and November 5th to make sure that we will have some "taking over" to do!

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Hill
P. O. Box 350
Littleton, New Hampshire 03561

10044 17470 - Sept. 28, 1965

1. This message concerns American policy toward Germany in the light of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

2. This event -- deeply shocking to virtually all Germans -- has resulted in increased readiness to provide more money for defense and to move further on European integration, including British entry into the Common Market. Although movement in this direction is hesitant and as yet inconclusive, it is more positive than any heretofore under the present government and clearly marks a waning of de Gaulle's influence here.

3. I welcome this evolution and believe it is in the interests of the US. Conversely, I believe that if the Germans do not act now, the opportunity to strengthen NATO in the light of the Czechoslovak crisis will have been missed. This will make the invasion of Czechoslovakia an even greater short

term Soviet success than it is already and will sharply reduce the possibility of converting it into a long term Soviet failure.

4. If the crisis does not lead to strengthening NATO, I believe the result in Germany will be a mood of pessimism and of accommodation towards the USSR. The result in the US will be disappointment over the lack of European response and continuing pressures to withdraw more American troops from Europe. The outcome either way may be a historic turning point. If it is negative, it will give impetus to a downward spiral in the US relationship with Europe, which, Germans tell me, must eventually result in Western Europe's becoming an enlarged Finland.

5. The German decision is not firm yet. It may not take final form for several weeks. Perhaps the major concern of German leaders with regard to it is that, if they finally decide on a go-ahead policy, they will be left in ~~an~~ isolation by their allies, and thus exposed to Soviet attack and to both European and German criticism as being hasty and foolish "hardliners".

6. I hope I appreciate at least some of the difficulties of your present situation, but I believe it most desirable in view of the importance of the German decision to give them some encouragement by positive moves of our own in response to some positive prior European moves. One such move would be a statement from you that you will recommend to the incoming administration that the US should commit itself to continued adherence to the NATO treaty beyond the 1969 deadline. Another would be a similar recommendation to retain at least the present level of troops in Europe in the face of the new situation caused by ~~EM~~ the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and preferably, to return to Europe permanently the two withdrawn brigades of the 24th Division.

7. The reports about strategic arms talks with the Soviets are a real worry here -- at whatever level talks might be held. Although I know little of current plans, I accept the proposition that a workable arrangement on this subject

would be in the interest of Europe as well as the US and that the matter should be pursued with the Soviets in the future.

8. Nonetheless, given the present atmosphere in Germany, a decision apparently to reward Soviet ~~ag~~ aggression by embarking on arms talks would, I fear, be incomprehensible here. How, it would be asked, can one explain a willingness to trust the Soviet word when they have just broken it so flagrantly in Czechoslovakia?

9. Another effect of an expression of US willingness to ~~ax~~ start talks with the Soviets now would be to put in doubt the judgment and good sense of German leaders ~~in~~ pressing for increases in defense. Such a US decision might well eliminate the possibility of a positive German decision on ~~our~~ defense.

10. You may have a different perspective in Washington. But as I view it, the chance for strengthening NATO, and the damage which would arise from not doing so, outweigh in terms of our national interest the potential gain from opening ~~the~~ the talks with Soviets ~~at~~ at this time.

1040 Fifth Avenue



Dear Mr. Nixon --

You must be very tired and very happy -

All the hopes and good wishes of the country
are with you now -- and I just wanted to add mine to that long
long list --

and to wish you so deeply strength and health,
and peace of mind and happiness for all the years that lie
ahead -- and last, but so important, good luck.

Most Sincerely,

Jacqueline Bouvier Onassis

A handwritten signature and initials are located at the bottom of the page. The signature is written in cursive and appears to be 'Jill'. To the right of the signature, the name 'Onassis' and the initials 'Spl' are written in a similar cursive style. The entire signature and initials are enclosed within a large, hand-drawn oval.

Dear Mr. Nixon -
You must be very tired and
very happy.

All the hopes and good wishes
of the country are with you now -
and I just wanted to add mine
to that long long list -

and to wish you so deeply
strength and health, and peace of mind
and happiness for all the years that
lie ahead - and last but so important,
good luck.

Most Sincerely
Jacqueline Bouvier Davis

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
810 Fifth Avenue
By Hand

Exchange of messages
R.N. - Podgorny

Thru State + Soviet
Embassy

Released to press
11/15/68

1

File From Russian ^R
Govt

11/8

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION BY THE SOVIET EMBASSY OF TELEGRAM
TO RN FROM M. POGORNY, CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

Dear Mr. Nixon:

Please accept our congratulations on ~~y~~our election as
President of the United States of America.

We wish you fruitful work in this ~~high~~ high office. We
would like to hope that the forthcoming period will be marked
with a further development of relations between the USSR and
the USA in the interests of the Soviet and the American
peoples, in the interests of strengthening peace through
our world.

(Dictated 6:45 p.m., to B. Harlow, November 8, by Consulate
Mikhailov, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.)

Mr. Mikhailov (NA 8-7550) wishes to be notified that the
original cable has reached Mr. Nixon. He awaits a return
call.

Have been received by USSR

9:50 a.m.

November 13, 1968

Mr. Haldeman: Ray Price phoned in the following letter to be written to Chairman Podgorny of the USSR.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your kind and gracious note of congratulations on my election as President.

I remember with great pleasure my trips to the Soviet Union, and especially the friendship I found expressed so warmly between the Soviet and American peoples.

I join you in the hope that this friendship can be preserved and further strengthened. It is now more essential than ever that our two peoples work together, in a spirit of mutual respect and with a recognition of the special responsibilities we share for the peace of the world.

I am sure great strides can be taken in the years just ahead, toward the genuine peace and security that people everywhere yearn for.

Good *reply of* *Richard Nixon*
President Elect of
the United States
of America
Chairman Podg
Telegram

Telefax

western union

Telefax

LLG045 (31)CTB027 CT
LYA014 PD LYNCHBURG VIR 10 905A EST
HON RICHARD M NIXON
SHOREHAM HOTEL WASHDC

I STRONGLY RESENT THE APPOINTMENT OF SGT SHRIVER TO THE UN
STOP YOU ARE BITING THE HAND THAT FEEDS YOU
THOMAS T UPSHUR 2255 LANGHORNE RD

(905)

1968 DEC 10 AM 9 5c

FAX M

Unanswered

WU 1270 (RB-66)

Telefax

western union

Telefax

LLF128 (56)NSA166
NS ABA082 PD SNYDER TEX 10 143P CST
HONORABLE RICHARD NIXON
SHOREHAM HOTEL WASHDC

SGT SHRIVER HAS ALREADY CONSUMED TOO MUCH US TREASUREY DONT
GIVE HIM ANBASSADORSHIP. SO FAR YOUR APPOINTEES HAVE BEEN GOOD
MR AND MRS J E SORRELLS

(155)

1968 DEC 10 PM 5 12

FAX M

Unanswered

Murray Chotiner
Special Assistant to Campaign Manager

Nixon Agnew
Campaign Committee

Staff of Richard M. Nixon
445 Park Avenue
Third Floor
New York, N. Y. 10022
(212) 661-6400 Ext. 11

Rose-

RN will probably
want to handle this
himself.

Murray

Murray Chotiner

Bob (Guthrie)
Spl

NIXON MUDGE ROSE GUTHRIE ALEXANDER & MITCHELL

20 BROAD STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10005
212-422-6767

NOV 9 1968

JOHN T. TRIMBLE
COUNSEL

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
202-298-5970

12, RUE DE LA PAIX
PARIS 2e, FRANCE
742-05-99

CABLE ADDRESSES
"BALUCHINS-NEW YORK"
"BALUCHINS-WASHINGTON"
"BALUCHINS-PARIS"

*John saw this
file*

JOHN H. ALEXANDER
BLISS ANSNES
PETER W. ASHER
ARTHUR M. BECKER
MILTON BLACK
JOHN F. BROSNAN
GEORGE E. BUCHANAN
WILLIAM H. CANNON
HARRY B. CLARK
GOLDTHWAITE H. DORR
THOMAS W. EVANS
RICHARD S. FARROW
JAMES G. FRANGOS
LEONARD GARMENT
GERRIT GILLIS
GERALD B. GREENWALD
(D.C. BAR ONLY)
RANDOLPH H. GUTHRIE
MATTHEW G. HEROLD, JR.
JOSEPH V. KLINE
WILLIAM B. LANDIS
JOHN LARSON
FRANKLIN B. LINCOLN, JR.
WILLIAM A. MADISON
JOHN N. MITCHELL
RICHARD M. NIXON
RICHARD S. RITZEL
MILTON C. ROSE
NORMAN M. SEGAL
HARRY G. SILLECK, JR.
HENRY ROOT STERN, JR.
JAMES P. TANNIAN
ROBERT E. WALSH
GEORGE W. WHITTAKER
DONALD J. ZOELLER

November 7, 1968

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
President-Elect
810 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. President:

The new form of salutation gives me the greatest pleasure. Your victory, as I well know, is an unbelievable story of what courage, determination and ability can accomplish.

All of us here who have been minding the store take great pride in our partner and his colleagues. Some of us did not even really appreciate how emotionally involved we were. We did not go to bed until Humphrey conceded! And one of us, I can personally confess, is too damned old for such ordeals, loaded with such suspense.

Well now it is over -- we all know you will do the best that a human being can do to resolve the almost insoluble problems that face our country.

Best to Pat and the children.

Sincerely,

BB

RHG:ARK

D D E

GETTYSBURG
PENNSYLVANIA 17325
Walter Reed Hospital
December 4, 1968

Dear Dick:

When I saw you all Thanksgiving Day there were two rather personal matters that I wanted to mention but with so many people present I thought it better to write you personally, making sure you got the letter yourself.

The first one has to do with Bob Woodruff. As you know, being from Georgia, he has been a Democrat all his life but he has supported me in the past as well as you this time. He made a significant contribution---I suppose secretly, due to his party affiliation. I am told that the amount was in excess of \$20,000. I know you are acquainted with Bob and thought it quite possible this knowledge had not come to your attention. I felt if you knew it you would write a note of appreciation.

The other point has to do with General Heaton. When he was asked to remain another two years on active duty (Though now retired) he declined to do so before the election for the simple reason of his determination to avoid serving under your opponent. I believe under the last resolution passed by Congress, a resolution extended his service to sometime in May. It occurred to me that you might want to take some action in the matter. He wants nothing for himself, but all his associates that I have met are so impressed; first, by his standing in medicine in the United States and second, by the close and friendly relation he has built up with Congress during the past 15 years that you might want him to continue for a couple years as the Chief, Army Medical Corps or you might want to use him in some capacity as coordinator of military medicine in all the services. He is an extremely able man.

Incidentally, we were all delighted to hear that you are assigning Colonel Tkach as your White House Physician. He is top flight in every respect.

I hate to bother you with a letter but these two matters were personal and are the expressions of my own opinion. No one else has any knowledge of this letter. I shall address it to Bryce Harlow who can bring it to you at your convenience.

I cannot tell you how much I enjoyed the visit you and your family made to Mamie and me on Thanksgiving Day. That occasion has been the highlight of seven long months in a hospital room.

With every good wish and affectionate greetings to every member of your charming family.

Cordially,

Jks E.

President-Elect Richard M. Nixon
c/o Hotel Pierre
5th Avenue at 61st Street
New York, New York 10021

D D E

GETTYSBURG
PENNSYLVANIA 17325
Walter Reed Hospital
December 13, 1968

Dear Dick:

I think you have named a fine cabinet, one that ought to attain rather a very fine standing in public esteem. Herb Brownell has probably already told you that I had a question mark about one appointment, but after all, you are the one responsible and I have every intention of supporting you and him in every way.

Bill Rogers, who came to see me a day or so ago, said that you wanted to have each of your Cabinet members pay me a visit at the convenience of each. I can assure you I will be looking forward to such visits. I am quite anxious to meet the ones I do not know---like the Secretary of Treasure, the Secretary of Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Attorney General, and the Post Master General. Of course, I would like to have a long talk with Governor Finch. I remember meeting him on one occasion, I have not had a chance to have a real conversation with him. However, I assure you I'll be interested in meeting all the members of your cabinet. Another paper attached expresses some personal ideas. Please destroy it as soon as you have read it. I wanted to make sure you haven't overlooked certain possibilities about a new appointment you will soon have to make.

Of course, you know how disheartened I am to have to miss the wedding of Julie and David. Nevertheless, I am happy for both of them and think my grandson is one of the luckiest young fellows in the world to get such a girl.

Give my love to Pat and the girls, and of course, best wishes for your success.

Cordially,

JRZ 2.

P. S. This morning Mel Laird came to see me.
After talking to him I feel much better.

W.

President-Elect Richard M. Nixon
c/o Hotel Pierre
5th Avenue at 61st Street
New York, New York 10021

MEMO of some personal views!

Walter Reed Hospital
December 13, 1968

Personally, I believe that a fine man for the Post of Chief Justice would be Herb Brownell. There's no use for me to extol his record or for me to bore you with my high opinion; you know him as well as I do. I realize that there may be reasons that, from your stand point, would make such an appointment unwise or undesirable. But assuming that there are no insurmountable objections, I give you the above suggestion as a very earnest one.

Before I knew that you had named Bill Rogers as your new Secretary of State, I had an alternative to suggest if for some reason you should not find it wise to make the Brownell appointment. This alternative was to move Potter Stewart up to Chief Justice, and then perhaps to appoint Bill on the court to the available vacancy. At any rate, if you don't desire, personally, to select Brownell, I think Potter Stewart would make a fine Chief Justice.

Again I would ask that you would destroy this memo after you have had a chance to read it.

DE,

R.M. Nixon
no reply
John

GETTYSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17325



President-Elect Richard M. Nixon
c/o Hotel Pierre
5th Avenue at 61st Street
New York, New York 10021

PERSONAL FOR

MOLDOVER HAUSER & STRAUSS
COUNSELLORS AT LAW
BOWERY BANK BUILDING
110 EAST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
(212) 687-4890 CABLE: STRAUMOL

Bob
Haldeman

RITA E. HAUSER
EDWARD D. MOLDOVER
PETER J. STRAUSS

1001 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W.
SUITE 800
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
(202) 628-7234

8, PLACE DU PALAIS BOURBON
PARIS 7, FRANCE

November 27, 1968

✓

President-Elect Richard M. Nixon
Hotel Pierre
New York City

Dear Mr. Nixon:

I am sorry I missed the chance to say congratulations to you last evening when I popped in on the 39th floor en route to the annual dinner of the International Chamber of Commerce at the Hotel (I was pressed into service translating on the subject of the American challenge to business in Europe).

John knows how elated I have been since the election. I wanted to tell you especially how happy you have made many of us in New York who have labored long for your cause in the shadow of the other "big" figures in this State. We feel great, particularly me, and if you could induce John to stop calling me "Mata Hari", my pleasure would be complete.

Best to you in the days ahead. We are very much with you.

Sincerely,

Rita H.

Rita E. Hauser

REH:pb

✓
Bob H
She along with
others like her
deserve a special
remembrance

spj

My dear Dick,

I have been following the campaign with the closest interest and deepest admiration for you. Even from this long distance, your victory is assured. Your success is the devout hope of many millions in this part of the world.

Christina and I are having a few days in Japan in the first week of November where we'll get the results.

Give our love to Pat and take good care of yourself.

Good luck! Good luck!

Yours,

spj

(s) Harold

spj
H.W. Lee
74, Kennedy Road
Hong Kong



OCT 22 1968

Tippings

74, Kennedy Road,
Hong Kong

19. X. 68

My dear Dick,

I have been following the campaign with the closest interest and deepest admiration for you. Even from this long distance, your victory is assured. Your success is the devout hope of many millions in this part of the world.

Christina and I are leaving a few days in Japan in the first week of November when we'll get the results.

Give our love to Pat & take good care of yourself.

Good luck! Good luck!

Yours

Harold



Postmal



Mr. Richard M. Nixon
810. Fifth Avenue
New York City N.Y.

U.S.A

74, KENNEDY ROAD, HONG KONG.

H. W. Lee

JOHN ALEX M^C CONE
612 SOUTH FLOWER STREET
LOS ANGELES 90017

5 December 1968

*Fitz
no reply
re: [unclear]*

Dear Dick:

In my recent work on urban problems, I have been very much impressed with the thoughtful approach and active interest of Mr. Gilbert Fitzhugh, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.


I know nothing of Mr. Fitzhugh's political orientation but his publicly expressed views on such subjects as employment and training, welfare, housing, and fiscal and monetary policies indicate sound and thoughtful judgment and a deep concern for the public interest.

Attached is a resume of his background, drawn from Who's Who, and a copy of a speech recently delivered before the Commerce and Industry Association in New York City.

If you have not already done so, you might turn Gilbert Fitzhugh's name over to your talent scouts as a possible candidate for something or other.

Best regards,

Sincerely,



Honorable Richard Nixon
Century Plaza Hotel
Los Angeles, California

FITZHUGH, Gilbert Wright, life insurance co. executive

b. Bklyn, July 8, 1909; s. Herbert W. and Ethel (Gilbert) F;
BS, Princeton, 1930; LLD (honorary) Carroll College, 1966;
m. Lea Van Ingh, June 17, 1933; children -- Gilbert Van Ingh,
Lea Armistead. With Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 1930 --, various
positions acturial and group divisions, 1930-58, asst gen mgr
Canadian head office 1946, 47, v.p. charge planning and development,
NYC 1958-60 v.p. gen mgr for Canada, 1960-61, exec v.p. NYC 1962-63,
president and chief executive officer, 1963 - 66, chmn bd., chief
exec officer since 1966 --.
dir. Singer company, Chase Manhattan Bank; trustee Consol. Edison Co.
NY, Inc. Member bd dors. Institute of Life Insurance, Dir. Greater
New York Fund, Economic Devel. Council N.Y.C., Life Ins. Med. Research
Fund N.Y.C. Pub Dev Corp.; trustee YMCA Retirement Fund, Natl.
Industrial Conference Board, Com. for Econ Development, Fellow Society
Acturies (past president), American Academy of Acturies, also Casualty
Acturial Society; member Commerce and Industry Assn, N.Y. (dir.),
N.Y.C. C of C. (v.p.) Phi Beta Kappa

Clubs: Blind Brook, The Links, Union League, Princeton (NY City)
Rideau, Ottawa Hunt and Golf (Ottawa, Canada),
Adirondack Mountain (Lake Placid, N.Y.), Seigniory
(Montebello, Can)

Home: 16 Sutton Place, N.Y.C. 10022
Off: 1 Madison Avenue, N.Y.C. 10010

Facing Up To Our Urban Problems

Address by

Gilbert W. Fitzhugh

Chairman of the Board

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

At the

Commerce and Industry

Association Luncheon

New York, New York

November 27, 1968

**RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET**

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER ____1____ ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.



file
Anakin Hanson

President Elect
Richard M. Nixon

Happy Birthday to
 Our Honorary Member
 Richard M. Nixon
 The Yuba Linda Veterans
 11-11 Club!

Howard Luther	Mary McMillion	Jean de Coster
Patty Harms	Karen Henderson	Patty McMillion
Bob Henderson	Bob Schoepe	Patricia Horan
Kay Huntzinger	Deborah Doyel	Shari
Jennifer Thirk	Rodrey Barth	Mark Barth
Sherrill Schoepe	Mat Vallance	Mat Vallance
Lisa Ocheltree	Paula Mieger	Sherrie Gatliff
Luen Bradford	Cynthia Hammond	Michael Horan
Bridget Hazenby	Kathy Horan	Tom Henderson
Denise Phoades	Patty Judi	Michele Calbert
Greg Stary	Jennifer Sunday	Kim Ocheltree
Candy Gorman	Jim McMillion	

file
Anakin Hanson

President Elect
 Richard M. Nixon

San Marcos -

55th Bruns

P.J. Moriarty 6/73
SATURDAY

11:30 AM FIT. #53
NORTHEAST

2:11 PM Arrive Miami

San Marino 53 ~~4~~
no Reservations

60 E 91st

SIR ROBERT MENZIES

W. G. J.
95 COLLINS STREET
MELBOURNE C.1 VICTORIA
TELEPHONE 63 9463

Sppl.
OCT 18 1968

In London

9th October, 1968

PERSONAL

My dear Dick Nixon

Thank you very much for your kind letter. I have just emerged from a four and a half week stay in hospital, and still have some limitations resulting from what was in effect a mild stroke. My signature will therefore be most peculiar.

It seems to us at this distance that you are likely to be elected. I have always believed in the intervention in Vietnam; indeed, it was my Government that put Australia into the field. I therefore view with some distaste the spectacle of Vice-President Humphrey getting as far away from Johnson's action as possible.

As a foreigner I have, of course, no politics in your country. But I have a great personal regard for you, and I therefore make bold to offer one remark. When Tom Dewey was forecast by all the pollsters to beat Truman in 1948, the Republican supporters went too far. They even began to publish the names of those who would be his Ministers of State. This I thought made a lot of Republicans so confident that they forgot to vote. This cannot arise in Australia, where we have compulsory voting; but with you it seems to me to be an almost chronic danger to appear to be certain of victory. So, for heaven's sake, keep an eye on your public relations boys!

With my warmest personal good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Robert Menzies

(R. G. MENZIES)

Mr. Richard M. Nixon.



PERSONAL

Mr. Richard M. Nixon,
P.O. Box 1968
Times Square Station,
New York, N.Y. 10036,
U.S.A.

From: R. G. Menzies.