

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
1	32	12/20/1968	Memo	From RN to Bill Rogers RE: the State Department. Handwritten note added by unknown. 1 pg.
1	32	12/20/1968	Memo	From RN to Bill Rogers RE: the State Department. Handwritten note added by unknown. 1 pg.
1	32	12/20/1968	Memo	Copy of a memo from unknown to the Nixon Staff RE: administration position announcements. 1 pg.
1	32	12/20/1968	Memo	Copy of a memo from Parker T. Hart to Ambassador Bohlen RE: Prime Minister Eshkol, King Hussein, and Prime Minister Gahndi. 1 pg.
1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel. 1 pg.
1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding King Hussein of Jordan. 1 pg.


<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding Prime Minister Gandhi of India. 1 pg.
1	32	12/19/1968	Memo	From John M. Leddy to Ambassador Bohlen RE: Prime Minister Wilson, Prime Minister Trudeau, and Chancellor Kiesinger's visits to Washington. 1 pg.
1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding Prime Minister Harold Wilson of the United Kingdom. 1 pg.
1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada. 1 pg.
1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger of Germany. 1 pg.
1	32	12/20/1968	Memo	Copy of a memo from William P. Bundy to Mr. Bohlen RE: visits from President Thieu, President Suharto, and Prime Minister Gorton. 1 pg.
1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding "President Thieu of South Viet-Nam." 1 pg.

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1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding Prime Minister Gorton of Australia. 1 pg.
1	32	12/20/1968	Memo	From N.H. Heubeck to R.S. Dillon RE: visits of President Mobutu and President Kaunda. 1 pg.
1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding President Mobutu of Congo. 1 pg.
1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. 1 pg.
1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding President Kaunda of Zambia. 1 pg.
1	32	12/20/1968	Memo	From Viron P. Vaky to Ambassador Bohlen RE: visits from the leaders of Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay. 1 pg.

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1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding President Jorge Pacheco Areco of Uruguay. 1 pg.
1	32	N.D.	Other Document	Information and suggestions regarding President Carlos Lleras Restrepo of Colombia. 1 pg.

December 20, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bill Rogers 

FROM: RN

At some time I would like for you to talk to Walter Judd and get his in-put on the State Department. Walter, as you know, is considered by many to be too doctrinaire on the Far East, but he is a broad-gauged very decent man in his appraisals of foreign policy generally and has been one of our most loyal friends through the years. I think he would be most grateful if you would have a talk with him. Perhaps you might find some assignment for him outside of a Far Eastern area which could be useful to you. This, however, is not necessary if you do not conclude it to be a wise course.

December 20, 1968

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December 20, 1968

TO NIXON STAFF

At a press briefing on Thursday, December 19, Ron Zeigler announced the intention of the President-elect to make the following appointments:

Harry S. Flemming, who will serve as Special Assistant to the President. Mr. Flemming was Vice President of Madigan Electronics Corp. in Washington, D.C. He is the owner of four weekly newspapers in Alexandria, Arlington and Fairfax counties. During the 1968 Presidential campaign he served as State Co-Chairman for Nixon-Agnew in the State of Virginia and as Special Assistant to Ray Bliss, Republican National Committee Chairman.

Edward Morgan has been appointed Deputy Counsel. Mr. Morgan is a graduate of the University of Arizona and in 1960 received the Freeman Award to Outstanding Male Graduate. After serving as a Captain in the U.S. Army from 1963-65, Ed was an attorney for the State of Arizona Industrial Commission. Until his recent appointment he was associated with a law firm in Phoenix, Arizona.

Egil (Bud) Krogh, Jr. will serve as Staff Assistant to the Counsel. He is a graduate of The Principia College and the University of Washington, Law School. Bud Krogh served as a Lieutenant in the United States Navy from 1962-65. He was part of the Stanford Research Team studying Vietnamese land reform in 1968.

Charles E. Stuart, who will serve as Staff Assistant to the Counsel. In 1960 he received an A.B. (Economic) degree from Union College. Mr. Stuart was employed by Walter E. Heller & Co., as Marketing Manager. He was also Vice President and a member of the Board of Directors of the A.C. Gilbert Co.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

16310

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEC 20 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO : G - Ambassador Bohlen

THROUGH : S/S

FROM : NEA - Parker T. Hart *PTH(SWR)*

SUBJECT : State and Official Visits

As you requested in your memorandum of December 16, I attach statements of justification for the proposed visits of Prime Minister Eshkol, King Hussein and Prime Minister Gandhi. We have indicated the preferred dates for each visit.

Attachment:

1. Justification statement for Israel. (TAB A)
2. Justification statement for Jordan. (TAB B)
3. Justification statement for India. (TAB C)

NEA:HPrecht:bw
12/20/68

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Series 1B~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

By:

By: KMP Date 3-22-07

Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel

Given the crucial role of Israel in the Middle East conflict and any possible resolution thereof, I think it would be most desirable for the new President at an early date to discuss the situation with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol who is expected to continue as Prime Minister for some time.

Mr. Eshkol has visited the United States in 1964 and 1968 in his capacity as Prime Minister. On the latter occasion he was received at the President's Ranch. Because of these previous visits, and in order to concentrate on essential matters, I recommend that on this occasion he be invited to pay an Official Visit to Washington, D. C. In order to afford the new Administration time to review policy, in view of the Israeli general elections scheduled for October 1969, and so as not to conflict with Passover which begins April 20, I suggest that the visit take place during the early part of the week of April 13, 1969.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

I strongly recommend that King Hussein be invited to Washington early in the new administration for the following reasons:

1) King Hussein is the most outspoken Arab advocate of a peaceful settlement with Israel. His visit could well lead to renewed momentum in the Jarring Mission and, at the very least, sustain his interest in a peace settlement.

2) The U.S. is having problems in maintaining its credibility with Hussein. An invitation would be firm evidence of our continuing interest in Jordan's and Hussein's well-being, provide him with the encouragement he needs to continue his fundamentally pro-Western policy, and bolster the King's prestige with his populace which is increasingly critical of his close ties with the U.S.

3) Moderate Arab states friendly to the U.S. are losing ground to the radicals who--with regrettable effectiveness--are portraying the USG as pro-Israeli and anti-Arab. In an area where intangibles and personal relationships count for so much, an early invitation to Hussein by the new administration would help disprove these charges and provide a fillip to the Arab moderates.

4) An invitation to Hussein would help counterbalance the effects of the sale of Phantom aircraft to Israel.

I believe that King Hussein would prefer a "working visit" to Washington, D.C. rather than a full scale state visit. This would afford the King the maximum opportunity for discussions with administration leaders in addition to the President. I suggest that the visit take place during the week of March 23, 1969, or alternatively the week of March 30. I have selected this timing in keeping with Embassy Amman's recommendation that King Hussein be invited prior to May, and also in order to avoid a conflict either with the Easter holiday falling April 6 or with the proposed visit of Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel the week of April 13, 1969.

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Prime Minister Gandhi of India

I recommend that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi be invited to Washington in July 1969, preferably the second week.

An early invitation to the Prime Minister would symbolize and highlight the significance the new Administration attaches not only to India but to the whole of the developing Afro-Asian world, of which India is the largest and in many respects the leading member. The invitation is particularly advisable because of the feeling in many quarters that the Nixon Administration may be less concerned about the developing nations than were its predecessors. I believe that the President will wish to dispel this feeling. I am confident that an early visit by Mrs. Gandhi, an interesting, attractive, and newsworthy figure, could do so in dramatic fashion.

A July visit by the Prime Minister could come at a particularly appropriate time in the course of Indo-US relations. Our Embassy has reported that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Moscow's decision to supply arms to Pakistan have produced a sharp reaction in India. These moves have prompted a re-examination of Indian relations with the great powers. They have opened important opportunities to us which a Nixon-Gandhi meeting could effectively exploit.

An early visit could provide the opportunity for the President to discuss India's role in Southeast Asia as peace is achieved in Vietnam. It would also be the occasion for a much needed review of our bilateral relations with India in the areas of security and economic assistance.

Although we do not want to compete with the Soviets in programming visits, the USSR has clearly been much more attentive to India both in terms of invitations to Indian leaders and in visits to Delhi. A Gandhi visit here would dispel Indian apprehension that we are less concerned about them than the Soviets.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

16316

CONFIDENTIAL

DEC 20 1968

TO : G - Ambassador Bohlen ✓
THROUGH: S/S /nh
FROM : EUR - John M. Leddy ~~BM~~
SUBJECT: State and Official Visits

As requested in your memorandum of December 16, I am submitting individual justifications for the proposed official visits to Washington during March-July, 1969 of Prime Minister Wilson (UK), Prime Minister Trudeau (Canada), and Chancellor Kiesinger (Germany).

Attachments:

1. Tab A - Justification for visit of Prime Minister Wilson
2. Tab B - Justification for visit of Prime Minister Trudeau
3. Tab C - Justification for visit of Chancellor Kiesinger

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By KND Date 3-22-07

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Prime Minister Harold Wilson of United Kingdom

I understand that this prospective visit has already been confirmed, in principle, by an exchange of letters between President-elect Nixon and Prime Minister Wilson.

According to Pat Dean, this exchange originated in London on November 28 when Senator Javits conveyed an oral message to Prime Minister Wilson that Mr. Nixon would be pleased to see him in Washington. The next day (November 29) Wilson sent a letter to Mr. Nixon, through Pat Dean and Ambassador Murphy, stating his willingness to come to Washington at an early date after Inauguration Day. On December 3, Mr. Nixon replied to Wilson, reiterating his agreement in principle to such a meeting and indicating the "target date" could be late February or early March. Therefore, as far as HMG is concerned, all that remains is the fixing of the precise dates for the visit, presumably within that time frame.

Pat Dean has also told us that Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart will probably accompany the Prime Minister on that occasion.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada

I recommend that you invite Prime Minister Trudeau to Washington for an official visit in April, preferably during the week following the NATO Ministerial Meeting which is scheduled to be held here April 10-12. As you know, it is traditional for the President to meet with the Canadian Prime Minister early in a new Administration. In addition, the Prime Minister has all but publicly invited himself in an interview reported in the New York Times of November 29. More importantly, the Canadian Government has over the past six months been reviewing its foreign policy and its defense policy in depth and it looks now as if the review will not be completed for sometime to come. It would be in our interest that an invitation be extended to Mr. Trudeau to pay an official visit to Washington before the Canadian Government publicly commits itself in such areas of important concern to us as future Canadian participation in NATO and in NORAD. Even if the visit did not actually take place before the Canadian Government reaches firm conclusions on its review of Canadian policies in these areas, extension of an invitation before such conclusions are reached would, I believe, have a salutary effect on the outcome.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger of Germany

I consider it to be vitally important that the new President establish a personal relationship with the German Chancellor at the very earliest possible time in the new Administration. Germany is one of the most important factors in our European policy. The Federal Republic of Germany is probably the strongest country in Western Europe from the military and economic point of view. The division of Germany, and the special problem of Berlin, are key issues in the effort to achieve a stable and secure Europe. The views and actions of the German Chancellor, and the ability of our President to influence him, are, therefore, of great significance to us. His friendship, understanding and cooperation are essential in dealing with almost any European or indeed broad international problem. Consonant with the importance of his country, and the importance he attaches to good relations with the United States, the Chancellor and the German people would certainly expect an early meeting between the Chancellor and the President. A visit as early as possible in the Administration is advisable. We recommend May 1 to 3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

16348

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 20, 1968

TO : G - Mr. Bohlen

THROUGH: S/S *ja*

FROM : EA - William P. Bundy *for WPB*

SUBJECT : State and Official Visits

In accordance with your memorandum of December 16, I enclose individual justifications for visits by President Thieu of Viet-Nam, President Suharto of Indonesia and Prime Minister Gorton of Australia.

Attachments:

As stated.

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BY S/S: CMS

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

By *KMB* Date *3-22-07*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Thieu of South Viet-Nam

A matter of top priority concern would be the handling of President Thieu of South Viet-Nam. He saw President Johnson in Honolulu in July, but this was conceded to be only a substitute for the state visit which had been offered to him in April and which he has long considered highly desirable. Moreover, it is evident that there are major substantive matters that could profitably be discussed between our new President and President Thieu. On the other hand, the new Administration must weigh the same problems of possible hostile demonstrations, an excess feeling of embrace, and the other factors that led President Johnson finally to settle for the Honolulu visit. I do not have any firm recommendation, and there may be some bearing in how the new President deals with our representation in Saigon and Paris, and how the Paris talks proceed. But the question is plainly a top priority one that should be in the mind of the new President as he schedules visits and other meetings in the first six months of 1969.

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President Suharto of Indonesia

I believe high priority for a state visit in the East Asia area during 1969 should go to President Suharto. Indonesia is larger in population than the remainder of Southeast Asia combined, and this fact together with its location and resources make it a nation of great actual and potential importance. Suharto is the architect of the highly successful campaign to eliminate Sukarno as a political force and to discredit his policies. Under Suharto's pragmatic leadership, Indonesia has made a good start toward tackling the economic shambles he inherited from his predecessor. It has also become a responsible and constructive member of the world community and has set as a prime foreign policy objective the encouragement of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. I believe the symbolism of a state visit by the leader of a major non-aligned Asian country would also be important early in the new administration.

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Prime Minister Gorton of Australia

At a press conference on December 11, Prime Minister Gorton of Australia indicated a desire to visit Washington in March or April. Subsequently the Australian Embassy told us informally that Gorton is thinking of coming in early April and would find it difficult to understand a negative response should he make such a request.

Gorton would be an outstanding candidate for a visit in 1969. He exerts a rather special personal dominance of his Government at present, and his personal feelings play a more than usually significant role in U.S./Australian relations. In the last few months Gorton has fallen out quietly with us on a number of procedural and leak questions, and has ended up rather jaundiced about the Johnson Administration and therefore disposed to embrace a Nixon Administration with special force. Having said this, I would be of two minds in opening the schedule of Asian visits for the Nixon Administration with the representative of a white nation which has already had excessive attention from the Johnson Administration.

However, it is true that active Australian participation is the key to the emergence of a new pattern of defense cooperation for the Malaysia/Singapore area following British withdrawal in 1971. Consultations looking towards such an arrangement have been paralyzed, and fundamental decision on Australian defense policy postponed, by Gorton's fears that a U.S. retreat from Southeast Asia may be in the making. Until Gorton hears directly from President Nixon an exposition of the new Administration's Asian policy, it is unlikely that the GOA will be able to reach and announce a clear-cut decision on maintaining an active military presence in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971.

Probably the best way of handling this situation would be to get in touch quickly with a firm proposal - thus anticipating the feeler that will certainly be coming from Gorton - but to set a date later in the year, perhaps on the grounds that it would be better to have the visit after the election which Gorton is expected to call around mid-year.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Bureau of African Affairs

16324

December 20, 1968

TO : G - Mr. R. S. Dillon
THROUGH : S/S *[Signature]*
FROM : AF - N. H. Heubeck
SUBJECT : State and Official Visits
REFERENCE: Your Memo. December 16, 1968

I am enclosing the three justification papers for the visits mentioned in your memorandum.

AF would like to record its desire to make the visit of President Mobutu, Congo (K) a state visit. It is desirable from our standpoint to make the visit of President Kaunda of Zambia an official rather than a private visit. Justification for these requests will be submitted if required.

Enclosures:

1. Justification for Emperor Haile Selassie
2. Justification for President Mobutu
3. Justification for President Kaunda

MICROFILMED
BY S/S: *[Signature]*

AF:NHHeubeck:deh

Clearance: J. Palmer 2nd

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By *[Signature]* Date 3-22-07

CONFIDENTIAL

President Mobutu of Congo (Kinshasa)

I recommend that President Joseph D. Mobutu be invited for a state visit in June 1969.

Because of its size, geographical position and tremendous natural resources, the Congo has been a "country of special interest" to the United States ever since the summer of 1960 when the United States strongly backed the United Nations peacekeeping force in the Congo. Mobutu has now been President for three years and has made remarkable progress in his attempts to create national unity and economic stability in this heretofore chaotic land.

President Mobutu has never visited the United States since becoming Chief of State. He has had a standing invitation to make a visit since 1967 but has so far been unable to come. He has expressed a desire to make a visit early in 1969. He has also been invited by the Canadian Government and will likely be visiting Canada sometime in 1969. The exact date of the Canadian visit has not yet been set and it might be desirable to coordinate the two visits.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia

I believe it is important that an African chief of state be among the early foreign visitors to the new Administration. Emperor Haile Selassie is the obvious choice of African leaders. As the "elder statesman" and host to the OAU and ECA in Addis Ababa, he is respected by all Africans, both North and Black.

U.S. association with Ethiopia has been longer and closer than with any other African country, with the exception of Liberia. Ethiopia has probably been the most consistent and effective friend of the U.S. on that continent. Our interests in Ethiopia, especially Kagnew Station, warrant timely reaffirmation of this close and mutually beneficial relationship.

President-elect Nixon has visited Addis Ababa twice, in 1957 as Vice President and again in 1967. Each time he had talks with the Emperor.

Any time after May 5 would be appropriate. (May 5 is Ethiopian "Liberation Day" usually requiring the Emperor's presence in Addis Ababa; having him here on that occasion might embarrass U.S.-Italian relations.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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President Kaunda of Zambia

The University of California, Santa Cruz, has invited President Kenneth D. Kaunda of Zambia to deliver its annual Charter Address and receive an honorary degree in late April or early May of 1969. If President Kaunda accepts this invitation, I recommend that he be invited to pay a private visit to Washington in connection with his trip to California, including a call on the President. If at all possible, I would urge that the President offer a small luncheon in Kaunda's honor, even though such entertainment is not normally included in private visits.

Zambia will play a vital role in the evolution of the racially troubled southern portion of Africa. A relationship of trust and candor with President Kaunda will be of increasing significance because Zambia's declared non-racial policies represent the values and goals the United States supports.

Zambia vies with Chile as the world's third largest producer of copper and is a key supplier to the West. It is one of the leading recipients of private American capital in Africa; U.S. direct investment, principally in copper, exceeds \$200 million. Zambia's geographic position and the large new airport at Lusaka give it strategic potential in relation to air transit of sub-Saharan Africa.

At a time when, for a variety of reasons, the United States finds it increasingly difficult to identify in relevant ways with the aspirations of black Africans, a Presidential meeting with President Kaunda would clearly emphasize continuing U.S. interest in African goals.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

18304

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 20, 1968

TO: G - Ambassador Bohlen

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: ARA - Viron P. Vaky, Acting

SUBJECT: State and Official Visits

As requested by your memorandum of December 16, I have attached individual justifications for our recommendations that the Presidents of Chile, Uruguay and Colombia be invited for State visits during the first half of 1969.

Attachments:

Justifications

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ARA:PEFitzGerald:pat 12/20/68

MICROFILMED
BY S/S: CMS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

By AMA Date 3-22-07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Frei of Chile

On November 13, the Chilean Ambassador called on me to discuss the possibility of a visit to the United States by President Frei in February or March, 1968. The Ambassador noted that President Frei had been unable to come when invited in 1967. I suggested to Mr. Katzenbach that we recommend to President-elect Nixon that he agree to a visit. Ambassador Murphy discussed the matter with the President-elect on November 14, and I was informed that Mr. Nixon agreed to the visit, with the exact timing to await clarification of Mr. Nixon's plans. I so informed the Chilean Ambassador on November 25, and he has discussed it with President Frei.

As Chile's national Congressional elections will take place March 2, it is unlikely that President Frei would want to leave Chile until about the third or fourth week of March. However, we have received no word from President Frei about when in March he would prefer to come. Ambassador Korry is following the matter, and as soon as we have some specific proposals for timing, I would anticipate discussing them with Mr. Nixon's office.

President Frei was denied permission to visit the United States in 1967 by the Chilean Congress, acting for domestic political reasons. We have consistently and repeatedly made clear to President Frei that we viewed the visit as postponed, not canceled.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Jorge Pacheco Areco of Uruguay

I recommend that President Pacheco Areco be invited for an official visit to Washington, D.C. during the first half of May 1969. The invitation would serve the interests of the USG for the following reasons:

1. President Pacheco, who will remain in office until 1972, has been a successful governor, despite formidable problems. An unknown when elected Vice President in 1966, Pacheco on the death of President Gestido in 1967 quickly moved to cope with the decades-old economic and financial problems which threatened the continuance of the traditional political institutions of the nation. In coordination with the USG and international agencies, the Pacheco administration began the first serious economic stabilization program in recent Uruguayan history and in 1968 the rate of inflation was cut in half from nearly 140% in 1967. I believe that a visit would serve to increase our ability to influence the GOU to persevere in this program and to pursue market-economy oriented development plans with greater urgency.

2. President Pacheco inherited a rickety political base and an outmoded set of government administrative institutions. While he has made some significant political gains, notably in curbing the influence and activities of political extremists, his political base remains fragile. A visit would strengthen Pacheco vis a vis his political competitors at home and enhance his ability to pursue needed administrative reforms.

3. The GOU has traditionally been a rational and moderating voice in international affairs. Pacheco's visit would strengthen the GOU's healthy role in international and hemispheric institutions and reciprocate the GOU's host role for the two historic hemispheric meetings in Punta del Este this decade.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

President Carlos Lleras Restrepo of Colombia

A visit by Colombia's President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, head of an outstanding democratic government and an acknowledged hemisphere leader in promoting Latin American cooperation, could serve to reemphasize the importance the United States attaches to the Alliance for Progress and to constructive approaches to the problems of the hemisphere. Under Lleras' leadership, Colombia, a major aid recipient, has made a courageous attack on its severe economic problems. Because of Colombians' high regard for Lleras as an economist, lawyer, professor, and diplomat, he has been able to attract talented men to assist his development efforts within and outside the government. His four-year term will end on August 7, 1970.

Lleras is pledged to a program of "national transformation" to reform the country's political, social and economic structure within a democratic framework. After a hard two-year struggle, he has now gained Congressional approval for sweeping constitutional reforms which are expected to help significantly in these efforts.

President Lleras already has obtained unanimous Senate consent for him to visit unnamed countries abroad before the next session of Colombia's Congress begins July 20, 1969. This may indicate that he desires to come here early in 1969. However, tentatively I recommend that he be scheduled for immediately after the Fourth of July, and in any event, not before conclusion of the loan negotiations for the loan period beginning April 1, 1969.

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