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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan
             Israeli Ambassador Y. Rabin
             The President-Elect
             Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Date: December 13, 1968; 9:45 a.m.

Place: Hotel Pierre, New York, New York

The President-Elect opened the conversation by telling Minister Dayan how much he enjoyed his visit to Israel and how much he appreciated the fact that Minister Dayan had seen him on what had obviously been a very busy day. He added that he was not receiving foreign visitors at this time, but that he had always been interested in the State of Israel. Dayan replied that the problems of the Middle East were very complex and that he was grateful for the President-Elect's interest in them.

Dayan added that the reports of Israel's displeasure with the Scranton visit were incorrect. The Israeli officials felt that Mr. Scranton had left with a better appreciation of the complexities of the issues. The President-Elect asked whether there were any Arab countries which might prove more ready to make peace than others. Dayan replied that Arab countries were not very promising but that Ethiopia might perform a useful role. Of the Arab countries, he thought Jordan might be most ready to settle but he indicated no great enthusiasm for this prospect.

The President-Elect asked about guerrilla activity. Dayan replied that it was over-rated; for example, Time Magazine had given a figure of 10,000 guerrillas, where in fact, there were only 3,000. The President-Elect told the Israeli Ambassador that we would be glad to receive an estimate as to the correct figures.
MEMORANDUM

TO: EA - Mr. William P. Bundy

THROUGH: EA - Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown

FROM: EA/ANZ - Robert G.

SUBJECT: Australian Defense Plans and Gorton Visit Possibility

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

1. At a press conference December 11, Australian Prime Minister John Gorton shed some light on GOA thinking with respect to the future defense of Malaysia/Singapore, as well as on his own wish for an early meeting with President Nixon.

2. Gorton denied previous press reports that the Cabinet had postponed making any decisions on the Malaysia/Singapore question until after the Viet-Nam peace talks and was going to "put things off until 1970." He said the GOA had officially reassured the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore that this was not the case. On the contrary, the Cabinet had made "quite significant decisions" on what the post-1971 approach was to be. These decisions, already conveyed to the defense authorities, would suffice to enable them to make recommendations on equipment to implement the post-1971 policy.

3. The policy decisions would be announced to Parliament when it reconvenes February 25. It would not be necessary, Gorton said, to hold up the announcement until he had talked to the new American President. Reporters at the conference gained a strong impression Gorton was implying a continuing Australian military presence in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971.

4. On the question of a meeting with President Nixon, the Evening Star on December 12 quoted the following exchange from the press conference:

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Question: "Would talks with President Nixon, when he becomes President, still have some visible effect (on the 'significant' defense decisions)?"

Gorton: "Well, obviously they would be extremely valuable. There is no point in talking to Mr. Nixon until he has become established in his office, selected his public servants and Cabinet ministers and had a chance to study matters from the box seat. But I think as soon as that has taken place, it would obviously be of great value to have talks with him. I would envisage that time -- depending a good deal on the convenience of the President himself -- as being March or April. The defense forces and so on have not got to wait for that."

5. Furlonger, Australian Embassy Minister, phoned me December 13 on the subject of a Gorton visit. He said he was not making a formal request or proposal (though he implied vaguely that Ambassador Waller might later raise the matter separately at a higher level) and assured me the Embassy had heard nothing officially from Canberra, but wanted me to know informally that the Embassy "discerns evidence" that Gorton probably would like to visit the President "about the beginning of April." I told Furlonger that I would inquire into the policy regarding state visits but reminded him that the situation is likely to be fluid for some time. By way of comment on my guess that there would not be many state visits during the first part of the year, Furlonger commented that Gorton might find it difficult to understand a negative response should he in fact seek an April meeting.

6. I see no reason to change the EA recommendation regarding state visits already made to Ambassador Murphy's office, but Ambassador Murphy might wish to know of the latest developments regarding a Gorton visit, described above.