

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
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Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
1	10	N.D.	Other Document	Paper detailing the career of Dr. Lee A. duBridge. Author unknown. 1 pg.
1	10	N.D.	Other Document	Handwritten paper regarding duBridge. Author unknown. 2 pgs.
1	10	N.D.	Memo	From a Pete to a Ted RE: passing on information to a Bob. 1 pg.
1	10	12/01/1961	Letter	From T.F. Walkowicz to RN RE: scientific fact and military decision-making. 3 pgs.

RE: Dr. Lee A. duBridge

1. duBridge is an outstanding scientist, administrator, and educator. His performance as Director of the M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory (development of military radars) during World War II was truly magnificent.
2. During the post-World War II period, duBridge has been a prominent member of a small but powerful group of scientists who have dominated advising U.S. policy makers on scientific matters. This group, at various times and in various ways, has sought to "slow down the arms race" by promoting ideas which would weaken the U.S. unilaterally vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. For example:
  - a. The group opposed the U.S. H-bomb program and campaigned against the recruitment of good scientists for the Livermore H-bomb Laboratory, even after President Truman made a firm decision to go ahead with the program.
  - b. During the pre- and post-Sputnik period, this group campaigned strongly to "limit space to civilian, purely-scientific, endeavors," minimizing potential space weapons development. The recent Soviet development of an orbital bombing system, with no comparable U.S. program, now makes apparent the dangers inherent in such a policy. When the U.S. military were working to be given a role in the U.S. space program, duBridge belittled them publicly by referring to them as "space cadets."
3. The above two examples are not exhaustive. To summarize, duBridge is a great American man of science, who has been naive and idealistic regarding the Soviet drive for military power and world domination.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ file

From Strauss

168 " Sept. re dubridge

① He is 67 - too old for 4 offices:  
As Asst of Sec & Tech  
Chm of Pres Sec Adv. Com  
Chm of Fed Com for Sec & Tec  
Dir of Off of Sec & Tec.

② Letters dated Aug 4 & 19, 1954  
to Sec of Def to effect he  
doesn't have much use for Sec.  
FBI.

③ Mar 4, 1954 he wrote a letter to  
RN on the strength of which  
RN contacted FBI re Oppie

④ June 4, 1954 he wrote Strauss  
saying the A.E. Commission should  
support Oppie. He testified that  
Oppie's associations were of the  
past and said risks were  
"trivial".

⑤ He never stepped forward to join Secretariat for P.W.

⑥ He is an Establishment man, so if he's there, there won't be much of a change.

⑦ Strauss is writing a letter in which

This would be a "very important defeat." He would hope the decision can be deferred till other facts can be marshalled.

Room 5600  
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA

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To: *Pete*  
FROM: *Ted*

*Bob should read this?*

*Please return again.*

8

~~PTF -~~  
pls save. My only  
Ted - copy. W.  
Many thanks -  
It's amazing how  
slowly things  
change. We  
may be  
better than  
Pete

120 East End Avenue, 7A  
New York 28, New York

December 1, 1961

Sir:

I feel it my duty to inform you that a conviction has crystallized among many reputable scientists and others concerned with United States military policies that the scientific advice being tendered the Chief Executive in military matters is not as objective as it should be.

To say this is not to impugn the patriotism or the motives of those who tender the advice. Rationalism and idealism accord with the scientific spirit and their pulls are understandably strong. The only question is whether with some advisers these pulls may be so strong, in certain particulars of scientific policy, as to weaken their concentration on the strictly technical considerations which are, after all, the specific responsibility of the President's Scientific Advisers. Many scientists and other technical men, and I among them, have become convinced that the scientific advice going forward to the highest organs of Government has been so weakened too often.

It is a fact that, as regards certain areas of national action and particularly those related to the nuclear side of strategy, U.S. scientists have divided into two generally opposed groups, and one group - the one whose reasoning I share - is convinced that its views and recommendations are not now being given adequate representation in the resolution of strategic policies.

I. DISARMAMENT, AN EXAMPLE OF OPPOSED VIEWS

As regards the general proposition, both groups started out with the same basic objectives: to slow down the arms race, and to maintain U.S. military strength until diplomacy produced an inspected disarmament. Where the groups divided was over the question of what would constitute the "science" in the policies to be recommended to the Government in pursuit of these aims.

One group - the one that has been and is dominant in Government councils - is made up predominantly of scientists who either actively opposed the American development of the thermonuclear bomb or are sympathetic to colleagues and friends who did. A compelling factor in their opposition, quite apart from their lack of enthusiasm

for the technical feasibilities, was a conviction, powerfully advocated, that if the United States abstained from developing the weapon, the Soviet Union might also abstain. This was a case, as events were quickly to demonstrate, of an excessively hopeful and totally unrealistic political judgment by scientists to accompany an excessively pessimistic technical judgment.

More recently, members of this same group urged the Government into the nuclear test ban on the premises that (1) cheating would be easy to detect and the cheater would be found out; (2) the art of nuclear weaponry had already been pushed to the point where further advances were no longer militarily consequential; and (3) the ban would have the additional effect of permanently freezing the American superiority in nuclear technology.

The other group challenged all three premises. It held, but unavailingly, that the premises were without real scientific basis.

The straight scientific judgment, as distinct from the politico-scientific judgment, was again vindicated in essential particulars. It has been proved that nuclear cheating is possible and a danger to us, and that the control system relied upon by the first group is not a safeguard for the nation. It has also been proved, and unfortunately not by the United States, that significant gains in nuclear weaponry are not only possible but in hand. Finally, it is now an established fact that the moratorium, far from protecting the American nuclear superiority, was exploited by the Russians to whittle away the margin and perhaps even to eliminate it in some critical particulars.

On the face of the past judgments, by the dominant group of scientists, it would seem that a way must be found to bring the countervailing scientific view more forcefully into policy making.

As matters now stand, the second group considers itself all but excluded from that process. To the degree that it is drawn upon by the President's Science Advisory Committee, it emerges only as a hopelessly over-balanced minority on a committee or advisory panel, the findings of which - according to fairly widespread cynicism - are foreshadowed by the built-in majority.

## II. SUGGESTED ACTION

Inasmuch as scientific opinion now diverges on a number of grave issues, the requirement is to make certain that the advice of the second group - the outs - no longer goes forward simply as a dissent that has been overpowered in advance. This other source of advice should be heard by the higher authorities. It has been scientific. Moreover, it has been right.

It is reassuring to observe that you are already aware of this basic problem, and have just recently consulted directly with leading members of the second group of scientists. A further step towards a permanent solution, of course, would be to give the leading members of the second group appropriate representation on the President's Scientific Advisory Committee. Another possibility would be so to arrange debate on controversial technical issues before the higher authorities as to allow this other group to present its views as an organically independent position, and not as an appendage to the "majority" view.

The matter, in any case, is a serious one. It calls for further action. Perhaps a good way to begin would be for you to ask men intimately familiar with the schism among the scientists to make recommendations. In this connection, I have specific suggestions to make, and would be glad to present them, if you should so desire.

Respectfully yours,

T. F. Walkowicz

The President  
The White House  
Washington 25, D.C.