

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NSC/Soubers to Smith D9/06/2002

By ug Date 02/08/09

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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May 1, 1973

National Security Study Memorandum 180

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia in the Light of the
Southern Philippines Muslim Insurrection

The President has directed a study of the implications of the Muslim insurrection in the southern Philippines for basic U.S. interests, objectives, and policies in that country and as concerns regional stability in Southeast Asia. The study should define and evaluate the policy options open to the United States, and pursuant to these options the specific courses of action that might be taken to protect the U.S. interests involved.

The study should draw upon the interdepartmental response to NSSM 155 and SNIE 56-73, and should reflect the basic policy guidance contained in NSDM 209.

The study should assess the current situation as it may affect (1) basic U.S. interests, objectives, and policies in the Philippines and (2) U.S. interests in Southeast Asian regional stability. This evaluation should include but not necessarily be limited to consideration of the following:

- The nature and extent of outside support for the insurrection, and the possibility of involvement by other major powers.
- An evaluation should also be made of the leadership of the insurrection including identification of the leaders and their past and present contacts with the U.S. in business, education and other fields.
- Evidence of any Philippine Communist involvement and outside support for such Communist involvement, as well as an updated assessment of the personalities, training and supply situation of the Communist led New People's Army on Luzon.

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GDS Dec. 31, 1981

- The extent of Malaysia's control over Tun Mustapha, and of Indonesia's influence with him.
- The present and potential affects of the insurrection and related outside involvement on regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, and on Southeast Asian stability.
- The importance of the Philippine claim to Sabah in the dispute, and the extent of the Marcos Administration's flexibility on this question.
- The likely near and longer-term effects on Philippine internal stability and development, and on U.S. military basing and investment interests, should the insurrection continue at its present level or worsen.
- The Marcos Administration's strategy and tactics for handling the insurrection -- both internally and diplomatically -- and their effectiveness to date. A brief review of the types of contacts between the Philippine Government and the insurgents should be included with attention as well to the subjects discussed, reactions of the parties and the participants in the discussions.

Based upon the foregoing assessment, the study should define and evaluate the policy options open to the United States to protect U.S. interests and objectives. Within the context of the basic policy options, specific steps which could be taken to protect U.S. interests and objectives should be discussed. The evaluation should include but not be limited to consideration of the following issues:

- Should the U.S. encourage individual countries in the region, or forces such as ASEAN, to attempt to help stabilize the situation?
- What position should the U.S. take on the question of the Philippine claim to Sabah?
- How should the U.S. respond to the Philippine Government's request for increased and accelerated U.S. security assistance to help end the insurrection?

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and be submitted not later than June 15, 1973 for consideration by the Senior Review Group.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff