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The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to The Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to transmit the following communication to the President of the United States from the Prime Minister of Israel:

"Dear Mr. President,

"Your friendship and understanding encourage me to take the liberty of sharing some of our urgent concerns with you.

"The Government of Israel, after long and serious deliberations, decided on August 4th to accept the American peace initiative. This decision was made possible by two factors. The first was your letter of July 24th which contained clarifications on the nature of peace, the principle of non-imposition and on the question of refugees. It further contained a reaffirmation of American adherence to the fundamental principle that 'there must be a peace agreement in which each of the parties undertakes reciprocal obligations to the other and that no Israeli soldier should be withdrawn from the occupied territories until a binding contractual peace agreement satisfactory to you has been achieved.' The second factor which enabled us to take our decision was that, unlike earlier proposals on a limited cease-fire, the proposal in the U.S. peace initiative included an agreement on a standstill which was to serve as an assurance that the other side would not exploit the cease-fire to improve its military posture.

"We both know, Mr. President, how the U.A.R., with the encouragement and participation of the Soviet Union, violated the standstill agreement and, moreover, succeeded to get away with it. We now face the dilemma how to return to the Jarring talks when across the cease-fire lines, within the standstill zone, there are 161 missile emplacements including 40-50 operational batteries, a third of which are SAM-3. These missiles which have been sited practically on the banks of the Canal, have a range that covers up to ten miles east of the Suez Canal. All this in addition to one thousand guns and other equipment, which are now in position in the standstill zone.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

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By CIM NARA, Date 1 May 2009

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"It is natural that before we decide whether to return to the Jarring talks we should compare the position in which we will find ourselves during these talks with the position of the other principal negotiator. With Soviet guidance and participation, Egypt has established a most advanced and sophisticated network of anti-aircraft missiles close to the Canal, partly manned by Soviet crews. Egypt's political positions, including its territorial demands, have the all-out backing of the Soviet Union.

"I wish to express our deep appreciation, Mr. President, for all your decisions on arms supplies to us. I also deeply appreciate your decision to ask Congress for substantial credits on favourable terms for us in view of the economic burden which continuous Egyptian warfare has laid upon us.

"I am sure you will agree that even though we shall now possess a larger number of aircraft, this will not represent a complete rectification of the situation. If the shooting is renewed, we will face a new and heavy concentration of Russian missiles. Moreover, permit me to draw your attention to the fact that there is as yet no decision for the continuation of the supply of aircraft after 1970. Egypt, on the other hand, is assured an uninterrupted and massive supply of planes and heavy equipment from the Soviet Union. I therefore have no doubt that you will understand our need to know now what our situation in this regard will be in the future.

"To turn to the territorial question, I feel it necessary to reiterate what I had occasion to tell you personally in September 1970, that we cannot accept the proposals made by Secretary Rogers in October-December 1969. The Government of Israel thinks it imperative that it should be completely free to negotiate without relation to those proposals. By this I mean that the Arabs and the Soviets should not be able to exploit those proposals as a means of pressure on us.

"In asking for assurances on this point, I do not suggest any public statement by the U.S. Government, relating to the 1969 proposals. I would like, however, to be assured that the U.S. Government will not introduce these proposals at any stage of the negotiations, and

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that it will oppose, if necessary by veto, any attempt by the Arabs and the Soviets to achieve a Security Council determination on a territorial settlement. We cannot overlook the possibility that in case of a deadlock in the negotiations, the Arabs and the Soviets will aim at bringing about an imposed settlement through the Security Council, assuming, not without basis, that in the present composition of the Council, this might be attainable. We are naturally not asking the United States to support in advance every territorial proposal that we might put forward. We must, however, be certain that our freedom of negotiation will not be prejudiced since matters affecting vitally our interests and security are involved. Both the territorial settlement and the refugee question fall into this category.

"Your concern for our security as expressed in word and deed are of the utmost importance to us. In my conversations with you, I was convinced that we would have no difference of view on the nature of Soviet objectives and on the extent to which the Soviet Union may be prepared to go to advance its aims in the Middle East. Israel will fight for its freedom and its survival regardless of who the aggressor and its supporters may be. But we are aware of the great odds we may have to face. We must take into account the possibility that in the event of Egypt resuming large-scale hostilities, the Soviet Union will undertake direct military intervention. In order to deter the Soviet Union, may we anticipate that the U.S. would communicate to the Soviet Union the full weight of its commitment to the survival and security of Israel I feel that it would be useful if some framework could be established for discussions with us on possible eventualities.

"A final word, Mr. President, on the cease-fire. The lack of clarity on the framework of the cease-fire agreement since November 5th has created a fragile situation. All concerned should now endeavor to strengthen the basis of the cease-fire. This can be done by devising concrete arrangements aimed at preventing deterioration and assuring a scrupulous and mutual observance. These arrangements should include the setting up of adequate machinery for the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. The United States, as the author of the peace initiative, could, I believe, perform a major role in clarifying this subject with all concerned. I have asked our Minister of Defence to discuss this matter in detail during his forthcoming visit to Washington.

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