MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY

You have asked for my proposal on Internal Security.

Present White House involvement with internal security questions arises most often when major demonstrations and protests are planned for Washington, D.C. or other major cities. When militant groups such as the Black Panthers, S.D.S., or Young Socialist Alliance (not so militant) receive visible press through a shoot-out, bust, or bomb-scare, the White House is kept fully informed, and we are able to suggest courses of action to the Justice Department, the FBI, or the military. To date, our suggestions have been exclusively advisory; primary responsibility for decisions regarding investigations of subversive groups, the granting of permits, and statements to the press in the aftermaths of protests or shoot-outs rests with the Attorney General.

Huston proposes two things:

(1) Establishment of an apparatus within the White House to monitor and review all intelligence bearing on internal security problems. The man in charge would collate all this intelligence, and have responsibility for developing an Administration position. He mentions that, perhaps, Clark Mollenhoff would fulfill this role.
(2) The extension of political control over the decisions rendered by the Attorney General. The handling of negotiations prior to the November 15 demonstration, the decision to accuse the New Mobe of violence, and our delay in moving on a Black Panther investigation all stemmed from decisions of the Attorney General.

Let me say that I agree with Huston in his evaluation that the above three incidents he cited were mistakes in judgment. John Ehrlichman's and my input to the Justice Department prior to and during the negotiations for the November 15 march were pretty substantial. We recommended the man who was appointed to negotiate with the New Mobe: John Dean. I attended all planning meetings (which for the most part were pretty loose and sloppy), and was able to express White House concern about security. We suggested the ultimate parade route (up Pennsylvania to 15th and left to the monument) which was finally accepted. However, it was clear that at all times the decisions concerning the parade route and the accusation of New Mobe as violence-mongers were made by the Attorney General.

In my judgment, these decisions should continue to be made by the Attorney General if he is to continue to bear responsibility for the safety of this country in matters of internal security. Mr. Mitchell is certainly attuned to the President's thinking on these matters of internal security.

The out-pouring of support for the President's Vietnam position after the speech on November 3 and the Mobilization on November 13-15
was undoubtedly sparked by many factors. I'm not prepared to say that the Attorney General's decisions during the negotiations for a parade permit or resultant press blast afterwards lessened the support we have received.

Our goal during the protest period was to isolate the radical element from the broad spectrum of U.S. public opinion, and I think we succeeded. Mitchell's emphasis on the violent aspects of the protest period - while it may have strained the credulity of those who were here and saw it - nevertheless may have had a very helpful impact nationally. My personal view is that the Administration should have tried to have appeared more reasonable, fair, and in the posture of a "victim" suffering the outrages of the radical group which might have generated more support for our goal - isolation of the "Peace Now" nuts. This would have meant prompter issuance of a permit and low-key press afterwards. But I'm not sure this would have been any more effective than Mitchell's approach, and I don't think Huston is sure either.

However, I do have some suggestions for improvement. Huston is a master at analysis of intelligence, separation of relevant information from hoary scare-projections of the intelligence agencies, and in recommending sound courses of action. But his skill at analysis and genius at organizing an Administration position vis-à-vis militant groups is balanced somewhat by a rather uncompromising, acerbic, and at times paranoid
reaction to positions less dogmatic than his own. Thus, I would not suggest that he deal directly with either Mitchell or Kleindienst. Huston has good contacts within the FBI who regularly funnel information to him.

Since the Mobe, the FBI intelligence has been much better. But right now some of it flows first to Huston and then sent, as he notes, to those with prime responsibility: Garment gets the Black Panthers stuff; Chapin gets protest stuff relevant to Presidential trips; I get information on planned demonstrations and protests.

**Recommendation:**

We need a central repository for all intelligence matters relating to internal security. My office, it seems to me, should be it. I will then ask Huston - when appropriate - for review, analysis, and the development of an Administration position on questions about internal security in general and protests or Black Panthers in particular for submission to Ehrlichman for approval. Once a position has been developed here, I will then present it to the Attorney General or the military when appropriate.

I do not recommend any veto power here over Justice Department decisions. Only by my developing rapport with the Attorney General and an earned respect for sound thinking will he be willing to go along with the suggestions from here.

My only recommendation for a veto would be in appointing Clark Mollenhoff to head a group responsible for internal security. His
performance to date with questions in the Agriculture Department relating to the suitability for retention of an employee involved in the Billy Sol Estes case was a model of energy and rudeness.

My proposal would be to define the guidelines for preparation and receipt of intelligence relating to internal security. All should probably flow through me for dissemination to those most concerned with a specific issue, e.g. Dwight Chapin for Presidential trips, review by Huston on larger questions about subversive groups, Len Garment for Black Panthers, etc. After approval by JDE and, if necessary, the President, I will then present our position to the appropriate department, either alone or with the staff member most directly involved.

Egil Krogh, Jr.
Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs

cc: John Ehrlichman