



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Sunday, September 20.

At Camp David. Kissinger called first thing regarding latest in Jordan. Syrians moved tanks in, then backed out. Testing us. Kissinger now worried because State wants to take to UN – Jordan wants us to give direct warning to Syria.

Kissinger very worried about Rogers' plans. Finds he's in New York this week and just learned Dobrynin coming back and spending two days in New York. Kissinger afraid Rogers has plan to meet Dobrynin regarding deal on summit. Feels Rogers should not see Dobrynin – especially before NSC meeting Wednesday. Thinks Soviets will no longer come to Kissinger – because they have patsy in Rogers. Kissinger wanted me to call Rogers, tell him not to see Dobrynin - Kissinger didn't want to talk to President about this, but later agreed to on my recommendation, and it worked out fine. Says President problem is his reluctance to understand that tactics turn into strategy, and you can't let things go along and then try to save them without brilliant maneuver. Feels the real stake is Nixon credibility with Soviets.

Has a real plot building – regarding whole Soviet plan. They have been building a strategic nuclear naval base in Cuba which will increase effectiveness of their subs six times. Now looking at sequence of events Kissinger feels they have been using summit and Egypt missiles as cover for their Cuba operation. Following same pattern as in '62.

In July, Russia affirmed all Cuban agreements and we did likewise (Kissinger thought this was signal that they wanted a Summit). August 15, we formally offered a Summit. August 20 they started building a full scale installation.

Kissinger fears Rogers softness will mislead them – as Bush did in '62. Thinks this will surface in ten days-two weeks. Can't hold until after elections, which is what President wants. Feels if Rogers goes ahead with Dobrynin meetings etc. Soviets will lose all their fear of Nixon – then President will have to go violently the other way. Last thing we want is crisis with Russians now



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– especially with this new strategic advantage. Is now beyond point of just indulging Rogers - could project a two year series of crises.

Kissinger feels should not have summit because it would tie us down for weeks and prohibit our precipitating a confrontation for sometime afterwards – so would give them perfect cover for completing the sub base. Russia may well be heading to a showdown. Real long-range problem is we must have a game plan and we don't.

All this also explains why Dobrynin away so long – so we'd have no one to talk to regarding Egypt and Cuba. Egypt was smokescreen – especially because they were so blatant. Cuba is real kick in the teeth to Nixon. Kissinger urges he and I work together to handle all this - especially with President and vis-a-vis Rogers.