



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Wednesday, April 28.

The President spent the day in press conference preparation supposedly, but because this gave him free time, I got caught for some long sessions, including an especially long one this morning with Henry. He started-- the President, before that, started out telling me about a couple of memos he had written, one to me and one to Ehrlichman, on problems from yesterday. Ehrlichman's regarding the cancer program; the President's convinced by Elmer Bobst that we should not put this in the NIH, but rather should set up our own agency to do it, so that we can get some credit and get some steam behind it with a real manager and PR-type running it, instead of a doctor. Then, on the Voluntary Action Program, he sent a memo to me because he was thoroughly disgusted by the group that Etherington turned out for the reception last night.

When Henry came in, we got into a discussion of a number of other things, and then the President led into his major development, which I won't cover here in specifics but only for recall. Henry reviewed the past record and read the current document. Continued on the other side.

[End of tape reel AC-07(A)]

[Begin tape reel AC-07(B)]

Continuing Wednesday April 28. Regarding Henry's major development he read me the background and then the current document and then there was a long discussion about implementation. Primarily, the question of selection of an emissary, with the President ruling out himself or Rogers, and then ruling out Kissinger, because that would break all the china with State. This boiled it down to David Bruce, or the remote possibility of Nelson Rockefeller. This



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was discussed in some detail along with timing and various potential outcomes and scenarios, with no decisions made at that time. We had another session in the afternoon at the EOB, and Henry had his thoughts more in line by then and made the point that he was the only one who really could handle this, and that the way to go at it was in effect to set it up for the President, with a secret meeting prior to that with Henry; and that's the way it was left as Henry took off late this afternoon for a week in Palm Springs. No action will be taken for a week or ten days, and then we'll start moving from there.

All of this led the President to quite a lot of discussion about the need to build a stronger team, which apparently he'd given a lot of thought to last night, and got into the whole question of the lack of strength in the Cabinet. We also got into a discussion of shifting around the timing of the Midway trip and will probably now wait until the latter part of June, instead of trying to do it on the anniversary on the 8th. The President agreed to do this only if Henry would promise that he could announce the end of the draft, or the end of sending draftees to Vietnam, on the 8th, so that we'd have some announcement at that time.

Later-- earlier today we were in something of a flap over Rogers' speech yesterday in London at the SEATO meeting, where he gave a speech on China, which was singularly inappropriate. Haig called me at home tonight even more upset because he'd given another speech today, this time saying that in our moves with China or Russia the action might offend the other party, but if it did, that was just a dividend that we would get out of it. This, of course, is a horrifying thing, and Haig wanted me to send a cable, as did Kissinger, to Rogers telling him to say nothing more on China. I agreed to do it, and then later in checking with the President by phone, he felt I should not send a cable, but should wait and call Rogers on the phone tomorrow. Which I am now going to do.

There was a little flap with Shultz late this afternoon, as he said he had to see the President regarding the minimum wage decision. The President didn't want to do it, because he was working on the press conference, but did call him on the phone. It turned out that Shultz was



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trying to get a decision tonight on whether to go for a \$2 minimum wage, and the reason being that Hodgson has to testify tomorrow. The President refused to make the decision, told him to delay it, say nothing, and that the Administration position will not be decided for a week.

The President came up with an idea tonight for moving Bob Ellsworth back here to head up OEP and having General Lincoln go take the NATO job, a direct switch. It might work pretty well. It sounds like a good idea in any event. He called several times concerning the question of whether or not to use a podium for the press conference, whether to eliminate the platform and put him at ground level, whether or not he would use makeup. Obviously, he's spending some time on the mechanics. He also called one time in great glee because he had learned the market was up to 950 today, on 24 million shares, second highest day in history. The upswing is really pleasing to him.

End of April 28.