



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

Thursday, April 5.

Back to Dean this morning. He felt that he had a new idea that we ought to consider, which is that we should go public, saying that we want the facts to emerge in this case, but we have trouble finding out how to do it, so we suggest that the Ervin Committee cut Watergate out of their inquiry, let the US Attorneys summarize that later, when the appeals are not jeopardized, and at that time commit to releasing a full report. Then Ervin could go ahead on all but the Watergate, because really the rest of it's all "BS" anyway. The point is, we have nothing to hide, but we can't handle Watergate properly with the committee without jeopardizing the defendants' rights, and so on, in a legal action. He suggests maybe the VP take the lead on this. He says Jeb Magruder now thinks that he's going to be indicted, but that he can beat it on trial, or at least his wife has told Bart Porter's wife that.

Dean goes to the grand jury one day next week and feels we need a plan for how to handle that. He'll first have a session with the US Attorneys to discuss the parameters. He feels we should hold any release of the Segretti material until we work out the plan for the Senate committee.

The President had me in 10:00 covering some general items, the question of whether Ehrlichman or Schultz had talked to Connally. And he wants him to call him today, get his feelings on the economic situation. Wants Harl-- he's told Ehrlichman to tell Harlow to make it clear to the Vice President that he can follow his own course and the President will follow his own course. The President's very disturbed because of the Vice President's unwillingness to step up on the executive privilege matter unless the President will talk to him.

Then we got into a long Watergate review, as usual. The problem of how to handle the Q&A and my statement and the idea of maybe going for a sworn statement instead of a newspaper interview. Later he had Ehrlichman in, to give him a report on his meeting with O'Brien. Apparently O'Brien feels that-- reports to John that Mitchell wants me to talk to Magruder and tell him to keep quiet and also to get Dean to work with O'Brien.



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

Kissinger talked to the President this morning. His theory is that Mitchell is responsible and should come forward and say so. The President feels we need someone to have talks with Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean, persuade them that we have to show some motion, that we just can't sit in a bomb shelter, that we can do some things that won't hurt them. Wants me to talk to Magruder and tell him that this is all coming through on the jungle telegraph, full circle, and he's got to quit talking. He feels we do have to go with a Haldeman statement to the staff, Cabinet, and leaders clear it with Mitchell first. His idea, or Ehrlichman's, is that we have the staff, Cabinet, and leadership meetings and I read my statement and answer their questions as a preparation before going up to the Hill.

We talked to George Bush, who said he had had a one and a half hour meeting with Connally and wanted to talk to the President. He raised this with Rose Woods and one of the things Bush raised was, well, his primary thing, was the Connally matter. He's concerned that Connally telling him we've got to get the Watergate thing cleared up, which hardly comes as a surprise. The President wanted me to call Bush and work out with him the need for a plan for the reelection funds on the basis that there be no Governor candidates, no incumbents and no more than \$100,000 in any Senate campaign, no more than \$25,000 in any House campaign and he wants Bush then to give us a plan regarding the use of the money under those circumstances with the understanding that it does not go to the campaign manager but for radio, TV, newspaper, direct mail or telephone campaigns, not for personnel and that Bush has a responsibility to the President regarding selection of candidates and districts. Bush says that Connally wants something done drastically, that someone has to walk the plank and some heads have to roll. So the President told me to call Connally and tell him he wants to see him in Washington next week, Wednesday or Thursday. And that I should give him a point on that we know his concerned on the Watergate, give him the information we have, but point out that we're checking the White House staff on sworn statements, that Ervin and Ehrlichman are meeting on Monday to work out a committee procedure, that there's nothing the President's greater concerned about, but frankly, he doesn't have answers as to how to deal with it. Who does he think ought to walk the plank?



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

O'Brien pointed out that Carmine Bellino, the Kennedy man, is involved in the investigation. Also Ehrlichman lobbed in the terrible staff morale problems, which got the President very disturbed. This was in relation to my having the staff briefings. He wanted to see if Dick Moore could get Mitchell to make a statement and take the heat. Then he had me call Dean to find out why Gordon Strachan is being called to the grand jury. Dean says that he thinks Strachan went to Petersen's office before, on Segretti, and he has no idea why he would be going to the grand jury except to try and develop some idea on Liddy's White House contacts or something. Dean says they're calling a lot of secretaries and low-level people to try and develop this kind of information.

I had a bunch of miscellaneous phone calls. Elliot Richardson all concerned about personnel in the Defense Department and things being held up there, especially on the Air Force Secretary where we vetoed his man. Bob Hope was worried about the guest list and stars for the POW dinner. I talked to Pat Gray this evening at the President's request. We removed him as FBI nomination. The President wanted me to call him and just say we were all thinking of him and so on, which I did. Talked to Finch, who says he's made his decision. He's going for the Senate, but he has to extract commitments. He has a list of concerns, such as how to play it against '76, what did you do with Connally, what did you do about Nelson Rockefeller versus Reagan versus Connally, and so on. He can't go to the ball game with the President Friday night because he's speaking at Marymount, but wants to see the President on Saturday, which I later set up. He feels we need a capability-- he needs a capability of having input on appointments in California. He wants to work as if he were a Senator with the White House. Probably he won't announce until the first of the year, but he'll do some dramatic things now and get out of the governorship hassle. He's going to talk to Reagan and the other candidates next week. Feels this must be closely held, because he's got to get commitments, especially from Younger and Reagan.

I had a long talk with Connally on the phone tonight. He says the Watergate thing's gone too far to back off of, that we have to view it not only as the Watergate, but Segretti and the whole thing. He says that we ought to pose the Segretti approach on an attack basis, to counter what--



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

that we did it in order to counter what we were confronted with by the Democrats. Go on the offensive. Use the examples of what they did. He thinks the President should waive executive privilege on the grounds that the Senate committee is so partisan and demagogic that they've impaired the government's function. That as many of us as can should go up there, they should get it away from Haldeman and away from the White House. He says they won't let it rest until someone else is brought in, involved, and hung. There's no way to stop it, so we should get divorced from it. We should be outraged at their demagoguery. Take them head-on in open session and grandstand it.

He thinks we have a problem with Dean not going. He has no special privilege, and he has to go up. He thinks Ehrlichman though in the negotiation, should hang tight for first-hand knowledge only. We have to let everybody be grilled. You can make the Senators look bad in this. In the last two weeks, people have become concerned, not regarding any great crime or anything, but they just want the thing cleaned up. Then, as we discussed possibilities, he said if our testifying up there results in convicting a higher-up, then he would reconsider, unless that would happen anyway. If it would happen anyway, then, if we don't testify, we'd be part of the cover-up, because it would appear that we had known all along. On another point, he says if, by hunkering down, we could avoid convicting anybody, he'd take another look. That that would be the thing to do, but it would hurt us nonetheless.

On a purely hypothetical basis, and he never mentioned his name, he said if it gets to Mitchell, people would never believe that the President didn't know it. He says if we don't know the facts, we should get a good trial lawyer and then tell him all the facts and get his advice as to the possibilities. He thinks we could say that, at any cost, the President has to sacrifice anybody in order to clear the Presidency, but, if one particular individual is involved (and he's referring to Mitchell), then you can't get the taint off unless the President, himself, delivers him up. It's entirely possible that there's a middle road, such as Ehrlichman going up and saying to the Committee "We know you're after Haldeman, so we'll waive privilege for him if you'll agree to shut down after that". He then agreed with me that wouldn't work.



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

He says assume Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, Colson, Chapin all go up and really put on an act, take the committee on, try to nail them that they'd been on a witch hunt. You need some phrases. You need to be coached and rehearsed, each one of you. You might, by that, screw the committee in people's minds and destroy it, or at least pull its teeth. But you should definitely get there at the beginning. Be the first ones on. There's more involved in this, too. The whole White House Congressional relations question, and this would solve the confrontation problem there. He doesn't like the idea of my making a statement ahead of time. He says it would steal my thunder when I appear. His view is that you have to destroy the effectiveness of the committee, and we should send our strongest people first.

On the economic subject, he said he's having a meeting with Shultz tomorrow on that. That he's very worried about Wall Street and the uneasiness in the country and feels we have to deal with it one way or another, and, in a way, it's related to the whole Watergate business, too.

End of April 5.