



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

Tuesday, November 21st. The President had me over first thing this morning; run through preparations, schedule, and odds and ends for the day.

He got on to the Dole problem first thing; wants Ford and Scott to go to work on trying to get Dole to step down. And it, the item came up a couple of times again as the day went on, especially since it appeared, as the day went on, that Bush was more likely to take the National Chairmanship. He ended up at the end of the day agreeing that he would take it, so, we now have our replacement set. As a result, the President thought that Mitchell should call Dole, tell him that we've got to have a full-time Chairman. The President does want him to step down. And then, when he comes to see the President, he should ask to be released, and should recommend to the President that he get a full-time man, and that he wants, that for Dole's sake, he ought to step out while he's on top.

Kissinger problems came up a number of times in conversations during the day. The President thought Henry ought to forget about the fetish of secret meetings. That he's worried about Henry observing the freeze on *Time* and *Life*. He says if *Time* does a Man of the Year this year and doesn't give it to Nixon, it'll probably go to Kissinger, which would really create a problem, and that Henry should not give an interview, if this does happen. Yeah. He feels that getting the whole Kissinger situation into shape is going to be hard, and that I'm going to have to handle it; that he can't tolerate Henry's increasing problems. That I've got to talk to him when he gets back, bring him back to earth, make the point that we can't go on with him bouncing around this way. The President really feels he should leave by midyear. He wants to be sure also that I turn him off on his idea of the China trip before the inaugural, and make the point that he can't do anything to detract from the President's position at this stage. Also that I should land on him on the Italian article, regarding what he really sees as his own role; it's very distressing to the people who count; not the jokes, and so on.



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These, there are appointments that he made, members of his staff, people who, in support of McGovern, hit him hard on the 50 percent staff cut, and drop the extra divisions, Africa and Latin America, and so on; not the secretaries, but the top people; go for the disloyal people, especially.

The President had some concerns about Ehrlichman talking to Volpe before he comes in; that we've got to get it set before he sees the President; that Shultz has got to talk to Rinfret and ask him to do something; that we've got to work out Garment's rank. Bill Timmisch is the really knowledgeable President watcher. That put Webster in IRS, and the President's assuming that's done and wants to be told if it's not. The President's concerned about Butz wanting to run his own show, and that Ehrlichman's going to make it clear to him that the President is going to make the appointments; also going to make this clear to Morton. We've got to pound Butz on reorganizing his department. He wants everybody to stop using the term super-cabinet.

We have to make the point to Bush that we've got to totally reorganize the National Committee. Flanigan should maintain a low profile and let time heal his wounds; and that Malek should move to the OMB now. That moved out of the Secret Service, also Bob Taylor in the Presidential detail. That Colson should not be the RNC counsel. That I should meet with Rogers and cover the changes we're going to be making in the State Department.

The President had another batch of meetings today. The first one, which I had to handle, was Herb Klein. I made the pitch to Herb before the meeting about the reorganization, now that the campaign's over, and that we can only have one guy in charge of general PR and that has to be



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the Press Secretary, so the Communication Office will be retained, but under Ziegler, and slimmed down. That Colson's leaving, and so on, and under the circumstances Herb should not stay...

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Audio Cassette 27, Side A, Withdrawn Item Number 15 [AC-27(A) Sel 12]  
Duration: 9 seconds

...he can have ambassador to Mexico if he wants to or anything on the outside that we can help him on...

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...and that we want to put a new organization in, January 15th. Herb, needless to say, was not at all pleased by the discussion, but I think realized its inevitability, especially after the President hit basically the same line I did, and in some cases, even harder. Herb made the pitch that he ought to stay until he can find another job, and then should leave on that basis, and the office be closed after he leaves, rather than closing the office now, saying he's leaving to look for something. And I think he's right, not only from his viewpoint, but from ours, so we'll do that, since the President agreed to it, too, in our later meeting.

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DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013  
Audio Cassette 27, Side A, Withdrawn Item Number 16 [AC-27(A) Sel 13]  
Duration: 18 seconds



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Herb recommended Parma for ambassador to Mexico, and the President was intrigued with that. The President raised USIA as a possibility for Herb and he didn't turn that down although he did turn Mexico down.

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I don't think he'll take USIA, but we'll see. Also made the point that we should see if Shakespeare would take something else. Made the point to Herb that one of the best things he could do was go with one of the television networks as news director. And, he asked Klein for his analysis of PIOs; he wants that immediately.

Next meeting I had was Schlesinger. The President made him the pitch on wanting him to consider CIA, asked him how he would go about it. Schlesinger had some ideas: agreed with the President's view that it needed to be changed, and that the DIA was even worse, and that the Director of Central Intelligence should exercise overall control of both, but does not now; that Helms is a captive of the Georgetown set, at least to a degree; and that it is time for a change. He obviously wants the CIA job and is perfectly willing to leave the AEC. He did suggest holding it until March, when Helms becomes sixty and would logically retire, which would also give him time to get cleaned up at the AEC. The President told him to give him a memo on how the DIA should be controlled, vis-à-vis the Secretary of Defense. And, overall, Schlesinger did well in the interview, and I think the President is pleased with the thought of that move.

Next one was Bill Casey. The President made him the pitch for, ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State, but at first Under Secretary. The President at first said for Administration, but Casey got him shifted over to Economic Affairs, which is really better because it gives him more stroke. And Casey is obviously delighted. Totally agrees with the President's assessment of the State



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Department bureaucracy. Asked some of the right questions, but understands the problem with Rogers and is willing to work with that for the interim period; and is delighted at the opportunity to get in and clean out the dead wood. I think that one's going to work out extremely well.

Next one was Rush, who obviously was hoping to get Defense, but the President opened the discussion by saying that Laird had recommended him, but the President had a more important post for him, and that he really needed him in the State Department situation. The President gave him the whole background of the Rogers ultimate shift, and the present retention that...

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[Begin tape reel AC-27(B)]

It is Tuesday, November 21st continued. Talking about the meeting with Rush. The President reviewed the State Department situation; made the point that Rush may or may not move up to Secretary, and that would remain to be seen after Rogers leaves; explained the Casey role as the guy to tear up the Department. Rush's role is to back him and handle substantive matters. He said basically there'd be two purposes for Rush: one is substantive, that he should work on the preparations for the European Security Conference, SALT, Vietnam, and so on; and second, is a cover for the beginning of the reorganization. Rush got into quite an analysis of Laird and made the point that it was interesting in that department that Laird's theory was that he, Mel, was totally loyal with the President, and that the way he ran his Department was to insist that all of his people be totally loyal to him, and that that was the way he would insure their loyalty to the President. That meant that whenever Laird's position or view differed from the President's, the



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Department followed him rather than the President, which Rush obviously saw as not desirable. He made the point that there is a terrible problem of bureaucracy at Defense, as well as at State, but he recognized very much the President's views as to the problems at State, and totally agreed with the need to move in and clean it out. He expressed his view of Rogers as being a complete captive of the Foreign Service. That his, the problem with the Foreign Service is that what they want is to control foreign policy, and they aren't, and that makes them unhappy, and the way they react reflects that unhappiness, which is what poses the problem for the President with them. The thing that they don't recognize is that it's not the business of the Foreign Service or the State Department to control foreign policy or to make the decisions, but rather to provide the President with the input and information so that he can do that, and then to insure that his policy decisions are carried out precisely. This may very well have been self-serving rhetoric, as far as Rush was concerned, but it hit the point exactly right, and it's clear he's very pleased with a chance to take on this role, and understands that if he goes at it right, he's got a chance to move up to Secretary, which gives him a pretty strong motivation.

Henry called from Paris to report on the talks. The main thing had to tell me was that they had another five hour session; and that they had built TV towers outside their meeting place so that the camera could see into the courtyard, and they're getting pictures of him. He says they're getting pretty tough on substance; there's a cable coming on later. He's off to Brussels tonight to meet Suharto in the morning; meet tomorrow afternoon in Paris again at 2:30. He says he can't be back before Saturday; that the agreement will take two to three days, and then they have to go through the protocol and all, so he'd probably be back Saturday or Sunday...

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Audio Cassette 27, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 1 [AC-27(B) Sel 1]  
Duration: 10 seconds



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...and will be bringing Duc of Nor--, South of South Vietnam back with him to see the President.

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The President this evening got into the Secret Service problem; and he wants to change Rowley at the top and Bob Taylor on the Presidential detail. Lower the profile of the Secret Service and their coverage of him, especially keep them off the running boards and all, where they're so obvious. And they're to ride no more than six people in a normal car behind him in motorcades, rather than the open car. He wants to start this on the New York trip.

And he mentioned the Rumsfeld reaction. He was really furious the more he thought about it. He wants Ehrlichman to let Rumsfeld know that the President was amazed, and that it embarrassed Ehrlichman, and raised the question of what in the world was he doing, and so on.

End of November 21st.

Continuing November 21st. We had a long session tonight after dinner on personnel for remaining Cabinet posts and a complete rundown on undersecretaries and on agency heads. Good people lined up, and things are starting to fall together reasonably well.

End of November 21st.