



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Saturday, November 18.

I drove down from Camp David first thing this morning and went right to Rogers' house for my meeting with him and prepared a pitch. We spent a lot of time in sort of general chitchat-- review of election results and the basic transition approach. Rogers is concerned, because he feels the President's harsh way of going at the transition is hurting the opportunity for him to create a more friendly image generally in the country and thinks that we should have, for instance, waited a week before the Cabinet meeting asking for resignations, rather than moving so hard, so fast, etcetera. I then got into my pitch after about a half an hour of chitchat on how we structure the State Department. Made the points the President told me to, that it was unfortunate he had the impression of being fired, the President thought he was leaving. That we had no real problems with the rest of the Cabinet, they're all figured out, so you're the only problem. The President doesn't want to hurt you, but he's been through four rough years, between you and Kissinger, so from now on, things have to be through the system. We need a clear understanding that if you stay on, first, we have to go with the new organization now without delay. Second, the President will make the appointments on his decision as Kennedy did. We're doing this in all Departments, and must include State. Third, the Foreign Service promotions have got to be based first on loyalty, then on competence. We can't have another Yost situation. Everyone must now work within the system. The problems have been partly Kissinger's fault, but this must be understood and agreed, and we must have a clear understanding of the June 1 date with no further discussion, and, of course, no one else should know. He totally agreed to all of these. He said there is a problem of his working with the staffing system because Kissinger lies to him and there's no way to deal with him and he's particularly concerned with how to deal with Haig's replacement, because Haig has been the key to getting along. He does trust Haig. And Bill feels that his successor needs to be set up so they do have a way to deal other than Henry, which is impossible. He also made the point, in that connection, that he must be sure that Haig goes with Henry to Saigon, if he goes, because Thieu doesn't trust or like Henry. He does trust Haig. Apparently in Bill's last conversation with Al he indicated he was probably not going to Saigon



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with Henry and that concerns Bill. He argued that the Foreign Service are very much loyal to the President, especially now. They agree with his policies and his approach and he can win them over if he just takes a basically reasonable attitude toward them and not cut them out. He gives lip service to agreeing completely to the other conditions and says he feels he can work within them, even including the staffing thing for a few months, and that he definitely will leave, prior to June 1, maybe even by May 1. We had some discussion about personnel-- the Yost thing, he defended on the basis that we had done a bad job of firing him and that was what caused the trouble, and that we wouldn't have had a problem with Yost otherwise, although he recognized he basically was in disagreement with us and that couldn't help but be a factor no matter what. There were a few other people such as Apscher, Sisco, Newsom, and so on and we left on a very friendly note.

I called the President as soon as I got home -- the meeting had lasted about two hours -- and told him the Rogers thing was basically worked out OK. Reviewed all of the above with him. He then said he'd definitely decided to shift Richardson to Defense, but we'll have to sell it to the Congressional committees. Then got into the Colson thing, said his decision is that he must go. His concern is that he not be forced to turn his back on him at a later time, now it can be done in the right way. He recognizes that we do need his apparatus, and we need to count on him to set it up. The President's intrigued with Brennan, or someone like that as Transportation Secretary, he wants to let Chuck make the contact with Holland, and see whether Holland Fitzsimmons will accept it. That was at noon.

At 6:15 the President called to say that he'd figured it out: that the way to handle Colson was to announce his leaving now, but make it effective March 1 or something like that. In that period let him move into the West Wing but no change in title, and have him go on the scenario that he wanted to leave at the end of the year, but the President asked him to stay on to assist him in reorganization plans for 60 days. The President also jumped on the question of whether Colson had done anything on getting out the record about the President's campaign, because Connally had raised the problem of Congress bitching, especially Dominick and Wilson. You've got to



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build a backfire now, get to Scott and Ford and cover all the things the President did, the interminable photo sessions, tapes, films, etcetera. He also said he'd invited Colson up for dinner on Monday night.

He called me a little later and said it was important for me to talk to Colson soon and tell him the new scheme. He mentioned at noon that Kissinger was having problems with Thieu. He'd gotten a new cable and apparently Thieu is causing trouble again. The President told him to just go ahead and get the best deal he can and then let Thieu paddle his own canoe. Then when the President called in the evening, he said Kissinger has now read the message and it wasn't nearly as bad as he thought, so it was another crisis that Henry was stirring up. He got into some miscellaneous personnel items. He's having Garment come up on Monday for a meeting at 5:00, he thinks it's OK for Flanigan to stay on at CEP if Shultz will OK it. We're supposed to try to clear that. He says if Peterson takes the NATO job we're offering him, we should take another Southerner for Commerce, if we don't get Dent. He thinks Bill Calloway would be good for that.

Henry, incidentally, called to say that he thinks Peterson will take it. He had a meeting with him today. And the President is pushing for getting people up this week and getting a lot of meetings going. He wants to be sure he gets to Kleindienst, because he wants to get him to take Right as Deputy Attorney General, with the idea of moving him up to AG. Kissinger called me this evening before his departure for Paris tomorrow to report first that Peter Lisagor has an article regarding an interview Henry did with an Italian journalist woman-- some of it very bad, such as that the reason he's so popular is because Americans like cowboys and things like that. It'll appear in the Star tomorrow, and Henry was very much concerned about it. He said he thought he was just joking when he talked with her, and also that she was supposed to submit the interview for clearance before she printed it, but she didn't do it. So he's been shafted, which is not unusual. Had a concern that State's pushing for the Foreign Minister of Vietnam to visit the President during the negotiations. Henry feels strongly that this should be after, not during. He says the President agrees but wants to be sure I avoid State end running on it while he's gone.



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End of November 18.