



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Monday, April 17.

President called me at 1:15 in the morning last night. Pretty cranked up. Said we better move either to get Ervin lined up on a deal on Monday, the thing we'd been talking about Sunday afternoon, or else Kleindienst is out. We are to use another subterfuge or whatever is necessary but we must have a decision.

Staff meeting this morning. Shultz raised the point that they needed a '74 budget session with the President this week or next, because it involves a lot of actions now regarding vetoes and planning and so forth that need to be worked out, and we need to build some of this into the campaign.

We got into the whole Kleindienst planning thing in considerable detail this morning. We had to prepare a public tender of Flanigan: cover all the bases on restrictions on him, reserving the rights on other people and so forth, trying to make the deal with Ervin, which Fannin was to do at 10:00. We decide to-- Ervin made the deal, and so we decided to send a Flanigan letter to the Chairman, which is what Ervin wanted. That sets aside Executive Privilege, agrees to take questions within our rules. Ervin agreed that there'd be no other White House witnesses, that he'd support Kleindienst out of the committee on the 20th, that he'd take no part in the filibuster, and that he'd support Kleindienst on the floor when he goes in on the 27th. He said he's anxious to avoid a confrontation with the President on this sensitive constitutional question, but as the record stands now he has to have Flanigan as a witness.

The other concern was the problem of Gleason, who's due to testify on Tuesday. We've got to stop him at any cost, so we're discussing how to do that if-- since Ervin's bought the Flanigan deal we can't cut off the hearings with the Kleindienst withdrawal. The President agreed to all this, and we went ahead and worked out the deal on that basis. So it now looks as if we may be able to get Kleindienst through after all.



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Vietnam line was a major matter of importance in the President's meeting this morning. He told Ziegler to be enigmatic, not tell the press anything, nothing belligerent or controversial. He's very disturbed about a *New York Times* quote saying; "That if Hue falls, that's the end of Moscow", meaning the trip. Says we should hit the critics for shooting at the wrong target, that they should direct their fire at the Communist forces from North Vietnam that are invading, rather than against the President's-- the President, who's trying to stop this invasion. He says Ron should say, it's puzzling to him why the critics always end up taking the side of the enemy who are invading South Vietnam rather than the side of our allies who are trying to defend their country against a Communist invasion. Regarding any limits on attack activity, the President will do what is necessary. The bombing will stop when they withdraw across the demilitarized zone. Regarding negotiations, we should look them cold in the eye. For almost three years, before the January 25th speech, the press bullyragged Ron and the President regarding the negotiations. On January 25th the full record was put out. A lot of you who had said the Administration was not going far enough had red faces. I'm not going to discuss now what's being done since January 25th, but the record, when reviewed, will also leave some of you with red faces. So don't assume that the tip is all of the iceberg. He wants Colson to unleash Agnew with a tough Buchanan speech, hitting the accusers, defeatists, taking the side of the enemy, etcetera. Make the point that he's proud the President is willing to risk his political future to do what's right.

He's still pushing on keeping his schedule basically clear in order to concentrate on Vietnam. He is very pleased with Rogers' testimony on the Hill today. Bill did a good job, took a hard line, although before he went up, the President was very concerned about whether he would do so. As it turned out, he was really very good. The-- other thing the President wanted to do is to get the Congress to do a resolution condemning the North Vietnamese invasion as a counter to the Muskie resolution. Also hope that maybe Connally would dissociate himself from the partisans who condemn the United States for helping the country to defeat-- to defend themselves against the Communist takeover rather than condemning the aggressors. That he's proud that we have a President who will stand up, so on. He wants to be sure we stay on the invasion concept and



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attack the attackers. Especially in a debate planned for Wednesday in the Senate on Vietnam. We spent some time discussing the Kissinger trip cover, the President's idea that we'll go to Camp David, say that Kissinger's up there with him and that that'll do it. I'm concerned that won't do it.

End of April 17.