



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Thursday, March 9th. At the staff meeting this morning, Shultz came up with an interesting point that he's been analyzing Connally and feels that he has a totally different point of view regarding his basic approach to politics. Whereas, we feel that we should meet each problem as it's shown in the polls and worry about how the statistics play and so forth, such as the triggered unemployment benefits that are now going out. He thinks it's a mistake to worry about the bits and pieces that we overreact and worry too much. When things are going your way, you should just let them go, not worry, work on each little thing that we're too antsy. That we should just stick with our program and defend it. We have a program regarding the elderly, the spending, inflation, so on, we should stick to them. We should brush the other guys off and not worry about them. Thus, he looks at the basics in a totally different way than we do. He's very concerned regarding our overreaction, and thinks we need more of a feeling of stability and confidence. It's an interesting point. My answer to it being, that he's a Democrat and always has been in Democratic at politics where they can do that, because the press is with them. We can't afford that luxury.

The President got into some political follow-up things this morning, as he had me in for virtually all morning, about, three, over three hours, with Kissinger in and out during that. He had some follow-up on the primary, and some questions on Florida and so on. Then we got into the Rogers problem with Henry, and the President makes the point first, that if we try to change him, we have a huge issue. Second, that we can't put someone in now because we don't have anyone, the only one the President could consider is Rush.

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Audio Cassette 19, Side A, Withdrawn Item Number 28 [AC-18(B) Sel 19]
Duration: 39 seconds



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The President told Henry he would see Dobrynin next week and tell him that the President is in charge of the trip. But that we've got to give Rogers some things to work on. The main problem is the Middle East where Rogers said he wants to talk to Dobrynin about it. The President and Henry don't want him to. The President wants to keep for himself South East Asia, China, SALT, the Mideast, and the decision on the European Security Conference. We need our plans on those. Rogers can handle the grain deal, environment, space docking, science, and those things. We have to look at all of this in terms of what the Communists want...

...as, and then the President cited the Whitaker Chambers story regarding Taft and Korea. Saying that Taft's opposition to our going into Korea was wrong, because he was looking at it from the US point of view, where we should be look...

[End of tape reel AC-19(A)]

[Begin tape reel AC-19(B)]

March 9th continued. Talking about the Rogers problem, and the analysis of dealing with the Communists, the President was...

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...making the point that, in our planning for Russia, we have to look at all times in terms of what the Communists want. And he cited Whitaker Chambers story regarding Taft, who opposed Korea, and Whitaker Chambers said he was wrong because the war there was not a war about Korea, it was about Japan, which is the way the enemy looked at it. That we've got to put ourselves in a position of the other party, and analyze what are his problems.

We got into the question of Kissinger on television. The President wanted Ziegler to negotiate with Kalb on a cold turkey basis, about the Kissinger interview. If it's on substance only, we're dead. If it's on background, the man, the color, and so forth, then it's worthwhile. So we have to find out: What kind of a show we have in mind? What is the purpose of the interview? The only good to go on is if it adds a new dimension, not just a review of the communiqué and so on. The question of whether the hour will deal with the positive subjects. There's no point in putting Kissinger and us on the defensive, from our viewpoint, and creating a big stir for nothing. Our plus is the mystique of the trip. How did the trip come about, the President's planning? How the President conducted himself, his insight, technique and so on. So he wants Ron to be the devil's advocate and the question he wants to be added to what's already covered, basically, to find out what he's up to. The President and Henry agreed that Rogers trip...

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...to Poland is okay, but he can't go to Yugoslavia or Romania, because the President has already done that. It'd be gilding the lily. Poland is also more important politically.

Mitchell, well, the big thing today was the ITT deal again. I had a staff session where we tried to work on how to turn the thing into some positive PR. Mitchell called in the afternoon, or I called him, I guess, to check out the statement that was attributed to him in the testimony today that the President had told him to get the case settled. He said that, John said this statement had previously been in the Anderson column and in the press before, and that the facts are that Mitchell has only seen Dita Beard once in his life, and that was at the Louie Nunn thing. Mitchell never said anything like this to her, and he'll categorically deny it. He did then do it a little later in the day and it was on the TV tonight. Mitchell also said there's something fishy on the Dita Beard memo, that she's a drinking buddy of Anderson's secretary, and it may be that there's something involved there, and also in the fact that Anderson won't show the memo to anybody.

Kleindienst called me at home tonight on the whole thing, said that Anderson had piled up today with a whole bunch of wild charges, that the press and TV are not accurately reporting the positive testimony. They're only covering the sensational stuff today, like linking the President, and so on. As a result of this, Mitchell and Mardian have concluded that there should be a massive White House effort using our facilities to respond. Also, they think the Vice President should hit on the mischaracterization of the press. Mitchell told Kleindienst to call me. He suggested using the White House resources, first, to set up a task force over the weekend to review the testimony versus the newspaper accounts. Second, have the Vice President take it on, third, a general attack by any friendly press, Congress, government, and community people that we can get. He says that tonight Tunney, Hart, and Kennedy asked Eastland to get the SEC inside trading charges against ITT and let them romp through those, which we very definitely



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don't want them to do. He thinks it's clear now that the Anderson charge has been repudiated, and they're now after bigger game. And for this reason, he sort of regrets his request for the Hearing, especially since it's gone this far, but no one had ever anticipated the press and TV would come up with such unfair reporting. For instance, we could exploit the solicitor general's testimony, but the press haven't, has just barely reported it. He thinks that the fact of Hume injected the President into it on hearsay shows the serious basis that they're working on. He says that he is pretty suspicious about the whole deal now. That his hearing before the Committee for the nomination was a love fest, and everybody patted him on the back, said he was great, and all that. And that at the time he told Mitchell that something was fishy. Then right after they finished the Committee Hearing, the Anderson column came out, and Dick thinks that their plan was to air that in the full Senate and really go after him that way. He thinks that this was all contrived to come after the Committee Hearing and to force a debate on the floor of the Senate. That it's a carefully developed scheme, and that the saving grace for us now is that we've got it back in the Committee, and we're dealing with Eastland instead of with the full Senate leadership. He committed, absolutely, unequivocally, and positively that there was no possibility of any evidence of any kind that would substantiate any charge of wrongdoing on the part of any of our people.

End of March 9th.