



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

Monday, January 17th. The President had nothing scheduled for today because of speech preparation, but had no speech preparation work to do, because he dictated a long thing last night for Safire on the Vietnam speech, and has already pretty well wrapped up the State of the Union with Price.

There's a building story again on the reopening of the Howard Hughes loan. The President said we should get out the facts, as we did in '62, point out that the loan was repaid by the transfer of property, but don't let the impression of guilt build up, as responded to in '62, and there's nothing to it now. Figures maybe we should have Klein handle it, and we discussed that possibility with Ziegler later in the morning.

Also on the Anderson papers, Ziegler's going to say that the President, of course, is concerned about the problem on that, and we are conducting an investigation. That the President considers it important, because of the need for free discussion among advisors that we will not allow this to lead to less discussion. He totally supports Kissinger.

On the Vietnam speech, he was a little distressed when he found out during a meeting with Kissinger that Safire had reviewed the whole memo the President had written with Henry. Because the memo referred to the speech as turgid prose etcetera, and wasn't written for Henry's consumption. That is, it was a critique of Henry's first draft, and guidance for Safire on how to deal with it.

He had a fairly long session with Henry in there, during which he sent over, sent Manolo over to the house to bring his H.G. Wells book over. And he skimmed through it and found a devastating



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

quote regarding the military mind and the fact that it is, by definition, mediocre, because nobody with any real intellectual talent would submit himself to the military career. He also said that, of course, Wells has the feeling that every, the solution to all problems is education for everyone, and that's a terrible idea, especially for women, says the President. He is pondering the problem we have in getting our Air Force to do what's right. Henry was making the point, in reviewing the Vietnam progress, that the Air Force, as usual, was doing everything wrong and talking about how terrible they are. The President was agreeing with that and saying the problem we have is that we have so little time. He also got into the problem of the sniping against the China trip primarily by the press people who keep saying now that we're putting all the emphasis on making a television spectacular out of it. The President points out that we have to realize the reality of the event will be overriding and that we needn't worry about the carping of the critics, which is inevitable.

I raised the Kissinger-Rogers flap with the President today and reviewed the whole go-round of the weekend. And the President made the point that Rogers is acting in a petty way, that the Attorney General is going to have to face up to Rogers regarding the Israelis...

DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
Audio Cassette 18, Side A, Withdrawn Item Number 7 [AC-18(A) Sel 7-1]
Duration: 23 seconds

...because we, he must not force their hand too hard at this point. We've got to forget about the right and wrong of it for now and avoid confrontation. Also, it's imperative that the President must be totally informed regarding anything with Rabin.



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

On the other side of it, the problem is that Kissinger, by sending his memo, was purposefully humiliating Rogers and he just can't do that.

DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
Audio Cassette 18, Side A, Withdrawn Item Number 7 [AC-18(A) Sel 7-2]
Duration: 26 seconds

So we have the problem of how do we handle the Israelis. On the Mideast, the President has to know everything. If not through Kissinger, then it's got to be sent in through me. The European Security Conference that has to go into Kissinger and the NSC because it's a part of the agenda planning for the summit meeting. We have to shoot down Rogers's idea that the NSC is not an operating body, because they are.

The Attorney General also has got to make the point to Rogers that the Jews provided \$8 million in the last two weeks for Humphrey last time and we've got to be careful about their potential influence. Also, the AG has got to make it clear to Henry that first, he was wrong to send the directive to Rogers, and second, he's got to keep quiet until we get this whole thing smoothed over.

Later this afternoon we had a two and a half hour meeting with Connally. President had me sit in the whole thing. First part was to discuss the question of Flanigan taking on the Committee on International Economic Policy. And Connally, first of all agreed with the idea of Peterson and



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

Hodgson taking on the role of being active around the country about jobs, and said it's a good way to show concern and analyze, a good way to show our concern is to analyze the statistics. Making the point that unemployment is not a fiscal problem, but a social problem, because the pockets of unemployment are all among the young people, and blacks, and women. The President told Connally to bring Peterson and Hodgson together and give them the order to get this going, as a major thrust to the economic policy this year. This is to be done under Connally's aegis, as the chief economic man, and then they're to report to the President.

The President then made the point that he wants to clear up the international economic question so that there's no question where the authority lies. That Flanigan, if he takes the job, will be an inside man. The, Connally says that's the problem for the reason for the counsel to begin with. No other department has anything to do with monetary policy, and Connally isn't about to let Flanigan and his Council take that over, and Connally doesn't want State involved in monetary policy. He says the Council's purpose under the Ash Council Act concept was for trade and balance of payments and that sort of thing. So the President said that makes there's a decision then, monetary policy is under the Secretary of the Treasury. And that view is to be clearly understood that Flanigan is to take no initiatives unless requested by the Secretary of Treasury. He's to do nothing in derogation of the Treasury's dominant role in this matter. This is an area where you can't have a group talking. There has to be one man, the Secretary of the Treasury, otherwise it corrodes our negotiating position.

The President then said we need to be more clear on trade. First of all the question of who is Eberle under? Connally answered, he's under the President, not the State Department. The whole purpose of setting up that office of STR was to bypass State in trade negotiations. The President then said he wants to delegate his responsibility on that to Connally, because trade is so tied up with monetary policy. He wants to avoid a repetition of the San Clemente deal with Tanaka,



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

when Stans wouldn't let Eberle meet with him separately. The point is we can't have Peterson, Samuels, Eberle, and Connally all talking with different lines, so Connally must be in charge. We don't want all of these people ending up running the President. Where Flanigan comes in, is, he has to know who sits at the head of the table, and that's Connally. The delegation is to John Connally, the man, not to the office to Secretary of the Treasury. Then down the road we'll move it to State. Flanigan's to look at the whole international field in terms of restructuring it during the next term, especially regarding State, Commerce, and Treasury.

The President then wants Malek to take over Pete's White House responsibilities. Also Connally's to discuss with Pete the, his idea on raw materials development for Latin America, and so on. He also wants to put Flanigan on all these loan battles with the State, so that Kissinger doesn't have to handle those. The President agreed to meet with McNamara when he gets back from his trip and before the President goes to China, and then wants him brought in every couple months, because it's his understanding that McNamara will do what we tell him to.

Connally then related a horror story about Weintraub at State Department who has told Chile that we'll renegotiate their loan. And a man under him, named Fisher, has said, told the Chileans that it was lucky that their decision to suspend the loan was learned after some action we'd taken, otherwise we would have killed the deal. The President was horrified at all of this. In any event, Connally's sending a memo in asking for the President's okay that the Treasury head the delegation, and that memo should be approved.

The President then had me lay out the Buchanan thesis that maybe the professional president is the wrong political posture, and that rather we should be a fighting president and find someone or something to do battle with. Connally said until after the trips, or at least until after China, the



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

President should take on no enemy, but at the right time, he has to come out as a fighter, and he has to have an enemy.

The President said both parties have had it. That is, Eisenhower told him once in this office after the '56 elections: Damn the Republican Party, what we need is a new party. The President thinks maybe we should form that party after this next election, and he cites the growth of the Independents versus Republicans and Democrats. Then says to Connally he needs good advice as to what is the right posture to take. Connally says the reason the polls aren't greater at this point is that people don't think they know Nixon, so they don't go all out for him regardless of what the consequences are. They don't know how to judge Nixon. Kennedy had them memorized, mesmerized in that regard. Connally says that if a natural enemy shows at any time, we should grab it, but it would be better to wait until after the conventions. If we do anything now, we should take on our Republican opponents, but it's better not to have a fight now. When the Convention's over, we should pick out an enemy, such as unemployment, or balance of payments, or the ecology. The President went back to his earlier point and says how do you get people to know the President? Connally says you have to change your way of doing things. Like once a week you should pick a group and meet with them, maybe have a stag dinner here of 100 people, mend the fences with the hurt folks that we've let down. Like the big fun money raiser in Texas who got no recognition after the election. Should have them for dinner and have a real hair down session, tell them you need their help, and ask them how they think you're doing.

The President said that's fine for the leaders, but how do you break through to the masses? Connally said by becoming a fighter. The President asked if he meant using more press conferences, and Connally said no, that won't do it, although you should have one of those a month. But you need to be strongly for and, or against something. You need to do it fairly soon, to start preparing. Something that touches the lives of people, like taxes or the bureaucracy. He



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

says all people think that the President's doing an excellent job, but no one loves him, fears him, or hates him, and he needs to have all three. The good, professional president doesn't appeal to the motivating emotions. This is okay through Moscow, but it's too dangerous after that to just let it lie, even though he'd probably win anyway. At that time he's going to have to build love, fear, hate, and respect, so he has something to fall back on if the substantive things don't work out. August 5th, 15th did it, but in an abstract problem, which the people don't understand. Maybe a major shakeup in State and Defense would be the thing, where you'd get all the businessmen to applaud, at least, and you'd get equipped to compete in the world. Maybe the enemy is permissiveness—the whole field of permissiveness. We've gotten too soft. Be for discipline. His point is we've got to be for something and against something, and the people have to know about it. Something will come up. We can seize it, in a non-political environment. We discussed drugs as a possibility, then Connally offered Federal judges and the court, saying you should fight for a policy of reconfirmation of judges every ten years, and make them responsible to someone. Says you've got to get to the racial thing one way or another, and that may be the indirect way to do it. A great issue to oppose is integration. The President summed up that, first of all, we agree, we're better off today than we were a year ago. Secondly, that we need to establish an identity, not just as a professional president. He pointed out that he's had that before, but now he can't just float along. Connally points out the tendency today is to be against the ins in executive positions, although not in legislative, so we have to overcome that. Thus the professional president is not a good posture. We have to crystallize our support. Get people willing to get out and fight, tie people to you emotionally. The country needs emotional feelings regarding the President, but we have had the problem with the country all torn up, and we couldn't stir emotional feelings. Now we have had a year of cooling, we can heat up again. Before, they were fired up for the wrong causes, now you can stir them up for Nixon. The key one is schools and housing, that is integration, but there's a real problem with striking too early.



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

President then closed the meeting by inviting Connally to come to Walkers Cay over the Lincoln's weekend. He had me walk back to the Residence with him and discussed this a little more, and then called me at home to say he wanted me to talk that whole subject over with Ray Price and get his views because he has doubts re: Price's theory.

End of January 17th.