



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

National Archives and Records Administration, Online Public Access Catalog Identifier: 7787364

Tuesday, January 11.

President didn't call me in till 11:30 this morning. He came in late and worked alone for quite a while. Raised the question of our planned meeting of Attorney General with Rogers and me, and had some guidance on the line to use. He said we should put it on the basis that this is going to be a very difficult year for the President, and for all your little problems he has a hundred big ones, and we've got to discontinue finding ways to make his job harder. Bill's been good that way, but it does create problems-- but he does create problems for Kissinger. He had me come over to the EOB a little later, just after noon, and I was over there for a couple hours. He resumed the Rogers line. Made the point that we can't have two children on the President's hands. The President has every confidence in Rogers, but the State Department leaks like a sieve. That some State guy said that Pat Nixon's trip was totally political because she wanted all black faces around her, that Bill's got to realize that we just can't put everything on the diplomatic wire. He said to put it in terms of the tough campaign coming up, look at the President's week: Romney, the leaders, Stans, farewell to Hughes, Bartzell, Dutch Prime Minister Colombo, the State of the Union, the Cabinet meeting, preparing for China, plus all of Ehrlichman's domestic crap. Said we should tell him we will keep Rogers posted on China, but not down to the bowels of the State Department. President doesn't trust Marshall Green, not that he's bad, he's just loose. He does trust Alex Johnson, but not Irwin, who's not smart enough. He said I've got to think of a way to get around Rogers, not go on a frontal assault that I should play to his vanity. Make the point that we know Kissinger's difficult and so on, but we can't have a change at this point. Sisco to Iran would be OK, and that should be explored. Point out that Rogers has got to be ruthless and selfless. Let Rogers know how much handling the President has to do. Armed with all this sensational advice, we set up the meeting.

Fortunately, Rogers walked into it by calling me this morning to say that he'd like to be cut in on the China trip, but he's heard nothing, although Henry told him he'd send him copies of all the cables and everything. He says we've got to realize we have to work closely together. It's important to keep State filled in so that everyone knows what the other one is going to do, and



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he'd like to be in on Haig's briefing. This played directly into the first point we wanted to get a concession from him on for Kissinger, which is the fact that we need to know what he's going to do, just as much as he needs to know what we are. And that he's got to inform the White House before he meets with Ambassadors, etcetera. Then he got onto the Anderson papers, said that since his talk with the Attorney General he had issued orders that no one at State is talking at all to the press, but the Kraft column today showed that there's still divisiveness, and that someone's being untruthful. This led him the second point, which is that we need to be protective of each other, not critical of each other.

Which played right into Kissinger's second point, that an attack on Henry is equivalent to an attack on the President. So Mitchell and I met with Rogers for two hours at 4:00 today. Made the points that the President suggested and tied them to the points Rogers suggested, and said we have got to work out a means of dealing with all of this. We admitted that Henry was a problem in himself, but that he is essentially we've got to develop ways of working with it. Rogers said the basic problem he has is that he simply doesn't trust Henry. That he-- Henry has lied to him and he has admitted it, saying he was lying under orders, and that's the only time he did lie, but that leads Rogers to distrust everything that Henry says. Bill feels, therefore, that when he gets instructions from Henry or any kind of information, that he's got to question it, and that sets up a very difficult working relationship. He also hit some of his other sort of standard complaints about Kissinger's desire for publicity, and everything, but the important thing was his lack of trust. He also said that he's got to have a direct line of communication with the President, so that when he does question something, or want to raise a caution or something, that he can do it directly to the President without going through Henry. Mitchell and I agreed that he can use me as his conduit to the President directly, and Rogers thought that was fine. Then we agreed we had to set up a method so that Rogers would keep us posted on all meetings he has with the Soviets or the Israelis, etcetera. Rogers agreed that he would, if Kissinger would notify Rogers regarding all of his meetings, unless the President tells him not to notify. The basic principle to apply is whatever one of the three knows on foreign policy, all three should, between Kissinger,



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Rogers, and the President. Bill argued also that the President should have a few meetings regarding the China trip, including Kissinger, Rogers, and Haig, to provide some opportunity for discussion. He reviewed some of the India-Pakistan stuff and the other problems. Said the State Department never leaked; I confronted him with the State Department quote from *The New York Times* Sunday, and he was a little distressed about that, but says he hasn't any ability to control the leaks any more than he's now doing so, and I think that's probably true.

He called me later to say that he had been thinking about my challenge to him at the meeting that he wasn't keeping us posted on his meetings with Dobrynin, etcetera and said he has reported all meetings with Dobrynin, except the one before his last trip home: that he has no—and he gave me some rundown on that—said he has no interest in keeping any of these secret, and that he will be happy to always send a report of conversation, which he pretty much does now.

President called me at home to see how the meeting had gone. He had left for Camp David while we were in the meeting. He said we do have to find a way to bring Rogers in on the China things. We should tell Haig to find a way to present it without getting in to the sensitive parts of it. He said that Mitchell and I should now meet with Haig and Kissinger together, Kissinger can't expect that this is a one way street, he's got to cooperate both ways. He told Kissinger to "back channel" Ambassador Martin to put the Colombo visit off, and made some other schedule changes as he continues to try to keep himself completely clear.

He's really concerned about the speech writing problem because Ray blew the fourth draft of the State of the Union, and he thinks we really have trouble on that score. He asked that I look into the idea of totally revamping of the speech writing operation. At our earlier meeting today, the President also got into considerable analysis and pondering of the Hallett critique, in which Hallett really blasted a lot of the things we're doing. President feels, however, that we're in better shape than it appears, although the bombing in December hurt us, at least momentarily on the polls, but he thinks that's just a blip. I reviewed, in the-- during the course of the Hallett discussion, George Shultz's outline from our staff meeting last night as to the key issues and



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what our posture is on them. President asked that Shultz write a paragraph for him on the Spirit of America idea, as contrasted to pushing for being number one. He feels he should go to two press conferences per month on television, at 7:30, and he wants to do the high school press conference and the worldwide press conference. He said he had been thinking that, regarding the campaign: what he would do in the last two weeks was six huge night rallies in the Astrodome and such places, to show huge crowds and great support, but now he's thinking maybe that isn't the best approach. He thinks we need to poll the question Hallett raises on Muskie's image of a strong, thoughtful man versus Nixon as pure cosmetics. He said he might want to consider the possibility of a joint appearance with Muskie. I don't know why in the world he would do so. Regarding youth, we have to find a way so that they're not all against us. We need some action on the bomb Muskie crew, especially Agnew, that he's got nothing to gain in fighting the press anymore, but he should brutally attack Muskie, leaving Hubert and Teddy alone for now, since Muskie's way out front. President spending the night at Camp David, presumably to work on the State of the Union.

End of January 11th.