



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Saturday, December 11th.

DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 13526, Sect. 3.4: by MS, NARA, June 12, 2013
Audio Cassette 16, Side B, Withdrawn Item Number 18 [AC-16(B) Sel 14]
Duration: 40 seconds

Kissinger called this morning from the UN in New York. Thinks he has the Pakistan thing in good shape. They're going to push for a cease-fire and withdrawal at the UN with the idea losing it, and that will set the base for going with the cease-fire, on which we have a secret deal with the Soviets. He talked to Veronshov last night and thinks he's got it set up.

Then, later in the day, after Henry got back down here, he called again, this time to say we're having terrible State Department problems now that Rogers is back. He doesn't want me to do anything about it now, but I may have to later. Apparently, Sisco was scheduled to go on *Face the Nation* tomorrow, and Rogers canceled him because there were differences between Sisco's backgrounder and Kissinger's backgrounder. And now Kissinger's backgrounder has been read into the Congressional Record by Barry Goldwater. So he doesn't want Sisco to have to face up to the differences and the disagreement. Henry's furious because he makes the point that now we're running a tremendous bluff and we need to demonstrate that we're a united government, and he's afraid that the fact of a disagreement will get out, especially with the Sisco cancellation. He thinks we may have to tell State where to head in for the duration of the crisis.

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Duration: 5 seconds

Also, he thinks the Chinese are going to hit in India within 72 hours.

He says he showed Alex Johnson all the stuff they're working on, so State is fully informed. And he's saying I may have to call Rogers and demand a united government, but he doesn't think it's necessary to move on it yet.

Shultz called this morning in a big stew, because there was a story in the New York News today saying Laird was fighting for a Defense budget of \$81.5 billion, up \$5 billion from this year's \$76.5. Shultz feels this puts the President in a terrible position and louses up any possibility of a rational approach. George is also upset because he's discovered there was a Laird letter to the President, top secret sensitive that never officially went to the OMB. Although, NSC asked for some OMB help on it, so Laird, I mean, Shultz has seen it on a bootleg basis. The problem is Kissinger's man doesn't understand the difference between outlay and authority and is, therefore, screwing up the budget discussion, and Laird by this public move is putting us in an impossible position. When I pushed him, George said we need two things. First, the ability to sit down with Laird. The President keeps Shultz out of this, but Shultz thinks he should do it. At least to give him some straight talk, because Laird doesn't, hasn't even had a chance to be straightforward up to now on the budget. Because he doesn't know what our problem is. Second, we need some discipline on the leaks. We keep bouncing the little guys, and then the Secretary of Defense pulls one like this, and we let him get away with it. He says the article has a lot of information that's contained in the Laird memo to the President and therefore clearly is a Laird leak. He says the problem is that we have Kissinger as the sole channel, and then he's not in the channel and he's not available, and the show can't stop while Kissinger handles crises. Shultz doesn't know



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Kissinger's position on it, and Kissinger has a new staff man who isn't able to function, so that's a problem. We also have a problem today, I think, in that Laird put out a story on their huge cutting of the draft, because of the reduction by Congress in the size of the Army. This, seems to me, is going to badly hurt the President's January Vietnam announcement.

Shultz made the point that he doesn't feel he has the President's confidence in this whole Defense area, and I think he's probably right. He called me back a little later, saying he still hadn't been able to reach Kissinger, but Laird had called him regarding the memo, which he had discovered Shultz hadn't seen, and so he was sending someone over with it. Shultz then went over the problem on the phone. Laird wasn't aware of it. Laird says he'll get into it with Bob Mood, his Assistant Secretary, who does understand the problem. Shultz read Laird the newspaper article, said it gets us locked in, we need to understand where we're going. Laird disclaimed any knowledge of it. Laird is down to 79.5 on the budget now, and Shultz says there's no problem if we can just get at it. He explained to him the \$80 billion obligation authority line, and Laird agreed that was good. And then there's the other problem Laird was concerned about that apparently the President told Packard in the meeting yesterday that he was going to move the outlays around, and Laird is alarmed that the President is talking about this. Shultz feels that if he could just get into it with Laird he could solve it, but it has to be done with Laird. It can't be done with someone else.

Then Peterson called all in a stew, because he'd been getting a lot of playback on Rumsfeld's operation from the Business Council and related type people, saying that they're very concerned that Rumsfeld doesn't understand business and economics and how things operate. That Weber and some of the others have done an outstanding job, but Rumsfeld conveys neither the economic viewpoint nor the business viewpoint, and thus alarms them from both counts. Peterson feels we should get Rumsfeld a Deputy to handle the in-depth presentations. He gives



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the feeling he doesn't understand the economics, and this could be a major contributor to the confusion and indecision we now have. I think basically Peterson's just maneuvering, but that was his line as of now.

The President spent the whole day at Camp David.

End of December 11th.