



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Tuesday, November 30

Staff meeting this morning with Ehrlichman and Shultz. Got into quite a discussion of Colson. Ehrlichman was upset, because Colson called to say the President had told him to develop legislative strategy against labor, with Ehrlichman to give him the staff to do it. Shultz then complained that he gets a note that Colson has talked with Scammon, who will work with us on the GNP figures, and Shultz thinks it's murder to have him in this because-- murder to have Shultz in it because they're-- Connally in it-- Colson in it, because everyone thinks he's untrustworthy, also that he's out to get Hodgson, which is a problem. Ehrlichman then said that George Bell says he can't stay with Colson any longer.

Then Shultz made the point that he thinks, regarding labor, we may be on the verge of a spectacular breakthrough, because our strategy, which was to neutralize the headquarters and woo the locals, is working and that now the headquarters are falling apart at the seams and Meany's power is waning, we're in very good shape. With this in mind, the worst thing we could do is allow Meany to get back on top, and any signals from the White House regarding anti-labor activities would do just that. He says that we can make our changes in labor via the NLRB and the Court, rather than going into taking them on by legislation.

The President was concerned about some stories in the news summary that said that he had muted Connally and that we were pulling him back, and so forth. So he told me to call Connally in Rome and make the point to him, reassure him that these stories were totally without any foundation in fact. I did that. Connally seemed to appreciate the call very much and was most enthusiastic about the way today had gone with the group of ten. He said he had presided at the meeting, and Volcker had made most of the United States' presentation, and that he thinks we've finally gotten through to these people what the situation is. He hasn't arrived at any solution yet, but at least he's established the problem, which is real progress.

Kissinger bounced in several times, really furious, because he found out Rogers had told *Time*— had called in *Time* and *Newsweek* and told them that the White House is driving him to an anti-



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Indian policy which he doesn't want. Also he's scheduled a Congressional briefing tomorrow where he's going to cover the Middle East situation, and he's giving a speech tomorrow night. He's told us nothing about it and won't show us the text—and this is to the Overseas Press Club—and so Henry thinks he's sneaking stuff through on him. He's all cranked up about it. He then came in while I was talking to the President and made the point that Rogers was going to make a public announcement to the Congressional group on the Israeli Phantoms and undercut the President on that. So Henry's back up in arms. He said that I should understand clearly, that if Rogers does do anything permanently detrimental, that he, Kissinger, will resign and that I shouldn't discount that as an idle threat. It's hard not to after the hundreds of times he's made the same point, however.

MacGregor called this afternoon from the Hill to say that Butz looks better. He's now got Percy out strongly for him, and he thinks that the trend is going our way and that we may be able to make some headway. He also wanted to talk to the President, which he did, about his idea for free television time for all candidates. The President wasn't really serious about it, but apparently Clark's got something going on it now, and it may turn out to be a pretty good maneuver.

End of November 30.

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Special item. It occurs to me that I don't have the whole story of the Meany interlude in here, and that it would be a good idea to get it in, to get it established for the record. Going back to the whole thing, Shultz-- the President decided on Wednesday night, the 17th at about 7:00, that he would address the AF of L Convention and he'd like to do it on Thursday at noon; so we had Shultz call Meany to set that up. We waited around, as I think the record will show on the November 17 log that George couldn't get through to Meany until about 8:30 that night, because they couldn't find him in Miami, and when they did finally get him Meany made some crack to



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the effect of "George, I'm surprised at you. Those other people at the White House I would expect this of, but you ought to know better. Tomorrow's my day at the convention, and the President can't come. I have the schedule completely filled, and he's welcome to come any other time, but we can't work it out tomorrow." So George told him, "Thank you very much. I'll have to get back to you in the morning on what our plans will be, after I check out the schedule." Meany suggested that he could go 4:00 Thursday afternoon or any time that he wanted to on Friday. Then Thursday morning, the President agreed to go-- or actually he agreed Wednesday night, but bought the idea that we should wait until Thursday morning to confirm it. So Shultz called Meany Thursday morning and told him that the President was able to work it out to come down on Friday morning at 10:30, and if that was okay, that's what he'd do. Meany said that would be fine and, as Shultz says, assured him that they would extend all the "courtesies."

We went ahead on that basis and went down to Florida Thursday night, so the President would be there in time to do the speech Friday morning. We found out shortly before we were ready to go over to Miami that they were not going to play *Hail to the Chief*; that the President was seated in the second row on the platform; that Meany had attempted the night before to get the Executive Council not to sit on the platform, but they had overruled him; that there were strong orders given to all members not to show any discourtesy to the President, but also not to show any approval. And as the log states, that's exactly what happened, and as a result of that, the whole flap built up. One fascinating afterthought, or after note, is that Colson came up, a couple of weeks later, with a photograph that the Teamsters took of the piano with a violin on it, by the stage, with the sheet music to *Hail to the Chief* on the piano. So, obviously, they had intended to play it and then canceled it, which sort of shoots down Meany's point that he made at one stage, that they didn't have the music.

End of special item.