



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Monday, November 22

The main item of the day was strategy and the line on AF of L and Meany. The question being how hard to take him on and by whom. We discussed this in the staff meeting this morning. Then the President had Colson and me in first thing. He had no schedule for today because he had originally intended to be in Florida, so he just covered things on his own initiative. He felt that we need to get Rumsfeld going, to take the heat off of Grayson and Bolt, and that someone has to attack, which Rumsfeld can do, but they can't-- rather than just defend. We're getting the wrong line from our own people. We need them out leading the way. He is concerned about the line they're developing now, that the White House trumped up the whole deal regarding AF of L treatment of the President, and we can't let this get distorted. He feels the Pay Board has got to be tough with labor, but we can't break it off with them. We have to understand that the opposition is going to use the big lie technique all the time, and that they do it right in the face of our strongest positions, such as the labor thing now. We can't allow this, we've got to whack back hard. He told Colson and me to set up a meeting with Shultz, Connally and Rumsfeld this afternoon and then report back to him on this.

He also called Connally before his press conference. Told him to hold the veto threat on campaign spending and to charge in on the other things. Then he called him again after the press conference to congratulate him on the job he had done, especially in hitting Meany as hard as he did. Apparently Connally really whacked Meany for being rude, boorish, discourteous, etcetera to the President. So we had our meeting this afternoon and came out pretty well. It was agreed that we should be very careful not to martyr Meany or to drive the union members to support him. We need to drive the wedge between them instead. Connally feels they're not about to get off the Pay Board, that Meany just can't afford to get off now, and we certainly don't want to fire him. He feels the Board should be very firm in dealing with labor but also fair and make no bones about it. We don't want Meany off the Board, but if he does get off, we have to develop a plan for dealing with it, and the view was that first, we'd send a letter to the Executive Council asking them to designate a replacement. If they turn this down, we then suspend both the labor



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and business members and keep the Pay Board going just on the basis of the public members. We keep the sanctions, and the whole key to this would be to avoid the appearance of the system not working and then gradually decompress it to phase off the controls as much as we can. It was fully agreed that the President must stay out of this. We should let others keep touching up the Meany thing, pricking him carefully so people don't forget the issue, but we don't want the appearance of a personal beef on the part of the President. It is, though, in our interests to keep Meany hostile, so that we keep the issue alive; and therefore, we should not deal with his office or give him any extra courtesies. It was agreed that by all means we should keep the boards in existence if for no other reason than to keep the heat off of us. Connally made the point at the end of the meeting that Colson told him that his intelligence was that Meany was furious as a result of Connally blasting him today and that he might use this as the excuse to get off the Pay Board tonight. Connally said he didn't need to jump at it now, that he'll have plenty of opportunity in the future, because Connally will hit him every time he attacks the President.

Another major item today was the Butz confirmation problem. There was some question as to whether we're going to get it out of the committee, but that worked out all right with an 8 to 6 vote, which was just what MacGregor figured we'd have. The problem is that we've lost Young and Miller on the Republican side, which poses a problem for his effectiveness in the future and also a problem in making any partisan charge on it. He did at least get the nomination out. The President had MacGregor in this morning for a chat. Said that we may have to take Congress on and it's time to start setting them up. But the President also said he was concerned that our staff isn't adequate in the farm area, and he told MacGregor to go around our staff and do something on corn and wheat, regardless of what the staff wants. He also wants a freeze put on Jack Miller from here on out.

Another big item today was the Political Contribution Bill, basically the Pastore amendment which provides the \$1 check-off on the tax return. Another one MacGregor said it would be close, and it sure turned out to be. The Senate got everybody present, so they had 99 voting, and we lost 52-47-- although we had a 50-49 vote and could have held it, but there was no need to



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since we had it lost anyway. This is one where Karl Mundt caused us the difference between a win and a loss. The President's strategy now will be to veto the Tax Bill if it ends up out of conference with the check-off provision in it, which it probably will, and then he'll call Congress back into session and demand that they pass a new tax bill.

Kissinger brought Goldwater in for a minute. The President discussed the need for a more concerted attack and also the need for some support from the conservatives who ought to be, if they won't support the President, at least attacking the liberals instead of attacking the President. We got into a general schedule discussion. The President wants to drop all our church services in December, skip the Christmas "Evening at the White House," schedule several weekends in Florida in preparation for his three foreign policy trips. Also he wants the White House Christmas parties all scheduled during the time he's going to be gone, so that he won't have to attend them.

Henry burst in at noon to say that the radio and television reports that India has attacked Pakistan. He has no confirmation. By 9:00 tonight, he still didn't have any confirmation. Our vast intelligence network doesn't seem to be able to tell us when a couple of major nations are at war, which is a little alarming, to say the least.

We had the report from our weekend poll, and it showed no improvement in Presidential approval, but very strong support of the President versus Meany on the whole AF of L flap; so we'll get that part of it out. The President, in trying to analyze it, feels that the drag now is the economy and, apparently, the UN China vote. He feels that we need to get the public mind off the economy. Use other events, particularly foreign policy, to distract them. We also had some discussion of why the Roper question, on people thinking things are going in the wrong direction, stays so solidly that way.

Our Monday dinner was devoted mainly to the problem of the large number of important items on the President's agenda in the next couple of months, through December and January, and the problem of how we're going to deal with them. Ehrlichman makes the very valid point that the



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way to handle domestic stuff is for the President to delegate it, but he must consciously do so, and he's got to face up to what's involved before he does it. So we'll try to set some meetings to accomplish that purpose in the next few days.

End of November 22.