



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Monday, September 20.

Mitchell called this morning to say the Chief Justice had called him to report that the other Court resignation is forthcoming. It can be delayed if we want to, but we should weigh the question of when the impact does us the most good. In any event, we can't hold it for very long. Mitchell's inclination is to think we should face up to it and put the two vacancies together and put them both out in the open, which I certainly agreed with and recommended to the President. He concurred; so he called Mitchell and asked him to try to get the resignation in to him right away. Puts the President in the unique opportunity of appointing two justices at once, which will give him his four on the Court and darn near control of it.

He met with Connally for quite a while this morning to review his European trip, etcetera. Called me in at the latter part of the meeting to review timing plans for the economic decisions. He wants to keep the weekend of the first of October clear for meetings, and he agreed to do a reception for the International Monetary Fund while they're here and agreed to see Arthur Burns alone at noon today, which we then set up. I talked with Connally a little after the meeting at the President's request, and raised President's idea on shooting down anti-VP speculation at his Q&A Thursday evening in Detroit by saying that he intends to keep the VP on the ticket. Connally fully agreed that it was exactly the right thing to do, regardless of which ultimate direction we expect to go, and that he definitely should do it. Connally then reviewed in some detail the international economic situation and his feeling that the President's going to need to make a statement on the subject at some time soon, so that he can clearly maintain his leadership on the whole thing. He also laughingly reported that he does not want to serve on the Supreme Court.

Vice President called, asking my judgment and the President's, on whether he should do the anti-foundation speech that Buchanan has had in readiness for some time. He feels that it will cause another uproar, but it is still worth doing, and he's the only one who can do it adequately. I talked to the President about it, and he felt it was a good possibility, but not right now, that we shouldn't



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take on new enemies at this time. Also, we should wait and look for a provocation, that maybe we can build one out of Gelb and the Brookings business.

We got into some discussion on the TV plan for Detroit, and it turns out that the networks are not going to carry it live. So the President decided that there will be no film or Television coverage, that we'll just do it as live radiocast and writing press coverage. His point is that allowing film coverage, so that they can then pick and choose what parts of it they want to run later on TV, creates all the hazards and the work of a live televised meeting, but without any of the benefits. Also, he feels the VP question will create substantial news, and that they'll regret not having it on film and that it may get them next time to think more carefully before they decide not to carry it live.

Finally, at the end of the day, he got around to reporting to me on his very much off-the-record breakfast meeting with J. Edgar Hoover. Said that it's "no-go" at this time. Hoover didn't take the bait, apparently, and is going to stay on as a political matter. He feels it's much better for the President for him to do so. He will then pull out at any point in the future when the President feels that it would be politically necessary. He claims he is fully dedicated to the President's reelection, wants to do whatever he can to ensure it, but feels that his departure at this time would be counterproductive in that regard.

We had our usual Monday night meeting tonight. This time even Kissinger joined us, and the principle item of discussion was the question of how to handle the operating group to work on the international economic question. The problem is that Peterson, who really should handle it by virtue of his position, is not accepted by either Kissinger or Connally as being capable of it, and the President really doesn't feel he is either. The conclusion was that Henry would talk to Connally and try to set up a little operating group of Connally, Kissinger, Shultz and McCracken, with Connally's agreement, and then let Peterson more or less front for it, while the group made the basic decisions. This would seem to be the best possibility for the short term, anyway.

End of September 20.