



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Tuesday, July 13th. Today was the day of Henry's return, and that dominated everything, of course. We got in early for Henry's helicopter arrival at 7:00. The President and I met him at the chopper, and then the President took him in his golf cart over to the Residence for breakfast. They were there until after 9:00, when the President came over to the office, and I guess Henry went home. The President called me in at 10:00 and quickly reviewed Henry's findings, which basically we already knew. He made the point that our real problem now is to set up something for Rogers to say, and to find a way to finesse Vietnam on Thursday night. The problem being, that with all the attention there's been on Vietnam, the public is going to expect a Vietnam announcement when the President says that he's going on the air Thursday night, which he, we will put out at noon on Thursday. So he thinks that we need to say something ahead of time about Vietnam to get that out of the way. It's clear now that Rogers can't give the speech on China in London on Monday, so his speech should be on Vietnam.

He had also apparently decided to let Henry have an informal backgrounder on Friday, to make the point primarily that the President did this whole thing, and give a little color and background on his meeting with the Chinese. The President then told me that Henry will be going back to Paris to follow up on his meeting there, and that the China visit timing was set in the framework of December 1 to May 1. But the President's feeling is that he would select spring, probably April.

At 10:30, he had Kissinger and Haig in, the purpose being to game plan the Rogers meeting, and he raised again with them the problem of needing to say something tomorrow regarding Vietnam, so that the networks and the news commentators won't speculate on what the President will do Thursday night. We talked about this a little in general and didn't arrive at any conclusion. At 11:00 Rogers arrived, and we started the regular meeting which lasted until nearly



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2:00. The President had Henry give a general report on his trip, starting with the India-Pakistan situation...

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Duration: 2 minutes 58 seconds

...and he made the point there that he's convinced that India is planning to move on Pakistan. And that Yahya has no political settlement in mind, but plans to fight back if the Indians attack, even though he only has 30 day's supplies and no real abilities to sustain a defense.

Chou En-lai told Henry that China will support India if they do move, or support Pakistan if India does move on them. He then diverted them to the trip and made the point that it would be done without—with a minimum of Secret Service that we would control a number of press—we would tell them what we want; there'd be no political visitors beforehand, etc. Henry then made the point that when we made this announcement; we're going to shake the world, which Chou had said to him. And said in talking about Vietnam and the settlement there, Chou made the point that in the past we've left the tail behind and the tail has grown into a dragon. And that the Chinese don't want this done in Vietnam. There's a commitment they made that there would be no comment or speculation regarding the agenda or anything of the sort. Our party is to be very small the President, Rogers, and Kissinger with one aide each. The Chinese have made the point that we can visit as many cities as we would like, and they specifically want the President to go to Mao's country place to meet privately with the Chairman.



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Regarding the announcement itself, we apparently can say every little beyond the communiq s itself. The President said he would work up 500 words to expand on the communique. He'd like to refer to peace in the world. But, Henry wasn't sure that the Chinese would permit that; they will not permit reference to peace in Asia.

He could, will refer to the President's State of the World address and its lang-, the State of the World message and its language, making the point that for two years we've been working for this, also we can refer back to the *Foreign Affairs* article. Rogers made the point that the important thing is to convince the American people that we have leadership that is orderly; that the President knows what he's doing; and that the reason for this being secret is in order to make peace. The plan is to ask for time at 12:00 noon on Thursday and to broadcast at 7:30 Thursday evening, Pacific Time.

The President then got into the question of how to cover Vietnam and suggested that Rogers's speech can't be totally on Vietnam, but it would be useful to cover the whole foreign policy area; that he could basically take the President's Kansas City speech, make some changes, refer to the changes in the world, the, the new power centers, the question of Europe, Soviets, China, etcetera, work Vietnam in in the beginning; and say that our vision regarding these great changes has been obscured by Vietnam for too long. Use that as the lead in and then talk about Vietnam a little, but then try to get the eyes of the world not just on Vietnam, or just on China, but looking at the whole picture, the worldwide foreign policy.

So then today, we should say something about Vietnam. Say that we've had a complete review at this meeting of Henry's trip, including the current status of the Paris negotiations, but since



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they're still underway, we'll have no comment on them. Then refer to the fact that there will be a NSC meeting on Friday. This was hashed around, but the upshot was that we wouldn't say anything today; we'd wait until Thursday and then say the speech would have nothing on Vietnam. Rogers does feel that he should make his speech on Vietnam, but doesn't want it built up because he won't be announcing any solution either. Regarding Vietnam...

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Duration: 45 seconds

...Henry feels this gets to the Paris question, past the China trip, Henry feels we have a fifty percent chance of an August settlement. Le Duc Tho said that they didn't agree with Madame Binh's seven points, and, in fact weren't terribly interested in her proposal. The way it came out is that, the whole thing could be worked out if we could settle the Thieu question; that's the only thing that really hangs us up. Kissinger told Le Duc Tho that we will not overthrow Thieu, and that they have to prepare their position with that thought in mind.

They've set a new, another meeting for July 26, and our proposition now is that until the next meeting, we have to hang on somehow, and we have to give people some smidgen of hope. For example, Rogers could lay out a rationale of where we stand, make the point that we won't fold only for the POW's; that we're on the threshold of completing the process, and we should not quit now at the last moment; that it's not in the American character to throw in the towel in the, during the fifteenth round. This is Rogers's idea. Rogers feels that he should have a single subject speech, and that subject should be Vietnam.



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Then we got into handling of the China question in the United Nations, which they decided would probably be best handled by Rogers's Congressional testimony. We will vote in favor of admission of the People's Republic of China, but we will vote against expulsion of Taiwan. We have to figure out how we avoid double-crossing Taiwan in this. So we have to fight against their expulsion. The President concluded, therefore, that he can't have a press conference until Rogers announces our China policy, and that either Rogers or Bush has to announce it. Henry was concerned that we not appear to the People's Republic of China to appear to support a two-China policy, because we're committed against that to them. The President got into some reflection of how everything all turns around: that here years ago, he fought the battle for Chiang, and really led the fight; and he's always taken the line that we stand by the South Koreans, and that we stand by the South Vietnamese, etcetera; and that it's ironic now that Richard Nixon is the one to lead the move in the other direction.

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Duration: 1 minute 7 seconds

Both Rogers and Kissinger agree that there's a real question in unleashing the Chinese as to what they'll do to us some day, because of their native ability—a point that Rogers had raised earlier, and that Henry strongly shares, but the President made the point that they would do far worse if we weren't working with them than they will this way. So, it's still—what we're doing is the right thing. Then the point was raised as to how this changes the entire world balance, shatters the old alignments, puts enormous pressure on Japan, and will probably force them into an alliance with the Soviets. In any event, it makes a fundamental shift in the power balances of the world. The Soviets will move to the Japanese and Indians probably now.



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In Henry's discussions with them, it developed that they would permit us to, take any time we wanted between December and May, and then Mao personally ordered that this be at our discretion.

The President then said that he was thinking of going at the time of the Gridiron dinner, which caused everybody to laugh, but I think he was at least partially serious. They agreed that the second half of March might be the best time. It would give us a chance to see what the Soviets do, and it would be good to hit the Democrats at primary time. Then the President said that maybe he'd go in January, so he could avoid the State of the Union. We got into some discussion of notification; it was agreed that Kissinger should talk to Dobrynin.

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Duration: 11 seconds

Henry and Rogers argued about who gets to tell the Indians. They know it's really going to shock them, and they both want the pleasure of being able to do it.

Basic line will be that the communiqué states exactly what we have in mind: first of all, normalization of our relationships; second, a wide range in discussions; third, it will not affect our relations with other countries. This whole move is consistent with the President's basic policy as he has said in his State of the World message. We have to, however, remind our press that this



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didn't happen accidentally. It's the culmination of a long process in the development of the Nixon policy. It's something we planned, and we need to use it to the fullest advantage in the Nixon world leader posture. The President should cover this in his announcement, and Rogers strongly argues against any backgrounder, although the President eased into that a little. Rogers said that we should not say anything beyond the announcement. In describing the overall thing, going back to Henry's tour de force...

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...he gave us quite a good description of the Indians whom he with whom he was thoroughly disgusted. They gave him a very bad reception and did not treat him well. And, and he's come out of that extremely anti-Indian. The Paks, of course, treated him much better as they were working in their dual role.

The Chinese visit was apparently a fascinating experience for him. They put him directly in a government guest house when he arrived; told him to rest; and then the top people with whom he conferred—Chou En-lai, the Ambassador to Canada, a sort of defense minister-type apparently, and one or two others, plus two very good interpreters—they all called on him at the guest house; and they had their talks there. The talks were abruptly recessed, and the parties came and went from time to time as they tried to work things out.



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Duration: 9 seconds

It was clear that Chou was consulting directly with Mao on various points as the thing went on.

Henry hung very tight on our points apparently, at least the way he tells it, and out of that, came out extremely well, in that we got the visit and the announcement set up pretty much the way we want it. It's pretty clear that the Chinese want it just as badly as we do, and that makes it easier to negotiate.

The general feeling of the group was that the North Vietnamese, when they find out about this, will undoubtedly be pushed even more strongly towards working out some negotiation with us, and so that enhances the hope that something will develop there. After I got home this afternoon, the President called and raised the point that maybe it would be a good idea to take Henry out for dinner tonight, maybe just the group who knows, let him unwind a little. I stalled him and checked with Haig, who was already planning to take Henry out just to block his evening, felt he was dead on his feet, and would just want to go for a quick dinner and then get to bed. And, so I called the President back, and he agreed. The President also made the point that Kissinger was obsessed with doing something with the press, and maybe, the way to handle it would be not to have him do the whole press corps, but just pick a few of the ones we like and let them get a backgrounder from him. My own view is that we should avoid the backgrounder with Henry; I agree with Rogers on this, but that's going to be hard to do, because Henry really is determined to do it. He obviously did a superb job, and feels he did and is really ecstatic about it. He thinks we've come out quite well.



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I'm not making any attempt to cover all the details of the meeting. I didn't take any notes and don't feel that my report on it will be particularly accurate, and I'm sure Henry has—I know he's prepared a written document for the President, so that will be available in the President's files, and there's no need for me to try to add anything to it, except the notes above on the general tenor of the meeting, etcetera. Rogers really reacted extremely well, didn't raise any objection, except to the idea of Henry backgrounding, and was most gracious in congratulating Henry on the work that he had done—both on China and on Vietnam. So I think that we're over that hurdle, although the President was very worried about it up until this morning.

End of July 13th.