



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Tuesday, June 22

Started at Key Biscayne this morning and flew to Atlantic City for the President's address to the American Medical Association, which went fine. Good reception in the city, and speech and the reception there also went well. Then, back to Washington for an afternoon of getting caught up.

Big problem currently today was the round of Senate resolutions launched by a Cook-Stevens amendment to require an end of the war in nine months. This got all hung up in a lot of Parliamentary maneuvering, amendments, etcetera, but -- during part of which we were going to back a substitute which wasn't really what we wanted, but it turned out it couldn't get any backing anyway, so we pulled off. And, the net result was that Cook-Stevens was amended by Stennis to put in a relatively favorable amendment for us, and then it passed on that basis. But then Mansfield offered his resolution as a substitute for it and Mansfield passed 57-42, which is a pretty strong vote and solidly against us. So we've now taken our basic defeat in the Senate on the anti-war deal.

This worried the President some and worried Henry a great deal more. He got really cranked up about it, because he really feels that this is the collapse of the country, and that it will mean not much chance for his negotiation in Paris this weekend, which is especially galling to him. The -- line we'll take on this with the press, and so on, is that it is only a Sense of the Senate resolution, has no force of law and that it's, in any event, not a Sense of the House of Representatives, that it is contradictory on its face because setting a deadline is totally inconsistent with a cease-fire negotiation and release of POW's -- so the enemy's initiative, or incentive to negotiate would be eliminated. Makes the point also that we respect the Senate on the other matters in here, other than the deadline, and that we actually initiated negotiations ourselves October 7th on the other points and have been pursuing them through all channels and will continue to do so.

We got into a thing--or I did, with the President in the further follow-up, on how to handle Rogers regarding Kissinger's trip, and he's told me that he wants me to move in on it now and tell Rogers that the President wants Henry to go on this trip, that only four people know the basic



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reason: the President, Haig, Kissinger and me. And that is, that Yahya has, as Bill knows, shown a great interest in the US-China situation, and he's now indicated to us that he has a personal communication from the Chinese at the highest level for the President, and he wants to deliver it to Kissinger personally, not through the Ambassador, especially not now after *The New York Times* stuff has come out. President believes that we should have Kissinger pick this up from Yahya. He doesn't know what it will amount to. It could be very important, or it could be just another reiteration of the Taiwan position; but anyway, he thinks that we should take a stab at it because the stakes are so high. He says to assure Bill that Henry will take no position regarding India and Pakistan; he'll listen respectfully to both and we'll leave it at this: that we have to do this-- you know the President says to me that we have to do this to lay the groundwork, so that-- because we've got to let Bill know that something's in the mill and put him in a position to be able to say he was informed when the time comes. Point is: first, that there is something that Yahya feels that he must convey directly to the President's emissary; second, the President considers it worth doing because of the high stakes; third, it may not develop into anything, either it will be very important or it will be nothing, but any chance of getting anything depends on absolute secrecy. Also, we'll get a report in San Clemente if anything develops. In the meantime Rogers must tell nobody about this. So-- Henry was-- I'm not-- also not supposed to tell Henry about this; so I'm kind of caught in the middle. Henry was in poking around today to see what we were going to do on it.

The President met most reluctantly with Frank Shakespeare this afternoon, who plodded through a stage by stage report on his trip in Asia, some items on Ambassadors, and so forth, nothing very significant.

*The New York Times* Papers question goes on. The President now wants to set up a small team, as he's told Ehrlichman, by getting Huston back. He wants me tell Haig this is an order to have Huston set up a small team under Ehrlichman to start rifling through all the secret documents, and especially the Cuban missile crisis, etcetera, as well as Vietnam, and then get some newspapers to demand that it come out and also get a Congressman to do so. He doesn't want to



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get Kissinger into this. That's what he said this morning on the plane. And then later today when he had Kissinger in the office, he got to talking on the general subject and made the point that he had had a call from *The Chicago Tribune*, and that they're demanding that we release and declassify World War II and Korea documents, also the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban confrontation, and that the President is ordering that this be done, everything that's not involved in current security. And he wants to get some pros in to handle it. This was his second stage on this to shake Henry; he knows that Henry is concerned with covering up some of this stuff, because he was involved in the early part of it.

Ehrlichman was right up the wall, because Laird today directly disobeyed his orders not to do anything on *The Times* Papers and, instead, went out and made the announcement that he was accelerating the declassification procedure, in order to make as many of the papers available as quickly as possible. This was clearly a direct violation of what John had told him to do, and it really distressed Ehrlichman. Then it turned out that Rogers and Laird were planning to go up and see Carl Albert on the basis, on the subject of turning the papers over to Congress, which would have one-upped the President on that one too. This time, the President also was furious and told Ehrlichman to order them not to go, and he'll meet with Mansfield for breakfast tomorrow morning and set it up with him to release the papers to the Select Congressional Committee, thus, undercutting Laird on it.

The President feels, going back to the release of the other papers, that the Democrats are playing with a big fire here, because all the wars are theirs; and getting out those other papers will make a difference, because it will clearly paint them as the war party. It now appears that this Congressional thing will fit into that pretty well too, because they'll set up this select committee and start having hearings and come this fall, we'll have this spectacle of McNamara and Rusk and Rostow, etcetera, being called before this Congressional committee to explain why we got into Vietnam and all the details that are involved, which could really put them in a bad spot.



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We got our poll today, and it indicates that half the people aren't even aware of *The Times* controversy, and even those that are aware of it only half feel that it's a serious problem. There's considerable confusion, obviously, and mixed opinion on this whole thing, which is what we expected we'd find. As we got into how to handle the Laird situation, I made the suggestion that we just cover it through a Ziegler briefing, which the President agreed we ought to do, and that would get our thing on the table without getting into a problem. Later in the afternoon, we had a meeting with Mitchell and Ehrlichman on the overall strategy. The President had asked for some PR judgment on whether or not to go to the Supreme Court. He's concerned that if we don't, it might appear that we quit, and we'd lose our friends that way. If we are going to drop it before the Supreme Court, we need a strong offense to sell, on the basis that it would require too much delay, and so on, to go ahead with.

President had his Gideon's Army of Businessmen for dinner tonight and was not particularly pleased with the prospect and was not looking forward to having to-- handle that group, but I'm sure it will go very well.

End of June 22.