



H. R. Haldeman Diaries Collection, January 18, 1969 – April 30, 1973

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Tuesday, March 2.

The President went through some various reactions to the Des Moines thing yesterday. He had read the news summary this morning and of course, all the reports were to the effect that the reception had been chilly and not as enthusiastic as we had hoped and so on. He made the point that we should be sure, for Rochester on Friday, that we have a big crowd and a lot of enthusiasm, so as to put this other reaction to rest. He also wanted to get some follow-up on what the local reaction and coverage had been, and in checking, I found it had been very good. He wanted Jack Miller to blast the *Washington Post* and the networks for saying that it was a cool reception, and point out that they had ignored all of the supporters that had turned out and put all of the attention on the demonstrators. This also led him to some discussion of the value of going to small states, which he is convinced is great. He made the point that all of the small states add up to more than the big states, and that we've got to cover them, too. Also, a visit to a small state has an enormous effect in that locality, much greater than in a big one, and so he wants us to look for events that would be good to bring the Presidential presence into these smaller areas. In fact, he's now thinking it would be a good idea to try to hit all fifty states as we had suggested earlier. He doesn't even rule out Alaska at this point.

He did want us to get more intelligence on how the students had organized and how they had got there and so on, with an idea also of trying to find out why our intelligence had not told us about this ahead of time.

The big flap today was a speech Symington gave on the Senate floor, or-- on Henry Kissinger and executive privilege, blasting Henry for refusing to testify and in the process really cutting Rogers on the basis that he didn't amount to anything and that all the power was in Kissinger, etcetera. Apparently there was also a colloquy on the House floor that was equally tough on Rogers. Bill called in regard to this and felt we had to move on it quickly; that it was a major crisis because it would, of course, build up, and he wanted to talk to the President about it. In the meantime, the President talked to him on the phone and then got Ziegler in and worked out a



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statement; so by the time Rogers arrived at the White House, I was able to take him into Ziegler's office, and we worked out a refinement of the President's suggested statement. Rogers actually watered it down substantially from what the President was willing and actually ready to say.

Then, after the day's schedule, at about 5:00, Ehrlichman was still in the President's EOB office, and the President called me over. The three of us had a long discussion about the whole Rogers-Kissinger problem, trying to figure out whether there's any solution. John feels that it's reached the point where it's-- it is actually insoluble, and that one or the other has probably got to go. He feels that Henry's at a point emotionally where, when one of these things hits, he's going to come charging in and quit before he actually even realizes what he's doing; and that once he does so, it will be too late: there won't be any more we can do about it. I question whether this is likely to happen, but I guess it might.

In any event, the President concurred with my feeling that Henry is much more valuable to him than Rogers, but that there's a real problem of whether replacing Rogers will solve the Kissinger problem. In other words, once Bill's gone, the problem could very well arise anew with the next Secretary of State. Also, the President is not very anxious to move on Rogers, although I think he's more and more beginning to realize he may have to. Actually, most of the fault in all of this is chargeable to Henry, because of his almost psychopathic concern with everything that Rogers does. He acts like a little kid, and we don't seem to be able to find a way to overcome this. The President made the point several times that the price that he has to pay for Kissinger, in terms of emotional drain on himself, is very great and probably will continue to be, even if Rogers were gone; and he feels that's got to be weighed into the equation also, which of course, it does.

End of March 2.