

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
 Contested Materials Collection  
 Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
53	20	6/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Safire to Haldeman RE: "Campaign" 3pg
53	20	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Finch to Haldeman RE: "Campaign Strategy" 4pg
53	20	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Flanigan to Haldeman RE: Response to Views on Campaign 2pg
53	20	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Price to Haldeman RE: "Campaign 72" 4pg
53	20	6/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Clawson to Haldeman RE: " '72 Campaign" 5pg
53	20	6/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haig to Haldeman RE: Analysis on Presidential Campaign 4pg
53	20	6/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: Analysis on Campaign 3pg
53	20	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to Buchanan RE: Summarized View Points on Campaign 1pg
53	20	6/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan/Khachigian to Haldeman RE: "Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972" 7pg

**DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]**

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
N1 [DOC #135]	memo	Haig to Haldeman (4pp.)	7-24-72	C
N2 [DOC #134]	memo	Clawson to Haldeman (2pp.)	7-22-72	C
N3 [DOC #133]	"	Hallett to Haldeman	7-21-72	C
N4 [DOC #132]	"	Hallett to Haldeman (5pp.)	7-20-72	C
N5 [DOC #131]	"	Rice to Haldeman (2pp.) re First Family w.att. no. N-6 scheduling	7-21-72	C
N6 [DOC #130]	"	Rice to Haldeman (2pp.) re Campaign (w. 6 pages of attachments) strategy	7-21-72	C
N7 [DOC #129]	"	Whitaker to Haldeman and Ehrlichman (8pp.) w.att. no N-8	7-21-72	C
N8 [DOC #129]	"	Higy to Whitaker (1p.)	7-19-72	C
N9 [DOC #128]	"	Whitaker to Haldeman (4pp.) w.att. no. N10	6-21-72	C
N10 [DOC #128]	"	Haldeman to Whitaker (1p.)	6-12-72	C
N11 [DOC #127]	"	Klein to Haldeman (4pp.)	6-17-72	C
N12 [DOC #126]	"	Buchanan to Haldeman (3pp.) w.att. nos. N13 - N14	6-18-72	C
N13 [DOC #126]	"	Haldeman to Buchanan (1p.)	6-12-72	C
N14 [DOC #126]	"	Buchanan/Khachigian to Haldeman (7pp.)	6-18-72	C

FILE GROUP TITLE <i>Staff Secretary</i>	BOX NUMBER <i>90</i>
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FOLDER TITLE  
*Campaign ~~Strategy~~ Strategy - 1972, BAK's copies of answers to campaign strategy memo*

RESTRICTION CODES

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| <p>A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.<br/>                 B. National security classified information.<br/>                 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.<br/>                 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.</p> | <p>E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.<br/>                 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.<br/>                 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.<br/>                 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.</p> |
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## DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
N15 [DOC #125]	memo	Weinberger to Haldeman (4pp.)	6-15-72	C
N16 [DOC #124]	"	Cole to Haldeman (4pp.)	6-19-72	C
N17 [DOC #123]	"	Haig to Haldeman (4pp.)	6-20-72	C
N18 [DOC #122]	"	Clauson to Haldeman (5pp.)	6-17-72	C
N19 [DOC #121]	"	Price to Haldeman (4pp.)	6-16-72	C
N20 [DOC #119]	"	Flanigan to Haldeman (2pp.)	6-16-72	C
N21 [DOC #120]	"	Rumsfeld to Haldeman (6pp.)	6-16-72	C
N22 [DOC #118]	"	Chapin to Haldeman (10 pp.)	6-14-72	C
N23 [DOC #117]	"	Finch to Haldeman (4pp.)	6-16-72	C
N24 [DOC #116]	"	Colson to Haldeman (5pp.) w.att. no. N25	6-16-72	C
N25 [DOC #116]	"	Colson to Haldeman (9pp.)	5-17-72	C
N26 [DOC #115]	"	Dent to Haldeman (5pp.)	6-16-72	C
N27 [DOC #114]	"	Hallett to Haldeman (5pp.)	6-15-72	C
N28 [DOC #8]	"	Safire to Haldeman (3pp.)	6-14-72	C

FILE GROUP TITLE

Staff Secretary

BOX NUMBER

90

FOLDER TITLE

Campaign Strategy - 1972, BAK's copies of answers to campaign strategy memo

## RESTRICTION CODES

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 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.  
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Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: Staff Secretary  
Box Number: 90

Folder: Campaign Strategy -- 1972 BAK's Copies of answers to  
Campaign Strategy Memo

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>	
8	Return	Private/Political
114	Retain	Open
115	Retain	Open
116	Retain	Open
117	Return	Private/Political
118	Retain	Open
119	Return	Private/Political
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121	Return	Private/Political
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130	Return	Private/Political
131	Return	Private/Political
132	Return	Private/Political
133	Retain	Open
134	Return	Private/Political
135	Return	Private/Political

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 11652, Section 6-102  
By jjw NARS, Date 1/9/82

confidential

June 14, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: BILL SAFIRE  
SUBJECT: Campaign

You will be receiving all sorts of memos revealing the wisdom of the President acting like a President, not campaigning for sheriff, etc., and I will not belabor that point.

Instead, let me pass along two items of advice from Thomas E. Dewey, whom the President sent me to talk to in 1969.

1. Get a villain. With FDR, it was "economic royalists," as it might well be again this year; with Truman, it was the "do-nothing 80th Congress." With Nixon, Dewey suggested inflation -- in more specific terms, the price-gougers and union bosses who greedily pursue their own concerns to the detriment of the public interest.

If the opposition is McGovern, I would not select Meany as the villain, since the chance exists he will take a passive role in the campaign. On anybody else as the opponent, he will come after us hard with all labor's money, and we should go after him harder.

2. Don't act so Presidential as to be out of touch. FDR tried this in 1944, got a good scare, and wound up campaigning hard; Dewey, of course, learned this the hard way. There is an anomaly we should recognize: While people are titillated and fascinated by mystery and distance from a leader, they are also warmed by attention he pays them and evidences of humanity. It is a mistake to go exclusively one way or the other -- a leader should be neither a remote authority nor a buddy-boy. Nixon's greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds.

For example, the President, the First Lady, and the two girls should fan out across the country on the Fourth of July, each involved in some Bicentennial activity (a whole list of grassroots stuff is now in Chapin's hands); it's patriotic, it is visible and it is running for office in a way that cannot be criticized.

I think we would do well to drop our uptightness about campaigning. It is not something to be ashamed of. Jefferson and Madison, on a political trip through New York before the Constitutional Convention, held to the fiction that they were on a scientific expedition looking for varieties of butterflies; JFK nicely turned that one into "I'm not looking for butterflies, I'm looking for votes."

We don't have to be crass about it, but should not be coy, either; the President should begin to say now, well before the convention, that after the convention he'll be campaigning with zest. He wants to get out there and renew his strength. He gets a lift from meeting people. Nixon is no stiff-necked Coriolanus, too proud to ask the electorate for support -- by so doing, he shows respect for the system that shows respect for him. If on the other hand, we take the attitude that affairs of state make it difficult to take the time to campaign, and that campaigning is a necessary evil in getting re-elected, we will be pious, dull, insulting, arrogant -- and dead.

Now for a couple of other thoughts not based on Dewey:

If McGovern is the nominee, we have a unique opportunity to take New York State. Keys are Jews and Puerto Ricans. As to Jews: Humphrey has wounded McGovern on this one; Scoop Jackson's attacks, though not publicized, can be utilized later. He's weak on Israel, the first time that can be said of a Democratic nominee ever -- and with Ambassador Rabin's statement that sure looks like a Nixon endorsement, we can exploit this opening as never before. Every switched vote is two votes, and 175,000 of those wins New York. We should use up-and-coming Jewish office-holders in positions of leadership in our NY campaign: Roy Goodman, the only Republican State Senator from Manhattan, about 40, excellent credentials, and Rita Hauser (she's only half Jewish, and that's good enough) come to mind. Let's not rely on oldtimers who have a defeatist attitude about Nixon and Jews -- this is a new ballgame, and we could get up to 30%.

We should also make a hard pitch at the Puerto Rican vote in New York as part of our Spanish-speaking campaign. Although there is some friction between Cubans and Puerto Ricans, we should, for example, have Manolo Sanchez and Bebe Rebozo interviewed in Spanish on every Spanish station about Nixon just about every week between now and November. We tend to think of our Spanish effort aimed only at Texas and California -- New York is important, the PR registration is rising, and we have a fresh chance there.

I will do a Charlie Regan memo, on how to beat Nixon from a Democratic manager's point of view, in a couple of weeks. (Whenever I do one of those, people look at me strangely for awhile.) The issues that worry me most are health and crime -- we shouldn't gear ourselves up to answer an attack on inflation and unemployment to the neglect of other gut issues that can be exploited by a smart opponent.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: ROBERT H. FINCH  
SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy

Point 1: What should be the President's posture between conventions?

In my mind, there is no question but that the President should remain "the President" not only between conventions but during the entire campaign. From now, until as late in the campaign as possible, the President should be a "working President," remain mostly in Washington attending to the business of the nation.

From a tactical standpoint, our campaign apparatus must be geared to exploit openings in the opposition and their platform as we move into the Democratic convention. The tax conscious, elderly, Jews, labor, and the South can be ripened for Administration support. Careful use of Presidential "surrogates" can be effective in setting the stage to capture these disaffected voters.

Point 2: What should be the President's posture during the campaign?

Presidential detachment from the political wars I believe should be the keystone of most of the early campaign. Particular care must be taken, however, to insure that the President's stature does not appear "stagey" or "phoney." The "non-political" non-credible, cross country jaunts that President Johnson took in 1964 and 1966 should be avoided. We can tolerate the whining of those who want the President out on the stump early, then; like FDR, when the President does move, it will have a heightened impact.

Improved use of Presidential "surrogates" can protect the President's position -- up to a point. In order to orchestrate and maximize their effectiveness they must have better communication with campaign headquarters and the White House. The "Answer Desk" for the "surrogates" must have up-to-date positions on changing issues and late-breaking world events.

As soon as the Democrats pick their ticket, the "surrogates" should mobilize and articulate the areas of our record that will appeal to the "swing" constituencies. The Democratic nominees will be formulating their strategy during that period and the Administration will have an opportunity to capture and lock-in the swing constituencies. Some groups can be appealed to particularly during the summer. The three million graduating high school seniors, for instance, will hear only anti-Administration rhetoric once they enter college. If our campaign can reach them before they begin college, however, we have a good chance of gaining a higher percentage of their votes.

These early efforts should be limited to specific constituencies. The dangers of peaking our campaign too early, especially against a fast moving Kennedy/McGovern type campaign, are all too real.

With the base already established, we should use the Republican Convention as the kick-off and build support for the President's re-election. With special mailings, highly structured organizations, vertically and horizontally, we can generate an exciting, positive, and effective campaign for the President, building in momentum, until the President himself does decide to enter the lists.

Point 3: What issues should we stress during the campaign?

To insure victory we should convey the images of (1) strong leadership, and (2) responsible change. Specific programs and issues sort out under these two broad headings.

The media would have us believe many Americans are totally dissatisfied with the "old Politics." It is now the fashion to describe this unrest in the rhetoric of the old Populists. That is only partially true; what Wallace and McGovern are exploiting is a strong ambivalence towards "The Establishment," i.e. "things as they are." In 1972 many middle class

Americans have obtained a standard of living that their parents only dreamed about during the 1930's. Yet in the midst of their success many middle class (and especially lower-middle class) voters are irritated. They are troubled by high prices, high taxes, their fear of drug abuse, busing, militant minorities, poverty, and expensive health care. For many of these voters irritation has led to frustration, a general feeling of helplessness, and a visceral reaction against the "ins."

These voters will respond to "responsible change" and/or the security of strong leadership. The President has laid the groundwork brilliantly for this case.

An aggressive campaign emphasizing substantial Administration achievements and proposals can advance the image of responsible change. By utilizing the appropriate slogans and publicity, such programs as the EPA, the Higher Education Act, FAP, and Revenue Sharing should be exploited to the fullest.

The President's record as a strong, bold leader does attract support. We should not be seduced into attempting a "charismatic, Kennedy-type" campaign. What we offer is substance. The fundamental concept here is moral strength and determination. The foreign policy initiatives of the President accurately display the courageous and bold qualities that Americans are seeking and which produce real results because the President bargains from strength.

Two major weaknesses are the "rising cost of food" and "unemployment." The food cost affects every American family and we are obviously vulnerable. There is nothing that we can do about food costs except what has been done and obviously the Democratic nominee will be equally unable to solve the problem. We must therefore concentrate on getting the voters to think about other issues.

Unemployment will be better because of the expanding economy. Otherwise, there is also little that we can do that is not already set in motion. We have offered the FAP and imaginative ideas in manpower training, but those facts offer little comfort to an unemployed worker.

Point 4: Weaknesses and strengths of opposition strategy.

A McGovern candidacy will cause divisions in his party that even an attractive running mate will not repair. The South, for instance, will be out of reach as even members of the McGovern organization in the South will admit.

A Wallace candidacy in a third party will be a disruptive element that could both hurt and help our campaign depending upon how many states he can achieve ballot position. Wallace could damage our effort by siphoning off conservative votes in industrial states where the election might be close. But some argue a physically handicapped Wallace may also help the re-election of the President where he does appear on the ballot by attracting seriously alienated voters away from McGovern. The theory behind this argument is that angry voters will go for McGovern while "really mad" voters will support Wallace.

As we saw in the televised debates during the California primary, McGovern's soft-spoken, apparently candid thoughtful manner prevents him from easily being labeled a "wild-eyed radical." Yet his simple answers to the complex problems of the world does reflect a dangerous naivete and a total lack of ability to lead this nation.

Thus, McGovern's weakness lies in the very simplicity that makes him attractive. His massive spending programs, for example, will defeat the thrust of his tax reform package. The most important tax reform is lowering taxes. McGovern's programs will require higher taxes. If the Administration can drive home the cost and froth of his proposals and push him catagorically into far left field, we can turn the onslaught on the "McGovern crusade" into a landslide for the President.

# ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

PETER FLANIGAN 

This memo is in response to your request for my views as follows:

1. The President's posture between the conventions should be that of "President". In my view he would be doing his candidacy a great disservice by engaging in political activity during that period.

To the extent that the McGovern phenomenon is a reflection of the electorate's disillusionment with "politics and politicians", political activity by the President would be a negative. To the extent that he casts himself as the country's leader and an experienced statesman as contrasted to the inevitable political discord of the Democratic Convention and political dullness of the Republican Convention (my brother Bob's efforts notwithstanding) it will be a positive.

2. As to the President's posture after the Convention, to some extent the thoughts expressed above continue to be valid. Nevertheless, once nominated even the President will be expected to get on with the business of politicking. This President, however, can remain sufficiently in the public eye that the kind of intensive saturation campaign used in 1960 and 1968 should not be necessary. Assuming there is no issue which we are trying to obscure, as we tried to obscure the issue of the economy by an over-concentration on law and order in the 1970 campaign, I would suggest the following percentage of time dedicated to campaigning:

- From September 15 to October 1 - 1/3 of the President's time
- From October 1 to October 20 - 2/3 of the President's time
- From October 20 to Election Day - Substantially all of the President's time.

-2-

With regard to the time devoted to campaigning, I would have it include a very substantial amount of travel. Given the ease of movement available to a President, as well as the national and regional impact of Presidential visits, I would not rely heavily on Washington-based activities. In the early part of the campaign I recommend considerable reliance on so-called "non-political" activities. This has been used effectively in the past by incumbent Presidents (i.e. Roosevelt) but failed in 1960 when, you will recall, Eisenhower took an abortive 6 week non-political trip. The 1960 failure proves that non-political tours are ineffective when they attempt to transfer the incumbent's support to another candidate rather than the ineffectiveness of non-political type activity for the incumbent.

3. To some extent the campaign issues and points of attack will be determined by the opposition, as well as by domestic and foreign developments. However, assuming our commitment of men to Vietnam continues to diminish and the progress of the South Vietnamese continues to appear successful, and assuming the economy continues to recover, I would recommend a fairly simple campaign - the President's record against the Democrats. In this I would point out his accomplishments in foreign affairs and the strength of the economy, plus the frustrations of his legislative programs (including busing) by the Democrats. As to timing, I would begin stressing the campaign themes right at the beginning of the campaign and keep pounding them through to the end.

4. The opposition will of course attempt to attach Vietnam and unemployment. Frankly, I believe the demonstrable facts of the matter will make this attack ineffective. They will then move to the general dissatisfaction with government, where the credibility of the voters will be the decisive factor. Always admitting the gullibility of the American electorate, in the 1972 campaign the incumbent will have both the Presidential platform and the facts in his favor. This might well force the opposition, particularly if it is McGovern, into relatively extreme positions which will appeal to his supporters and are his natural inclinations anyway. It should be our objective to create conditions in which the Democrats will be encouraged to take these positions, rather than allowing them to succeed in any attempt to move to the middle.

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN  
FROM: RAY PRICE *RP*  
SUBJECT: Campaign 72

I'd like to expand more fully in a subsequent memo on the points you asked my thoughts on in yours of June 12, but here for a starter:

1. Posture between the conventions: Still Presidential, statesmanlike, holding rigorously to his announced intention not to do political things until after the Republican convention. Take the position that there's work to be done running the country, and there will be time later for campaigning. McGovern, of course, will be hitting him, and probably hitting hard; during this period he should not answer directly, but rather let others do the hitting back while he goes about the people's business. Try to establish the sharpest possible contrast between RN the President and McGovern the politician.

2. Posture after the GOP Convention: Be a candidate, but continue to be President first and candidate second. Remember at all times that he comes across to the public more sympathetically and more positively as President than as campaigner. Keep campaign travel limited, and do as few rallies as possible. Rallies are bad TV -- too much phony hoopla, too much like a hard sell for Dr. Hoogan's Snake-Oil. Do some symbolic events that demonstrate concern with selected, identifiable problems, and that give an opportunity to say something specific about them. Use radio: the campaign itself will give the peg, the excuse, that's been lacking during this pre-campaign period. Remain Presidential; resist the temptation to respond in kind to the attacks that will be made. Have others

carry the attack -- and make maximum use of outside organizations, individuals and ad hoc committees to blast the opposition's crazier schemes. As the campaign draws to a close, let RN show increasing irritation not with attacks on him personally, but with the monkey-wrenches the opposition is throwing into the machinery of government, and -- depending on the nature of the opposition's campaign -- be prepared in the closing days to stand up on behalf of the nation and alert the electorate to the disaster that the accumulated nonsense of the campaign suggests a Democratic victory would visit on the United States, on the world, and on the next generation.

3. Issues, timing, points of attack, etc.: Assuming McGovern to be the nominee, I agree that we should try to nail him for his left-wing radicalism -- but his vulnerability in this regard is not so much on an ideological basis as it is in what the positions he's staked out reveal about his basic preconceptions and his sloppy thinking: we should make the public fear a McGovern Presidency in much the way that they feared a Goldwater Presidency -- which wasn't so much a matter of disagreeing with him on the issues as it was fearing that his approaches revealed a shallowness and a shoot-from-the-hip tendency that the Nation can't afford in the Presidency.

McGovern of course will be more careful -- but if he does start a dance toward the center we can hit him not only as an instinctive extremist, but also as one who leaps before he looks, and only afterwards tries to climb back out of the hole he's fallen into. That's not what people want in a President.

We should try to nail him as soon as possible on his radical positions -- on the assumption that he's going to back off, as he already has begun to do. Our aim should be fourfold:

-- To cement the identification of him with positions that are perceived as radical, scary or hairbrained;

-- To make it clear, when he does back off, that he is backing off, not merely "clarifying;"

-- To plant the impression that he too readily embraces schemes that have been only half-thought through; that he's not only radical, but imprudent, and therefore not to be trusted with the power of the Presidency.

-- To undermine his image (which is a great part of his strength) as a plain spoken prairie preacher who, by God, at least says what he thinks -- and to show him as an opportunist who follows the polls, which will cut directly to one of his principal issues: trust.

4. Opposition strategy and how we should meet it: They'll probably portray RN as insensitive to human needs; as calous toward the poor, the black, the young, the working man; as a war President, who needlessly sacrificed 10,000 lives in Vietnam. Heavy emphasis on the economy, on which it looks as though we'll still be vulnerable -- jobs, inflation, taxes.

A central part of the opposition campaign will be a focus on trust, with the theme that you can't trust RN; that he's a calculating political manipulator, who uses the Presidency for polical purposes first and for public purposes second; the President of ITT of secret campaign contributors, of big business, for the big guys and against the little guy.

I think we've got to be very careful about backlash to some of the issues we've been staking out. For example, pushing too hard on marijuana could cost us California, with its huge youth vote (including those out-of-State students who'll be voting in California). This is even more of a gut issue to them than it is to their anti-pot elders; and I also think there are a hell of a lot of parents who don't like the idea of their kids smoking pot, but like the idea of their being thrown in jail for it even less. I suspect that people are getting a lot more sophisticated now about the distinctions between marijuana and hard drugs, and thus more sympathetic to the argument (which I think is true) that criminal penalties for use of pot increase rather than decrease hard drug usage. Similarly, the right to abortion is a highly emotional gut issue for millions of women, of all political

persuasions, and a lot of them are getting very angry at us -- and there are more women who vote than there are conservative Catholics. If we don't nuance our stands on these and similarly cross-cutting issues with a sufficient sensitivity to the feelings of the other side, we can get in real trouble.

As for how to meet the opposition strategy, the basic way is to do our best to keep the campaign on our issues: proven performance, world statesman, remember how bad things were in '68 (Don't Let Them Do It Again), don't take a chance on McGovern. We've got a great thing going with the summits as the first big step in a series that can only be completed by the man who started it off -- Give Peace a Chance -- Don't Throw It Away. One counter to the "trust" issue is to be doubly careful not to let another ITT-type thing crop up between now and election; another is to make it our issue by focusing a spotlight on McGovern's race from previous stands to popular stands.

Essentially, though, I think our strongest pitch is a larger reflection of the theme of Rockefeller's highly successful "Governor Rockefeller for Governor" campaign in 1966: "President Nixon for President." The central focus of our campaign should be on one thing: to make people proud of their President.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

By jlw NARS, Date 1/4/83

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 17, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: KEN W. CLAWSON  
SUBJECT: '72 CAMPAIGN

BETWEEN CONVENTIONS

The President should maintain a very "Presidential, above the battle" posture during this period, focusing on his innovative and meaningful domestic programs that have met with both partisan and cavalier attitudes on behalf of this very unproductive Congress. Using the Democratic Party platform planks for ammunition -- although never publicly identified as such -- the President should focus on his compatible domestic initiatives and publicly question why they languished in Congress. At the same time, our surrogates as well as Republican Members of the House and Senate should draw the specific "copy-cat" analogies over what the Democrats have proposed and what the Democratic Congress has refused to pass.

I think the President can remain above the partisanship involved in this effort by scheduling domestic-related events around the Presidency but with our spokesmen responsible for actually focusing on a lethargic Congress during a period when the legislative body will be most vulnerable.

POST GOP CONVENTION

I am convinced that even during the prime campaign period, the President should, as much as is politically possible, maintain the posture of the professional, business-like Chief Executive going about his very important duties; and while I understand it will not be possible to sustain this posture throughout the campaign, I do believe that at no time should the President drop to the level of the contortions the challenger will be forced to perform.

I believe the axiom that an incumbent President only can lose an election; that a challenger cannot defeat him, that an incumbent President only can defeat himself.

That is why I am concerned that the dignity of the Office of the President be maintained regardless of how much or how little the President should "slug it out" with the opposition. That job, it seems to me, is for our surrogates who ought to willingly and enthusiastically perform "any" function that would be politically desirable.

After the Convention, it seems to me that the President ought to spend the next week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional and local Party officials to give them his personal marching orders. This should be done in a closed atmosphere, but one which will stimulate the press to hover on the fringes and speculate intensely about what is going on, thereby providing for our own Party faithful an intense interest and focus on what may be in the wind.

Until an evaluation of the caliber of our campaign, I suggest that any Presidential travel be geared to bonafide events of interest and concern to the Nation as a whole. I would stick to this format until the quality of our effort is evaluated and then be flexible enough to adjust to campaign conditions. However, I still think that as much as possible, the image of the hard-working Chief of State should be maintained as long as possible.

To sum up the above, my two basic points are that (a) the President should be highly selective of the activities involving himself and that they should have a broader gauged *raison d'etre* other than partisan politics for as long as possible, and (b) the 132 Presidential surrogates and all other spokesmen aligned with us put on the most intensive campaign this country has ever witnessed.

CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Unless events go awry in Vietnam, I don't think that there is any question but that the main issue for the Democrats will be the economy and the related issue of unemployment. The Democrats have historically lived off these issues and even though McGovern is a likely candidate, I see no reason to believe the Democrats will abandon their traditional stress on the economic issue.

I think that we are in a parallel situation to the last six months of 1959 in which the economy indeed was improving although the government wasn't able to convince anyone that this was true. I think we have a major problem in selling the concept that economic conditions in this country are good and that the economy will actually be better than our ability to convince the public of this fact.

I propose that we seriously create an almost separate, well staffed, well financed internal group whose job will be solely to create an image of economic well-being in this country. I guess you can call this the merchandising of the economy, and I think that it is essential that it be done.

Remaining with the economic issue, I am disturbed that this government has itself caught in a position where mechanisms have been set to spew out economic reports on a periodic basis, with our credibility rising or falling on the output of some machine or neutral or unfriendly career civil servants. This routine economic reporting is going to hamper our efforts to convince the public that the economy is better than it seems to them.

As extensively and as loudly as we can, I think we ought to pound on the theme that individuals in this Nation are better off economically at this particular time than at any other time in their lives. I think our surrogates should ask their audiences to look inward and make their own judgments on the economic well-being. The honest answer to that question is that indeed most people are better off now than ever before.

If the Democratic nominee is McGovern, we obviously must subject him and his position to the utmost scrutiny. With the resources of this government, there is no excuse for there existing a single miniscule detail about George McGovern, his positions, his wife, his friends, his staff and/or his mistress escaping us.

I hope there exists some internal task force of investigators who have already compiled everything there is to know about George McGovern, or any other potential Democratic candidate. If there isn't, one should be established immediately.

There also has to be a counterattack mechanism throughout the campaign, which I presume would be handled by Colson in collaboration with John Mitchell. I see a great value in this although this is obviously one of the more ticklish areas -- where the President could beat himself -- and should be most carefully controlled. If McGovern is nominated, we should do everything within our power to woe the American trade union movement as well as to convince George Meany that the AFL-CIO millions would better be spent on congressional, state and local campaigns and should not be poured down the drain on a man who can't win and who is not even ideologically compatible with the principles of trade unionism.

To deny McGovern labor's money and, more importantly, its manpower, is almost a singular key to winning the election. I would pull out all the stops in our efforts to obtain support from labor on all levels. Meany cannot be expected to publicly disassociate himself from McGovern, but it would be no surprise to see him deny labor's resources.

#### OPPOSITION STRATEGY

It seems to me that McGovern has two very important assets: (1) A nearly unlimited supply of liberal money and (2) an instinctive support from the liberal news media.

With this in mind, we are not going to get any breaks caused by lack of campaign funds, and we had better be ready to spend it all in every area.

Addressing the media problem, it seems to me that our major effort should be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The hard questions

just aren't going to be asked by the press, and therefore ultimately it will be Administration officials who are going to have to publicly ask the hard questions. In that regard, I wonder if the establishment of a GOP truth committee should be established to hold regular press conferences and take McGovern on each of his issues and utterances.

We also have an obligation to discredit the news personnel who commit documentable instances of being McGovern "sweethearts." I don't think the broad gauged attack is productive, but every time we can prove media bias or inaccuracies, we should prove it publicly. This should be done in a straight forward, calm manner that is very specific and to the point. It should not go beyond the specific error or article to which we are addressing.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: AL HAIG 

Here are my views and accompanying analysis on the four points raised in your memorandum of June 12:

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?

Unquestionably the events between now and the Democratic Convention and most importantly events at the Convention itself will influence the ultimate strategy on the President's posture. Nevertheless at this juncture it is quite evident that the President is in a very strong position which is best retained and reinforced by maintaining a posture which is totally consistent with the achievements that have most decisively contributed to his popularity. These achievements are a solid statesman-like performance in the international area. They have been premised on flexible and progressive attitudes and the willingness to take risks in search of world peace and were masterfully combined with: (a) strength and decisiveness when U. S. interests are challenged; (b) the retention of initiative and momentum which has consistently enabled the President to stay ahead of the pessimism normally associated with stagnation, inactivity and lack of imagination; (c) the solidification of the world statesman role through which the President has captured national empathy based on his masterful performances in Peking and Moscow which were well-covered on national television; and (d) the development of a "Mr. & Mrs." team image which would not have been possible had total emphasis been on the President alone.

Based on the foregoing, the President's posture should be one of a statesman who is above the frantic gut-fighting and politicking of the campaign, whose strength and competence is taken fully for granted by a Party machine whose major task should be to engage in the cool organizational arrangements which are designed to exploit a solid posture of accomplishment.

I sense one possible distortion creeping into current assumptions about the Democratic candidate. Many of our political strategists are taking for granted that McGovern will emerge as the Democratic candidate.

EYES ONLY

This was evident in the strategy discussions held in last week's Cabinet meeting. We must be prepared for an emotional convention consensus in favor of Teddy Kennedy. It is difficult to conceive of the old Democratic Party machinery, which relies essentially on a power base of Labor, Jewish money and nouveau riche resources, merging to support a candidate of McGovern's ilk since each of these sources of power could be seriously threatened by his stated policies. For this reason our contingency planning must not overlook the possibility of a surprise popular surge in July which would settle on Kennedy as the only hope for the Democratic Party.

2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning? How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type of activities should he engage in?

Following the Republican Convention in August and taking full cognizance of events between the Democratic and Republican Conventions, I think the President should pursue a strategy totally consistent with that of a self-confident, competent statesman who is above frantic political campaigning. This means that his travel and public appearances should be most carefully contrived. Above all, they should be paced to avoid over-exposure in the national media, especially television. I do not believe we should succumb to a strategy which would portray him rushing from one adulatory situation to another. Rather, these should be carefully paced and only those which can guarantee maximum effect should be undertaken. That should involve exposure situations which underline the President's attention to the affairs of state and which avoid any appearances of contrived ballyhoo. In my view the greatest danger will be over-exposure and excessive campaign energy.

3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

Obviously McGovern is our most vulnerable opponent. We should therefore be very careful about adopting too strong an anti-McGovern posture between now and the Democratic Convention. The one theme which I believe is best stressed between now and the Democratic Convention is McGovern's irresponsible posture on the war in Vietnam in which we emphasize the fact that he is pushing a strategy which can only encourage the enemy not to negotiate and which in many respects is less stringent on Hanoi than even Moscow and Peking contemplate. Concurrently, we should prepare, but not use, a host of themes which attack McGovern's strategy on domestic spending, inheritance, welfare programs, busing, aid to schools, national defense, etc., that can be used following the

Republican Convention in August. The most important aspect of our anti-McGovern strategy should be to keep the homerun balls to the last phase of the campaign in a way which ensures that the President peaks off in the last three weeks of October. Television will dominate this year more than in any campaign in the past and it is conceivable that national attitudes can be influenced at the last moment in an overriding way. We should also have themes in reserve which can be used on a contingency basis to counter-balance bad news for us which is bound to occur in unforeseen patterns between now and November. A compulsive tendency to exploit McGovern vulnerability from the outset should be tightly controlled to ensure that we do not end up on a wave of criticism against the Republican Party and most importantly that we are able to quickly adjust to unforeseen setbacks which can come from scandal, setbacks in the international environment, or domestic shortcomings. To ensure this is done, a most careful analysis should be made of all McGovern vulnerabilities, a program should be tailored to exploit each of these then the exploitation program should be tightly time-phased to ensure continuing and growing momentum rather than to fire all of our shots simultaneously thus enabling the Democrats to develop compensatory neutralization programs:

4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

In the international area the Democrats will probably exploit the following:

(a) The war in Vietnam, bombing of North Vietnam, mining, etc. The only sound way to attack this is to keep constantly in the forefront Hanoi's intransigence and the solid pace of accomplishment represented by our continuing disengagement. It is obvious that we will have to get some break between now and November which will confirm the wisdom of our policy. I am somewhat optimistic that this will occur and the question will therefore become moot.

(b) The Democrats will try to exploit the inadequacy of the SALT agreement with the Soviet Union by stressing the theme that the President has favored an agreement which replaces a quantitative arms race by a qualitative arms race. This charge should be taken head on with straight factual elaboration on the provisions of the agreement.

(c) The Democrats, if McGovern is the candidate, will obviously try to exploit the President's image as a knee-jerk patriot who is hidebound by outmoded conceptions of U. S. honor and power. This attack is easily blunted by a track record of accomplishments which should focus on the

Peking and Moscow Summits and a carefully paced follow-up program of improved relations with both the Soviets and Chinese. Barring no unforeseen setbacks, this kind of momentum is definitely in the cards and should be counted as a strong continuing asset.

(d) Perhaps the most serious danger area is that of international economics, balance of payments, lack of progress in the monetary stabilization and a growing unfavorable balance of trade. This area, I believe, affords the Democrats the most fruitful grist for criticism. We will need a careful assessment in the weeks ahead of where we are going with respect to international trade and economics and to develop some new initiatives which will flesh out the initial philosophical advantage that resulted from the international monetary agreement. We have a long way to go in the area and I doubt that statistics which can be easily drawn upon by the Democrats will confirm that we have not done more than scratch the surface. We should achieve some advantages from improved US-Soviet trade but more dramatic steps have to be taken with respect to our European and Japanese allies.

(e) Accomplishments in Latin America leave room for criticism but we should not overreact to a vulnerability which does not have a particularly strong popular base.

On the whole, the President's performance and accomplishments in the international area constitute his strong suit. For this reason his statesman and world leader role should be carefully but fully exploited.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

In response to your memo of June 12 re: RN Posture --

A) • Have no hard feelings about what RN should be doing between Conventions. He should of course maintain the Presidential pedestal, eschew partisan activity, if not political. On this, however, we should be flexible, spending the outcome of the Democratic Convention. That is the event off which the President's activity should be keyed. If the dominant theme coming out of that convention is, say, pro-marijuana, abortion -- or pro-welfare -- then in our substantive actions, taken by the President, there might well be the drawing of the issues. Again, however, we will have to await the Democratic convention to determine this.

B) Post-convention to election, again, we should hold now to a posture of flexibility. If RN is running a lead following the GOP Convention, a good lead, his surrogates should handle the campaigning for him -- and he should only do enough to defeat the charge of the "front-porch" campaign. Since our strength is foreign policy in a world where there is a deep desire for peace -- RN should not rule out major foreign policy meetings, high visibility, which cast him in the role of Statesman, in unspoken contrast to McGovern, who one imagines will be waging a partisan argumentative campaign.

C) RN should hold off vigorous campaigning for as late as possible. Perhaps a couple of days early in the campaign -- then a testing of the effectiveness of this personal campaigning. I have a real question whether RN on the stump tends to add uncommitted votes, or whether the benefit is largely in terms of rallying troops, with the uncommitted tuned out. In any event, stump speaking should be on a high, high level. Even the drawing of differences between us and them should be on a high level.

D) Would not rule out of consideration a half-hour televised address by the President, or V.P. stating the "differences" between the candidates, in non-partisan, but ideological ways. We have so much on McGovern; we may want to take it directly to the people in a single message -- even while our surrogates are hitting the individual messages on the stump.

E) Suggest consideration be given to a series of Oval Office fifteen minute addresses, with the President using the sounding board of the White House -- to make his campaign appeal to the American people. Foreign policy, Social policy and more Government vs. less Government (and less taxes) could be the Nixon appeal. They should be candid, straightforward, and give the clear-cut differences between the two of us, rather than a blurred type thing. (This corresponds with my view that while many elections find both candidates ending up saying the same thing -- this time we want to put some air between us and McGovern, and paint him as honest, sincere, and way, way out.)

F) Let's keep his travel schedule flexible. However, the President in campaigning should not restrict himself to GOP audiences at all. The idea of a giant Catholic or ethnic audience -- a kick-off address in Cadillac Square -- something symbolic to indicate the new GOP should be actively considered. It would be wrong to rule out GOP audiences -- but we have to assume that they are going to be ninety percent with us. The President should seek out massive audiences of the swing voters in this election -- who will not unlikely be the Northern Democrats who cannot abide the elitist, permissive liberalism of George McGovern.

G) One thought. Why not have the V.P. candidate, assuming that it is Mr. Agnew, and John Volpe, right at the head of the Columbus Day Parade down Fifth Avenue. From our polls, one understands that what we risk losing to McGovern are upper income moderate GOP WASPs (we have to scare them back with the "socialist" issue) and what we stand to gain are the lower and middle income ethnics and working class, many of them of immigrant origins, and many of them Catholic.

(One thing we could do for the President is to put that crazy Forest Hills integration scheme over the side; it would help up immensely with Jewish and ethnics, who don't want their neighborhood busted up by liberal bureaucrats.)

H) On strategy for attack -- my thoughts are already largely in hand. However, just some reminders:

1. Don't shoot it all out of a canon at once; dribble it out so that as soon as McGovern has spent four days answering one charge, the next one is moved from the front burner onto the serving board.

2. Avoid stridency and nastiness and partisanship -- some of this is certain to creep in late in the campaign, but the press here is intolerant of our attacks where it is indulgent of the opposition's. Keep our cool for as long as possible.
3. A late start in the campaign -- unless we are behind in the polls, would be my recommendation. I recall well how all our people, and some press were saying, "Get the hell up to New Hampshire; Romney is starting to make enormous gains." We waited to the last minute, and then campaigned sparingly and rolled up an eight-to-one margin. We ought to again, hold our fire until they are right in front of the trenches.
4. We ought to have a formal reassessment of the strategy midway in the campaign. And have what I do not feel we had in the general election of 1968 or of 1970 -- the flexibility to shift gears rapidly and move off one theme or one approach onto another.

#### OPPOSITION LINE OF ATTACK

Already, they are signaling what it is. They are going to use the "trust" thing, McGovern is a candid, honest man whom you can believe, while Nixon is shifty, and crafty and has a credibility gap -- and the character of our leader is important. (This partially explains their reluctance to move off their "tinkertoy proposals." They don't want their man to be in the position of being portrayed as another shifty politician. Some of them fear that worse than the radical charge.)

Our response. Wait a piece until they start up this attack; it will get harsh. And then our top surrogates should go over on the attack -- accuse McGovern and his people are using a campaign of character assassination against the President of the United States -- and demand that if they are going to whisper at rallies that the President is dishonest and untruthful, by God they should have the courage to come out and say it publicly. Accuse them of using "code words" to call the President an evil man; accuse them of a gutless refusal to debate us on the issues, and of a retreat into the politics of slander and smear. If they confront us on the issues, I don't see how --- if they are clearly and politely and consistently made -- we can lose this one.

Random thoughts of a summer afternoon. The important thing is to keep our flexibility, not lock into a Schlieffen Plan at this particular point in time. The old Eisenhower adage here is apposite. Planning is essential; plans are worthless.

Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1972

Eyes Only

MEMORANDUM FOR: PAT BUCHANAN

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN *H.*

It has been requested that you summarize your views and analysis on the following points:

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions? *Note*

2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning? How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type of activities should he engage in?

3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc. *Note*

4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it. *Note*

*Note*  
Please let me have your memorandum by 5:00 p. m. Friday, June 16.

Pat:

Bob realizes that your "Assault" memorandum covered some of the questions above. Anything you would like to add should be included in your response to this memo.

Thank you.

*Larry Higby*  
Larry Higby

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

June 18, 1972

E.O. 12958, EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

By

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN/KEN KHACHIGIAN

SUBJECT: Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972

Many of the points HRH mentions were omitted in our original Assault Strategy memo for the basic reason that we were focusing exclusively upon the "negative" rather than the positive. Some recommendations in the HRH memo we would concur with -- others we do not. Let's take them point by point:

"1. The Buchanan memorandum fails to recognize the necessity to keep our strength up front and center. In other words, all of our attack lines on the opposition should end up emphasizing our strengths."

We don't agree with this. For the following reasons. First, millions of Americans vote not for, but against -- their hostility toward one candidate is the compelling motive at the voting booth, not their enthusiasm for. And a "negative" campaign -- largely directed from the positive one on RN -- would in our judgment be much more convincing to those swing voters who have never been pro-RN, but who can be "terrified" by this new phenomenon. LBJ could not conceivably have gotten his sixty per cent against RN -- he got it against Goldwater, not because of the positive LBJ "ads," but because Goldwater was portrayed as a threat to the Republic. We should, in our judgment, recognize that potentially millions of knee-jerk Democratic voters are going to come our way, if they come -- because though they are not enthusiastic about RN, they are anti-radicalism.

Secondly, when one observes that McGovern apparently lost 15 points in one week in California -- among Democrats, it is clear that there is tremendous room for movement downward by McGovern -- from a relatively small investment. On the other hand, we see that RN -- from the unprecedented China trip and attendant publicity, and from the historic

Moscow visit and SALT agreement -- has only risen seven or eight points.

The lesson is clear. The potential for movement by McGovern -- downward -- is far easier and less costly, than the potential for additional upward RN movement. In short, if it takes a Peking and Moscow summit, and a SALT agreement -- and reams of hours of heroic copy to move up up seven points -- while George can be dropped fifteen in a week by some hard-nosed Humphrey attacks -- dollar-for-dollar -- when it comes to McGovern this argues we ought to put our campaigning dollars into attacking him, rather than boosting ourselves.

Third, and related: RN is known to the nation; impressions of RN have hardened over a period of twenty-five years. There are not likely to be any sudden new perceptions of RN by the masses, in five months. On the other hand, the perceptions about McGovern have not even begun to harden with the nation as a whole. We have a far better chance of affecting a change in the present image of McGovern -- than we do in the present image of the President.

Fourth, let's look at it this way. RN cannot possibly get below 40% of the vote, and cannot probably exceed 60%. Those swing voters are more than likely Democrats, or independents somewhat lukewarm toward the President (a group that would probably split half for RN and half for JFK in 1960.) What is most likely to convince them to vote 95% for RN: Is it a major campaign convincing them of what they already know fairly well -- that RN is competent, experienced and innovative in foreign affairs. (Even many of RN's opponents would concede this.) Or is it more likely to result in greater returns if we convince them rather that the "alternative" is an utter disaster for the country. In short, anyone who can be convinced that McGovern is a disaster is automatically a vote for RN. While someone who can be persuaded that RN is an imaginative foreign policy leader is not necessarily a vote for RN -- and he can still vote for McGovern. My view is that the negative McGovern campaign need not be -- and should not necessarily be -- tied to a pro-RN pitch at the end. If there were five people in the race, I would subscribe wholly to point one -- but there are only two; and anyone whom we can convince that McGovern is a wild man is ours -- for certain -- even if he at the same time thinks RN is a conservative square.

Fifth, and finally -- not only does the pro-RN approach tend to dilute an anti-McGovern message; the President should not be twinned with McGovern on those issues where our disagreements are of degree rather than kind. For example, if we are going to say McGovern is toying with the security of our country -- whereas we, too, have cut back, but only responsibly on defense -- then we are weakening our case. Where the

President can be contrasted with McGovern is where the breach is clean as a whistle. I. e. McGovern favors abortion on demand -- RN thinks this is morally wrong; i. e. McGovern favors legalization of marijuana; RN thinks this is wrong, and a threat to the American family. We should keep in mind that what we have is a President and a statesman and what they have is a light-weight and a wild man -- and we ought not to be comparing them too much in speeches, just as we don't want any debates which would have the effect of putting them on the same plane.

Lastly, look at it this way. During the fall campaign the pro-RN news footage of RN as President will probably amount to seven times the pro-RN advertising footage. Thus, the pro-RN ad materials will only be a minor reinforcement of the RN national image -- a minor fraction of the time RN is seen. On the other hand, given the pro-McGovern disposition of the liberal media, the anti-McGovern material from our campaign is likely to be a major and crucial segment of the entire anti-McGovern materials that go out to the nation.

"2. We must not get trapped into McGovern's bog of peddling himself as a new face. If people want new ideas, this Administration has the boldest initiatives in history."

We agree with the first sentence, but not necessarily with the second. The reason is this: We have spent countless hours and unrecorded effort selling the bold dynamic "New American Revolution," -- more effort probably than we can duplicate between now and November -- and the returns are, in my judgment, not encouraging. If we took a national poll dealing with RN's domestic proposals -- and asked how many considered them bold, new, imaginative and then further, how many were going to go with RN because of them -- the returns, one assumes, would not be particularly heartened. Dollar-for-dollar, again, it is not a cost-effective investment of PR time, money or effort to attempt to portray the Nixon Administration domestic program as "exciting". We would be going against a public perception; we would be attempting to convince millions of the attractiveness of "programs" when increasing numbers have about had it with government "programs" in general.

The first sentence -- about knocking down the "new face," is right on the money. McGovern has been part and parcel of the Congress which has sat on its duff for two years; he has been a member of the Democratic majority which has controlled both houses of Congress, since McGovern came to Washington.

Who wrote the loopholes in the law; who raised the taxes; who failed to provide relief; who is now sitting on its can doing nothing for the average man -- but waste his dollars. Why who, other than the Congress of which George McGovern has been an integral part since 1956, the Congress he and the left-wing liberals have been in control of, absolutely, ever since McGovern came to Washington. Wallace hit them on this, and so can we. McGovern should rightly be portrayed as not someone with new ideas, but someone with a plan to dump new billions in tax dollars down the old ratholes, he and his friends constructed over the last 16 years.

(Both the Broder and Drummond columns hit the nail on the handling of this issue.)

"3. The Buchanan memorandum deals almost entirely with domestic matters and totally misses our big issues which are foreign policy. Who is the bold leader? Who is the fresh leader? Who is the dramatic leader in foreign policy?"

Basically, we agree that foreign policy will be a long suit for the President -- and we mentioned specifically attacks on McGovern on Israel, Europe, defense and Vietnam. But, again, the same question arises. The entire nation has seen RN in China, seen RN in Moscow, seen RN sign SALT -- the coverage has been sweeping and massive. Can we really advance that appreciably with speeches and verbal references to what the nation already knows and already believes -- that RN is an imaginative statesman.

We should -- in our positive advertising, and in RN's posture during the campaign, publicly, emphasize the Somber Statesman, the imaginative statesman, who has mastery over the issues of peace and war. But we don't need to constantly draw explicit comparisons. The implicit one is satisfactory. If we can get individuals like Rockefeller, liberals and moderates, saying that McGovern is naive and a madman, if he thinks we can gut the Sixth Fleet, without Israel going down the tubes. If George can be portrayed as something totally out of his element in questions of foreign policy, a man who is both too soft and too much of a light-weight, a foolish man whom Brezhnev would eat for breakfast -- than anyone who is convinced of that is automatically an RN voter. There is no other choice.

There are two foreign policy problems we see. One -- Vietnam. Polls show McGovern's support is tied inextricably to the desire to get out of Vietnam. In our view, the "wrong from the start" materials in the Assault Book, portraying McGovern as repeatedly duped, and misled by

Communist profession of good intentions, and his "abandoning" of our prisoners should help neutralize his potential strength here. Also, if RN pulls the rug out on McGovern, with a settlement -- we should lace into him as a "squalid nuisance" who only harassed and nit-picked and back-stabbed the President who brought America out of the war -- while McGovern and company got us into a war they could not win or could not end.

The second serious problem is that McGovern is milking the old right and the new left isolationism both. Frankly, foreign aid truly has no constituency left -- and McGovern recognized this. The argument against spending our money for exotic weapons, when we need to re-build here at home; the argument that maybe our allies should do more for themselves -- these arguments hit home far beyond the McGovern constituency. (The McGovern endorsement of that 1% of GNP foreign aid [\$1 billion] with "priority on Africa" ought thus to be hung around his neck. Like Mr. Wallace used to say, "Those fellows want to give more billions of dollars away to Hottentots.")

Given the necessity for foreign military assistance and its growing unpopularity, we may have to out-demagogue George on this one, case him in that role, and use the arguments that the only way to prevent Americans from fighting future wars is to provide the natives with the guns to defend themselves. If we don't we'll have American Marines, rather than South Vietnamese Marines defending South Vietnam, as we did when McGovern's men sat in the White House.

"4. We should attack McGovern in a way that surfaces our point, not just hit his points. We should not get trapped into putting out the enemy line."

We concur. We think this is covered in our earlier points.

"5. We have to build the foreign policy issue in terms of the question of changing horses in mid-stream. In other words, President Nixon has launched some very major, far-reaching, foreign policy initiatives. We can't afford to let an inexperienced novice come in and pick up the reins at this point. We cannot afford to have McGovern in the White House in terms of foreign policy. His inexperience and

naivety in the foreign policy field would be disastrous.  
Do we really want "White Flag McGovern" in the White  
House?"

Excellent here. This is one area where we can contradict No. 3 -- especially in a possible RN speech. How should we build RN up while tearing McGovern down. Here are several ideas:

The theme that RN has brought 500,000 boys out of Vietnam, has saved that little nation from collapse, has opened the door to China, has negotiated a truce in the Cold War, has brought into bearing the most historic arms agreement in history -- and, for God's sake, let's not throw this away by putting into the White House, some rank amateur and clown who doesn't know his fanny from first base about foreign policy.

We can build up this theme, and should. The United States today stands on the threshold of building a structure of peace that can last for the remainder of this century. There is a chance, a good chance, but not a certain chance, that if RN can finish the structure which is now half built -- that for the remainder of this century no more American boys will be dying in places like Vietnam. But for God's sake, to fire the architect when the cathedral is half finished, and replace him with an engineering student is insane. This is like firing the research physicians at NIH right at the point at which they may have a cure for cancer -- and replacing them with some hippie medical students.

This could serve as a counter to the McGovern argument that RN's initiatives in foreign policy are good -- but that job is done. We must now turn to the home front. Our argument has to be the job is not done -- and anyone who thinks it is and acts on that belief, is likely to bring down the entire structure just before it is completed. The concrete is still soft -- it has not yet hardened; now is not the time to change builders.

Further, along these lines, we should emphasize the incredible naivete of McGovern who thinks that the way you negotiate with the Soviets is to cut your fleet in half, reduce your army to pre-Pearl Harbor level, mothball half your bombers, scrap much of your nuclear deterrent -- and then negotiate. RN and the people high up around him can say -- We have been there in Peking and Moscow and candidly, they will not be impressed by a nation which strips itself naked to show its good will.

They will not treat an America that abandons its strength with respect, but with contempt. They will not then be convinced that the path of peace is best, but the path of hostility and testing. My friends, a weakened and softened and beseeching America is not the kind of America that can keep the peace. Only a strong and resolute and tough nation will be respected, and be treated with respect. If we throw our arms into the sea -- the enemy response will not be to love us, but to laugh at us -- and to treat our friends and allies as totalitarians and bullies have always treated the weak.

Lines such as, "My friends, the price of peace cannot be unilaterally reduced by the United States, or George McGovern. You cannot buy security in a nuclear world by cutting your defense budget in half -- and doubling your hopes. "

"My friends, the greatest threat to peace today is not the American defense budget; it is the mistaken and indeed naive belief that permanent peace is guaranteed -- and we need not make any great sacrifices or efforts to maintain. That is not reality. That is a dream from which Americans will awake with a terrible shock, if we believe it is reality. "