

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
53	19	9/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Safire to Haldeman RE: "Critique of First Campaign Swing" 2 pg
53	19	9/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From McLaughlin to Haldeman RE: "RN's Campaigning in New York and California" 3 pg
53	19	9/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Price to Haldeman RE: "New York - California Trip" 3pg

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: Staff Secretary

Box Number: 90

Folder: Campaign [II]

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
1	Retain Open
2	Retain Open
3	Retain Open
4	Retain Open
5	• Return Private/Political
6	Return Private/Political
7	Return Private/Political

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
N-1 [Doc # 1]	memo	Kehrli to Price re: "Vermont Royster Comments".	10/13/72	C (Nixon)
N-2 [Doc # 2]	memo	Moore to Kehrli re: "Presidential Posture During Next Six Weeks. . ."	10/4/72	C (Nixon)
N-3 [Doc # 3]	memo	Kehrli to Haldeman re: "Vermont Royster Comments".	10/10/72	C (Nixon)
N-4 [Doc # 4]	memo	BAK to RN re: <u>comments</u> .	9/29/72	C (Nixon)
N-5 [Doc # 5]	memo	Safire to Haldeman re: "Critique of First Campaign Swing".	9/28/72	C (Nixon)
N-6 [Doc # 6]	memo	McLaughlin to Haldeman re: "RN's Campaigning in New York and California".	9/27/72	C (Nixon)
N-7 [Doc # 7]	memo	Price to Haldeman re: "New York - California trip".	9/27/72	C (Nixon)

FILE GROUP TITLE

STAFF SECRETARY

BOX NUMBER

90

FOLDER TITLE

Campaign [II]

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: BILL SAFIRE
RE: Critique of First Campaign Swing

If we were in any sort of contest, the first two days' campaigning would be cause for alarm.

These were the impressions a normal person would get from the activities:

1. The President went out to raise money. The huge headline in the New York Daily News, no liberal bastion, was "Nixon In Town To Raise Funds." Since over 2 million copies of that headline circulated in an area of 15 million people, it can be safely said that the negative message got across to the greater metropolitan area. In Washington, the Star headline was "Nixon Raises \$7 Million" and that carried also on radio and TV. On the positive side, the young people theme at the dinner went well.

The other story in New York, the Statue of Liberty visit, got good pictures but a bad play. The demonstrators left a bad taste. What I saw on television was a fairly obvious message from the President about how patriotic immigrants are -- very political, no uplift. Looked like a cover to his fundraising appearance.

The meeting with Jewish leaders came across well, with the "no harsh confrontation" theme predominant.

2. The President was apologizing for not campaigning. That's for others to say; not like Nixon to apologize the way he did in San Francisco and made the UP lead.

3. The President talked spending in San Francisco and holding down spending in L.A. This impression created by Broder story and headline -- "Nixon Promises Spending, Thrift" -- but he influenced a lot of other writers and broadcasters.

4. The thing wasn't in focus. Other stories dominated -- Kissinger in Paris, the POWs on the way home. Seemed like the campaign was being conducted in Europe.

Some lessons to be drawn:

1. Fundraising appearances at this stage are a great big mistake; the dead audience calls for an infusion of yelling kids, and the money could have been raised with a Presidential film at the dinners. Our fat cat image grows, and we do not appear to care. Fortunately, the other side doesn't know how to exploit it without seeming envious.

2. High-intensity, 17-hour campaign days preceded and followed by relative news calm make our campaign look herky-jerky. We do not have a stride, nor are we explaining what our campaign rhythm is; as soon as the poll difference begins to narrow, this kind of sporadic campaigning will be interpreted as "Nixon, worried about the latest poll showing McGovern momentum, cast aside his above-the-battle pose and plunged into... etc."

3. We're not campaigning for anything. The "four more years" chant is offensive. We know that people vote against, and we should help them be against McGovern and what he stands for; but the best way to be "Presidential" -- which is our best attitude -- is to carry a positive line. Some of this was in the fundraising dinner speech, especially toward the end, but the only way I know that is because I asked for a text. "The" speech is not yet with us.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

JOHN McLAUGHLIN *John*

SUBJECT:

RN's Campaigning in
New York and California

1.) Statue of Liberty. The physical presence of RN with the ethnics was politically very lucrative. Faces of ethnics on the television screen, like the old Jewish man with the yarmulke, and their association with the President at the scene -- first rate. The verbal tussle between RN supporters ("Four More Years") and the militants ("Stop The War") favorable to the President because of the higher decibels of the RN supporters. The physical tussle between the two elements worked to RN's advantage too, providing drainage to millions of Americans who feel an irritated sense of surfeit with the demonstrators. RN's remonstrance, by indirection, to the television producers to focus not only on the handful of militants but on the thousand others gathered here was said perfectly: RN smiled as he made the very clear point. This segment on the ethnics took the edge off the wires' heavy coverage of CREP filling its coffers, and Dan Rather's stress on the \$40 million incremented by the 28 dinners. Two minor minuses: RN sounded a trifle angry when talking about ethnics believing in hard work, not a handout. RN should avoid the appearance of irritation. Secondly, I would have liked to have seen him warmer with the people, as happened with the Italians and the Scalobrini Fathers. Obiter Dicta: The "Jews For Nixon" sign on the TV screen (two networks) priceless; Machin's comment that RN appears to have the ethnic vote which he never had before, also very valuable.

2.) Labor Leaders. Another very remunerative sequence. There is simply no substitute for the direct talk of Gleason and Brennan. One leader made the point that labor supported Rockefeller, despite Rockefeller's wealth; therefore, there's no reason why they can't support RN, since RN doesn't have Rockefeller's wealth. This language has no substitute: It grabs the working man where he lives. Minor Minus: In this sequence, too, RN looked a trifle too restrained. I would like to have seen more give-and-take with the labor leaders, more warmth.

3.) San Francisco. The BART sequence good, and reminiscent of the sight-seeing in Peking. An imaginative piece of politicking, associating RN with transportation innovation pictorially. Here again, however, RN would have benefited by meshing more with the crowd, not immersing himself in the flesh, but more contact than we saw on the screen.

4.) The Basic Strategy: For RN McGovern Doesn't Exist. Excepting Rather's forced comment that RN had attacked McGovern by the "confiscation of wealth" charge, the media play on New York and California left the impression that for RN McGovern doesn't exist. I think this strategy is absolutely sound and wise for this point in the campaign, and quite probably right through to the election. In his remarks, I would like to see more blue sky from RN, more stress on the future, more vision. On the issues, my feeling is that RN should avoid prose and modes of presentation of self that might suggest that he is confronting a McGovern allegation. (McGovern's single high point in an otherwise catastrophic campaign was his timing of his statement on drugs, creating an impression that RN was smoked out into a rebuttal.)

5.) Surrogates. The surrogate program is theoretically sound. There are practical problems with it, however, the chief of which is diffusion. RN can only maintain his "above-the-battle" stance, if his surrogates get media attention, not just locally (where they are getting considerable), but nationally. I see problems with nationally pick-up of surrogates: 1.) Mankiewicz is leaning on the networks to restrict their surrogate coverage, since the surrogate is not the candidate. 2.) Focus for the surrogate's national coverage appears lacking, i. e., with several surrogates in the field on a given day, the networks are given the license to select which surrogate to cover, and also their production task is increased. If the media could be trained to expect a prime surrogate response, we would be guaranteed that the subjects we want addressed, will indeed be addressed, thus taking away the power of selection from the networks. Recommendation: Provide focus for a daily prime surrogate response by establishing one platform, preferably the White House press briefing room. This would draw the surrogate and his political expressions closer to the President and in so doing help ease us by Mankiewicz's objection. Secondly, it would give us the control and national media power to blunt any momentum that McGovern may develop. The margin is going to shrink, as happens uniformly in Presidential races when the trailing contender is the candidate of the majority party. This movement can be contained, however, if the surrogates on national media confront, challenge, harass McGovern daily and demonstrate how RN's program in any given area is superior. I know that extensive discussion has taken place

on the political problems entailed in having a surrogate appear in the White House press room itself. Doubtless there is some substance to these concerns; nevertheless, I think we are hypersensitive in this regard. If the WH press room is unacceptable, then CREP might serve but in my view it would be a distinct second choice.

Conclusion: RN's campaign strategy is right on target and the visits to New York and California were both strong gains. The mechanism of the surrogate program needs some modulating, but its theory is excellent.

(Of Note: In a visit to Notre Dame this week, I learned that the students straw polled as follows: 1700 RN, 1500 McGovern and about 500 undecided. In Rhode Island, RN's 50th State in 1968, a private Becker poll (an excellent pollster who proved to be right on target in my own race) showed RN last week leading McG. better than 2 to 1.)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: RAY PRICE *RP*
SUBJECT: New York-California trip

I don't really have a strong impression of the trip; such as I have is made up from what I happened to catch on the evening news, and read in the paper or the news summary -- thus it includes nothing of whatever may have been the local impact.

It didn't seem to me to have a great deal of impact -- but that fact, at this point, is not all bad. We wanted, after all, to minimize the attention paid to the \$1000-a-plate dinners.

One general impression I've been getting is that news coverage of the campaign this year is inordinately -- more so than before -- focused on the techniques of the campaign; not just in the coverage of us, but in the coverage of McGovern as well. Reporters seem to feel a greater compulsion than before, in reporting what the candidate said or did, to analyze why he did it this way, how it fits into his campaign strategy, etc. To a considerable extent, this is legitimate and responsible reporting: after all, the techniques of the campaign are an important part of the story, even though we'd rather not have them reported on when the focus is on us (though we like it when the focus is on McGovern). Thinking back impressionistically rather than scientifically over the reporting on this trip, it seems as if a great deal of it was focused on the busing in of crowds to provide backdrop for the cameras, the stationing of young people to cheer, the assembling of ethnic groups at Liberty Island, etc.; in short, this may be the year when, in effect, the advance man is pulled out into the spotlight. McGovern has gotten the same treatment: there's been heavy reporting of his staging events for the cameras, etc.

There's nothing we can do about the fact of this kind of reporting, but it looks as though we're going to have to take it pretty centrally into account in planning the rest of the campaign. One thing it probably means is that we should lean toward less rather than more contrivance. Another effect may be to make the White House comparatively more desirable (as against the road show) as a place from which to conduct the campaign, and real events more desirable as compared with manufactured events. It may also argue for comparatively greater emphasis on such things as written statements and formal (or radio or TV) speeches.

Vermont Royster had little in the way of specific comments on the trip; he noted that he's simply seen "bits and pieces on TV," plus what he'd read in the papers -- his general impression was that it "came off okay."

Reflecting on his understanding that it had received pretty heavy coverage in those places where the President was, but that the rest of the country had gotten only "snippets in the morning paper, or on CBS or ABC," he said he thought we should look for one or two occasions when he can get "a lot of public exposure all over the country in one hunk."

When I talked with him, I'd already written the comments above -- and I asked whether as an old-time newsman he'd had the same impression about the focus of coverage this year on techniques. He leaped to it, said absolutely, and that in fact he's taking part in a panel next month in which "that's precisely the point I'm making." He plans to cite as an example the coverage of McGovern's speech to the security analysts -- "the stories I saw down here all had long stories about his appearance, about the reaction of the security analysts, about George going into the lion's den -- but none told me what he'd said -- they were all writing about the mechanics of the campaign.... I'm having a hard time keeping up with George, with what he's saying." And on the President's visit to the Statue of Liberty -- "I guess he made a speech, but I don't know what he said. Four or five people started a little furor, and all the

cameras turned on them." So, he suggests, we've got to find a way of getting the focus on what he's saying -- which he thinks is one advantage of the formal speech, "the kind of thing you force the New York Times to carry the text of."

He also had some additional thoughts unrelated to the trip, which I'll pass along in a separate memo.

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